Liberalism, political theory, and the rights of minority cultures: Just how different are the 'politics of difference'? by Parvin, Philip
Liberalism, Political Theory, and the 
Rights of Minority Cultures: 
Just How Different are the ‘Politics of Difference’?
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
Philip Parvin
Government Department 
London School of Economics and Political Science
University of London
July 2001
UMI Number: U615217
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615217
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
V7<i35
OF 
POUT'CA'- 
AN 0
Suu-bzS
Abstract
Liberal political theory has come under increased criticism in recent years for its supposed 
inability to sufficiently 'accommodate' or 'recognise' cultural difference. Liberalism, it is said, is 
insufficiently attentive to the importance of group attachments, is rooted in a universalism which 
undermines the boundaries between cultures and is, therefore, unable to adequately resolve those 
political conflicts which arise out of the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity found in 
contemporary Western societies.
The thesis examines these claims and argues that liberalism is more resistant to criticism than 
many non-liberals (and liberals) believe. The thesis argues that liberalism is a necessarily 
'comprehensive' doctrine, committed to the principle of individual autonomy and that this places 
constraints upon what groups can and cannot be allowed to do in the name of cultural values. It 
therefore challenges those 'political liberals' who seek to isolate individual autonomy as valuable 
only in the political sphere, and those other liberals who argue that liberalism should not commit 
itself to autonomy at all. The thesis argues that these liberals fail to displace the importance of 
autonomy in liberalism, and that they cannot help but appeal to precisely this principle in order 
to reach the conclusions they do.
The thesis extends this argument to those pluralists, difference-theorists and advocates of a 
politics of 'recognition', who seek to replace liberalism with a new form of politics altogether. It 
shows that these doctrines presuppose the ability of each and every individual to reflect upon 
their ends and to justify them to within particular constraints in the same way as liberalism. It 
argues therefore, that these antiliberal theorists are required to encourage and defend the 
autonomy of each and every individual within the polity in much the same way as liberals.
Finally, the thesis questions the significance of 'culture' to liberal political theory and to 
normative theorising more generally. Most specifically, it questions the link between cultural 
membership and personal autonomy made by liberals like Will Kymlicka and Joseph Raz. It 
argues that 'culture' is insufficiently determined in the literature and that this severely weakens the 
argument for the 'affirmation' or 'protection' of cultural groups. The thesis argues that once we 
begin to examine the idea of 'culture' (as it is used in the literature) in detail, we soon realise that 
cultural membership is not a prerequisite of individual autonomy in the way that culturalist 
liberals believe.
Having argued as much, the thesis claims that the liberal argument for affording 'group rights' to 
cultures is severely weakened, as are similar arguments advanced by advocates of a politics of 
difference, recognition, cultural recognition, or pluralism.
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Introduction
The first wave of writings on minority rights was primarily focussed on 
assessing the justice of claims by ethnic groups for the accommodation of then- 
cultural differences . . . [W]hile difference-blind institutions purport to be 
neutral amongst different ethno-cultural groups, [campaigners for minority 
rights argue that] they are in fact implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests, 
and identity of the majority group . . . Minority rights do not constitute unfair 
privileges or invidious forms of discrimination, but rather compensate for 
unfair disadvantages, and so are consistent with, and indeed may be required 
by, justice. In our view this first stage in the debate is coming to a close, with 
the defenders of minority rights having effectively made their case.
Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, ‘Introduction’ 
to Citizenship in Diverse Societies.
[I]t is common-ground that human beings should not have different rights and 
priveliges as a consequence of their membership of ascriptive groups. When we 
ask for the justification of principles and rules to govern our relations with one 
another, we cannot discount the interests and claims of some people simply in 
virtue of their identities. This is the premise of fundamental equality.
Brian Barry, ‘Something in the Disputation not Unpleasant’, in 
Justice, Neutrality, and Impartiality: Re-Reading Brian Barry’s
Justice as Impartiality.
It is often said that, in these post-modern, multi-cultural, often anti-foundationalist, Godless times, 
little more can be said of the ‘core’ ideas and presuppositions of our major political doctrines than 
that they represent the convictions of a particular group, in a particular region, at a particular time. 
Liberalism, like any other political doctrine, we are told, is inevitably and inescapably rooted in 
traditions and understandings which have only localised validity and what is ‘true for us* may not 
only be untrue to others but incomprehensible to them. This, it is said, is the great paradox at the heart 
of modern morality and politics; that we struggle to understand the world (and our place within it) 
by making claims about it which we understand to be universally true and which we believe capture 
something important and recognisable in all people, regardless of where they live, or what they 
believe, but that our attempts to do so are inevitably constrained and circumscribed by our own 
particular (and contestable) ideas about the world. We judge others by our own standards while 
claiming that these standards are universal, and we seek to examine the world through eyes which
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we believe to be impartial but which are shaped and enlivened by our own experiences and by the 
experiences of those who preceded us.1
For many, the claim that one moral perspective is ‘better’ than another, or that one ‘way of life’ is 
‘more valuable’ or ‘more just’ than another reveals all that is wrong with the post-Enlightenment 
ideal of creating a universal community of human beings bound together by their equality and 
rational freedom.2 For them, Enlightenment cosmopolitanism (and the liberal interventionist ethics 
that it spawned) is merely an expression of cultural imperialism. We are not all members of a single 
community, they argue. We are members of different cultures and communities and nations who 
understand the world (and the people within it) differently, and to ‘impose’ human rights and basic 
norms of justice and fairness on groups who ‘do not support them’ is an unjust infringement of 
local understandings which shows an impoverished and naive grasp of exactly how important 
cultural and religious values are to people. Traditions cannot be ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than others, they 
say; they can only be ‘different’. As such they must be presumed equally valuable.3
Liberal cosmopolitans, in turn, have generally argued that the appeal to ‘shared values’ implies a 
relativism that renders people defenceless against the whims and injustices of elites and majorities.4
1 This ‘duality of standpoints’ has been described most succinctly by Thomas Nagel. See his The View 
From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) and Equality and Partiality (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). Resolving this paradox has been the central preoccupation of liberal 
contractualists who have sought to present a justification for procedural neutrality within a rights- 
based framework. For more details, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993); Charles Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1989); Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (London: Oxford University Press, 1996); and 
Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1999).
2 For example, John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture and the Close o f the Modem 
Age (New York: Routledge, 1995); Michael Walzer, Spheres o f Justice (New York: Basic Books, 
1983); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1990); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985) and Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).
3 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining 
the Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
4 For example, Brian Barry, ‘Do Countries Have Moral Obligations? The Case of World Poverty’, 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values 8 (University of Utah Press, 1987), ‘Spherical Justice and Global 
Injustice’, Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, D. Miller & M. Walzer, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), and ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, Is Social Justice Obsolete? 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, forthcoming); John Rawls, ‘Law of Peoples’, John Rawls: Collected 
Papers (Harvard University Press, 1999); Jeremy Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan 
Alternative’, The Rights o f Minority Cultures, ed. W. Kymlicka (Oxford University Press, 1995);
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The appeal to ‘common ways of life’, they say, ignores the fact that often groups and individuals 
within the community are denied the capacity to contribute to the formation of their own history 
on the basis of arbitrary factors afforded a spurious legitimacy by the dictates of those in charge. 
Consequently, these people (these women, these gays, these blacks) find themselves embedded in a 
community and a history which prizes not their membership of a ‘shared’ way of life, but their 
exclusion and alienation from the very norms and ideals which are supposed to define them. That 
is, they find themselves part of a history written and constructed by others. For the liberal 
cosmopolitan, the discrimination and alienation that they feel as a result is not made legitimate by 
an appeal to localised beliefs or values ‘shared’ by an ascendant majority.
What, then, do we do when faced with oppression and injustice? And how are we to be sure what 
these terms mean? When deep conflicts between peoples and value systems and ways of life are at 
stake, or when we witness what we believe to be cases of suffering or injustice, we are called upon 
to make decisions (and take action) in circumstances in which decision and action are fraught with 
tragic and overwhelming complexity. And the actions and decisions we make matter because of the 
potentially ruinous, perhaps irrevocable, effect that they have upon people’s lives.
While this is most obviously the case at an international level, it is also true at the level of diversity 
within particular social and political communities. Debates about cosmpolitanism, particularism, 
and the limits of authority are familiar in the theory of international relations, but they also provide 
the background against which recent disputes about multiculturalism, difference, and toleration in 
liberal states must be understood. It is a commonplace that increased migration and mobility 
between nations has rendered contemporary western societies more diverse, more multi-cultural 
and multi-ethnic, than ever before. Consequently, we are now forced more than ever to confront 
those ethnic, cultural, and religious differences which co-exist within liberal-democratic states, and 
to establish how these different groups can flourish beside one another.
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
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To what extent should we ‘value’ this diversity? How can we encourage common allegiance to 
basic principles and institutions without undermining the capacity of different peoples and 
religions and communities to live according to their own, perhaps radically different values and 
beliefs? Or to put it more broadly: can we fulfil the liberal cosmopolitan ideal of establishing 
common citizenship which transcends difference (and which applies to all individuals equally), 
while satisfying the communitarian or nationalist claim that individuals are only intelligible as 
members of distinct historical communities? Can we, that is, go some way in resolving the paradox 
of modern political morality that necessarily characterises our normative claims?
One thing, I think, is clear: we will not do so by conforming to the all too common strategy of 
understanding the debate in terms of radical dichotomies and opposites. This is an important 
theme that runs throughout this thesis. The tendency among theorists to polarise arguments, and 
to seek to fit them within pre-existing (and ultimately limiting) categories which stand in 
opposition to one another can be seen to have characterised if not all, then certainly a predominant 
proportion of contemporary philosophical debates about justice and politics. We make a mistake 
though, I think, if we consider these dichotomies to be a necessary and enduring feature of these 
debates. Sometimes they will be. Sometimes critiques will be so forceful, so new and conflictual 
(and political stances so extreme), that a real and definite duality will be revealed that simply cannot 
be overcome by conventional debate and argument. But more often we can witness the dissolution 
of these dualities via the arguments that emerge and take place within the parameters set by the 
extremists. These are subtle arguments of synthesis and accommodation, of reconstruction, 
reinterpretation, and, when in the political sphere, of appeasement and compromise. And they are 
crucial because in clinging to metaphysical or political dualities (between ‘individualism’ and 
‘collectivism’, ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘nationalism’, or ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism’) we 
obscure the intricacies of the arguments themselves, place unnecessary constraints upon the 
conduct of moral and political discourse, and stifle the search for meaningful answers to complex 
political and theoretical problems.
Press, 1979).
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One such dichotomy is that established between liberals and communitarians. Liberalism, it is 
often said, cannot accommodate the ‘Romantic’ or ‘communitarian’ critique of the liberal self (and 
the normative prescriptions which flow from it) because it is committed to a form of politics and 
agency which foregrounds individual autonomy. And, even more recently, these same claims have 
been raised from a non-communitarian platform as a means of revealing the inability of liberal 
states to accommodate or represent the interests or integrity of those diverse communities and 
social groups that co-exist in contemporary mass societies which do not accept this commitment.5 
The criticisms advanced are, by now, all too familiar and can be seen to possess a common root; 
that liberalism abstracts individuals from their ends and values and thus robs them of the capacity 
to make sense of themselves and the world in which they are implicated; that liberal commitments 
to autonomy, individuality, and freedom undermine the self-identity of the agent by forcing it to 
understand itself as separated from the ends it chooses for itself; that, in compelling us to ‘put aside’ 
or ‘bracket* our ideas about the good, liberalism presents an impoverished conception of political 
discourse capable only of deriving agreements so stripped of content that they become worthless; 
and that, more fundamentally, the liberal project is intrinsically bound up with the post- 
Enlightenment folly of constructing a universal set of “standards and methods of rational 
justification by which alternative courses of action in every sphere of life [can]. . .  be judged just or 
unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened or unenlightened” according to principles which are 
“independent of a ll. . .  social and cultural particularities.”6
In many respects, of course, anti-liberalism of this kind represents not merely a rejection of 
liberalism, but a rejection of the entire conception of the modem world upon which it is founded. It 
embodies the claim that the liberal individual is born into a world which is ‘disenchanted’ and 
emptied of telos by the legacy of Enlightenment rationalism. In such a world, communitarians 
argue, the subject is defined by its rational freedom and its separateness; it is conceived as a
5 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990); Seyla 
Benhabib, Democracy and Difference: Changing the Boundaries o f the Political (Princeton 
University Press, 1995).
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rational end-chooser divorced from its culture, its history, and any sense of tradition (free, that is, 
from any constraints placed upon it by its social environment or its cultural history). For 
communitarians and many identity theorists the liberal self is defined by its capacity to choose its 
own ends and is then robbed of all the constitutive aspects of the self which make such choice 
possible. The liberating promise at the heart of liberalism (that persons should be allowed to 
‘exercise their capacity as self originating sources of valid claims’ within a world governed by a 
moral order which is born out of, and justified by, the choices made by individuals themselves)7 is, 
they claim, corrupted and undermined by the very metaphysical assumptions that lie at the heart of 
the liberal ethic. “Only in a world empty of telos, such as seventeenth century science and 
philosophy affirmed, is it possible to conceive a self apart from, and prior to, its purposes and 
ends,” wrote one prominent theorist who later became subsumed within the ‘communitarian’ 
critique, and “only a world ungoverned by a purposive order leaves principles of justice open to 
human construction . . .  [A]s independent selves, we are free to choose our purposes and ends 
unconstrained . . .  by custom or tradition or inherited status.”8 And in doing so, it is claimed, we 
fulfil the Enlightenment ideal of the ‘authentic’ liberal self; reflective, rational, deliberative, free 
from the fetters of tradition and history, and bound only by a moral and political order of its own 
design.9
The closer we look, however, the less radically opposed liberalism and communitarianism appear. 
Like most movements which seek to challenge ideas and beliefs which have become all but 
universally accepted, communitarianism emerged at its most radical. The sheer scale of the 
problem, it seemed, the sheer pervasiveness of the Enlightenment world-view, made such radicalism 
necessary (or at least, understandable). This emergent radicalism, embodying the will to overturn 
established hegemonies of thought or custom, can also be seen to some extent in other social and
6 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Duckworth, 1996), p. 6.
7 John Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, in Journal o f Philosophy 77, p. 515-572.
8 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), p. 175.
9 See Charles Taylor, The Ethics o f Authenticity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992);
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions o f Moral 
Enquiry (London: Duckworth, 1990). See also Joel Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’, J. Christman, ed., The
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philosophical movements like feminism and other branches of identity-theory; and, like feminists, 
communitarians have shown an increased tendency in subsequent debates to move away from the 
trenchant and radical critique of modernity writ large, and have increasingly sought to show the 
ways in which the modem world (and liberalism) can be augmented or re-articulated or re-shaped in 
order to accommodate the more radical claims of their theoretical forebears.10
This is not to say, of course, that radicalism is not common, and neither is it to argue that all 
theorists believe that liberalism is capable of accommodating the criticisms put to it by radical 
communitarians or feminists or identity-theorists (or, for that matter, by conservatives or 
socialists). Such generalisations would be clearly false. Iris Marion Young, for one, has sought an 
emancipatory 'politics of difference' rooted in a complete rejection of impartiality in both its 
republican and liberal guises for all the reasons we have already mentioned, calling instead for a 
politicisation of group membership and the establishment of a democratic public which ensures 
"the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of its 
constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged."11 In doing so, of course, Young sets 
herself against both the liberal and the communitarian positions in an attempt to replace them 
them with a politics rooted in the interactive communication between social groups through a 
series of 'mediated' social relations. For her, both positions are mistakenly rooted in the desire to 
"reduce difference to unity,"12 thereby suppressing the complexity of human experience either by 
encouraging the adoption of a "universal point of view" abstracted from all that makes human 
beings unique (in the case of impartialists)13, or by seeking the "fusion of subjects with one 
another" under a unity of over-arching values and beliefs (in the case of communitarians).14
Inner Citadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
10 For example, Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1991); 
Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
11 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, p. 184.
12 Ibid. p. 97.
13 Ibid. p. 100.
14 Ibid. p. 227.
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But again, it is not clear exactly how radical Young’s critique of liberalism -  and hence, her 
alternative to it -  is. In one sense, Young merely appears to dissolve one dichotomy, only to 
replace it with another which is equally stifling. This should not strike us as particularly surprising, 
perhaps, given that her ‘politics of difference’ represents an attack on liberalism which is relatively 
new (and hence, we might say, in the throes of the same fledgling radicalism which characterised 
the emergence of communitarianism). But the folly in it is especially visible -  and the radicalism 
undermined - when we come to realise that many of Young's criticisms of liberalism (and, for that 
matter, of communitarianism) are misplaced. Just as communitarians would be right in rejecting 
liberalism if their conception of its core principles and ideals were correct, so Young would be 
right to criticise liberalism if it indeed embodied the claims that she thinks it does. If it did, then I 
too would be against it. But it does not, and once we realise this, the radical dichotomy she seems 
so keen to establish between herself and liberals (and between herself and the communitarians) 
collapses.15
One reason this is particularly important for us, of course, is that the tendency to establish false 
dichotomies and to fabricate controversies is not only common to non-liberals, but is all too 
common among liberals too. The communitarian critique forced liberals to reassess their 
commitment to community and the importance of embeddedness. While it did not succeed in 
establishing a substantive alternative normative theory to liberalism, it did force liberals to show 
more explicitly than they had before the importance of social and political attachments to 
individual identity and freedom. Unfortunately, a number of liberals have bought into the 
communitarian critique too completely and decided that principles like autonomy and individuality 
were now too ‘controversial’ to be encouraged by liberal institutions because not all groups would 
support such principles. Consequently, liberals like Chandran Kukathas, William Galston, and 
Charles Larmore have argued that liberalism should not seek to protect individual autonomy (i.e. 
one’s ability to question or interpret their current ends or the values which prevail in the groups to 
which they belong) but should instead seek to tolerate and encourage the diversity which exists in
15 As we will see later.
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contemporary liberal societies, even if these communities deny or undermine the individual 
autonomy of any or all of their members. “[Tjf autonomy and individuality are supreme values [in 
liberalism],” Larmore claims, “they must regulate the way we affirm not only our substantial views 
of the good life, but our most fundamental moral commitments as well. . .  yet these commitments 
. . .  seem difficult to understand as objects of decision at least if we view ourselves as moral beings 
whose allegiance to morality arises out of something more than expediency.”16 Hence, he argues, 
liberalism must be 'recast' in a way which does not view our ends and commitments “as ones we 
choose, or would choose, were we to stand back and reflect upon them. [Our ends] are so integral 
to our very conception of ourselves as moral beings that to imagine them as objects of choice 
would be to imagine ourselves as without any guiding sense of morality at all.”17
But again, this is to establish an unnecessarily strict and unrealistic dichotomy between liberal 
theorising (which conceives persons as having the capacity to question and interpret the world in 
which they five for themselves), and non-liberal agency (which, apparently, conceives persons to be 
bound up in constitutive communities which they cannot question and from which they cannot 
escape). Toleration-based liberals like Kukathas, Galston, and Larmore are correct in their claim 
that personal autonomy (understood in the liberal sense) is premised upon the notion of ‘choice’, 
and upon the idea that the lives we lead and the values we espouse, should be those that we adopt 
as the consequence of some form of deliberation and reflection and not merely the result of 
arbitrary imposition. However, as we will see more clearly later, they are wrong in their claim that 
this reflection and deliberation must take place from the perspective of some plateau of reason or 
consciousness which stands radically separate from (and at a distance to) one's particular ends and 
attachments. The recognition among liberals that our deliberations about right and wrong, and 
about what we believe and what we do not, are affected and shaped by our more particular ideals 
and perceptions (our own individual understanding of the world and of our place within it) is not 
difficult to find, as I will show in chapter six. Neither, indeed, is it difficult to uncover a significant 
and widespread theme in 'post-communitarian' liberalism that one's community and empirical
16 Charles Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, The Morals o f Modernity, p. 130.
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circumstances need not (in and of themselves) impinge negatively upon one’s deliberations about 
value (thereby undermining or corrupting them) but can in fact provide the necessary conditions in 
which these deliberations are rendered possible and intelligible. Where communitarians and liberals 
(and, we will see, many other theorists from different movements) divide is not in the fact that one 
values community attachments and the other does not, but in the way in which these attachments 
are valued, and how they can be seen to affect and shape individual self-understandings and, 
consequently, their deliberations about value, about right and wrong, and about justice.
Only by rejecting the all too common tendency to establish dichotomies between doctrines and 
ideals, and by avoiding the strategy of thinking in terms of radical oppositions and polarities, is it 
possible to reveal the true strengths and weaknesses of the arguments in question. It is with this in 
mind, that I argue in this thesis for the importance of personal autonomy not only in liberalism, 
but in many of those movements and doctrines which have been offered in its place. Hence, it is 
with this in mind that we might go at least some way in resolving that central paradox at the heart 
of our normative and moral claims by suggesting a way in which the personal and the impartial 
standpoints might be reconciled.
1. The Aim of the Thesis.
My intention in this thesis is three-fold: (1) to show that liberalism must be committed to 
individual autonomy (and that this principle circumscribes and limits the extent to which different 
ways of life can be accommodated or tolerated in liberal societies), (2) to show that this 
commitment is shared by many non-liberals who do not merely reject autonomy, but liberalism 
more widely, and (3) to argue that those liberals and non-liberals who believe that individual 
autonomy presupposes and requires one’s membership in a particular, individuated, flourishing 
cultural group are mistaken. Parts one and two will address the first of these aims, and will prepare 
the way for our discussion of the second in part three, by presenting my argument that liberalism is
17 Ibid.
17
necessarily and importantly characterised by its commitment to individual autonomy. To many, 
this may seem like an exercise in futility. The claim that personal autonomy occupies a central place 
in liberal theory may seem self-evident as liberalism has always been characterised as rooted in the 
idea that individuals should be afforded the capacity to contribute to the way in which their life 
unfolds, rather than watch it determined by arbitrary circumstance, just as they have always been 
committed to structuring political institutions according to the consent over whom they govern.18 
But as we said, this ‘self-evident truth’ has become increasingly controversial among liberals in 
recent years.
I will argue that many recent dichotomies and distinctions -  both within liberalism, and between 
liberalism and its various critics - are false, that liberalism is rooted in the comprehensive value of 
individual autonomy, and that this commitment necessarily circumscribes and animates the way in 
which liberal institutions should respond to cultural, ethnic, religious, and social diversity. I will 
argue that liberalism presupposes the value of individual autonomy at both the level of institutions, 
policy, and practice and at the deeper level of political justification, and that these two levels are 
interwoven and interdependent. I will argue that those liberals who seek to erode or reject entirely 
this commitment to autonomy -  either in an attempt to accommodate communitarian and 
‘difference’-based criticisms of liberal politics, or to better accommodate the actual diversity that 
exists in many contemporary liberal societies -  fail to do so and must, in the end, appeal to 
precisely this commitment if they are to arrive at the conclusions they do. Moreover, I will argue 
that the appeal to individual autonomy is not as ‘controversial’ as it is claimed to be by critics of 
liberalism and that many of those who seek to ‘re-cast’ liberalism or replace it with some other 
form of politics -  a ‘politics of difference’, for example, or political pluralism, or
18 For example, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty & Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford University Press, 
1991); Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), and Ethics in the 
Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and 
Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
and ‘From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism’, unpublished paper presented at 
the University of Wales, 1998; Amy Gutmann, ‘Civic Education and Social Diversity’, Ethics 105 
(1995), p. 557-579.
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communitarianism -  must also appeal to this principle in order to arrive at the normative 
conclusions that they do.
This will lead to part three, in which I will examine the claim that individual autonomy requires and 
presupposes our membership of individuated and flourishing ‘cultures’. I will argue that while 
autonomy indeed presupposes our membership in an open and liberal political community -  and 
that, hence, autonomy is not inimical to embeddedness or group memberships -  it does not 
require that we are members of distinct ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ groups. I will argue that the popularity 
of what we might call the ‘liberal-culturalism’ of Will Kymlicka, Joseph Raz, et al and the liberal 
nationalism of theorists like Yael Tamir and David Miller, in the recent literature can be explained 
by the unwillingeness of these theorists to define ‘culture’ or ‘the nation’ in anything like a 
philosophically compelling or substantive way. I will show that liberal-culturalists and liberal- 
nationalists are, in the end, merely arguing for a conventional liberal state (founded upon, and 
circumscribed by, liberal principles) and that their appeal to ‘nation’ or ‘culture’ does little or no 
work in their arguments. As such, I argue, the claim that liberalism should be structurally 
committed to defending or encouraging particular national or cultural identities through the 
allocation of ‘group’ or ‘community-specific’ rights is unfounded.
My intention is thus not to define autonomy in any substantive or foundational way. I do not 
attempt to discuss the various metaphysical controversies which a full and thorough-going 
conception of autonomy would require. I will not, that is, engage in anything other than a cursory 
discussion of such issues as the freedom of the will, intentionality, consciousness, or the structure 
of reason; I will not seek to contribute to debates in the philosophy of mind, or science, of social 
science, as such complex and far-reaching debates are beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, I 
will limit my discussion to examining the implications that recent and pervasive definitions of 
personal autonomy offered by liberals and non-liberals hold not only for liberal political theory, 
but for normative political theory more generally. I am not, therefore, attempting to provide a 
substantive definition of individual autonomy -  or a justification of liberal principles more
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generally -  from the ground up. My aim is more modest. It is to tease out the normative 
implications of two specific and related claims and hence, to impose some order and clarity upon a 
confused debate. The first claim that I will examine is, as I have said, that liberalism need not (and 
should not) be committed to the ideal of personal autonomy. The second is that, in order to be 
autonomous, we need to be members of distinct and individuated ‘cultures’. I will therefore 
challenge liberals and non-liberals on their own terms by employing the definition of autonomy 
that they themselves offer, and which is predominant in the debate about the toleration or 
accommodation of cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity in liberal societies.
Personal autonomy, on this account, describes the ability of individuals to “choose a conception of 
the good life,. . .  to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life” in 
the light of their own particular circumstances.19 It is the idea that persons should only live 
according to those rules and structures of authority that they themselves have consented to; that 
they possess the ability to question, interpret, revise, and potentially reject those ends for which 
they currently strive, or those attachments or group memberships that they currently possess, or 
those forms of religious, cultural, and political authority which govern them, such that these 
attachments and ways of life and forms of authority are in a sense ‘self-imposed’ rather than 
imposed against their will from outside by some arbitrary and external body.20 It is, therefore, 
conceived to be more than merely one’s negative liberty, defined in terms of one’s ‘freedom from 
arbitrary, external restraint’.21 An autonomous individual possesses the requisite knowledge and 
self-confidence - the requisite psychological disposition - to deliberate meaningfully on his or her 
particular ends (and the forms of authority under which he or she lives), as well as the requisite 
economic security and education to be able to lead a life that he or she believes to be genuinely 
worthwhile rather than a life imposed by economic necessity, a lack of education, or an ignorance
19 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 80
20 This is the account of autonomy found in, among others, Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community,
and Culture and Multicultural Citizenship; Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom', Joseph Raz 
and Avishai Margalit, ‘National Self Determination’; and Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism.
21 As Kukathas, Nozick, Galston, and Larmore believe it to be.
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of the opportunites available.22 It is, we might say, the account of freedom embodied in Rawls’ two 
principles of justice, which aim to secure not only each individual’s equal freedom under the law 
(through the application of universal negative rights) but also the economic and social resources 
(or positive rights) necessary to render this equal freedom accessible and meaningful to them.23
The account of autonomy to which I appeal, then, is a thinner and less demanding ideal than it is 
in the hands of some others, but more substantive than the account of freedom offered by those 
liberals who believe the principle of autonomy is too controversial or substantive to support 
liberal politics. For some, autonomy represents a process of ‘self-realisation’ through the active 
“development [of] all the valuable capacities a person possesses.”24 For others, it embodies the 
distinctive capacity which defines humanity.25 And for others still (usually those who wish to 
undermine or reject it) it necessitates radical abstraction from one’s particular pursuits and ideals 
and values, and the adoption of a ‘view from nowhere’.26 For us, however, and for those liberals 
that I discuss in this thesis, personal autonomy does not (or need not) imply any of these claims.
We need not claim that autonomy represents the definitive property of humankind in order to claim 
that it is important to humankind; and neither must we assert that it should be used as a means of 
achieving a. particular goal or ideal (be it long-term or short-term). Rather, personal autonomy 
represents the capacity for individual agents to contribute to the way in which their life unfolds by 
acting and deciding on the basis of their deeper, more substantive ideals and values within 
constraints which they themselves have endorsed as reasonable. Autonomy, then, on my account, 
does not represent a first-order conception of the good because it does not “specify what the good 
actually consists in. Anything could be regarded as good.. .  so long as the person who conceived it 
as good. . .  had arrived at this conception in a way that satisfied the requirements of autonomy.”27
22 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship', Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom and 
‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’; Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1987); Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and 
Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
23 See John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, esp. part one.
24 Ibid. p. 375.
25 Harry Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual 
Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
26 See Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
27 Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 129.
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Rather, it represents a second-order good. It claims merely that as individuals we should, regardless 
of our particular group memberships or ends, be able to live “in accordance with our beliefs about 
what gives value to life” even if this means we reject the values embodied in the cultural and 
releigious groups to which we belong.
My aim in this thesis is to challenge those liberals and non-liberals who believe that this goal 
threatens the existence and integrity of those groups which could not support it, and who 
therefore claim that the idea of personal autonomy is too demanding or controversial to represent 
an appropriate response to diversity and should be dropped in favour of a doctrine which is more 
tolerant of collective, non-individualistic ways of life. This will include a critique of Rawls himself, 
who has famously recanted much of what ma.de A Theory of Justice an important statement of liberal 
egalitarianism, and who has, in doing so, rendered his ‘justice as fairness’ largely incoherent and 
hollow.
In arguing for the importance of personal autonomy in liberalism and many forms of non-liberal 
politics, we will also discuss what it might actually mean to be a member of a ‘collective way of life’ 
from a liberal point of view, and what this implies for our normative theorising about politics and 
justice. Again, however, it must be stressed that while some discussion of these issues is crucial to 
working out the role and responsibility of political institutions, it is not the aim of this thesis to 
offer a water-tight or substantive conception of ‘the individual’ or ‘identity’ or ‘autonomy’. Rather, 
it is to show that liberalism must necessarily be committed to individual autonomy in the sense 
suggested above, but to reject the claim -  made by many of those liberals who offer such an 
account of autonomy -  that this necessarily requires the protection of (or membership in) 
particular cultures (defined in anything other than the broadest possible terms). I will, of course, 
build upon the sketchy account of autonomy that I have thus far offered, although I will not do so 
in a single chapter or paragraph. I will fill in the gaps in this account as the thesis unfolds so that, 
by the end, we will hopefully be in a position to see what liberalism should be committed to, and 
what this commitment entails.
22
2. Themes and Structure: An Outline of What is to Come.
The thesis is split into three parts, each dealing with a particular aspect of the debate over the way 
in which liberal political theory might resolve those political conflicts arising out of social, cultural, 
and religious diversity. The multiculturalist debate is characterised by an overwhelming confusion 
over what the various ‘sides’ actually argue and what their arguments imply, due in part to the 
already mentioned tendency among political theorists to approach complex theoretical problems in 
terms of dichotomies, and also to the unwillingness of many liberal and non-liberal theorists to 
define the normative concepts that they employ. The very aim of determining a ‘liberal response to 
cultural diversity’ presupposes a clear and viable account of what ‘liberalism’ is and what values it 
embodies. It also presupposes a clear idea of what diversity exists in contemporary liberal societies, 
exactly what political conflicts arise from it, and what kind of challenges these conflicts pose for 
liberal accounts of justice, politics, and public reason. And, of course, it presupposes a substantive 
and workable definition of ‘culture’.
Are the twin ideals of individuality and autonomy too controversial to represent a basis for 
liberalism? In parts one and two, I examine the claims made by those liberals who believe -  to 
varying extremes -  that they are and that therefore, liberals must re-interpret (and perhaps, drop 
entirely) their commitment to them. I begin in chapter one, by looking at those ‘political liberals’ 
like John Rawls, Stephen Macedo, Martha Nussbaum, and Susan Moller Okin, who argue that 
while liberalism should not reject the principle of personal autonomy entirely, it should 
nevertheless confine it to the political sphere. To commit liberal institutions to the defence and 
encouragement of personal autonomy in the ‘non-political’ lives of citizens would, these political 
liberals believe, be to impose substantive liberal understandings upon them in a way that 
undermines their more particular ends and obligations and self-understandings. What we actually 
require from liberal institutions, they argue, is simply the defence of liberal principles -  and the
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encouragement of liberal virtues and ideals -  in the political sphere without the concurrent claim 
that persons need to value these ideals or virtues in their lives more generally.
I argue that this central political liberal aim of politicising autonomy fails as a coherent 
philosophical response to diversity because it makes unrealistic demands of citizens, because it 
rests upon a flawed and confused conception of autonomy, and because it is entirely incapable of 
responding to those actually existing forms of diversity which exist in contemporary liberal 
societies. In chapter one, I tease out tht  philosophical implications of the political liberal account of 
autonomy and politics in order to show that it is incoherent at a conceptual and normative level. I 
then go on, in chapter two, to explore the various ways in which political liberalism fails to capture 
what is at stake in contemporary debates about diversity by attempting to resolve some of the 
questions raised by the accommodation or recognition of minority religious and cultural practices 
in Britain and the US. I argue that the only reason that political liberalism has been understood to 
represent a coherent liberal response to religious and cultural diversity -  and the only reason why it 
is still held to be so by politicial liberals -  is because its advocates consistently refuse to confront 
those very forms of diversity that their theories must address, and ignore those questions which 
political liberalism must resolve. John Rawls is the most obvious guilty party in this, of course, but 
he is no more guilty than those political liberals who have followed him.
If my argument up to this point holds -  and if autonomy is indeed a comprehensive doctrine in 
the sense that it cannot be confined to either the political or the non-political sphere but must 
instead stretch across ‘both’ spheres - then at the end of part one we find ourselves at a crossroads. 
If liberals are faced with the choice of embracing individual autonomy as an ideal worth protecting 
in the political and the non-political realms or rejecting it entirely, then why should they not 
choose the latter? After all, claiming that autonomy is a comprehensive ideal does not in itself tell 
us whether we should reject it or accept it. To see why we must accept it, more must be said. The 
strategy of rejection is, as we have already mentioned, advocated by William Galston, Charles 
Larmore, and Chandran Kukathas. Given that not all persons might understand themselves as
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autonomous individuals in the way required by liberalism, they argue, liberalism must drop its 
commitment to autonomy in favour of a principle of tolerating the practices and customs of those 
groups that exist in society even if these groups actively deny any or all of their members the ability 
to question or interpret their own lives, and seek to impose prevailing and dominating values upon 
their members.
I claim that this argument fails both as an account of liberalism, and as a justifiable normative 
strategy for responding to difference. I argue that rejecting the principle of individual autonomy in 
favour of tolerating groups which deny their members the ability to question or interpret the worth 
or validity of their prevailing values cannot be understood to be a liberal theory. However, I also 
argue that, despite what they claim to the contrary, none of those liberal theorists who claim to 
reject autonomy in fact do so. I argue that Galston, Kukathas, and Larmore must all, in the end, 
appeal to the principle of autonomy if they are to reach the conclusions they do. It is this claim 
that lies at the heart of the discussion in part two.
Liberalism, I argue, is committed to autonomy at two distinct (yet interwoven) levels. In chapter 
three, I argue that liberalism must protect individual autonomy at the level of policy and political 
practice because it is necessarily committed to providing all persons with the intellectual, financial, 
and political resources they need in order to question their current ends, to interpret the value of 
their ideals and commitments, and to escape imposed and arbitrary forms of authority. Galston, 
Kukathas, and Larmore agree, of course, but claim that this ability (and one’s ‘right of exit’ from 
groups and communities) is adequately secured in the protection of negative liberties (in the form 
of formal rights and constitutional guarantees). I argue that one’s right of exit requires more than 
merely the absence of external constraints on action, however, and requires instead the fostering of 
conditions in which persons are both able to learn about and evaluate different opportunities and 
possess the self-confidence to pursue new ends and options if they so desire. Groups and 
communities often exert quite a powerful hold over their members -  they often make demands 
about the way in which their children should be educated, for example, or how persons should be
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socialised or punished or understood, or about what their members should be able to do or think. 
I argue that once we explore these issues closely -  and once we have seen some of the demands 
made of persons by their group memberships (in chapter two) -  it becomes clear that the appeal to 
‘negative* liberty is important but not sufficient to secure the ability of each and every individual to 
interpret and question their ends and values in the way that liberalism requires. I explore these 
issues of exit and the revisability of ends by picking up the discussion of liberal education and 
consent that was begun in chapters one and two.
But it is not merely because liberalism is committed to the revisability of individual ends and 
attachments that it is wedded to individual autonomy. It is because it is also committed to the 
much more fundamental claim that institutions, principles, and constitutional arrangements are 
also afforded legitimacy by the fact that they gain the consent of those living under them. It is a 
crucial theme of liberalism that authority -  whether it is political, religious, or cultural -  is only 
truly legitimate if those persons affected by it and living under it find it justifiable. This is 
embodied at the level of ends and ideals in the claim (made in chapter three) that one’s individual 
ends and attachments must be revisable and hence, subject to the consent of the individual him or 
herself. It is embodied at the normative level -  at the level of political institutions and the nature 
and content of the polity itself -  in the specific account of ‘public reason’ by which liberal and 
non-liberal theories model and constrain debates about justice. Liberal political theory presupposes 
certain constraints upon what can and cannot constitute a justification for a particular act or claim 
of justice, and it also makes substantive claims about who acts, claims and institutions should be 
justified to. Hence, the account of public reason to which it appeals has certain principled, 
structural constraints built into it. It is not an entirely ‘neutral’ framework for working out the 
bounds and content of justice, because no such process is possible. It presupposes individuality, 
equality, and autonomy. The question, then, is not whether liberal political theory invokes 
particular commitments in its account of justification, but rather what these commitments are, 
what implications they hold for our understanding of liberal political deliberation, and what does 
and does not count as a justification for a particular claim or practice.
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I argue that, at a very fundamental level, liberal public reason presupposes and requires persons to 
be autonomous individuals and that this is as true for those liberals who reject the principle of 
personal autonomy as it is for those who embrace it. Picking up the central theme of part one, I 
argue that the two levels at which liberalism appeals to individual autonomy are intrinsically linked 
in the sense that in order for persons to be capable of engaging in the kind of political deliberations 
and debates about justice that liberalism requires, persons must be afforded the requisite wider 
freedoms necessary to understand themselves as being able to engage in these debates; they must 
be capable of understanding themselves as of sufficient status to be consulted about political 
matters, and they must recognise that such deliberations are the best and most appropriate means 
of resolving political questions. In requiring all this, liberalism reveals itself to be more 
controversial than many would prefer. But this is because liberalism is a doctrine inescapably 
founded upon the comprehensive principles of individual autonomy and equality which cannot be 
renounced without rendering liberalism incoherent and unable to provide the conclusions (or the 
political outcomes) that it seeks.
But if liberalism is necessarily a ‘controversial* doctrine because it is rooted in an appeal to 
individual autonomy, then might that not simply imply that we should reject liberalism altogether 
in favour of an alternative, less controversial doctrine? After all, it would seem that our argument 
thus far plays directly into the hands of those who claim that liberalism is simply too demanding to 
provide a coherent and appropriate response to the political conflicts which arise out of cultural 
diversity. Should we not, therefore, reject liberalism in favour of a ‘politics of difference’, or 
‘recognition’, or ‘cultural recognition’, or ‘pluralism’? In chapter five, I argue that we should not, 
because in order to make sense, these alternative positions must also rest upon a commitment to 
individual autonomy at both the levels outlined in the previous two chapters. I argue that all these 
theories are united (with liberalism) by their commitment to the public justifiability of authority via 
an open and inclusive deliberative process involving individuals conceived as free and equal. In 
arguing as much, I examine in detail the claims made in favour of a ‘politics of difference’ by Iris
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Marion Young and the ‘pluralism’ advanced by John Gray and Bhikhu Parekh. I argue that these 
theories fail to undermine the liberal model (and the principle of autonomy) because they cannot 
help but appeal to precisely those principles that they seek to reject. Consequently, I argue, a great 
many non-liberals are themselves committed to protecting individual autonomy at the level of 
institutions and laws for all the reasons that liberals are.
In the course of the discussion in chapter five I discuss in quite some detail a number of claims 
that have been made about the nature and content of ‘culture’ and, as such, this chapter marks a 
new stage in the argument which is developed in part three. To recall, the primary criticism to 
which I am responding in this thesis is that liberalism is unable to respond appropriately to cultural 
diversity because it imposes particular ‘liberal’ values upon all persons and groups. And I argue that 
this is true in a certain sense, but that it is also true of those ‘non-liberal’ theories which seek to 
resolve these matters more successfully. But this claim depends on more than merely a clearer 
understanding of liberal theory. It requires also a clearer understanding of what ‘culture’ is and 
what it might imply for our normative theorising. Hence, in chapter five, my defence of liberal 
public reason (and political justification more generally) is framed in terms of a discussion of what 
might constitute a legitimate claim to justice and what might not, and what liberals and non-liberals 
have to say on this matter. Does, for example, an appeal to one’s particular cultural beliefs 
represent a ‘justification’ for acting according to these beliefs? That is, if we can show that a 
particular practice is ‘a part of our culture’ then has our search for a ‘justification’ for this practice 
come to an end? Or do we need to say more than this? Do we need to show that -  as well as being 
a part of our culture -  the practice is justifiable for some other reason?
I argue in chapter five that the appeal to culture cannot in itself represent a justification for an act 
or practice, and I argue that this is as true for non-liberals as it is for liberals. I argue that, on its 
own, the appeal to a particular way of life or cultural practice does not represent a justification for 
that practice or way of life, and that, as such, there may well be compelling reasons for outlawing
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it. This claim, I argue, is embodied in the claims liberal and non-liberal theorists make about the 
way our public reasoning about politics and justice should be conducted.
This takes us into part three, in which I explore the idea of ‘culture’ more explicitly. There is, in the 
contemporary literature on multiculturalism, an obvious and studious unwillingness to define what 
a ‘culture’ or ‘group’ is in anything other than the most vague and ambiguous terms, and this has 
created a vacuum at the heart of the debate which few theorists seem willing even to acknowledge, 
let alone confront. The common wisdom (especially among ‘culturalist’ liberals and difference- 
theorists) seems to be that we can discuss the way in which different cultures or groups should be 
accommodated or tolerated by institutions without first seeking any real understanding of what a 
‘culture’ is, how we might identify a ‘cultural’ group as distinct from any other kind of group or 
association, or how ‘cultural identity’, as opposed to any other form of identity, affects or shapes 
our ideas about life, the good, or the world in which we exist. Culturalist normative theory - and 
hence, our discussions about the way in which institutions should be structured in order that they 
successfully ‘affirm’ or ‘recognise’ the cultural memberships of those who compose society - is, it 
would seem, able to progress apace without ever really confronting the question of what it is 
actually talking about or referring to. This would be puzzling among representatives of any 
academic discipline but is, I believe, especially perplexing among political theorists, for whom the 
validity and coherence of ideas and concepts are of first importance. So how did this situation 
arise?
There are, I think, two reasons for the absence of any critical engagement with this question in 
contemporary political theory. The first is the general and growing antipathy (particularly among 
liberals) toward the idea that fundamental ontological questions are a proper or necessary concern 
for political theorists. With the rise of ‘political liberalism’, for example, and the concurrent rise in 
‘anti-foundationalism’ found in the work of postmodernist thinkers like Rorty, it has become 
increasingly accepted that normative theory can be conducted in a way that brackets or ignores the 
more foundational, ontological controversies over which ethicists and metaphysicians continue to
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squabble. Normative claims, it is said, can be offered and debated and enacted regardless of the 
way in which these deeper questions are resolved, and lucky for us. After all, it is said, if we could 
not debate the nature or responsibilities of political institutions until we had resolved those more 
fundamental questions which have plagued us for generations, then politics would never get 
started, and normative theory would be redundant.
The second reason for the absence in the contemporary literature of any real search for the 
meaning or nature of ‘culture’ or ‘the group’ is the misguided notion that these debates have 
already been had, and that these questions have already been resolved. This is most evident in the 
recent statement by Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman with which we began this introduction. In 
what they intend to represent an overview of the present debate concerning minority-rights, 
Kymlicka and Norman tell us that we no longer need to debate the nature or desirability of group- 
specific rights (let alone the deeper question of what a ‘minority culture’ or ‘group’ is) because “this 
first stage of the debate is coming to a close, with the defenders of minority-rights having 
effectively made their case.”28 Now, while Kymlicka of all people would undoubtedly love this to 
be true, it entirely ignores the fact that, firstly, the case for minority rights versus universal and 
equal citizenship rights has not been won, and that, secondly, the deeper question concerning the 
nature, content, and ontological character of ‘culture’ and ‘cultural membership’ have never been 
had in anything like a satisfactory or philosophically adequate manner.
It would not be unreasonable, you might think, to assume that any theorist who places as much 
emphasis on the existence and importance of such things as cultural groups or communities as 
pluralists, difference-theorists, culturalist liberals like Kymlicka and Raz, and liberal-nationalists like 
David Miller and Yael Tamir is required to come up with some kind of coherent account of what 
such groups might look like and how they should be understood, but the logic at the heart of these 
positions often precludes them from doing any such thing. To seek a universal or generalisable 
definition of culture or community would, according to the difference theorist or the pluralist or
28 W. Kymlicka & W. Norman, ‘Introduction’, Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford University
30
the cultural relativist, for example, necessarily represent a search for universal or generalisable 
definitions or standards of judgement which do not and cannot exist. That is, in claiming that 
persons reason about the world according to standards which are entirely located within - and 
specific to - the cultural group to which they belong, many pluralists, difference theorists and 
cultural relativists reject as illusory or mistaken any form of reasoning which might tell us what 
such groups are or how we might understand what they imply. They just imply, it seems, whatever 
they imply to those who claim to be constituted by them, and they just ‘mean’ whatever their 
members think they mean. Any attempt to go beyond this - any attempt, for example, to question 
those meanings or the validity of those claims which arise from them, or to define the notion of 
‘culture’ more generally in order that we might discuss its importance in political theory - is 
impossible and, ultimately, imperialistic. To require persons to explain their beliefs, or to justify 
those claims to justice which arise out of them, or, for that matter, to seek some workable idea of 
what ‘culture’ itself might mean to people, would not only represent an exercise in futility, but an 
exercise in ‘cultural imperialism’. Hence, the search for a workable notion of culture which is 
applicable to all (and which is thus able to inform our theorising about politics) is seen as both 
ontologically impossible (or, at best, unnecessary) and normatively exclusionary and dominating. In the 
absence of generalisable concepts and classifications, then, and in the absence of any form of 
common dialogue via which we might come to an agreement on such terms, it seems we are 
invited by pluralists and difference-theorists to take the importance (and existence) of groups and 
cultures on trust alone.
With this in mind, and having already rejected in chapter five the first argument that is often 
posited in favour of cultural recognition (i.e. that it is required by the principle of equality), I 
devote part three to examining the claim -  increasingly popular among liberals and non-liberals 
alike -  that political institutions must recognise or accommodate cultural groups in order to 
enshrine and protect the principle of individual autonomy. I argue that while culturalist liberals like 
Kymlicka and Raz are right in arguing that personal autonomy need not be understood as inimical
Press, 2000), p. 4.
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to one’s embeddedness in social and political roles, they are wrong to think that a necessary pre­
condition for autonomy is membership in a distinct and individuated cultural group. Or at least, I 
will try to show that culturalist liberalism requires a much more substantive and detailed account of 
what ‘culture’ is and what it is not if it is to represent a new and instructive insight into liberal 
political theory, and that as it currently stands, ‘culture’ is too vague and ambiguous a term to be 
helpful in our deliberations about justice, politics, and the responsibilities of the state.
In many ways, then, part three is, like the rest of the thesis, primarily a plea for clarity. I argue that 
the recent trend in identifying liberalism with the protection of cultures (or, more specifically, as 
we will see, the defence of national cultures) is characterised and perpetuated by an inability of 
culturalists to provide a substantive and compelling definition of a ‘culture’ or a ‘nation’. This, I 
argue, is a crucial factor in its popularity and success, but also explains why it cannot represent a 
compelling or instructive addition to the literature on liberal political theory. It is my contention 
that liberalism and many forms of non-liberalism are in fact united in their rejection of tyranny, 
inequality, and domination. Hence, they are united in their belief that all persons, regardless of the 
particular groups to which they belong, and regardless of what the prevailing elites in these groups 
may claim to the contrary, should be conceived as equally able to contribute not only to the way in 
which their own particular life unfolds, but also to the way in which the wider political 
environment in which they live their lives (and exercise their choices) is constructed and 
perpetuated. In necessarily commiting themselves to both, I believe, these theorists are committing 
themselves to a substantive conception of individual autonomy: persons are only truly free if they 
are bound by rules and structures of authority -  at the level of one’s political and non-political lives 
-  to which they have themselves consented and which are therefore, in a real sense, self-imposed.
In part three, I advance an account of embeddedness, agency, and political deliberation which 
draws upon communitarianism, identity theory, and culturalism but which departs from them all in 
its insistence that persons cannot be understood as defined by a particular, single attachment or 
community. I argue that persons are potentially members of many groups and communities -  and
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occupy many roles -  at once, and that this profoundly affects the way in which they understand 
themselves, the world in which they live, and the various groups to which they belong. Because 
persons are complex and multiply-embedded, they often understand the allegiences they share with 
others differently to anyone else; the understanding they have of their cultural group or their 
nation or any other community will be affected and shaped by their wider memberships, and their 
own unique experiences, and as such it need not be the same as anyone else’s. I argue that persons 
understand the world and their place within it (and the particular roles that they occupy) through 
the lens of their wider commitments and attachments and memberships. Persons understand their 
‘cultural’ and ‘national’ memberships in this way too. I argue that this holds important impications 
for our understanding of ‘cultures’ and ‘groups’; that they are, in an important sense, ‘imagined 
communities’ imagined differently by their various individual members and non-members, and that 
this undermines the claims made by culturalists, identity theorists and liberal nationalists for the 
importance of one particular group over any other as defining of personal identity.
The implications of this claim for the way in which we should understand the role of culture in our 
normative theorising, and for the way in which we should understand the conduct of public 
reasoning about justice and politics, are explored in chapters six and seven. Once we reject the 
strategy of selectively elevating certain aspects of people’s fives as necessarily the most defining of 
their identity, and acknowledge the complexity of each individual’s self-understandings and 
motivations, we are led also to reject the idea that our deliberations about what is right and wrong, 
good or bad, or worthwhile or unworthwhile, will always be conducted in a particular ‘realm’ or 
context or location. We are, I argue, led to adopt a form of political reasoning which is constrained 
and circumscribed by liberal principles of equality and individual autonomy, which allows persons 
to explore their own identities and values and understandings for themselves in a context of others 
capable of doing the same. And because these deliberations and discussions will take place in 
different locations and in different contexts depending upon the circumstances at hand, persons 
must be able to reflect ‘autonomously’ not only on their ‘political’ roles but on those other roles 
that they occupy, which shape their ideas about the world, and which make them who they are.
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Liberalism does not require persons to understand themselves as defined by a particular 
commitment or attachment, and it does not require that persons always reason from a particular 
standpoint (as a citizen, for example, or a Christian, or a father). Rather, it is committed to 
providing all persons with the ability to work out which attachments and obligations (and which 
forms of reasoning) are relevant to the particular circumstances at hand, and how the various 
aspects of their lives impact upon, and shape, the particular deliberations in which they are engaged 
at any particular time. It is therefore committed to ensuring the freedom of each individual to 
interpret and question the various forms of authority under which they find themselves, and to 
reject them if they so desire, even if this is contrary to the prevailing values of the group to which 
they belong, and even if it is held to be ‘controversial’ by certain cultural, religious, or ethnic 
minorities.
34
PART ONE
Chapter One
Political Liberalism, Autonomy, and the 
Privatisation of Identity
Liberals have persistently tended to cut the citizen off from the person; and 
they have placed on their humanistic pedestal a cripple of a man, a man 
without a moral or political nature; a man with plenty of contractual rights 
and obligations, perhaps, but a man without moorings in any real 
community.
Christian Bay, ‘From Contract to Community’, p. 30.
Is it a purpose of a liberal state to protect minority cultures from being undermined and 
eroded by prevailing liberal commitments to autonomy and freedom? O r is it the 
responsibility of the state (and of citizens) to encourage individuals to lead autonomous 
lives even if they do not value autonomy as a means to attaining the good life? And what 
might it mean to ‘value’ or ‘not value* autonomy?
Liberals who have attempted to define the limits of toleration without appealing to the 
prior principle of individual autonomy have been quick to dismiss comprehensive 
liberalism for falling into an obvious trap, that is, the corruption of the individual’s ability 
to lead a meaningful life by the universal imposition of a particular set of controversial 
moral values upon groups or individuals who do not support them.1 ‘Comprehensive’ 
liberals however, have not been so hostile to the notion of toleration, and have generally 
seen it as a requisite component of an autonomy-supportive society.2 It is my intention in
1 For further details see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993); Charles Larmore, Patterns o f Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987); Amy Gutmann ‘Communitarian Critics of Liberalism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14 
(1985), p. 308-322; William A. Galston ‘Two Concepts of Liberalism’, Ethics, 105 (1995), p. 5 lb- 
534; Chandran Kukathas ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’, 20 (1992), p. 105-139; and J.D. Moon, 
Constructing Community (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
2 See Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); ‘Autonomy, Toleration, 
and the Harm Principle’, Justifying Toleration, ed. S. Mendus (Cambridge, 1988); and Ethics in the 
Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), especially ‘Liberalism, Scepticism, and 
Democracy’ (p. 97-124). See also Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford:
36
this and the following chapters however, to argue that the conventional debate between 
‘comprehensive’ and ‘political’ liberals regarding the toleration of cultural diversity is 
misconceived. I hope to show that liberalism must necessarily be committed to 
encouraging personal autonomy throughout society as a whole, and that this requires all 
minority groups to provide their members with the freedom and the resources that they 
require in order to revise and deliberate upon their current ends and beliefs.
This so-called ‘comprehensive’ approach has come under increasing criticism in the debate 
surrounding the ethical limits of cultural recognition from liberals and non-liberals alike. 
Indeed, many liberals have sought increasingly to divorce themselves from the 
comprehensive good of autonomy and have instead moved toward a more general 
commitment to the ideal of toleration between groups that conceive their ends in radically 
different ways. That is to say that, in recent years, the liberal project of ensuring that all 
individuals are provided with the resources they need to free themselves from tyranny and 
imposed authority has been subverted by a new belief among a number of prominent 
liberals that it is the primary role of the state to encourage toleration between groups and 
individuals who hold radically divergent conceptions of the good life. Liberals, it seems, 
must choose which kind of liberal they are going to be.
This, however, is a mistake. One cannot choose which kind of liberal one is going to be 
because liberalism is necessarily a comprehensive doctrine rooted in the defence of 
individual autonomy and equality. The choice one faces is not between two different kinds 
of liberalism -  as theorists like Galston and Kukathas argue. It is between liberalism, which 
is rooted in the support and defence of individual autonomy, and some other doctrine 
which is not.
Clarendon Press, 1989), and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
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Our defence of comprehensive liberalism begins in this and the following chapter with an 
exploration (and rejection) of political liberalism. In this chapter I argue that political 
liberalism, as a strategy for reconciling equal citizenship with the recognition and 
protection of cultural diversity, fails because it is unable to secure the freedoms that it sets 
out to encourage. Furthermore, I lay the groundwork necessary to show that the 
conventional debate between ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ liberals regarding the 
treatment of minority groups is false. It is my contention in this and the next chapter that 
the traditional dichotomy established between ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ liberals is 
based entirely upon a misconceived notion about the nature and purpose of liberalism 
itself. In an attempt to substantiate these claims, I explore the arguments advanced by 
political liberals, concentrating primarily on Rawls’ Political Liberalism, and show that the 
political liberals’ aim of relegating autonomy to the political realm is untenable and entails 
consequences that political liberals themselves would not support.
3. The Search for Political Justice.
3.1 Setting the Scene: Deontology, Teleology, and the Ends o f Justice.
The debate between ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ liberals represents a search for the 
most defensible means of accommodating moral and social pluralism within specifically 
liberal principles, which is to say that it is also a quest to discover what these ‘specifically 
liberal principles’ are. Comprehensive liberalism, it is often argued, fails to acknowledge 
the deep conflicts which divide and characterise contemporary mass societies because it 
seeks to reconcile disputes (and resolve questions of justice) by appealing to over-arching 
accounts of value. Political liberalism, on the other hand, rejects the idea that justice can be 
premised upon claims to moral authority lying in some contestable account of ‘the good’
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and instead seeks to arrive at principles of justice which claim their justification in the free 
and equal assent of all to whom they apply.3
In both its guises, then, liberalism embodies a rejection of the idea that we find in thinkers 
like Plato and Augustine (and in later elitist thinkers like Schumpeter) that the content of 
justice can be known by an enlightened elite who are capable of handing this knowledge 
down to those others who are considered too unintelligent or ‘irrational’ to discover these 
moral truths for themselves. The pre-modern belief that moral truth lay ‘out there’ to be 
‘discovered’, and that the universe was in some way bound together by truths which lay 
external to us (in God, in Nature, in the great Platonic Forms) which only a gifted few 
could perceive, represented a justification for minority rule unchecked by democratic 
procedures which has survived (in a number of guises, and in various parts of the world) 
until the present day.4
Similarly, for civic-republicans the ‘good life’ was -  and still is - something that could be 
known and that we could all be taught to embrace. For Aristotle (as for Livy, Sallust, and 
Cicero of the Roman res publica, for Machiavelli in Renaissance Italy, for Harrington and 
Milton in Britain, and for more diverse thinkers like Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and 
Hannah Arendt) the good life was ultimately embodied in active participation in public
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism; Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology 
and Political Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles Larmore, Patterns o f 
Moral Complexity.
4 We can see it in the failed totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union, for example, and the dictatorships 
of Pol Pot and Mao. For these leaders, as for Stalin and Lenin and many other rulers who flout 
democratic decision-making and popular sovereignty in favour of coercion, the state legitimacy was 
not derived from the consent of the people because these people were largely seen as incapable of 
seeing the true end to which the state should be aimed. In this sense, Stalinism perhaps finds its most 
obvious precursor in the work of Georg Lukacs, whose theory of totality provided the ontological 
premise for Stalin’s later denial that the Russian people were able to know the true ends of 
communism. See Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics 
(London: Merlin Press, 1971).
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life.5 But like Platonism, civic-republicanism often embodied the strongly ‘essentialist’ 
strategy of restricting the domain of the political to those who were considered (naturally) 
capable of participating meaningfully within it. That is, while republicans consistently 
championed the notion that individuals should be enabled to contribute to the shared body 
of values and ideas which constitute the ‘common good’ (as formed by public discourse 
among the citizenry), they also sought to exclude many groups and individuals from this 
process by denying them the resources (i.e. the status) that this participation required.
For liberals, of course, the idea that political inequalities can be justified by an account of 
justice rooted in ‘nature’ or ‘God’ or any other first-order ‘truth’ for all persons, is 
unacceptable, as is the notion that freedom or citizenship rights should be denied to 
individuals on the basis of ‘morally arbitrary’ characteristics like gender, ethnicity, or 
religion. For liberals, the ‘good life’ is not ‘out there’ for us to discover, rather it exists 
(differently) within each of us and we must find our own way to it by deciding for 
ourselves what we believe to be valuable and what we do not in the light of our own 
particular experiences, commitments and allegiances. Consequently, liberal justice 
embodies a response to the plurality of ideals and values and ways of life that will exist 
within a society that is not held together by a single account of value, or a first-order 
conception of moral truth.6 Liberalism, therefore, is concerned above all else with
5 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin Press, 1977); Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses 
(London: Penguin Press, 1983); Cicero, The Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1928); James Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and a System o f Politics, J.G.A.
Pocock, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); John Milton, ‘The Ready and Easy 
Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth’, O f Reformation In England: The Complete Works o f John 
Milton, F.A. Patterson, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931-38); Montesquieu, The 
Spirit o f the Laws, eds. A.M. Cohler, B.C. Miller, & H.S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, F. Bowen, ed. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1958); Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
For a discussion of Livy and Sallust see Quentin Skinner, Foundations o f Modern Political Thought 
(2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) and Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
6 This, of course, is the idea behind Rawls’ ‘thin theory of the good’. As we will see, he later came to 
believe that the theory of the good embodied in his justice as fairness was not as thin as he first 
thought and consequently sought to reformulate it. It is an important aim of this and the following
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providing all persons with the capacity to contribute to the derivation of those principles 
which will regulate and circumscribe the institutions which govern them (and which 
bound and limit their own conduct with regard to others), and which allow them to decide 
upon the content of their own lives for themselves.
To this end, liberal principles are commonly conceived to be ‘constructed’ from out of the 
reasoned deliberation of individuals who are -  for the purposes of framing specific 
deliberations about justice and political conflicts - generally considered to be in some 
abstract condition of choice and reflection.7 This has led some critics (most notably, the 
communitarians, but also difference-theorists, and certain ‘identity-theorists’) to claim that 
liberalism (even ‘political’ liberalism) understands individuals to be independent of their 
ends and commitments in a way that they can never be. But, as we will see more clearly 
later, liberals are not (and should not be) committed to the idea that all the constraints and 
conditions which rightly frame one’s reasoning about politics should frame or animate 
one’s reasoning about anything else. Liberal contractualism does not seek to invoke a 
substantive conception of the way in which persons might resolve conflicts and dilemmas 
in all aspects of their lives. Rather it models the way in which persons might or should 
deliberate about a specific set of questions (namely, political ones).
Nevertheless, a number of liberals have responded to this criticism by rejecting the notion 
of ‘contract’ in favour of a stylised form of discourse or collective deliberation which seeks 
to root our claims about justice in a specific context of reflection and debate between
chapter that this reformulation is incoherent, and that his initial account of justice as fairness was 
more successful in providing a response to diversity than his later political liberalism.
7 This is not common merely to liberal-egalitarian theories of justice, of course. It is also used in 
various ways by critics of liberalism. See, for example, David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
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culturally and historically situated agents.8 This represents an important development in 
the process of theorising social justice and will be explored more fully in the chapters that 
follow. As a pre-cursor to this argument, I will say briefly here that one of the central 
claims made in this thesis is that the dichotomy established between ‘contractualist’ and 
‘discursive* or ‘deliberative’ forms of liberal reasoning is false because if contractualist 
theories are guilty of invoking substantive ideals about the self and value, then so are those 
premised upon some form of discourse.9
Communitarians and difference theorists, of course, are united with many postmodernists 
in their claim that liberalism necessarily presupposes a particular account of the good life 
and of the person and that, as such, its commitment to some ‘comprehensive’ value like 
autonomy is not compatible with the liberal aim of constructing a moral community as a 
response to social and moral diversity. Many liberals appear to have accepted this criticism, 
arguing that liberalism must be ‘re-cast’ in a way that eschews any commitment to 
comprehensive goods like autonomy and individuality. The idea common to all these 
‘neutralist’ or ‘impartialist’ or political liberals is that if we are to find truly reasonable 
grounds for arbitrating between different ends, then we must reject comprehensive 
accounts of the good (and of the self) and establish instead a political conception of justice 
which stands independent of, and prior to, our more substantive ideas about ourselves and 
the world. That is, the aim of political liberalism is to derive an account of justice which is 
‘thin’ enough to gain the endorsement of all those to whom it is to apply, but ‘thick’
8 See, for instance, Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1980); Jurgen Habermas, ‘Reconciliation Through The Public Use of Reason: Remarks on 
John Rawls’ Political Liberalism’, The Journal o f Philosophy (1995), p. 109-131; Matthew 
Festenstein, ‘Toleration and Deliberative Politics’, Toleration, Identity, and Difference, S. Mendus & 
J. Horton eds., (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 146-162. Charles Larmore’s Patterns o f Moral 
Complexity', J.D. Moon’s Constructing Community; A. Gutmann & D. Thompson, Democracy and 
Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass: Belnap Press, 1996); John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and 
Beyond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); Jon Elster (ed.) Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
9 See chapters four and five.
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enough to provide a set of rules which successfully regulate and circumscribe the 
enactments of public institutions. It must embody an account of public reason which is 
agnostic about the nature of the self. To do so is to respect the diversity of ends and values 
and commitments which characterise society. To do otherwise is to deny that society is 
characterised by a diversity of ends and is to imply that all goals and beliefs and self- 
understandings can, if deliberated upon for long enough, converge and be reconciled under 
one principle or account of value; that the deep divisions which split society and which 
cause the very conflicts which justice is supposed to resolve must, in the words of Isaiah 
Berlin, “in the end, be compatible with one another, and perhaps even entail one 
another.”10
In many ways, this debate represents a revival (or a continuation) of the kinds of concerns 
which characterised the debate between teleologists and deontologists in the wake of 
Rawls’ A Theory o f Justice. Rawls, we must remember, argued that teleologists claimed a 
broadly Aristotelian conception of morality and the self as being founded in some 
intrinsically valuable good, some telos, which the state must encourage and promote. This 
good might be the maximisation of aggregate welfare in society,11 or it might be the 
encouragement of persons to realise their nature as God’s subjects,12 or it might be some 
highly generalised account of human motivation like the pursuit of happiness, or material 
wealth, or freedom.13 Whatever the content of the good however, whatever we conceive the 
ultimate ends of all individuals to be, Rawls claimed that teleological theories can all be 
seen to share a common basic structure. That is, as Moon puts it, they are all generally 
founded upon a ‘thick’ conception of the self “including an account of basic human needs
10 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer (eds.) The Proper Study 
o f Mankind: An Anthology o f Essays by Isaiah Berlin (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997), p. 191- 
243.
11 As Utilitarians might argue.
12 As Augustine or Aquinas might argue.
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and capacities, such as the ability to reason, fundamental motivations, sociality, and 
emotional make-up, and a description of central human experiences.” Then, “on the basis 
of this conception, the theorist offers a vision of human flourishing or the human good - an 
account of the conditions which contribute to a person’s ability to realise the good, and 
thus it will project an ideal of human excellence.” Armed with this wide-ranging 
conception of the person (and the needs and capacities which characterise and define it), the 
theorist is then able to “prescribe the kind of practices and institutions which are required 
if these conditions are to be realised, given the motivations and capacities that the theory 
posits.”14 That is to say, as Brian Barry puts it, the relationship between ‘justice’ and 
‘morality’ in teleological theories is a purely derivative one. First “we start with a 
conception of the good which is to be achieved, as far as possible. We then assess potential 
rules of justice by their conduciveness to the achievement of that good.”15 For the 
utilitarian then, or the Thomist, or any other theorist who claims a teleological method, 
the most fully justifiable set of principles is that which encourages the individual to realise 
its own nature and which structures social, political, and economic institutions in such a 
way as to promote whatever the conception of the good at the heart of the theory claims is 
the “ultimate and true good of human beings.”16
‘Teleologists’ may choose not to phrase their arguments in quite such abstract or austere 
terms, of course, although they might still subscribe to the same consequentialism that we 
find at the heart of such an account of ethics.17 They might not, that is, phrase their claims 
in terms of ‘ultimate goods’, or the pursuit of one’s telos (or they might not appeal to some
13 As much economic (and especially rational choice) theory supposes.
14 All quotations are taken from J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community, p. 13.
15 Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 76.
16 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre-Dame: University of Notre-Dame 
Press, 1988), p. 2.
17 It is not possible to enter into a detailed debate concerning consequentialist ethics here. For more 
details, see, for example, Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); 
and Samuel Scheffler, Consequentialism and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
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explicitly Aristotelian account of selfhood or virtue), but they might instead subscribe to a 
broader ethical system rooted in the encouragement of generalised ‘states of affairs’.18 In 
such a system, of course, the ‘common good’ need not be derived from some ‘ultimate and 
true good’ valid for all humankind, but merely the aggregated preferences of those in a 
particular community. Once individual preferences have been aggregated (and the common 
good found), then actions can be judged right or wrong, good or bad, according to the 
extent to which their consequences (or outcomes) advance or inhibit the achievement of 
the greater good for all. Important work in social choice theory has shown this idea of 
aggregating preferences to be more problematic than many utilitarians suppose.19 But even 
if such aggregation was a coherent goal, the liberal objection to it (and to consequentialism 
more generally), of course, is that it seeks to suppress the diversity of individual preferences 
and motivations and inclinations in order to fit them within a single account of ‘the good’ 
common to all, and that it falsely equates the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness* of an action with 
the extent to which its consequences aim at the ‘common good’. Liberalism, on the other 
hand, seeks to establish substantive standards of ethical conduct (or, more specifically, 
principles of justice) out of the collective deliberation of all to whom these rules are to 
apply, which is to say that they explicitly endorse a conception of public justification 
which is genuinely fair and non-exclusionary. Again, this aim has attracted a significant 
degree of criticism in recent debates surrounding the accommodation of cultural diversity 
and group ‘difference’, as we will see in this and later chapters, and indeed it is a central aim 
of this chapter to show that ‘political’ liberalism is unable to achieve those goals that it sets 
for itself precisely because it invokes principles which are inherently ‘comprehensive’ in 
scope. Indeed, I will argue in this thesis that, like those ‘teleological’ theories from which it 
separates itself, liberalism must also posit an account of the self and its capacities, and a
18 See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973 -  1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981) and Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (London: Fontana Press, 1985).
19 See, for example, Shaun Hargreaves Heap (ed.) A Theory o f Choice: A Critical Guide (Cambridge,
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particular (sometimes controversial) set of comprehensive values and ideals. Importantly, 
however, this does not mean that liberalism is as intrusive or as destructive of group 
memberships as its critics often fear precisely because the goods to which liberalism must 
commit itself do not stipulate the first-order ends to which persons must orient their lives, 
rather they simply demarcate a limit to the claim that groups may have over their own 
members.
Consequently, liberal principles of justice are not “designed to tell us how to live . . . [but 
rather] how to live together, given that we have different ideas about how to live.”20 That is 
to say, they focus on “what it is right to do rather than what it is good to be, on defining 
the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good life.”21 The problem with the 
teleological conception, liberals argue, is that it not only entails practical implications 
which do not correspond to our deeply-held beliefs about right and wrong (in that they 
inevitably subordinate the welfare of the individual to the achievement of some greater 
good), but that they presuppose some contestable notion of what ‘welfare’ is. Specific 
moral principles are conceived to be derived from, and thus subordinate to, the common 
good and hence they can be abandoned or over-ridden in the name of this higher good. 
Consequently, there is no reason in principle why -  according to a teleological or 
consequentialist conception of morality - minorities should not be marginalised, 
imprisoned, or forcibly compelled to adopt the beliefs of the majority if in doing so the 
greater good is achieved.
Political liberals and anti-liberals criticise ‘comprehensive’ liberalism for collapsing into the 
same teleological method of affording ultimate priority to some contestable first-order
MA: Blackwell, 1992).
20 Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 77.
21 Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 3.
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conception of the good and then structuring society in such a way as to advance that good. 
These theorists have argued that the dignity and freedom of the individual is only truly 
respected if the state avoids imposing comprehensive goods upon them. Moral and social 
pluralism, they argue, is only accommodated if we avoid enshrining problematic and 
contestable value judgements in the justification process and this inevitably entails the 
rejection of goods such as autonomy which impose constraints upon our deliberations 
about justice and which lie external to the agreement process itself. Later in this chapter and 
more specifically in chapters three and four, we will have cause to question not only the 
attractiveness of such a claim, but its logical consistency. For now, however, it is sufficient 
to suggest, at this early stage, that the process of discourse and agreement invoked in both 
political and comprehensive liberalism presupposes that persons possess a significant degree 
of personal autonomy (in the sense that they can stand apart from their ends and 
attachments sufficiently to offer compelling reasons as to why their claims should be 
accommodated) and that they are enabled to engage in this process of agreement as 
individuals who know their own interests more fully and more coherently than any 
outside authority or elite or representative. Pure procedural justice divorced from any 
commitment to individual autonomy would in fact spell the end of any hope of agreement 
or meaningful debate about justice, and hence it would spell the end of politics itself.22
3.2 Rawls * Political Liberalism and the Status o f Comprehensive Doctrines.
The question that faces us, then, is: can liberalism secure basic political freedoms for 
individuals without appealing to some substantive, over-arching account of value or of the 
self? In the most obvious sense, this question would appear self-contradictory: after all, 
there must be some account of the good or the self at the heart of liberalism, otherwise 
there would be no reason to suppose that institutions should protect basic political
22 As we will see more clearly in chapter five.
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freedoms at all. But what is this account? And what implications does it hold for the way 
liberal political theory should respond to diversity? To answer these questions it is 
necessary to grasp more clearly the role and status of supposedly ‘comprehensive* goods 
(like autonomy and individuality) in liberalism. Comprehensive liberals have generally 
argued that a community can be judged ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ depending upon the extent to 
which it encourages personal autonomy among its members and they have consequently 
argued that ‘illiberal’ communities should be encouraged or compelled to restructure their 
community practices in such a way as to provide individuals with the resources they need 
to pursue goals which they have chosen autonomously.23 As Raz states, for example, for 
groups who condemn their young “to an impoverished, unrewarding life by denying them 
the education and the opportunities to thrive outside the community . . . assimilationist 
policies may well be the only humane course, even if implemented by force of law.”24 
Political liberals on the other hand, maintain that while autonomy is an important political 
virtue, it need not be enforced or nurtured in the private lives of individuals. As we will 
soon see, this leads them to argue that individuals can understand themselves to be bound 
up in their cultural, religious, or moral attachments in private while enjoying equal access 
to basic political freedoms as citizens.
The way in which political liberals have sought to achieve this - the way in which they 
have sought to invest this claim with normative weight - has been to re-imagine the 
conditions and constraints embodied in the original agreement situation in such a way as to 
ensure that the resultant principles apply exclusively to the political, legal, and economic 
institutions which compose the ‘basic structure’ of society.
23 See J. Raz, The Morality o f Freedom, especially chaps. 14 & 15; Steven Wall, Liberalism, 
Perfectionism and Restraint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Will Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights’, Amy Gutmann, ‘Civic Education 
and Social Diversity’, Ethics 105 (1995) p. 557-579; Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political 
Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
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This, we might recall, was Rawls’ original aim in A Theory of Justice, in which he claimed 
that the subject of justice was “the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in 
which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine 
the division of advantages from social co-operation.”25 Where A Theory of Justice went 
wrong, he now argues, was that it appealed to comprehensive and over-arching accounts of 
value (and of the self) in order to justify the rightful distribution of these ‘rights and 
duties’.26 By imposing a single set of values and understandings on a society which would 
inevitably contain a plurality of comprehensive doctrines, Rawls believes that justice as 
fairness (as presented in his early work) was incapable of securing the level of stability and 
co-operation necessary for persons to successfully pursue their ends on a free and equal 
basis with others in the public realm. In seeking to structure the political and economic 
institutions of the state in such a way that they encouraged personal autonomy, Rawls 
argues, justice as fairness “became but another sectarian doctrine” in the sense that it 
unfairly marginalised and excluded those individuals and groups who could not understand 
their most deeply-felt beliefs and understandings to be the object of autonomous choice and 
reflection.27 Therefore, given that society will be characterised by a plurality of different 
ends and beliefs, and given also that the free and equal pursuit of ends in the political realm 
requires a degree of stability and co-operation, then justice as fairness must above all else 
provide a viable account of the way in which competing (and often incompatible) 
comprehensive doctrines can be accommodated within an inclusive democratic society 
regulated by substantive principles of justice.28
24 Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom, p. 425.
25 John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 7.
26 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, especially the Introduction.
27 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, John Rawls: Collected Works 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 409.
28 Some have argued that this represents a shift in emphasis in Rawls’ work from ‘justice’ to 
‘stability’ (or ‘peace’) and that, consequently, he is returning to the Lockean ideal of establishing a 
substantive conception of toleration in order that diversity does not lead to instability and social
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Consequently, in Political Liberalism (and in those articles which composed and followed 
it), Rawls invokes the original position as a means of dramatising the distinction between 
‘public* and ‘non-public’ reason which he believes is necessarily demanded by an 
exclusively ‘political’ conception of justice.29 This distinction enables Rawls to concede that 
individuals will be in some way constituted by the beliefs and values that are conferred 
upon them by their membership of various non-political associations and groups (indeed, 
he argues that individuals “may regard it as simply unthinkable to view themselves apart 
from some certain religious, philosophical, and moral convictions, or from certain 
enduring attachments and loyalties”30) while at the same time denying that these 
memberships and loyalties should provide the basis for reasoning about principles of justice 
in the political realm. That is, he argues, the fact that individuals value certain cultural 
practices, or that they engage in rituals and customs which shape the way they understand 
themselves in the private realm is not in itself a sufficient reason to argue that these values 
should be advanced by the state, or that they should guide our public reasoning about 
principles of justice.
fragmentation. This is partly true, although like Locke, Rawls appears to be equating justice and 
stability as if one cannot exist without the other. This fits with his earlier views concerning the 
importance of a ‘well-ordered’ society to liberal justice, but raises important questions about the role 
and status of personal autonomy injustice as fairness. Again, like Locke, he appears to advance a 
conception of toleration which is circumscribed by the prior commitment to autonomy but, as we 
will see, he thins this commitment in such a way as to render it incapable of doing the work he 
requires of it. See John Locke, A Letter on Toleration, S. Mendus & J. Horton, eds., (London: 
Routledge, 1991) and Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits o f Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 
1991). For more on stability see Brian Barry, ‘John Rawls and the Search for Stability’, Ethics 105 
(1995), p. 874-915.
29 See John Rawls, ‘Social Unity and Primary Goods’, Utilitarianism & Beyond, A. Sen & B.
Williams, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 159-186; ‘Justice as Fairness: 
Political Not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), p. 223-252; ‘The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 7 (1987), p. 1-25; ‘The Priority of the 
Right and Ideas of the Good’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 17(1988), p. 251 -276; ‘The Domain of 
the Political and Overlapping Consensus’, New York University Law Review 64 (1989), p. 233-255; 
‘The Idea of Public Reason Re-Visited’, University o f Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer, 1997), p. 
765-807, re-printed in The Law o f Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
30 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 14
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Consequently, parties to the original position are considered to be ‘unaware’ of their 
particular interests and comprehensive beliefs (and the beliefs of those with whom they are 
bargaining) because it is the purpose of the original position to “make vivid . . . the 
restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice”31 if 
the parties are to structure the political and economic institutions of the state in such a way 
that they are not grounded in some controversial or ‘sectarian’ set of values and aims. That 
is, it is not the role of the original position to ‘make vivid’ some conception of the person 
which all parties must accept, and neither does it seek to establish some thoroughgoing 
conception of the way in which all individuals must understand their relationship to their 
ends. Indeed, as Amy Gutmann concurs, the primary aim of liberal justice is to “find 
principles appropriate for a society in which people disagree fundamentally over many 
questions including . . . the nature of personal identity. Liberal justice therefore does not 
provide us with a comprehensive morality; it regulates our social institutions, not our 
entire lives.”32 What Rawls (and political liberals more generally) seek to establish then, via 
the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘non-public’ reason (as embodied in the original 
position), is a conception of justice which is “free-standing and expounded apart from, or 
without reference to any . . .  wider background” of comprehensive moral values.33
In this, we can see that Rawls’ construction seeks the same end as that advanced by liberal 
impartialists like Scanlon, Barry, Beitz, Charvet, and Nagel (i.e. procedural neutrality 
enshrined at the institutional and constitutional level by binding, self-imposed deontic 
constraints). Where it differs most obviously, of course, is in the way in which this goal is 
sought (that is, the way in which the agreement situation or ‘contract* is structured). The
(1985), p. 223-251.
31 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 18.
32 Amy Gutmann, ‘Communitarian Critics of Liberalism’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1985), p.
308-322, p. 313.
33 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 12.
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Scanlonian construction, for example (used by Barry, Beitz, and Nagel, as well as Scanlon 
himself) clearly admits comprehensive doctrines into the agreement process (and therefore 
acknowledges that these doctrines have an important bearing on the way in which political 
institutions should be structured), while providing all individuals with a ‘veto’ that they 
can use to strike down proposals and claims which they feel are unduly prejudicial or 
oppressive of their own values and commitments.34 What this represents in practice, of 
course, is the idea (for which I will argue more fully in the next section and throughout 
this thesis) that ‘comprehensive’ doctrines should not be excluded (or considered 
excludable) from deliberations about politics as long as there is some mechanism internal to 
the agreement construction that protects individuals from being unfairly oppressed or 
marginalised by the interests and preferences of others. There are, of course, significant 
issues to be discussed with regard to the Scanlonian position (most notably its implicit 
commitment to autonomy). These are explored in detail in part two of this thesis. For 
now, however, I want to develop two interwoven criticisms of Rawls’ argument (and of 
political liberalism more generally) in order to show that it is unable to provide the 
conclusions that Rawls demands of it.
4. Agency and the State: The Limits of Political Justice.
The central flaws in Rawls’ position then (and the main reasons why it fails to transcend 
his earlier ‘comprehensive’ position), can be revealed by making two related points; the 
first concerning Rawls’ definition of the ‘basic structure’ and the second regarding the
34 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); 
Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality: A Treatise on Social Justice, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995) and Theories o f Justice: A Treatise on Social Justice, vol. 1 (London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 
1987); Charles Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Thomas 
Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For a non-Scanlonian 
account of contractualism, see John Charvet, The Idea o f an Ethical Community (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995).
52
account of human agency upon which the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘non-public’ 
reason is founded.
4.1 Defining the ‘Basic Structure*.
Firstly, it is necessary to realise that, despite his insistence that he has created a ‘free­
standing’ conception of justice which applies exclusively to the ‘basic structure of society’, 
Rawls’ political conception embodies a set of goods which strive above all to establish 
certain conditions in the wider society. That is, after being told that political liberalism is 
different from comprehensive liberalism in that it only applies to the ‘basic structure’ of 
society (i.e. the “framework of basic institutions and the principles and precepts that apply 
to it”35), we are then encouraged to conceive of this ‘basic structure’ as comprising not only 
the principal organs of the state, but also those social institutions which “fit together into 
one system, and . . . assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of 
advantages that arises through co-operation.”36 Therefore, we are told, the “political 
constitution, the legally recognised forms of property, and the organisation of the 
economy, and the nature of the family all belong to the basic structure.”37 It is the role of 
these institutions, Rawls tells us, to “secure just background conditions against which the 
actions of individuals and associations take place.”38
But how do these claims differ from the ‘comprehensive’ approach adopted by the likes of 
Mill, Gutmann, and Raz? Obviously, the theories advanced by Raz, Mill, Gutmann, and 
Rawls will differ significantly in their substantive content but what is important here, when 
seeking to distinguish political liberalism from comprehensive liberalism, is that these 
differences do not lie in the areas that Rawls believes them to. Mill, Gutmann, and Raz
35 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 11-12.
36 Ibid. p. 258.
37 Ibid.
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recognise the fact that in order to enable individuals to lead meaningful lives within a just 
political system, the theorist must concentrate upon the ways in which the state can 
encourage and perpetuate certain conditions in the social realm which are necessary for this 
pursuit. Raz, for instance, explicitly states that, when presenting his theory he is “referring 
primarily to the state and its organs.*39 And similarly, Mill is quite explicit in his claim that 
On Liberty represents above all a sustained attempt to justify a notion of the state which 
“does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development.”40 Even 
Kymlicka, who tempers his overarching commitment to personal autonomy by taking 
seriously the (often autonomy-denying) claims born out of culture and tradition and group 
membership, sees social and political institutions as the primary means of satisfying 
liberalism’s “most basic commitment . . .  to the freedom and equality of individual
• • M i lcitizens.
What links Raz, Gutmann, Kymlicka, and Mill then, is the approach that they take to 
justifying liberal principles: all of them express a commitment to some comprehensive 
account of the good (autonomy), and all of them see what Rawls wants to call the ‘basic 
structure’ as the means by which the wider social conditions necessary for the 
establishment of this good are established. It is in establishing such constitutional 
guarantees as Bills of Rights, for example, which uphold and protect the freedom of the 
individual within a framework grounded in the rule of law, and in the creation of 
institutional measures which limit what the government can and cannot do with regard to 
its citizens (and which uphold democratic procedures, such as a separation of powers, 
bicameralism, the appointment of officials and overseers to the constitution, universal
38 Ibid. p. 266.
39 Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 3.
40 John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford, 1991), p.
127.
41 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.
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suffrage, and the accessibility of political discourse to all) that the state provides the 
background conditions in which individual freedoms can be enacted/2 As we will soon see, 
however, these conditions are not sufficient in and o f themselves to secure individual 
autonomy. For now, however, it must be said that it is not enough for Rawls to claim that 
his ‘political conception’ of justice differs from ‘comprehensive’ theories of liberalism in its 
focus upon the basic structure of society when he so clearly seeks to include within this 
conception rules which are designed to regulate our actions and interactions in the wider 
social realm. Political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism therefore share a 
fundamental commitment to establishing certain conditions in society in order that certain 
particular aims can be achieved. The fact that, for Mill, Raz, and Gutmann these ends are 
located in comprehensive accounts of value and that for Rawls (supposedly) they are not 
makes little difference.
Rawls, of course, would argue that it makes a great difference and would no doubt seek to 
defend his theory by reiterating his claim that the political conception of justice “is 
expressed in terms o f . . .  ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture” of democratic 
societies, and explicitly avoids entering the “‘background culture’ of civil society” (or what 
Rawls calls the ‘culture of daily life’) / 3 The fact that he defines the basic structure of 
society in such a way that it makes claims about the way in which individuals should 
understand their relationships with one another is irrelevant, he might argue, because in 
the end he is only making claims about the way in which they should interact in the 
public, political realm in the interests of deriving an account of justice. What truly 
separates comprehensive and political liberalism, he might -  and does - say, is the fact that
34.
42 See Phillip Pettit, ‘Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization’ in I. Shapiro & C.
Hacker-Cordon (eds.) Democracy’s Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 163-
190.
43 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 13. This represents another change from A Theory o f  Justice
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comprehensive liberalism demands that people act and understand themselves in a particular 
way in the private realm of non-political associations and groups, while political liberals 
merely wish to ensure that all individuals are afforded the capacity to act as free and equal 
citizens in the political realm, no-matter what particular beliefs and values they cherish in 
private (as long as they can be accommodated within the political conception). “Central to 
the idea of public reason,” he says, “is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or non-religious, except in so far as that doctrine is 
incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity.”44
However (and this brings us to our second point, raised earlier), this final caveat 
dramatically limits what is permissible in a liberal society, and renders political liberalism 
far more restrictive of cultural and religious practices than Rawls believes. This is because 
the ‘public political culture* cannot be separated from the ‘background culture’ of daily life 
in the way Rawls contends. Our nonpolitical identities and interests will inevitably shape 
and affect the way we lead our lives (and deliberate about politics) in the political realm, 
and, similarly, our political and economic circumstances will variously affect the way in 
which we act and understand ourselves in the private realm.45 Consequently -  as we will 
see more fully later -  one of the ‘essentials of public reason’ is that persons are encouraged 
to understand themselves as autonomous not only in the political sphere but in the non­
political sphere too, and that therefore this will impose significantly greater constraints 
upon what ‘comprehensive doctrines’ can be admitted within a liberal state and which 
cannot.
to Political Liberalism in that while the former was explicitly ‘universal’ in scope, the latter seeks 
merely to articulate a conception of justice valid for Western liberal democracies.
44 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Re-Visited’, John Rawls: Collected Works, p. 574.
45 G.A.Cohen uses a similar argument to critique Rawls' account of fair distribution. See G.A. Cohen, 
I f  You 're An Egalitarian How Come You 're So Rich? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
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4.2 ‘Political* and ‘Ethical* Autonomy: Public Freedom and Private Tyranny.
In A Theory o f Justice, Rawls sought to establish certain metaphysical claims about the 
nature of the self (i.e. that it is autonomous and that, therefore, autonomy is a good both in 
the public political realm and in the non-political realm of associations).46 In his later work 
however, he posits the idea that, while the individual should be understood as autonomous 
in the political realm in the interests of justice, there is no particular reason why individuals 
should understand themselves as autonomous in the private realm; that is, justice as fairness 
now “affirms political autonomy for all but leaves the weight of ethical autonomy to be 
decided by citizens severally in the light of their comprehensive doctrines.”47 All that is 
required by justice, Rawls argues, is that persons be afforded the capacity to “agree to any 
conception of justice available to them, as prompted by their rational assessment of which 
alternative is most likely to advance their interests” independent of any ‘antecedently 
given* principles of right and justice.48 It is this idea, we must remember, that forms the 
basis of Rawls’ new account of stability and makes liberal justice possible.
Ronald Dworkin and Will Kymlicka have argued that this position leads to a 
‘schizophrenic’ conception of the self as able to understand itself in two (or more) radically 
different ways at one and the same time in the interests of justice, and have argued that 
Rawls fails to address the problem of why individuals who do not place a high value on 
autonomy in their non-political lives should think it a good idea that they do so in public.49 
In making this point, Dworkin and Kymlicka open up the debate concerning the 
relationship between the political and non-political realms, but they fail to mount anything 
more than a superficial critique of Rawls’ political liberalism. All Rawls need do to rebut
2000), esp. chapter 9.
46 See John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, part 3.
47 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 78.
48 John Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, John Rawls: Collected Papers 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 311.
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them is restate the primary objective of his political conception. The reason why 
individuals would agree to enshrine autonomy in the political realm, Rawls would no 
doubt argue, is because it is in their best interests; after all, in doing so they create a society 
in which everyone can pursue their own ends and commitments freely and equally 
regardless of what these ends and commitments may be (given that they fit within the 
general framework laid down by fairly derived principles of justice).
John Charvet has made a similar point to Dworkin and Kymlicka but goes further than 
either of them by highlighting the fact that the Rawlsian public/private distinction 
requires persons to be capable of understanding their relationship to their ends in radically 
different ways at one and the same time. That is, “the later Rawls believes that one can be 
anti-realist politically and at the same time be a realist in non-political ethical beliefs: the 
realist beliefs one may hold as a private person are irrelevant to one’s political life.” Thus, 
he goes on, “in effect, one must split off private beliefs and identity from public-political 
self-conception in a radical way as though one were two persons.”50 To some extent, of 
course, Rawls could even accommodate this claim by arguing that, again, reasonable 
persons are quite capable of claiming certain first-order moral or ethical statements as true 
while claiming that these ‘truths’ should not be invoked in the justification of public 
institutions or in the resolution of questions of justice.
What Kymlicka, Dworkin, and Rawls fail to realise however (and what Charvet’s criticism 
shows more clearly), is that the political/non-political distinction which political liberalism 
requires (and which persons must internalise in order to be ‘reasonable’) is rendered 
untenable once we understand the extent to which our political actions will be constrained
49 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1997), chap. 5, and 
Liberalism, Community, and Culture, chap. 4, p. 47-74.
50 John Charvet, The Idea o f an Ethical Community, p. 5.
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and affected by our non-political identities, and that members of communities which do not 
value autonomy will have little or no choice about whether or not they will value 
autonomy in the public realm. Rawls assumes that “people who are unable to leave or 
change their relationships in private life are nonetheless capable of exercising autonomy in 
their public lives . . .  If people’s autonomy in the public sphere is respected then Rawls 
assumes that the inability to exercise autonomy in the private sphere is benign.”51 But the 
claim that we need not intrude upon (and seek to encourage autonomy in) people’s non­
political lives and that we should seek to establish a ‘free-standing’ conception of justice 
which encourages autonomy as an exclusively political virtue collapses when we realise 
that our actions in the political realm are necessarily limited, shaped, and bounded by the 
circumstances in which we find ourselves in the non-political realm.
Consider, for example, a child born into a strictly religious family. She is denied access to 
newspapers, television, and radio as these are manifestations of technology and are 
therefore shunned (as are most labour-saving devices, medicines, and modes of transport). 
She is encouraged to do only that work which does not contradict her religious teachings 
(which means that she is often excluded from science lessons and classes dealing with 
morally ambiguous issues such as sex education), and she is expected to live according to a 
strict set of religious rules and restrictions. Mixing with non-religious children at school is 
discouraged and she is not allowed to play with other children after school.52 Indeed, she 
may not go to school at all, but may instead be ‘home-schooled’ as is increasingly the trend 
in the US. Now, in this situation, we might want to say that the girl’s parents have a right 
(and indeed, a responsibility) to raise their daughter according to their beliefs about what is 
valuable in life and that in imposing various restrictions upon her actions they truly have
51 Sawitri Saharso, ‘Female Autonomy and the Cultural Imperative: Two Hearts Beating Together’, in 
W. Kymlicka & W. Norman (eds) Citizenship In Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 224- 242, p. 230.
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her best interests at heart. We might think it unfortunate that the girl is being denied a 
great deal of what we (as outsiders) consider to be important and valuable experiences by 
being raised in this way, however, we might still want to respect the way in which these 
parents are raising their daughter out of a respect for their religious beliefs or out of respect 
for the girl’s right to be brought up according to the traditions and beliefs of her family 
and their forefathers, and so on. But can we say that, in doing so, her parents are providing 
her with the requisite resources to participate ‘freely’ and ‘equally’ in the political realm? 
Or does a state which values freedom and equality in the political realm need to encourage 
certain practices and ideas in the non-political realm in order that she gains the appropriate 
knowledge and skills that are necessary to participate on an equal basis with others? Or, to 
put it another way, can we say that a state which supports the ability of parents to 
constrain and limit the education that their child receives (as a consequence of their 
religious beliefs) is in some way complicit in that child’s under-achievement (where 
achievement is measured in terms of the extent to which the child is able to compete in the 
job market and access public institutions on an equal basis with others)?
Now, the role of education in culturally diverse societies will recur throughout this thesis 
(most specifically in the next chapter and in chapter 3), however for now it is necessary to 
state that Rawls’ argument forces him to invoke precisely those ‘comprehensive’ ideals of 
individuality and autonomy that he seeks to avoid. “Children’s education,” he says, should 
“include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights . . .  Moreover, [it] 
should prepare them to be fully co-operating members of society and enable them to be 
self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the 
fair terms of co-operation with the rest of society.”53 But, as Eamonn Callan points out, the 
“contrast Rawls draws [between political liberalism and those liberalisms of Kant and Mill
52 The Christian Brethren are one such religious organisation.
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which ‘lead to requirements designed to foster autonomy and individuality as ideals to 
govern much if not all of life’54] is bogus because the political virtues that implement the 
fair terms of co-operation bring autonomy through the back door of political liberalism.”55 
Clearly, Rawls believes it is a principal role of civic education to encourage the acceptance 
of the ‘burdens of judgement’ and hence, the adoption of a ‘reasonable’ perspective with 
regard to their own comprehensive doctrines. Hence,
[f]uture citizens must be taught to think in particular ways about doctrines that 
properly lie outside the scope of public reason: they must become critically attuned 
to the wide range of reasonable political disagreement within the society they 
inhabit and to the troubling gap between reasonable disagreement and the whole 
truth. This will require serious imaginative engagement with rival views about 
good and evil, right and wrong, and this in turn means that these views must be 
confronted in their own terms, without the peremptory dismissal they might 
receive according to whatever doctrine a child learns in the family.56
Interestingly, Rawls appears to acknowledge this point, claiming that “the unavoidable 
consequences of reasonable requirements for children’s education may have to be accepted, 
often with regret.”57 But, as Callan again points out, whether the effects are intended or 
not, they still force Rawls to acknowledge the pervasiveness of those values embodied in 
his ‘political conception of justice’, and the demands that this conception makes of persons 
not only in the ‘political’ realm, but also in the ‘non-political’ realm of faith and culture. 
“Learning to accept the burdens of judgement in the sense necessary to political liberalism,”
53 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 199.
54 Ibid.
55 Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens, p. 40.
56 Ibid.
57 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 200.
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he rightly says, “is conceptually inseparable from what we ordinarily understand as the 
process of learning to be ethically (and not just politically) autonomous.”58
This will be taken up more fully in the next chapter, however, for now it is sufficient to 
say that, if this is true, then there appears to be no necessary link between raising a child in 
the ways and customs of a particular community, and preparing them for free and equal 
participation in the wider society. Indeed, the two claims that Rawls makes (that 
individuals should be left to get on with their own lives in private, and that they should be 
allowed to lead free and equal lives in public), are quite separate and potentially 
incompatible. Being educated in the various practices and customs of one’s ‘non-political’ 
community is often quite different from being prepared for ‘free’ and ‘equal’ participation 
in the public realm. The ‘determinate relations’ in which we engage with others both 
within and outside our particular communities inevitably affect the kind of decisions we 
are able to make, what kind of lives we can lead, and how we might deliberate upon the 
content of our ends and of justice itself in the political realm.59 Clearly, the girl born into 
the religious family will be deprived of certain psychological and intellectual attributes 
which would allow her to adopt a ‘reasonable’ and ‘impartial’ standpoint with regard to 
her own ends and ideals and hence she will be unable to employ the vocabularies and 
discourses of public reason in the way political liberalism demands. But, at a more political 
level, she will also be restricted in her ability to participate on a free and equal basis with 
those around her in the wider society. A child brought up in such a secluded environment, 
isolated from many of the rigours of modern life (and discouraged from learning about 
different lifestyles, beliefs, and customs) will not be in a position to access common social 
and political institutions on an equal basis with others who have been adequately prepared
58 Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens, p. 40. For a similar argument, see Amy Gutmann, ‘Civic 
Education and Social Diversity’, Ethics 105 (1995) p. 557-579.
59 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 89.
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to do so, and neither will she be able to compete equally in the job market, or interact 
fruitfully with those around her (who may well be members of different communities, 
possess different beliefs, and pursue radically different ways of life to her own). Given that 
the pursuit of ends is inevitably a collaborative endeavour, that is, and given that 
successfully pursuing a meaningful way of life (and, more deeply, deliberating with others 
on the content of justice) will often rely upon negotiating with others (and being willing to 
accommodate differences in the interests of gaining the benefits of co-operation and 
mutuality), it is difficult on liberal grounds to see how individuals who have never learned 
the requisite skills to interact fruitfully with others can be understood to be equally able to 
lead as fruitful a life as those who have had the benefit of a broad and eclectic education.60
5. Recurring Problems, Ambiguous Debates: Political Liberalism After Rawls.
5.1 Stephen Macedo vs. Comprehensive Liberalism.
This separation of public and private, of political and non-political, recurs also in the work 
of other political liberals, with no greater coherence or success. Stephen Macedo, for 
example, rejects ‘comprehensive’ liberalism for precisely the same reason that Rawls does, 
namely, that its commitment to the values of autonomy and individuality (as valuable in 
both the public and the private realms) render it merely another sectarian doctrine among 
others, rather than a doctrine capable of accommodating and regulating these sectarian 
disputes within a thin procedural (yet moral) framework. In this, he says, he agrees with 
Iris Marion Young’s claims concerning the inability of comprehensive liberalism to 
accommodate radical diversity (and the complexity of human identity) within an 
overarching set of moral principles applicable to all; indeed, he claims, Young’s ‘politics of
60 This point will be explained more fully in chapter three.
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difference* should “be taken as a useful warning against the aspiration of . . . some liberals 
to a politics that would directly promote ideals (such as autonomy) in all spheres of life.”61
Unfortunately, however, Macedo (like so many other political liberals, as we will see) 
seems confused not only about what political liberals should be committed to, but also 
about what comprehensive liberals should be committed to. For example, he says (in a 
manner which pre-empts the discussion in chapter three), it is “tempting to say that the 
only real difference between political and comprehensive liberalism is that proponents of 
the latter are candid in admitting that liberal institutions foster an ideal of life as a whole.”62 
But, he says, “[c]andor . . .  is not the crux of the matter: political liberalism stands for a 
restraint that would be unnatural for one committed to the public authority of the vision 
of the good life as a whole informed by autonomy and individuality.”63 However, he later 
contradicts himself by claiming (in the same article) that “[l]iberal political virtues and 
attitudes will spill over into other spheres of life. Even a suitably circumscribed political 
liberalism is not really all that circumscribed: it will in various ways promote a way of life 
as a whole.”64 Given that both of these statements cannot be true, it would appear that 
Macedo’s political liberalism simply collapses into comprehensive liberalism in its 
promotion of certain values (in both the public and the private realms) over others.
The reason why Macedo feels incapable of accepting the comprehensive implications of his 
position is, I believe, almost entirely due to his misconception of what comprehensive 
liberals seek to encourage. For Macedo, comprehensive liberals are motivated above all else 
to define what he calls the ‘whole truth* for all persons. For example, while he
61 Stephen Macedo, ‘Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v.
John Rawls?’ Ethics 105 (1995), p. 468-496, p. 470. Young’s argument will be discussed more 
fully later.
62 Ibid. p. 476.
63 Ibid.
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acknowledges that his political liberalism “cannot avoid ruling out some accounts of w hat. 
..  [is of] ultimate value,” he claims that its strength lies in the fact that it “does not rest on a 
particular comprehensive account of the truth or the good as a whole.”65 But neither does 
comprehensive liberalism (or, at least, it need not do so any more rigorously than Macedo’s 
political liberalism). All it says is that if we believe that all persons should be able to make 
up their own minds about the way in which they wish to live their lives (in response to 
their own genuinely-held ideas about value), then this requires the establishment of certain 
conditions in private realm as well as in public. It does not seek to hold autonomy as ‘the 
truth’ or ‘the whole good’ any more than Macedo’s political liberalism does. Such claims 
would only make sense if comprehensive liberals understood to describe the content of our 
ends (that it somehow represented a ‘way of life’ in and of itself) rather than a structural 
second-order commitment which describes our relationship to our more substantive, 
deeply-held ends and projects. We will develop this point throughout this thesis, however 
for now it is necessary only to say that comprehensive liberalism does not rest on the 
assumption that autonomy is ‘true’ in any first-order sense, or that living an ‘autonomous’ 
life demands that we cannot understand our preferences and ideals to be shaped and 
circumscribed by our deeply-held attachments and commitments, or that autonomy is itself 
an ‘end’ to which each individual must strive, because neither autonomy nor individuality 
are as demanding or as thickly-conceived as political liberals like Macedo believe them to 
be. Autonomy need not be ‘true’, but political liberals must be consistent: if it is a role of 
political institutions to protect and encourage individuality and autonomy in the public 
realm then it is necessarily a role of these institutions to protect and encourage those 
conditions in the private realm which make their public realisation possible.
64 Ibid. p. 477.
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5.2 Martha Nussbaum and the Assumption o f Autonomy.
Interestingly, we encounter exactly the same equivocation and inconsistency in the recent 
work of Martha Nussbaum who, in discussing an essay by Susan Moller Okin, claims to 
subscribe to a form of political liberalism. “Given their views that autonomous lives are 
better than hierarchically ordered lives,” she says, comprehensive liberals “are bound to 
play favourites among the religions, using the state and its persuasive apparatus to wean 
people away from religions that do not foster personal autonomy.”66 The political liberal, 
on the other hand, merely “asks citizens to endorse a political conception of autonomy: 
that is, the idea that each citizen is an equal chooser of ends, and that none should be 
debarred by the luck of race, or sex or class from the exercise of political judgement.” 
Indeed, she goes on, political liberalism actually
does better along the dimension of respect for citizens [than comprehensive 
liberalism]; for - ironically, since autonomy is what it is all about - comprehensive 
liberalism does not show very much respect for the choices citizens make to live 
non-autonomously, as members of hierarchical religions or corporate bodies. 
Political liberalism . . .  agrees with comprehensive liberalism that a non- 
autonomous life should not be thrust upon someone by the luck of birth. 
Nonetheless, it respects these lives given a background o f liberty and equality, as lives 
that reasonable fellow citizens may pursue. In this way it shows respect for their 
search for the good.67
65 Ibid. p. 492.
66 Martha Nussbaum, ‘A Plea for Complexity’ in Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha 
Nussbaum (eds.) Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?: Susan Moller Okin with Respondents, p.
109. Emphasis added. Curiously, Nussbaum offers no examples of religions which ‘foster autonomy’ 
over obedience to particular values and norms.
67 Ibid. p. 110.
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But if we are to accept this as a definition of political liberalism, then it would seem that 
political liberals are as compelled to ‘play favourites’ among religions as are comprehensive 
liberals. Political liberals, and Nussbaum specifically, appear unable to endorse or recognise 
any religion which does not embrace the political liberal account of public reason, or their 
notion of ‘reasonableness’ (or ‘public reasonableness’ as Macedo and Galston call it), and 
which does not allow persons to develop their preferences and to genuinely ‘search for the 
good’ in their own way on a free and equal basis with others. Once again, then, it is 
difficult to discern exactly where political liberalism ends and comprehensive liberalism 
begins for Nussbaum, in that it is difficult to envisage exactly what a ‘non-autonomous’ life 
would look like on her terms. After all, she claims to respect the ability of the individual to 
live a ‘non-autonomous’ life as long as he has genuinely decided to do so within a society 
which provides him with a meaningful right of exit from the community in which he finds 
himself and which also guarantees basic political freedoms and equalities for all.68 But it is 
not clear why such a life should be conceived as ‘non-autonomous’ at all. Comprehensive 
liberals and political liberals should be united in their desire to support lives like this, just as 
they should be united in rejecting the idea that persons should be forced to live lives that 
they have not chosen for themselves (i.e. those in which ends and ways of life are imposed 
upon persons by arbitrary authorities as a result of dominating processes of socialisation or 
indoctrination, or by the repressive use of coercive force). They should be united in their 
rejection of those (unreasonable) religions and communities which reject the method of 
public justification and dialogue which liberalism embodies and demands, and they should 
also be united in their rejection of those entrenched norms and values which serve to 
undermine the “fully human use of [the individual’s] faculties.”69 This is because political 
liberalism and comprehensive liberalism are both necessarily premised upon a
68 The notion of ‘exit’ will be discussed more fully in chapters two and three, as will the uneasy 
relationship between Nussbaum’s political liberalism and her feminism.
69 Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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“comprehensive concern for flourishing,” expressed in terms of individuality and freedom, 
which necessarily extends beyond the ‘political’ sphere and into those wider spheres of life 
and experience which provide the content of our individuality and our ability to deliberate 
about the ends of justice.70
As we will argue in more detail later, if persons do genuinely choose to subordinate 
themselves to religious doctrines or forms of authority which constrain their freedom to 
act as they might otherwise have done, or if they choose to subordinate the fulfilment of 
their own interests to the fulfilment of those held by certain others who the individual 
cares about, or if they choose to live a life that we as outsiders might consider 
impoverished or of little value, then there is nothing in comprehensive liberalism that says 
the state must persuade them otherwise. If persons are genuinely willing to forego certain 
equalities and freedoms (and to bear particular burdens and costs) in pursuit of certain first- 
order goods then comprehensive liberalism, like political liberalism, should let them (as 
long as the state ensures that they are able to change their minds, and to reject these 
burdens if they so desire). Again, Nussbaum seems to assume that personal autonomy is a 
necessarily thick ethical ideal or a way of life in itself. But because it is not (because it does 
not represent an account of the ‘whole good’ for humankind, or the ‘truth’ to which we 
must all adhere or a specific goal to which individuals should be forced to pursue) persons 
can live lives that we as outsiders consider impoverished or of little value, as long as they 
also possess the resources necessary to change their minds and to re-assess their 
commitments should they wish to.
70 Ibid.
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53 Susan Moller Okin and Comprehensive Liberalism.
This is the response that Susan Moller Okin gives in defence of her own position which she 
takes to be somewhere ‘in-between’ political and comprehensive liberalism. She 
acknowledges that “many parents belonging to religions or cultures that do not respect 
autonomy would (and do) very strongly resist children being exposed to any religious or 
cultural views but their own,” but like Nussbaum, Macedo, and Rawls, she does not “think 
that liberal states should allow that to happen . . .  It seems not at all unreasonable within 
the context of a liberal state that values its citizens to make informed decisions about 
whether to lead autonomous or non-autonomous lives as adults,” she says, “to require both 
that children’s education - including their religious education - be non-sexist, and that all 
children be thoroughly exposed to and taught about other religions as well as secular 
beliefs held by people around the world. Indeed, without this, it would be difficult to claim 
that their adhering to their parents religion was voluntary at all.”71
This is undoubtedly true, but again it would also be difficult to see how a life truly chosen 
on the basis of such an education and lived against a background of basic liberal freedoms 
and equalities could be described as ‘non-autonomous’ in a way in which comprehensive 
liberals would find objectionable. Indeed, it could be argued that such lives could not be 
described as non-autonomous at all.
5.4 Charles Larmore: Patterns o f Moral Confusion.
It is in the work of Charles Larmore, however, that we find the most extreme attempt by a 
self-confessed ‘political liberal’ to separate the public and private realms for the purposes of 
deriving a political conception of justice. Larmore’s argument will be discussed in more
71 Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?, p. 130.
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detail in chapter three, however it deserves some mention here precisely because it invokes 
many of the arguments made by others discussed in this chapter, but to a greater extreme.
Larmore argues that liberalism must be committed to a principle of neutrality but that this 
principle should only govern “the public relations between persons and the state, and not 
the private relations between persons and other institutions.”72 Indeed, he argues, 
committing ourselves to individualism and neutrality in the political realm does “not imply 
that a broader individualism concerning the very sources of value must pervade the whole 
of social life.”73 However, Larmore (like Macedo, Nussbaum, and Rawls) leans too heavily 
on the public/private distinction and thus fails to grasp the extent to which our public 
agency will be constrained by the ways in which we think and act in private. For example, 
in Patterns o f Moral Complexity, Larmore argues that “the priority of the right over the 
good . . . serves only as a political principle, governing the relation between people as 
citizens. In the political realm neutrality must be supreme, and our substantial ideas of the 
good life, if controversial, must give way before it. But,” he goes on, “it need not extend 
further, and will not do so, where people have constitutive attachments to some substantial 
vision.”74 That is, such ideas as ‘individuality’ or ‘neutrality’, while being ‘supreme’ in the 
political realm, need not figure at all in “intermediate associations such as church, family, 
or ethnic group.”75 And Larmore develops this theme some years later when he claims that 
“[p]rivate associations cannot violate the rights of citizens. Yet they can continue to 
conduct their internal, extra-political affairs according to ‘illiberal’ principles - principles
72 Charles Larmore, Patterns o f Moral Complexity, p. 45.
73 Charles Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, The Morals o f Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 140.
74 Charles Larmore, Patterns o f Moral Complexity, p. 75.
75 Ibid.
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that deny their members equal rights and require them to defer to traditionally constituted 
authority.”76
This echoes Chandran Kukathas’ assertion that one should be free to live in a community 
which denies the value of autonomy as long as it provides one with a ‘meaningful right of 
exit’.77 It also echoes Rawls’ claim that “political principles of justice -  including principles 
of distributive justice -  [should not] apply directly to the internal life of the family” and, 
we must assume, other ‘non-political* associations and entities.78 But given what we have 
already said about the inevitable link between our public and our private experience it is 
difficult to see exactly how the state is able to protect freedom and equality in the public 
realm (or the ability of every individual to engage in public reasoning about the content of 
justice) while endorsing the potential oppression and humiliation of its people in private. It 
is not enough for a state to seek to secure certain freedoms and rights in the public realm 
via the implementation of laws (or to enshrine liberties in written constitutions or bills of 
rights or legal statutes) when it is quite clear that our ability to access these laws will be 
affected and constrained by our private understandings of ourselves and of the 
circumstances in which we are implicated. That is to say, it is all very well having a law 
which aims at the establishment of sexual equality of opportunity in the job market, for 
instance, or a legal ‘right’ which states that equality in the work-place should not be 
undermined by discrimination or unfair treatment, but this law or right becomes all but 
meaningless (and incapable of securing any kind of equal freedom at all) if it does not seek 
also to provide the basic background conditions which make this equality possible. As 
Isaiah Berlin put it, it “is important to discriminate between liberty and the conditions of 
its exercise. If a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his legal
76 Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, p. 140.
77 See chapter three for a full discussion of Kukathas’ argument.
78 John Rawls, The Law o f Peoples and the Idea o f Public Reason Re- Visited (Cambridge, MA:
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rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him.” 79A woman who is 
denied the right to an education equal to that of men, for example, or who is confined to 
the domestic sphere, or whose interests are consistently considered to be subordinate to 
those of the male members of her family is simply not able to act ‘freely’ and ‘equally’ in 
the public realm, or compete on an equal basis with others in the job market, or to engage 
fully and meaningfully in deliberation about her ends and principles of justice, unless she 
turns her back on her cultural beliefs or renounces her role in the web of private, ‘non­
political’ assumptions and understandings which shape her understanding of herself (as 
subordinate and unequal) and the world around her. As Feinberg states, “persons have the 
right of self-government if and only if they have the capacity for self-government.’’80 
Marginalisation and discrimination are not eradicated by the implementation of negative 
legislation governing the public realm because often it will be the inequalities and norms 
prevailing in people’s various ‘non-political* associations (their family, their church, and so 
on) which will cause and perpetuate this marginalisation. Liberalism must provide all 
persons with the capacity to interpret for themselves the worth and importance of all the 
various aspects of their lives.
Interestingly, Rawls appears to acknowledge this when, in complete contradiction to the 
claim we quoted earlier, he says that if a particular familial arrangement can be seen to 
deny any or all its members the ability to make up their own minds about the way in 
which they live their lives on an equal basis with others, then “the principles of justice . . .  
can plainly be invoked to reform the family.”81 Quite how the internal structure of the 
family (and, for that matter, of other associations) can be both a fitting subject of justice, 
and an unfitting subject for justice (both a part of the ‘basic structure’ and not a part of the
Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 159.
79 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. lvi - xlix.
80 Joel Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’, The Inner Citadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 28.
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basic structure) at the same time is, like so many other contradictions to be found in Rawls’ 
later work, left entirely unexplained.
6. Conclusion.
Thus far, then, we have suggested that if political liberals are committed to encouraging 
individual autonomy and equality in the ‘political’ sphere, then they must also commit 
themselves to encouraging those conditions in ‘private’ which make political autonomy 
possible. One’s ability to engage in the kind of public reason that political liberals demand 
is affected, facilitated and undermined by the particular understandings and ideals that one 
has in private. The way in which we are socialised, the beliefs we are taught, the 
associations and memberships that make us who we are and afford us our individuality will 
all shape the way in which we think and act and deliberate about politics. They will shape 
our opinions about how politics should be conducted and what kind of arguments count in 
political justification. And they will shape also the way in which we understand the role 
and responsibilities of political institutions.
Nussbaum, Macedo, Rawls and (as we will see more clearly later) Larmore all appear to 
believe that persons will just be able to engage in public reason (and be capable of accepting 
the virtues embodied in ‘public reasonableness’) regardless of what kind of life they 
otherwise lead, and regardless of the understandings and ideas that they are taught to have 
about themselves and the world. This, however, is false. And it is a falsehood that Rawls in 
particular is uncomfortable with, as evidenced in his ambiguous discussion of the family 
and other private associations. Furthermore, his discomfort (and his inconsistency) shows 
itself again in his discussion of liberal education, as we will see more clearly in chapter
81 John Rawls, The Law o f Peoples and the Idea o f Public Reason Re-Visited, p. 160.
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three. Rawls is right to be uncomfortable, as should the other political liberals thus far 
discussed. The more we explore the ways in which different groups distribute power 
among their members, and the more we understand the hold that religious, cultural, ethnic, 
and social identities often have upon the way in which persons conceive themselves (and 
hence, the way they think about their ends, the customs in which they engage, and the way 
in which politics is -  and should be -  conducted) then the more untenable it becomes that 
they can be thought to engage in anything like the kind of reasoning that political liberals 
demand.
Indeed, the popularity of political liberalism as a normative response to cultural and 
religious diversity can best be explained, I believe, by the unwillingness of political liberals 
to delve too deeply in the actual practices and customs of those groups that they hope to 
‘tolerate*. The more we find out about the beliefs and ideals of many cultural and religious 
groups found in contemporary western societies, the more difficult it becomes to accept 
the political liberal claim that political and non-political autonomy are separable. This is 
revealed all too clearly in chapter two, in which we explore the concrete practices and 
customs embodied in, and defended by, a number of religious and cultural groups.
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Chapter Two
Gender, Controversial Practices, and the 
Rules of Association
[T]he family is a social institution that defies the political/non-political 
dichotomy that Rawls has increasingly emphasized in recent years. For 
families do clearly fall within the basic structure, as defined, yet they 
are for the most part comparatively private relationships, where things 
both good and bad are frequently hidden from public view.
Susan Moller Okin, ‘Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender’, p. 27.
Political liberalism, as it is now understood, emerged quite recently as a strategy aimed at finding 
a coherent and reasonable normative settlement to political conflicts arising out of social and 
moral diversity. It is, in this sense, anchored in a real concern to confront and resolve those 
political conflicts which exist in the world and -  most specifically -  in contemporary western 
societies which harbour a diversity of different groups and communities and ways of life. Its 
strategy of ‘privatising* difference while ‘politicising’ autonomy and equality reflects a growing 
unease among liberals that comprehensive liberalism is unable to accommodate the divergent 
claims made by cultural and religious minorities for recognition or toleration, and so must be 
reinterpreted in a way which is more accommodating of a diverse public.
But there is a curious paradox at the heart of political liberalism which few political theorists have 
acknowledged. It is a paradox which goes some way in explaining the internal inconsistencies that 
we outlined in the first chapter and concerns the manner in which political liberals advance their 
arguments. While political liberals apparently seek to address those concrete political problems 
and conflicts which arise in existing societies, they consistently refuse to discuss the actual 
practices and customs that they seek to tolerate. Rawls is particularly guilty of this. Neither his 
Political Liberalism nor his Law of Peoples includes anything but the most cursory of glances at 
existing cultural or religious practices, which is odd given the issues to which they are addressed 
and the ends to which they strive. Macedo and Larmore are not much better, however, and 
prefer to pitch their arguments at a level of abstraction far removed from the problems and
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conflicts that they hope to resolve. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that the solutions they 
present are unable to address what is most at stake in these arguments.
Political liberalism, as we saw in the previous chapter, is rooted in the notion that any account of 
justice must - if it is to be publicly justifiable to all -  be sufficiently ‘ non-controversial’ or ‘thin’ to 
gain the endorsement of a great many people who think and understand the world very 
differently.1 The political liberal strategy, therefore, is to endorse principles to which all persons 
could agree as long as they were all reasoning in the right way, and were subject to the 
appropriate ‘reasonable’ constraints.2 The problem that we have been seeking to illustrate thus 
far, however, is that these ‘reasonable’ and ‘appropriate constraints’ presuppose an account of 
public reasoning which is only possible among persons who have been encouraged to conceive 
themselves and politics in a particular (and potentially ‘controversial’) way.
The response among political liberals to such claims is that even political liberalism can only 
tolerate claims and ways of life which are ‘reasonable’ in the sense that they are consistent with 
liberal principles of political equality and autonomy.3 Those whose arguments fall outside the 
bounds of reasonableness thus defined are, by definition, ‘unreasonable’ and legitimately subject 
to coercion in order that they might argue (and hence, understand themselves) in a way 
consistent with liberal principles. But if this is the case, then it becomes an incredibly important 
question as to what constitutes ‘reasonableness’ and what does not. This will be explored in more 
detail throughout this thesis, and especially in chapter five. But for now, it must be said that the 
appeal to reasonableness actually excludes far more customs and traditions than the political 
liberals think it does, and that, therefore, political liberalism is far less tolerant of cultural diversity 
than political liberals believe.
1 Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995).
2 The notion of ‘reasonableness’ and justification will be explored in more detail in chapters four and 
five.
3 See, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism', J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community; 
Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) and Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in
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In this chapter, I illustrate this point by engaging in precisely the kind of analysis that the majority 
of political liberals avoid. In discussing a number of cultural and religious practices, I hope to 
reveal more clearly the inter-relationship between the public and the private realm (and hence, 
the inconsistency of political liberalism as a coherent normative doctrine). In sections 7 and 8,1 
discuss some of the problems with political liberalism through the lens of the feminist critique of 
the public/private split. Feminists were among the first to criticise liberalism for its tendency to 
abstract from the concrete experiences of those to whom it was supposedly addressed. They were 
among the first to highlight the inability of liberal principles - and, more explicitly, the liberal 
distinction between public and private -  to free women from the dominating and oppressive 
conditions which prevailed in their ‘private* lives. Hence, I examine and extend the feminist 
critique of political liberalism to show that it captures a number of important issues regarding the 
accommodation and inclusion of cultural, ethnic, and religious minorities. This extends the 
argument already set out in chapter one, and provides the context in which we can discuss 
particular religious and cultural practices in more detail. In section 9,1 outline the beginnings of a 
liberal theory of association and, consequently, I begin to flesh out the liberal theory of toleration 
which is developed throughout this thesis. Having done so, I return in section 10 to the problems 
faced by political liberals in order to reconstruct a more coherent and plausible account of the 
public/private split than they offer.
7. Public, Private, and the Exclusion of Gender.
7.1 Feminism and the Importance o f the Private.
The theme underlying my argument thus far - that “power does not respect a non-public sphere 
of autonomy for each individual but rather it can pervade all the domains of modern society” 4 -
Liberal Constitutionalism ("Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
4 Shane O’Neill, Impartiality in Context: Grounding Justice in a Pluralist World (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1997), p. 39.
77
has been expressed most convincingly by contemporary feminist critics of liberalism.5 If we want 
to understand and address sexual inequality in contemporary societies, they argue, we must 
appreciate the extent to which patriarchal power pervades not only the public realm of social and 
political institutions, but also the private realm of faith, culture, and the family. Indeed, 
feminism’s “slogan ‘the personal is political’ signalled [more than anything else] that no aspect of 
everyday life would be exempt from reflection and potential criticism - language, jokes, styles of 
advertising, dating practices, dress, norms of child-rearing, and countless other supposedly 
mundane and trivial elements of behaviour and comportment.”6 In attempting to isolate the 
political realm as the appropriate subject of justice, that is, political liberals ignore the important 
(and often subtle) power relationships that exist between women and their husbands, their 
children, their parents, their church elders, and so on. Often, it is these very relationships (and 
the values that they embody and perpetuate) that constrain the public lives of women and which 
encourage them to understand themselves as unequal and subordinate to men. In such 
circumstances, they also argue, women are often not only robbed of the capacity to decide for 
themselves how to act and how to understand themselves, but also of the capacity to act upon 
these decisions and understandings due to the powerful psychological, economic, and intellectual 
constraints woven into the fabric of their religious and cultural (and therefore their family) lives. 
Political liberals who ignore this fact, or who commit themselves to merely encouraging ‘negative’ 
freedom, make the “characteristic liberal mistake [of focusing on] the forms of tyranny 
performed by and through government as the only - certainly the principal - kind of tyranny that 
should worry political theorists.”7
5 For more details, see Carole Pateman, ‘Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy’, in 
Anne Phillips (ed.), Feminism and Equality (Blackwell, 1987); Jean Bethe Elshtain, Public Man, 
Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 1981); Susan 
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). For a general and 
in-depth discussion of the feminist critique of liberalism, see Will Kymlicka, Contemporary 
Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chapters 3 & 7. For a 
persuasive account of the ways in which multicultural ‘group-rights’ undermine the rights of women 
see Okin’s excellent ‘Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions’, Ethics 108 (1998), p. 661- 
684.
6 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990), p. 87.
7 Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 31.
78
This would indeed be a grave mistake. Feminists are correct in their claim that it is often the very 
structure of ‘non-political’ institutions (and the affect they have upon the way in which persons 
reason in the political realm) which is at issue, and are right to point out that constraints in our 
private lives shape and thwart our lives in public. We can see this clearly in religious practices like, 
for example, the veiling of women. The whole point of such a practice is to exclude women from 
the public sphere as much as possible.8 Islamic law defines the proper role of the woman to be 
that of wife and mother, and her proper locus of responsibility to be the family and the home.9 If 
she must venture out into the public (and, presumably, into the lustful and proprietorial world of 
men) then she must cover herself so as to make as little impression on that world as possible.10
It is not difficult to see that such a view cannot easily co-exist with a liberal politics premised 
upon freedom and equality and the ability of all (regardless of gender) to engage in public 
discourse and reasoning about justice as free and equal beings. Islamic law states that politics is a 
realm properly suited to men, and not the place for women. Already, then, it would seem that 
liberal principles of equality and individual autonomy require the constraint of certain religious 
practices and claims in the interests of securing the conditions appropriate for liberal public 
reason (as it is defined by political liberals). But veiling is only the tip of the iceberg. The more we 
learn about the status of women in Islamic law, the more implausible it becomes to argue that 
individual autonomy and equality can be respected and protected in public while being ignored or 
thwarted or denied in private. For example, it is not merely the practice of veiling that makes 
Islamic law oppressive, unequal, and sexist, and nor is it merely its definition of divorce or its 
commitment to polygamy (both of which we will discuss in more detail later). Rather, it is the 
way in which it defines the roles of men and women more widely.
For example, Islamic law states that the husband in any marriage
8 See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston (eds.) International Human Rights Law in Perspective: Law, 
Politics, Morals: Text and Materials (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
9 Ibid. See also Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law, and Human Rights: The English Experience 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
10 See B. R. Nanada (ed.) Indian Women: From Purdah to Modernity (London: Sangam, 1990).
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may select the matrimonial home. . .  [and] may control [a wife’s] movements except to 
the extent of permitting her reasonable access to her close relatives. He may prevent her 
from taking up a job . . .  [and he] may take her on journeys unless such journeys would 
be unnecessarily dangerous or harmful to her health. If the wife disobeys the husband’s 
reasonable instructions she becomes nashuzm most schools [of Islamic jurisprudence] 
and therefore disentitled to maintenance. . .  [S]uch disobedience entitles the husband 
first to reprimand her and if this fails to refuse to sleep with her and eventually to beat 
her, with reasonable force. The wife’s right to maintenance is in one sense consideration 
for her submission to her husband’s authority.11
Hence, if women do not obey their husband’s instructions, they can be punished first by 
psychological and then by physical abuse. If neither course of action is successful in securing her 
compliance, she may be unilaterally repudiated and then denied any right to maintenance. Quite 
who decides whether or not a woman was beaten with ‘reasonable’ force as opposed to 
‘unreasonable’ force, or whether or not the ‘instructions’ that she disobeyed were ‘reasonable’ or 
‘unreasonable’ is unclear. What is clear, however, is that it is not the women in question, or 
indeed any other women, given their status in Islamic law. All those who sit in judgement of 
these women will be men given, as we have already maintained, that women have no role, and no 
legitimate place, in public life.
It would surely be an understatement of immense proportions to claim that such practices 
undermine the ability of women to engage in public reason on a free and equal basis with others, 
or to enjoy those rights and equalities that the liberal state is supposed to provide and defend. 
The systematic destruction and explicit denial of equality embodied in such practices, coupled 
with the overt desire to rob women of the capacity to make decisions about their own lives and
11 Keith Hodgkinson, Muslim Family Law: A Sourcebook (London: Croonhelm Press, 1984), p. 146. 
There is, as Hodgkinson points out, “no liability to maintain a wife guilty of nashuz [disobedience].
A wife is nashiza if without a valid excuse she disobeys [her husband’s] reasonable orders, refuses to 
cohabit in the house he has chosen,. . .  takes employment outside the house without his consent, or is
80
to engage in anything like a ‘liberal dialogue’ about the content of justice, or the resolution of 
political conflicts, necessarily and inevitably requires the liberal state to ‘intrude’ upon the private 
realm in the interests of securing those conditions and freedoms in public that political liberalism 
demands. The idea that women who have been systematically denied the ability to question or 
interpret the ideals and roles that have been handed down to them can simply decide to engage in 
public debates about justice in the way demanded by political liberals is simply untenable, given 
the psychological, intellectual and physical constraints embodied in the communities of which 
they are a part.
As one political liberal, Martha Nussbaum, points out, “when we reflect that a large number of 
the world’s women inhabit traditions that value women primarily for the care they give to others 
rather than as ends, we have all the more reason to insist that liberal individualism is good for 
women.”12 But if Nussbaum and the other political liberals indeed value autonomy and the good 
of public reason in the way they claim, then they must be prepared to encourage those conditions 
in the private realm which make these public debates and deliberations accessible and intelligible 
to all, regardless of whether or not the values which prevail in the group rule otherwise.
7.2 The Private: Non-political or Apolitical?
The problem, then, is not that liberalism conceives the private realm to be “radically apolitical or 
asocial. . .  [or] some antisocial condition of isolation and detachment” which lies beyond the 
reach of justice and politics.13 Rather, it is that political liberals misconceive the extent to which 
their account of justice (and public reason) depends upon the instantiation of certain (autonomy- 
supportive) measures and conditions in one’s life as a whole. Too often, liberals are accused of 
establishing a private realm which is not only entirely out of bounds of the state, but entirely 
apolitical. But as Rawls argues in a recent essay, political liberalism
imprisoned so as to be inaccessible to him.” (Ibid. p. 147.)
12 Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex & Social Justice, p. 63.
13 Nancy Rosenblum, Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the Reconstruction o f Liberal Thought
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does not regard the political and the non-political domains as two separate disconnected 
spaces, each governed solely by its own distinct principles. . .  The principles defining the 
equal basic liberties and opportunities of citizens always hold in and through all so-called 
domains. . .  If the so-called private sphere is alleged to be a space exempt from justice, 
then there is no such thing.14
Hence, if the feminist critique of political liberalism is, as Rosenblum believes, that it posits a 
‘private’ realm which lies beyond the reach of justice then this is simply a mistake. But feminists 
could -  and, as we saw in chapter one, should - quite easily concede as much while still holding 
that the political liberal distinction between public and private undermines the ‘basic rights and 
liberties’ of women, and especially women who belong to cultural, ethnic, and religious 
minorities.15 Nussbaum states that the problem “with views of the family held b y . . .  Rawls and 
others is not that they are too individualist, but that they are not individualist enough.”16 But this 
only shows the incompatibility of Nussbaum’s feminism with her political liberalism. Political 
liberalism does not posit a private realm which is exempt from justice, but it does posit a 
conception of justice which would -  if internally consistent - grant ‘non-political’ groups 
considerable power to treat women (and others) unequally, and to deny persons the ability to 
engage in precisely the kind of ‘public reasoning’ about justice and personal ends that Rawls and 
the other political liberals demand. Consequently, if Nussbaum and the other political liberals are 
genuinely concerned to protect the political autonomy and equality of women and other 
oppressed groups, then they must acknowledge the inherently comprehensive nature of autonomy 
and equality.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 61.
14 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Re-Visited’, in The Law o f Peoples and the Idea o f Public 
Reason Re-Visited (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 160-161.
15 Indeed, this is the position for which I argue in this thesis.
16 Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, p. 65.
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8. The Permeability of the Political.
Our discussion thus far shows political liberalism to be internally inconsistent in the sense that it 
advances an argument for the increased toleration of practices which contradict liberal principles 
of individual autonomy and equality while at the same time presupposing a conception of politics 
and justification which requires the protection of these values in both public and private. But it is 
also untenable for a second - and related -  reason. It insists that cultural and religious doctrines 
should be excluded from the political sphere and from public reason. In excluding one's 
'comprehensive doctrines' from the non-political realm, that is, political liberals hope to establish 
a system of political institutions governed by genuinely transcultural (and hence, universally 
applicable) rules and principles which are publicly justifiable to all members of the polity, 
regardless of their wider first-order notions about the good life. But just as one's ability to act and 
deliberate as an autonomous individual in public requires the instantiation of autonomy- 
supportive conditions in private, so one's ability to live a particular cultural or religious way of life 
will require the establishment of certain measures and conditions in public. Once the state has 
ensured as far as possible that the particular commitments and ideals to which a person adheres 
are 'voluntary' (in the sense that they have the capacity to reflect upon them and to reject them if 
they so desire), then the same state must ensure that these genuinely endorsed commitments and 
ways of life are acknowledged in laws and public policies in a way that is consistent with the 
requirements of public reason.
Consider, for example, the much-cited example of male Sikhs, who are required by their religious 
beliefs to wear turbans. Now, it is quite obvious that in claiming the right to wear their turbans, 
male Sikhs are seeking to secure the public recognition of an act which has significant 
consequences regarding their capacity to observe their religious teachings in private. That is, it is 
not good enough here to say that the observance of religion is a purely private matter because in 
order to fulfil their religious duties in private they are required to act and understand themselves 
in a certain way in public. And this, we might argue, is also the case for Orthodox Jews who claim
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the right to wear their yarmulke, and Muslims who claim the right to wear the chador, they do so 
because they cannot observe their religious doctrines in ‘private’ unless they also do so in ‘public’. 
Family matters and religious practices for such persons, “cannot be viewed as private matters of 
no concern to the legal system or public institutions when they relate to, for example, the 
treatment of women and children, the education of pupils at school, absences from work for 
purposes of worship, reactions to blasphemy, or the disposal of dead bodies.”17
But this will have inevitably problematic consequences for political liberals who argue that 
religious and moral beliefs should have no role in determining the way in which political and legal 
institutions are structured (and how laws themselves are implemented). Any state which is 
concerned above all with the establishment of ‘free’ and ‘equal’ access to public institutions (such 
as the economy and the job market), but which also seeks to accommodate the diverse religious 
and cultural beliefs in its midst, will often be confronted with circumstances in which it is called 
upon to support the claims of certain groups and individuals who are marginalised and excluded 
from access to these institutions on the basis of their religious beliefs. We might want to recall 
here the case of the Orthodox Jews who were prevented from military service because the 
uniform policy barred them from wearing their yarmulke,18 for example, or the Sikhs in Britain 
who were banned from working on building sites or public transport due to the fact that the 
wearing of turbans contradicted the uniform policy.19 We might recall those Sikhs who were 
refused employment because they insisted on retaining their beards,20 or those who were unable 
to ride motorcycles due to their inability to wear crash-helmets.21 Or we might want to cite the 
claims made by certain religious groups who have sought exemption from laws governing the
17 Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law, and Human Rights: The English Experience, p. 28. This last point 
about the disposal of dead bodies refers to the Hindu practice of submerging corpses in rivers as 
opposed to burying them. See Bhikhu Parekh, ‘The Logic of Intercultural Evaluation’, in Susan 
Mendus & John Horton (eds.) Toleration, Identity, and Difference (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
18 See Jacob T. Levy, ‘Classifying Cultural Rights’, in W. Kymlicka & I. Shapiro (eds.) NOMOS 39: 
Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p.22-66.
19 See Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law, and Human Rights: The English Experience, especially 
chapter 8. For details concerning the case of the Sikh child refused admission to school on the 
grounds of violating the uniform policy, see Sebastian Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority 
Customs (London: Butterworth Press, 1986), p, 187-188.
20 Sebastian Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs, p. 259-261.
21 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity
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length of time that their children must attend compulsory education (such as English gypsies, the 
Old Order Amish in the US, and various Christian sects in Canada, including the Mennonites, 
the Hutterites, and the Doukhobours).22 Or indeed, we might want to consider those cases in 
which members of religious communities have sought greater freedom to reconcile the 
requirements made of them by their religious beliefs with those made of them by their jobs (for 
example, by seeking abstentions from work at certain times in order to pray, or the recognition of 
religious holidays and festivals).23 In such cases, fair and coherent resolutions depend upon the 
ability of persons to articulate and describe their particular memberships and the importance and 
content of their beliefs in reasoned dialogue with others, and to show the ways in which political 
principles and institutions should take these beliefs and commitments into account.
Consider, for example, two recent occasions on which this strategy of privatisation was employed 
by the French government in response to two different cases of ‘cultural diversity’. The first is 
the notorious case involving two Muslim girls who were banned from wearing their religious 
head-scarves to school.24 The second concerns the same government’s attitude toward polygamy. 
As Susan Moller Okin has noted, at precisely the same time that the government was seeking to 
outlaw religious dress-codes from certain areas of public life, it was permitting “immigrant men 
to bring multiple wives into the country to the point where an estimated 200,000 families in Paris 
[alone] are now polygamous.”25 Is there any inconsistency here? I think not. Okin is surely right 
in saying that any “suspicion that official concern over head-scarves was motivated by an impulse
Press, 2000).
22 For details on the Amish and Canadian religious sects, see Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any 
Cultural Rights?’, Political Theory 20 (1992), p. 105-139, and the reply from Kymlicka in the 
same issue (p. 140-146). See also Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship. For information on 
English Gypsies, see S. Poulter, ‘Ethnic Minority Customs, English Law, and Human Rights’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 36 (1987), p. 589-615.
23 See Sebastian Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs, chapter nine.
24 See Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modem 
France (London, 1992); S. Poulter, ‘Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches 
in England and France’, Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 43 (1997) ; and J. Bell, ‘Religious 
Observance in Secular Schools: A French Solution’, Education and the Law 121 (1990). For a 
collection of essays dealing with the more explicitly philosophical and normative implications in this 
case, see J. Horton (ed.), Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and Toleration (London: Macmillan, 1993).
25 Susan Moller Okin, ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?’ in Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & 
Martha Nussbaum (eds.) Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?: Susan Moller Okin with 
Respondents (Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 9.
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toward gender equality is belied by the easy adoption of a permissive policy on polygamy” given 
the burdens that this practice imposes upon women.26 But for the French government, the 
problem with wearing head-scarves was never one of gender inequality. It was about the fact that 
wearing head-scarves in school would cause the ‘public* sphere to become infected by ideals and 
practices which had no place outside the ‘private’ sphere. Polygamy was a different matter, of 
course, because it was much more easily confined within the private realm. The ‘invisibility’ of 
polygamy made it much more tolerable from the point of view of the government and, we must 
assume, from the point of view of political liberals.
Regardless of whether or not the two decisions were consistent, however, it is clear that together 
they illustrate what is wrong with the strategy of privatisation. The fact that polygamy is more 
‘invisible’ merely makes it more, not less, insidious. It is precisely because the private lives of 
women (and men) are so important to them, and precisely because their actions and deliberations 
in the public realm will inevitably be shaped, thwarted or supported by their private deliberations 
about value and by their own particular understanding of the world, that the private lives of 
women must be subject to substantive principles which encourage fairness, equality, and 
openness. And similarly, it is precisely because the private lives of those who belong to cultural 
and religious groups are so important to them that the state should accommodate their public 
expression as far as possible within a polity bounded by the universal principles of individual 
autonomy and equality.
Given the diversity of beliefs and values in culturally and ethnically diverse states, and given also 
the importance of these beliefs in providing the basis for action and deliberation in the public 
realm, it is inevitable that laws will need to be implemented (and institutions structured) in ways 
that take into account the religious and moral beliefs of those groups and individuals who 
compose society. After all, “when members of ethnic communities enter into the public domain 
to pursue civic, economic, or legal roles, they do not automatically shed their identities in terms
26 Ibid.
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of religion, culture, language and dress-codes.”27 This is not necessarily to argue in favour of 
quotas which stipulate the ‘presence’ of marginalised minorities and groups in representative and 
decision-making bodies, and neither is it necessarily to argue that all religious practices can or 
should be accommodated in liberal-democratic societies. But it is to argue that ‘free’ and ‘equal’ 
participation in the political realm cannot be ensured by relegating religious and moral beliefs to 
the ‘private’ sphere just as it cannot be ensured by merely establishing constitutional guarantees 
or negative freedoms in the form of ‘rights’. In order for persons to be truly free to access their 
institutions, to be able to pursue their own lives according to values that they believe to be 
worthwhile, and to genuinely engage in substantive and meaningful debates about the nature, 
importance, and content of justice, they must be afforded the resources they need in order to 
access the freedom revealed by formal rights. Without active encouragement of autonomy- 
supportive conditions in society as a whole, rights do not secure the kind of freedom that liberals 
require.
9. Controversial Practices and the Rules of Association.
9.1 Association and Exit.
When taken together with the points made in chapter one, we can begin to get a clearer grasp of 
the ways in which private, implicit norms arising from religious or cultural values affect and 
shape the life one may lead -  and the discussions in which one may partake -  in public, and vice 
versa. But there are many other cases in which the state is legitimately required to make decisions 
about the permissibility or impermissibility of cultural beliefs which are not directly questions 
about the ability of persons to engage in ‘public reason’. For example, questions concerning the 
moral and legal recognition of polygamous or arranged marriages, as well as rules and customs 
regarding relations of affinity and consanguinity, divorce, same-sex relationships, and the age at 
which persons may be legally permitted to marry, or to engage in sexual relations, are all clearly
27 Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law, and Human Rights: The English Experience, p. 28.
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areas in which the state (and hence, justice) is legitimately concerned.28 But different groups 
understand such issues differently. Jewish law, for example, sets the age at which persons may be 
married far lower than is currently considered acceptable in Britain and the US, and Muslim law 
stipulates no minimum age at all.29 Indeed, Islamic law also expressly authorises polygamy, 
arranged marriages, and the giving of dowries.
Furthermore, Islamic law allows husbands (but not wives) to obtain a divorce through the 
unilateral declaration of talaq (which, in classical law, is not subject to any external check at all). 
As Sebastian Poulter points out, “no reason or justification for the divorce need be given [in 
either Sunni or Shi’ite law], nor does the wife even have to be notified of the talaq for it to be 
effective.”30 Furthermore, once a husband has repudiated his wife through the declaration of the 
talaq there “is nothing she can do to keep her marriage in being. . .  even though she may be in no 
way at fault.”31 No such right of divorce is available to women, who must seek either their 
husband’s consent to dissolve the marriage (which, of course, can be withheld at any time for any 
reason), or leave the Muslim faith (and all the ties of community and family and belief embodied 
in it) and become an apostate. The consequence of the latter is the same as the consequence of 
the talaq, namely, forfeiture of any right to maintenance, alimony, or child support.32
Similarly, orthodox Jewish law in Britain “continues to incorporate the feature that a husband 
may refuse to consent to a divorce and cannot be over-ruled by a rabbinical court, whereas a man 
can be granted a divorce without his wife’s consent.”33 As Brian Barry points out, it is not 
difficult to appreciate that such rules give men a significant advantage in gaining a favourable
28 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘The Logic of Intercultural Evaluation’, in S. Mendus & J. Horton (eds.) Identity, 
Difference, and Toleration.
29 Jewish law sets the limit at 13 for boys and 12 for girls. According to Islamic law, children cannot be 
given up for marriage before ‘puberty’ although they can be contracted into marriage before that 
time. See Sebastian Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs, chapter 2.
30 Ibid. p. 99.
31 Ibid. p. 101.
32 Ibid. See also Keith Hodgkinson, Muslim Family Law: A Sourcebook', and Henry J. Steiner & Philip 
Alston (eds.) International Human Rights Law in Perspective: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and 
Materials.
33 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2001), p. 157.
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settlement.34 For example, Judith Rotem tells “the miserable story of an ultra-Orthodox, destitute 
mother of three whose family had paid [her husband] to give [his consent to divorce], leaving no 
money to cater for the needs of the divorcee and her children [while] her husband. . .  had re­
married and was lavishing attention and financial comfort on his new family, ignoring the old.”35
How should liberals respond to such examples of ‘cultural diversity’?36 Clearly, liberals must 
begin by asking who it is that is defending these cultural practices, and who are going to be 
affected by them. For liberals, as we will see more clearly in chapters four and five, it is not 
enough to say that ‘Muslims’ or ‘Jews’ or ‘certain cultures’ are defending their practices, rather we 
must ask exactly which ‘Muslims’ or ‘Jews’, and which particular members, are invoking such 
defences. As we have said, liberalism does not require that all religious practices which appear to 
restrict one’s freedom must be outlawed. Rather, it requires that no such custom or practice 
should be imposed upon persons against their will, which is to say that it requires that all persons 
be capable of interpreting the worth of their various ends and attachments for themselves, and 
that each individual has the ability to change their minds about the ‘truth’ or importance of then- 
current beliefs and to pursue new and different goals as a consequence. As we said in the last 
chapter, if certain people choose to submit to what we as outsiders consider outrageous inequalities 
and unpleasant practices, then the state has no business in denying them the ‘opportunity’ to do 
so. The liberal commitment to free association does not, after all, merely defend one’s right to 
join ecological movements or human rights groups, it also defends one’s right to identify oneself 
as a member of a particular religious group, or to join such ‘autonomy-restricting’ and 
hierarchical organisations as the armed forces or tightly-managed business corporations. It would 
be a curious form of liberalism that did not allow firms to give more power to senior managers 
than to office runners, for example, or which required that the army re-structure itself so that no 
individual held more power than any other. Similarly, it would also be a curious form of
34 Ibid.
35 Oonagh Reitman, ‘Cultural Accommodation in Family Law: Jewish Divorce in England’, 
unpublished paper, quoted in Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 157.
36 After all, no response at all would represent a laissez-faire attitude toward the toleration of cultural 
and religious diversity which would itself require justification.
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liberalism that devolved to private firms the power to keep their employees working for them 
against their will, or which allowed the army to deny their members the ability to leave if they so 
desire. Hence, liberal-egalitarianism does not require each and every group or community to 
organise itself according to the strictly egalitarian principles that are appropriate for the state. 
Rather it requires merely that each and every group or association enables its members to make 
up their own mind about whether they wish to be a member of that group or not. Consequently, 
what liberal states have done -  and what they should do -  is allow individuals to submit to those 
forms of authority to which they consent, while providing them with the legal and political 
protections necessary for them to leave if they so desire.37 Liberalism therefore requires all 
groups to provide their members with the ability to question their ends and the freedom to act 
on these reflections, even if persons use their freedom to submit to forms of authority that we as 
outsiders consider of little or no worth.38
Hence, it is entirely acceptable from a liberal point of view for an individual to choose to live the 
life of, for example, a put-upon office junior or to suffer what we as outsiders might consider 
outrageous humiliations in the pursuit of a particular goal, but it is only acceptable if the state 
ensures that he has the legal entitlement to stop living this life and pursue a different one at any 
time. The liberal state must therefore ensure not only that all persons have the legal right to leave 
a group or organisation to which they belong but, as we will see more clearly in the next chapter, 
that a person’s decision to leave does not condemn him to a life of destitution or leave them 
without any ability to do anything else.
This principle holds also for cultural, ethnic, and religious groups, but for such groups the 
conditions for ‘exit’ are more complex, and will often require groups to be liberalised to a greater 
extent than many theorists and commentators suggest.39 Just as liberal states should not devolve 
power onto private associations and companies in order to force compliance or continued loyalty
37 See Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f  Multiculturalism.
38 See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture and Contemporary Political Philosophy:
An Introduction.
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among their members, so they should not give power to cultural or religious groups to force 
persons to accede to -  and take part in -  customs and traditions that they might otherwise reject. 
The difference, of course, is that the right of exit from associations like companies and clubs and 
so on generally means little more (or requires little more) than the protection of certain ‘negative’ 
freedoms through legal restrictions on what organisations can and cannot do, while ‘exiting’ one’s 
cultural or religious group often involves the ‘rejection’ of a belief or set of ideals or principles 
with which one identifies on a very deep level, and which one has adopted as a constitutive 
aspect of one’s life. Consequently, the conditions for exit require more than merely the 
instantiation of certain legal or political freedoms and entails the need to foster those conditions 
which allow persons to reflect meaningfully upon their ends.
This is a complex issue and will be explored fully in the next chapter. For now, it is sufficient to 
acknowledge that, in all these cases, the principle is the same. While liberals may disagree about 
the preconditions of consent and what consent actually entails, they converge on the idea that the 
only legitimate form of authority is that which the individual ‘imposes’ upon him or herself. That 
is, just as the only legitimate form of political authority is that which has gained the consent of 
the governed, for liberals, so the only legitimate form of religious or cultural authority is that to 
which the individual ‘consents’ through his or her continued membership of the group. Hence, 
any measures which would deny the individual’s capacity to interpret their own ends and to 
reflect upon the worth of the values and ideal which prevail in their community is, from a liberal 
point of view, illegitimate, and any group or elite which claims legitimacy while denying persons 
the ability to leave (in the sense that they are able to reject them if they so desire, and believe 
something else). While liberals might disagree about what is required by the state in order that 
this capacity for decision (and hence, exit) is made accessible and meaningful to people, they 
converge on the notion that the legitimacy of authority (whether at the level of community 
practices, or the state) is conferred by one’s consent to these practices and that, therefore, these 
practices are publicly justifiable to those persons who are to be affected by them. Liberalism
39 See next chapter.
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cannot, therefore, recognise or tolerate practices which rob women or anyone else of the ability 
to question the ends and ideals handed to them by their religious or cultural communities. Hence, 
liberalism cannot tolerate talaq divorce in the way that it is traditionally formulated because it 
effectively removes women from the justificatory process in a way that is inimical to the 
fundamental liberal principles of equality and freedom. And neither can it recognise polygamy or, 
as we will see in the next chapter, the exclusion of women (or anyone else) from school classes 
which are necessary to provide them with the intellectual and psychological capacities -  and the 
knowledge -  to reflect meaningfully on their ends and to question their own values and ideals.
9.2 Marriage, Divorce, and the Principle o f Universalisation.
One way of responding to this claim, of course, would be to universalise the right to invoke the 
talaq. But this would only extend the inequalities embodied in such a practice to all. After all, as 
we have already pointed out, the talaq does not simply embody the right of a husband to 
unilaterally repudiate his wife for no reason and without her consent, it also embodies the claim 
that, in doing so, the husband need pay no alimony or child maintenance. Consequently, making 
talaq open to all would actually condemn an even greater number of men and women (inside and 
outside the Muslim community) who could not afford to leave the marital home to oppressive, 
unhappy, and perhaps violent marriages. Equality is not best served by making non-Muslims as 
well as Muslims, or men as well as women, equally subject to oppression by their partners.
The point is an important one, however, because the principle of universalisation has been 
invoked by a number of theorists as a response to polygamy. Claims that polygamy (or, more 
accurately, polygyny) contravene the liberal principle of gender equality can be countered, it is 
said, by extending to women the right to take multiple spouses. Bhikhu Parekh, for example, 
argues that “polygamy, meaning a man having multiple wives, is sexist and unacceptable for that 
reason alone . . . But,” he asks, “what about polygamy which allows both sexes the same 
freedom? [This] violates no liberal principle, for it is based on uncoerced choices of adults, causes
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no apparent harm, encourages experiments in living, and relates to the realm of privacy with 
which the liberal state should not interfere.”40
Parekh repeats this point in two other articles. “[T]he constitution,” he says, “may require that 
men and women should be treated equally. That does not in itself entail monogamy, for the 
equality of the sexes only implies that men and women should enjoy equal freedom to choose 
their marriage partners, not that they should marry only one person.”41 If “men are allowed 
polygyny, then women should be allowed polyandry . . .  [T]he ban on [polygamy] needs a 
stronger and better-argued justification than a mere appeal to the principle of the equality of the 
sexes.”42 The same point is made by Joseph Carens and Melissa Williams who argue that the 
gender inequalities embodied in polygamy “would appear to be remedied by a legal regime that 
permitted women as well as men to have multiple spouses, even if, among Muslims, only men 
availed themselves of this opportunity.”43
But this surely misses the point. What Parekh, Williams, and Carens fail to realise is that it is not 
the fact that it is only open to men that makes polygamy objectionable from a liberal point of 
view, but that the practice itself embodies unacceptable inequalities and subordinations. As Brian 
Barry has put it, “the objectionable asymmetry of power . . .  is the inequality . . . within a 
polygamous marriage (whether polygynous or polyandrous). . .  [PJeople in western liberal 
societies are free to form any personal relationships they like, subject to a prohibition on incest. 
The question is what forms of relationship should be defined as constituting marriage for legal 
purposes, and the argument against polygamy is that systematically unequal forms should not be
40 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘A Varied Moral World’, Boston Review 22/5 (1997), pp 25-28. See also, Re- 
Thinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
41 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘The Logic of Intercultural Evaluation’, in J. Horton & S. Mendus (eds.) Identity, 
Difference, and Toleration, pp. 163-197, p. 169.
42 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy’, in D. Beetham (ed.) Defining and 
Measuring Democracy (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 199-221, p. 217.
43 Joseph H. Carens & Melissa S. Williams, ‘Muslim Minorities in Liberal Democracies: The Politics 
of Misrecognition’, in R. Bhargava ed., Secularism and Its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp. 137-173, p. 155-156.
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recognised.”44 Liberalism is not, of course, wedded to any particular conception of marriage, or 
to marriage at all, but it is wedded to equality and individual autonomy. It may well be the case 
that monogamy embodies pervasive and fundamental gender inequalities -  as a number of feminist 
writers have claimed - and if so, then this would be a good liberal argument against the state 
recognition of monogamous marriages too.45
When considering how the liberal state should respond to polygamy or the talaq (and whether or 
not the principle of universalisation represents an adequate liberal response to the inequalities 
embodied in them), then, it is important to remember the role that these practices play in the 
context of a person’s life as a whole. Polygamy, for example, is merely one aspect of a much 
wider, structural inequality between men and women in Islamic law. When taken alone, it may 
well seem that the inequalities embodied in polygamy are indeed resolved by extending the right 
to take multiple partners to women. But this argument soon collapses when we examine this 
practice in the context of those other norms and customs which regulate and define the ‘non­
political’ lives of Muslim women. After all, we must remember, Islamic law allows husbands to 
control a wife’s movements, deny her a divorce for no reason, and to force her acquiescence in 
virtually all aspects of her life through threats of psychological or physical abuse.
It is difficult to see how the strategy of universalising the right to beat or ill-treat one’s spouse (s) 
would make doing so any more acceptable from a liberal point of view. What makes polygamy 
unacceptable from a liberal point of view is that it forces certain persons (overwhelmingly, 
women) to engage in relations that they have no meaningful ability to leave, given their wider 
status within the group.46 Enshrining in law the right of women to take multiple spouses would
44 Brian Barry, Culture & Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f Multiculturalism, p. 369, n. 96.
45 There are, of course, many good liberal and feminist arguments in favour of legally recognising 
monogamous relationships. Not least among these, and most pertinent to the discussion at hand, is 
the security that legally enforced restitution gives to partners (and especially women) who decide to 
leave their partners. This is evidenced in such measures as the strengthening of divorce laws, the 
requirement that estranged fathers contribute to the raising of their children, and the instantiation of 
alimony. These again are required by the liberal principle of exit.
46 Susan Moller Okin, ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?’ Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & 
Martha Nussbaum (eds.) Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?: Susan Moller Okin with
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not resolve the inequality that exists within marriages that were entered into by women who, 
given their status in the particular religious group of which they are a member, have little or no 
choice in the matter.
This is seen most clearly, of course, if we look more closely at who the right to engage in these 
acts is being extended to. There are, of course, two senses in which the practice of polygamy 
could be ‘universalised’. One would be to establish a law that made it possible for all men and 
women -  regardless of their particular beliefs -  to enter into polygynous or polyandrous 
marriages. The other would be to argue that the right to take multiple marriage partners should 
be extended only to Muslim women. Neither is plausible. Extending to everyone (i.e. Muslims and 
non-Muslims) the right to take multiple partners fails to address the fundamental point that only 
certain members of certain communities will be coerced into engaging in these marriages, or that 
only certain members of certain communities will be required (by their religion, their friends, 
their families) to engage in relations -  and submit to subordinations and inequalities -  that they 
have no ability to question or reject, given their wider status within that religion or culture or 
ethnic group. Muslim women do not refrain from taking multiple partners because the state says 
they cannot. Rather, they do not do so because it is not a religious requirement that they do so. 
The clear implication of the universalisation strategy advanced by Parekh, Carens, and Williams is 
that Muslim women are being held back from taking multiple husbands by the liberal state and a 
change in the law would render them able to act on their desire to marry more than one partner. 
But this is not the case. If the right to take multiple partners were extended by the state to 
women, Muslim women would still be unable to do so without fundamentally contradicting an 
important aspect of their religion (namely, that only men are able to take multiple partners). That 
is, exercising their newly-acquired right to marry more than one man would require Muslim 
women to exit their community (and hence, to give up their religious beliefs and become 
apostates).
Respondents (Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 9.
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And the same holds true for other cultural practices too. What if we were to argue, for instance, 
that the ‘right* to wear a chador or veil in public should be extended to everyone in society, 
including male Muslims? Or that the ‘right’ to wear turbans should be extended to non-Sikhs and 
Sikh women? Or, to bring the discussion full circle, that the power of talaq should be extended to 
everyone, including female Muslims? Again, such a response would entirely miss what is at issue. 
The point is not that all persons should have the right to engage in any of these acts, but that all 
persons should be protected from being forced to engage in them against their will simply 
because their religious or cultural norms tell them they should. Attempting to resolve the 
inequality embodied in the covering of Muslim women by extending to men the right to wear a 
similar veil, for example, misunderstands the role that such a practice occupies in Islamic law, and 
misunderstands too the freedoms revealed by liberal principles. The point, again, is that in liberal 
societies Muslim and non-Muslim men and women already possess the right to wear a chador if 
they so desire: they are free to wear whatever they want. But only Muslim women would be subject 
to pressure to wear a chador by their mosque, their families, and their husbands. O nly Muslim 
women would be considered shameful or sinful if they refused to cover themselves. Similarly, 
anyone in a liberal society has the right to wear a turban if they wish, but only male Sikhs are 
required to wear them. And extending to Muslim women the legal right to invoke the talaq would not 
resolve any of the inequalities embodied in such a practice, because exercising such a right would 
mean renouncing a core tenet of Islam. To universalise the power of talaq to Muslim women 
would contravene a fundamental principle of Islamic law and would thus make no sense as a 
strategy of resolving inequalities within the group. Short of rewriting Islamic law from the 
bottom up, and seeking to persuade Muslims across the world that this new liberalised form of 
Islam is in fact the better or ‘truer’ form despite millennia of scholarship and teaching to the 
contrary, talaq would still be a weapon wielded by men only. Similarly, extending the right to non- 
Muslim men and women would do nothing to resolve the inequality between Muslim men and 
their wives.
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What all this points to, albeit tentatively at this stage, is a specifically liberal account of authority 
rooted in the notion of consent. For the liberal, the only legitimate form of authority is that 
which is, in a very real sense, self-imposed. And this is as true of cultural and religious authority 
as it is of political authority. Just as the only legitimate political arrangements are those which are 
publicly justifiable to all (under liberal conditions of freedom and equality), so the forms of 
power and authority embodied in religious and cultural groups are only legitimate if they are 
similarly justifiable to each of their members. This means that it is a responsibility of the liberal 
state to provide all persons with the genuine capacity to reflect upon, and hence, to endorse or 
reject, those forms of authority under which they find themselves.
10. Private Space, Public Freedom.
10.1 Reclaiming the Public/Private Dichotomy.
What, then, does the foregoing discussion tell us about liberalism, and about the way in which 
liberal political theory should respond to cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity? Importantly, it 
tells us that we should reject the political liberal distinction between public and private, but that we 
need not reject any such public/private distinction. It would be a mistake to point out the 
inadequacies of the political liberal strategy of ‘isolating the political* and then to conclude, on the 
basis of this alone, that there is no distinction to be made between an individual’s public and 
private experience.47 Such statements, as we will see later, are often taken by communitarians, 
republicans, and difference-theorists as proof that liberalism is internally flawed and that 
therefore the aim of establishing a liberal conception of justice (which places limits upon state 
action by appealing to some nebulous and ambiguously-defined ‘private’ realm) is, as Poulter puts 
it, necessarily “doomed to failure.”48 How then, can liberals support a distinction between public 
and private, given what we have already said about the overlap that exists between them (in terms 
of the claims for recognition made by minority cultures, of the necessarily comprehensive nature 
of personal autonomy, and also the ability of individuals to deliberate about the content of justice
47 Shane O’Neill, Impartiality in Context.
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itself through public discourse and agreement)? The remainder of this chapter is devoted to 
pulling together the threads of the argument thus far by tying our discussion of the 
public/private split to the wider discussion about consent and association. It is therefore my 
intention to lay the normative groundwork necessary for the more wide-ranging argument that 
follows.
10.2 The Many Inconsistencies o f Political Liberalism.
Political liberals strive above all to establish a ‘free-standing’ conception of justice which limits its 
scope to the political institutions which compose the state and which does not claim its 
justification in any particular controversial set of ideas about the good life for all. However, we 
have also seen that this project is undermined in three ways. The first is that, in order to 
safeguard and encourage basic freedoms in the public realm, the liberal state is inevitably required 
to encourage (or impose) certain measures and conditions in the non-political (or ‘private’) realm 
of faith, culture, and the family.49 The second is that, in order to live a particular way of life freely, 
the political sphere must necessarily embody the conditions which allow this way of life to be 
pursued in public.50 And thirdly, as we saw in chapter one, and as we will see more clearly in 
chapters four and five, liberalism (even political liberalism) inevitably represents a 'controversial' 
doctrine in its insistence that all persons, regardless of what group or community they belong to, 
adopt a particular, 'reasonable' standpoint with regard to their own ways of life for the purposes 
of deriving substantive principles of justice. To adopt such a standpoint is, liberals argue, to act 
‘reasonably’. To fail to do so is to act ‘unreasonably’ and hence, in a way that might legitimately 
be corrected through coercion. However, the ability to deliberate in such a way presupposes an 
ability on the part of every individual to understand themselves, and their ends and ideals, and 
their relation to the world, in a particular way. But the ability and the willingness to understand 
oneself in this way, and to engage in liberal public reason does not arise naturally or inevitably, 
rather it must be fostered and encouraged by liberal institutions. People are not born believing
48 Sebastian Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs.
49 See chapter one.
50 See section 4.
98
that liberal dialogue is the best way of resolving political conflicts and working out the nature and 
requirements of justice; rather, liberal dialogue must be shown to be the right way of deriving 
principles of justice, and more appropriate than merely appealing to our own particular 
comprehensive beliefs in order to derive our own understanding of justice. Consequently, 
political liberals must realise that (given the comprehensive nature of our beliefs and ideals, and 
of the values of freedom and autonomy, and of the virtues embodied in political liberalism), the 
universal acceptance of reasonableness and of the validity of the impartial standpoint must be 
encouraged in all persons regardless of their own particular values. This will necessarily entail 
encouraging persons to regard their own ends and beliefs from a particular perspective, and 
encouraging them also that this is the right perspective to take when thinking about justice.
Now, this third point poses a significant problem iorpolitical liberals but it is not a problem that 
all liberals need worry about. One reason for this is that, as we claimed earlier, it is inevitably (and 
necessarily) a role of the liberal state to set limits upon what persons can and cannot do in their 
private fives. As we have already seen, it would be a mistake to argue that political liberals seek to 
ensure the unfettered pursuit of private ends regardless of what these ends might be, as even 
political liberals maintain that the private realm must be subject to some form of regulation via 
public principles and legislation which aim at the eradication of harm, etc. Indeed, a state which 
appeared to conceive the private fives of individuals to be so sacrosanct that it permitted 
complete freedom to act in any way that that individual wished would fail to protect the well­
being of others and so would cease to be liberal.51 However, in conceiving the public/private 
split in the way they do, political liberals ignore that the relationship between ‘political’ and ‘non- 
political’, or ‘public’ and ‘private’ experience, will often be a subtle and ambiguous one.52 For 
instance, the conditions that prevail in the political realm will inevitably encroach upon our 
private fives not merely through explicit legislation or state sanctions (in the form of laws against 
certain kinds of behaviour, for example), but in more implicit and subtle ways too. Our ability to
51 John Rawls, The Law o f Peoples and the Idea o f Public Reason Re-Visited, p. 161
52 Veit Bader, ‘Religious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy?’, Political Theory 27/5
(1999), p. 597-633.
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access public resources (like jobs, money, and so on) will have unavoidable consequences for the 
way in which we live our lives in private, and for the extent to which we understand ourselves as 
capable of pursuing those ends and projects which are most important to us. We might want to 
consider here, for example, the extent to which a lack of employment (and the scarcity of income 
that will arise as a result) will often deny us the ability of joining (or renewing our membership 
of) organisations and groups that we consider very important to us. Or we might want to 
consider the ways in which our ability (or inability) to compete for jobs or offices on an equal 
basis with others in the public realm will variously affect the way in which we view ourselves and 
our abilities in private. Some will be able to brush aside failure in the public realm without 
suffering any significant angst or resentment; others, on the other hand, may feel the affects of 
these failures spill over into their private lives to the extent that they affect the very deepest 
sources of their self-identity, especially if these failures are common and/or symptomatic of 
wider discrimination in society. Often, that is, personal well-being (and one’s sense of self-worth) 
will be supported or undermined by the recognition one receives in the public realm, and thus the 
capacity of the individual to access public institutions is, for many, an important factor in the way 
they understand themselves and their abilities across both realms. Furthermore, the occupation 
of public roles and offices inevitably confers an important sense of membership or ‘belonging’ in 
the wider society which not only carries with it the explicit capacity to access the conventional 
public decision-making processes and structures which create and perpetuate the conditions 
which prevail in both the ‘public’ and ‘private’ realms, but also the implicit ability of individuals 
to feel that they occupy some definite role in society and that they have some form of bond or 
connection both with those around them and with the institutional and constitutional structures 
which bound and regulate their actions.53
From not being able to afford to travel to our place of worship, to losing our status in the 
community as a result of some public disgrace; from not being able to pursue our private 
interests and fulfilments, to not being able to send our children to the school we might choose,
53 This is obviously an important issue and one which will be developed throughout the rest of this
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or to university; our capacity to lead fruitful and rewarding lives in the pursuit of ends and beliefs 
which are important to us (that is, to fulfil our most deeply felt aspirations and goals), will be 
constrained and limited and circumscribed, to some extent, by our capacity to freely access public 
resources and institutions and engage in public discourses with others on a free and equal basis. 
Indeed, it is precisely this fact that makes the derivation of just political principles so important; it 
is precisely because the political realm will be so influential in the success or failure of both our 
private and public aspirations that we must expend so much time and energy making sure that we 
get the character of our social and political institutions right. Rawls knew this when he drew up 
his list of ‘primary goods’ (despite his later works being unsuitable to deliver them). Mill knew it 
too, as did other thinkers as diverse as Locke, Condorcet, and T.H. Green.54 Indeed, before the 
advent of contemporary ‘political’ liberalism, the public/private split was never seen as a way of 
splitting apart the ethical and political experience of the individual in order to isolate them in 
distinct realms. Rather it was seen as a principled strategy aimed at establishing the justifiable 
limits of state power over the individual which sought to place all persons under the jurisdiction 
of a coherent system of principles that took as their end certain universal claims about the value 
of freedom and equality.
Political liberalism cannot secure these aims and, indeed, it seems unwilling to commit itself to 
them at all, arguing instead that freedom and equality are values that can be isolated within the 
realm of politics (and which make themselves accessible to all merely by virtue of their existence) 
in this realm. In conceiving the split between public and private in the way it does, that is, 
political liberalism would appear to assert not only that we are able to pursue our private ends 
and beliefs in abstraction from all that characterises the political realm, but also that our private 
beliefs are, in the end, not answerable to -  or affected by - the political realm.
thesis.
54 See John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960);
The Marquis de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture o f the Progress o f the Human Mind 
(1795), trans. June Barraclough (London, 1955), p. 179-183; and R. L. Nettleship (ed.) The Works o f 
Thomas Hill Green (London, 1889).
101
Political liberals, of course, would reject all of this. They would no doubt argue that their 
commitment to public freedom embodies their belief that individuals require certain basic 
conditions of liberty if they are to be capable of pursuing their private ends fully and fruitfully. 
That is, they might say, political liberalism expresses the idea that private beliefs can only be 
pursued if the state encourages in society the basic freedoms which allow them to do so. Indeed, 
our discussion in section 4.1 might well be seen to lend a certain amount of support to this view. 
However, if this is the case, then political liberals must make up their minds exactly what their 
position is on the nature and role of the public/private split. They must either argue that their 
conception of the political realm extends into controversial areas such as the internal organisation 
of religious and cultural groups, or they must choose to stick to the idea that the political realm is 
somehow separable from this realm of ‘private’ understandings and values. That is, they are 
inevitably faced with a choice between establishing a ‘free-standing’ conception of justice (which 
somehow seeks to divorce itself from the complex and potentially volatile realm of culture and 
faith), and conceding that that the internal structure of groups and associations and communities 
is as much a subject for justice as anything else and that, consequently, our private experience will 
inevitably and necessarily animate and circumscribe our public deliberations about the content of 
justice. Quite clearly, when put this way, political liberals generally choose the former (because it 
expresses the basic political liberal claim that the state should not claim its justification in any 
particular conception of the good, and that the content of justice should be derived via a process 
of public reason which excludes one’s more substantive and personal ideas about the world and 
one’s relation to it). Once we realise however, that one’s ‘comprehensive’ doctrines necessarily 
affect and animate not only one’s private lives, but also the lives and pursuits that one is capable 
of leading in public, then the political liberal notion that persons are capable of engaging in 
discourse and deliberation in the public realm which stands independent of, and at a distance to, 
these private comprehensive beliefs collapses.
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103 Consent and the Social Contract.
It would appear then, that political liberalism embodies a very real tension at its heart concerning 
the capacity of the state to make claims about the relative ‘justice’ or ‘injustice’ of particular 
cultural or religious practices even though it must do so in order to establish the conditions 
appropriate for the conduct of public reason. Political liberals argue that inequalities between 
husbands and wives, or between parents and children, therefore, are not a fitting subject for 
political action unless they can be shown to place unfair constraints upon a persons political 
autonomy. But if what we have said thus far is true (that one’s political autonomy is directly and 
importantly linked to their autonomy in other areas of their lives), then this means that political 
liberalism is no more tolerant of religious or cultural practices than comprehensive liberalism.
While this tension is both obvious and problematic for political liberalism, it is, however, not a 
tension which need concern liberalism perse. This is because it is entirely consistent with liberal 
principles to retain the public/private split without claiming that the government cannot overstep 
this divide in the interests of protecting important individual freedoms, or that one’s 
comprehensive beliefs and ideals must be excluded from debates about the content of justice. 
Some critics argue that such claims spell the end of the distinction itself, but this is false. As we 
have already mentioned, the development of the liberal distinction between public and private 
grew out of a rejection of the idea that the state could actively strive to make one’s life better (in 
the sense that it should not aim at the improvement of the individual through the enforcement or 
imposition of certain first-order values or beliefs). Such self-improvement, it was argued, could 
only come as a result of decisions and deliberations made by the individual him or herself.55 It 
was not the place of the state to coerce individuals into adopting certain ways of life through 
force. Rather it was the job of the state to provide all persons, regardless of their particular beliefs 
and values, with the resources they needed in order to make meaningful decisions about what 
kind of lives they wanted to lead, what values they endorsed, and, importantly, what forms of 
authority they were willing to submit to.
55 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, ‘Foundations of Liberal Equality’, Tanner Lectures on Human
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Historically, this commitment to the principle of choice and to the idea that persons can actively 
contribute to the way in which their lives unfold by making decisions based upon their inherited 
values and beliefs and commitments can most obviously be found in Locke, Kant, and Mill, but 
can just as easily be seen in the work of such theorists as Condorcet, Constant, Tocqueville, 
Jefferson, and Paine.56 For them, as for many contemporary liberals, the public/private split 
represented what was to be the founding principle (and the logical consequence) of the social 
contract tradition: that “we cannot remain absolutely free, and [that we] must give up some of 
our liberty to preserve the rest.”57 And so, as Berlin points out, the central question for these 
(and other) ‘liberal’ theorists concerned the amount of personal freedom that persons should 
sacrifice in the interests of securing social and political institutions which protected above all else 
those freedoms and liberties that the individual retained, and supreme amongst these freedoms 
(or the principle that underpinned and animated them all) was the idea that all individuals should 
be provided with the ‘space’ we need in order to “pursue our own good in our own way,”58 free 
from the intrusions and manipulations of the state, other people, and other groups. 
Consequently, the bounds of the public, political realm are determined by working out exactly 
what the state needs to do (and how far it has to reach) in order to protect certain basic and 
fundamental freedoms within the private realm. All individuals, these theorists argued, need the 
space to reflect upon their aims and abilities and goals and therefore the state has a duty to 
protect this private space from those external factors which encroach upon it (and which 
therefore, thwart or constrain our capacity for self-reflection). And so the state has a duty to 
protect us from harm, and from instability, and from unwarranted intrusion or oppression not 
only because harm and tyranny are evils in themselves, but also because they undermine our
Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988).
56 See, for example, The Marquis de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture o f the Progress o f the 
Human Mind, trans. June Barraclough (London, 1955); Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, trans. 
Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America’, Thomas Jefferson, Political Writings, trans. J. Appleby & T. Ball 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Bruce Kuklick (ed.) The Political Writings o f 
Thomas Paine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
57 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, The Proper Study o f Mankind (Pimlico, 1998), p. 191- 
243, p. 198.
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capacity to decide for ourselves the way we wish to live our lives, what we believe, what we reject, 
and how we understand ourselves and our place in the world.
Where Berlin and a number of other liberals went wrong, however, is in their claim that 
‘negative’ freedom was enough.59 While the state has no business in trying to impose certain 
substantive ways of life upon us, that is, it does have a duty to provide everyone with the requisite 
resources to deliberate meaningfully upon the value of their inherited beliefs and of the cultural 
practices which regulate and define their most deeply-held self-understandings. And it does have 
the responsibility to encourage those conditions which enable all persons to consent to those 
forms of authority that they believe are worthwhile and justifiable, and to withdraw their consent 
(and hence, their support) for those forms of authority that they do not believe are legitimate, 
whether they be the state or cultural or religious hierarchies. For this reason, we should not seek 
to reject the public/private distinction entirely. Yet neither should we embrace the conception of 
this distinction put forward by political liberals because there is nothing illiberal or coercive about 
claiming that, in certain circumstances, the state has a responsibility to encourage certain 
conditions in the ‘private’ lives of individuals if in doing so important and basic freedoms are 
protected, and the conditions that one needs to give or withdraw consent (from the state, or the 
any other association or group to which they belong) are encouraged.
Correctly understood, then, the distinction between the political and the non-political captures 
the fundamental liberal concern to establish the source and the limits of authority. Social contract 
theorists applied their theories almost exclusively to the realm of political authority. But we can 
and should conceive the contract more widely, as applying to other forms of authority as well.
Once we do so, the substance of the foregoing discussion is revealed more clearly. Embodied in 
the contract was the central notion that consent could be given (and hence, freedom ensured) by 
simply providing persons with the freedom from ‘external impediments’ to action (i.e. negative
58 John Stuart Mill, chap. 1, On Liberty (Oxford, 1991), p. 17.
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freedoms).60 But, if what we have said this far is true, the ability for one to give one’s consent to 
a particular political arrangement is undermined and affected by the implicit, subjective norms 
and circumstances in which one is enmeshed. Our education, beliefs, self-confidence, and our 
self-understanding will all affect our ability to understand (and to afford genuine consent to) the 
authorities that govern us. And this is only too clear when we extend this model to cultural and 
religious communities, as we have begun to see, and as we will see more clearly in the chapters 
that follow.
11. Conclusion.
During the course of this and the previous chapter I have made a number of claims, some of 
which have been substantiated and some which have yet to be elaborated sufficiently. I have 
applied the political liberal response to diversity to a number of concrete examples of cultural 
diversity and have found it untenable. I have tried to show, somewhat tentatively at this stage, 
that liberals are necessarily committed to the idea that individuals should be free to lead their 
lives in pursuit of ends that they believe to be valuable, and that this idea necessarily requires the 
state to ensure conditions of freedom and equality in both their public and their private lives. As 
much contemporary feminist theory has shown, tyranny, coercion, and imposed authority often 
find their most potent, pervasive and subtle expression in the norms and networks which 
characterise the private lives of individuals (which have often been reified and perpetuated 
throughout the course of history). This is true, as our initial examination of various real practices 
has revealed, and as our later discussions will confirm. Consequently, any doctrine which seeks 
above all to provide persons with the resources they need to free themselves from imposed 
structures of authority must acknowledge that an important (indeed, integral) part of this process 
must be the encouragement of certain conditions in the private lives of individuals in order that 
persons are not thwarted in their attempts to access public institutions by the particular cultural 
and moral beliefs embodied in the religious or cultural communities to which they belong. And
59 As we will see in the next chapter and those that follow.
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similarly, the social, political, and legal institutions that regulate and govern the lives of an 
inevitably diverse populace should claim their justification in the fact that they truly express the 
interests of those to whom they are responsible, and the most significant way in which they 
might do so is to provide all persons with the freedom and the resources they need to pursue 
their lives in accordance with values and ideals that they believe to be worthwhile (within 
parameters which are themselves fairly derived and acceptable to all those to whom they are to 
apply).61 Liberals are, or should be, concerned to eradicate conditions of domination and 
inequality manifested in the relationship between individuals and the state. They should also be 
concerned to eradicate domination and inequality in the relationships individuals share with each 
other through the various groups and associations to which they belong. This requires liberal 
institutions to ensure that norms and structures of authority embodied in the ‘non-political’ lives 
of individuals are as subject to interpretation, questioning, and revision as forms of political 
authority. This means that liberal institutions have a duty to ensure that all persons are able to 
interpret, revise, and potentially reject the forms of authority under which they find themselves, 
even if the groups to which one belongs would prefer otherwise. Just as political institutions and 
practices are unjust if they do not attract the consent of those governed by them, so religious and 
cultural norms are unjust if they are imposed upon persons who do not have the ability to 
question -  and hence, exit -  them. One’s ability to question and interpret the role and 
responsibility of political institutions (and justice more widely) depends on their ability to adopt 
an ‘autonomous’, reflective perspective with regard to their particular ends, attachments, and 
commitments.62
What this reveals is the idea that our ‘comprehensive’ doctrines are not merely comprehensive in 
name but in the effect that they have on every aspect of our lives includingthe way in which we 
‘reason’ about the nature of justice. To seek to isolate comprehensive doctrines in a distinct 
‘political’ or ‘non-political’ realm is inevitably to deny that these doctrines are actually
60 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin Press, 1981).
61 See chapter five.
62 As we will see more clearly in part two of this thesis.
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‘comprehensive’ at all and is to suggest that we are capable of understanding ourselves and our 
ideals and ways of life and values in a particular way which is universally acceptable and 
achievable by all, regardless of what these beliefs and ways of life are. It is precisely because our 
membership of certain communities and groups and faiths is important to us, and precisely 
because our public and private lives will be shaped and affected by beliefs and understandings 
that we have of the world, that political liberalism fails to provide an adequate response to the 
most pressing and significant questions concerning the role of cultural and religious beliefs in our 
deliberations about justice and the rightful structure of political institutions. The interface 
between the public and the private, between the political and the non-political, is necessarily 
blurred and indistinct. It is open to debate and to challenges from different groups and 
individuals and these challenges will inevitably be animated by the cultural, moral, and religious 
beliefs of those involved. What is important to liberals is that all persons who are to be affected 
by the consequences of these debates are afforded the resources they need to contribute to them. 
It is only through such inclusive debate and agreement that principles of justice (which respect 
the dignity and individuality of each member of society) can be found. To seek to relegate the 
moral and cultural experiences of the individual to the ‘non-political’ realm is to deny the 
pervasiveness of our moral beliefs in our actions and in the way we deliberate in public, and is 
also to ignore the important ways in which our particular cultural and religious practices impact 
upon, shape, and circumscribe our lives more widely.
Consequently, the reason why political liberals are wrong to argue that a political conception of 
justice can secure the conditions that everyone needs in order to pursue their own ends freely and 
equally without interfering in the ‘non-political’ lives of individuals is because the “account of 
autonomy they employ is stronger than they take it to be.”63 Personal autonomy cannot be 
encouraged in public unless it is also encouraged and endorsed in private. And this, we might 
well argue, goes also for the various ‘political virtues’ which Rawls cherishes and which
63 Alan Apperley, ‘Liberalism, Autonomy, and Stability’, British Journal o f Political Science 30/2
(2000), p. 291-311, p. 292.
108
“strengthen the forms of thought and feeling that sustain fair social co-operation.”64 Free and 
equal participation in the political realm depends upon ensuring that individuals respect and 
encourage freedom and equality, and it depends also upon the individual possessing the necessary 
resources to lead a life in pursuit of ends that it has deliberated upon and has come to endorse as 
worthwhile (which is to say that it must be in a position to know the alternative life choices that 
are on offer, and it must possess the ability to choose these options as a result of decisions made 
against the background of their inherited values and beliefs). If political liberals are to be 
committed to autonomy in the political realm, if they are going to commit themselves to the idea 
that individuals should be given the opportunity to pursue their own ends freely and equally 
within a social and political system which they themselves have endorsed and made legitimate, 
then they must acknowledge the extent to which this depends upon establishing autonomy- 
supportive measures within the non-political associations of individuals. The alternative is not, as 
Rawls, Macedo, Nussbaum, and other political liberals would have us believe, the political liberal 
commitment to autonomy in some circumstances and not others, but the rejection of autonomy 
altogether.
64 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 195.
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PART TWO
Chapter Three
Comprehensive Liberalism, Group Membership, 
and Inescapable Values
The liberal separation between public and private spheres, and endorsement of 
pluralism within them, encourages both access to groups in which one has a 
‘voice’ and the possibility of ‘exit’ from them as equally important parts of 
freedom of association.
Nancy L. Rosenblum, Another Liberalism: Romanticism 
and the Reconstruction o f Liberal Thought, 1987.
In part one, we saw that the political liberal strategy of ‘privatising’ cultural and religious beliefs 
(or ‘comprehensive doctrines’) while ‘politicising’ autonomy and individuality fails as a coherent 
philosophical response to cultural, religious, and ethical diversity both because it fails to 
acknowledge the inherently ‘comprehensive’ nature of those liberal values that it seeks to enshrine 
in the political sphere, and because it fails to respond coherently to those claims which affect 
members of cultural and religious minorities in liberal democratic states. It is precisely because 
our comprehensive doctrines are comprehensive (in the sense that they shape and circumscribe the 
way in which we deliberate about the validity and significance of our own ends, and also about the 
content of justice itself) that they cannot be relegated to either the 'political' or the 'non-political' 
realm in the way political liberals contend.
Consequently, we claimed, liberals face a choice: either they can commit themselves to the 
comprehensive values of autonomy and individuality and strive to encourage autonomy- 
supportive conditions in both the public and the private realms, or they can reject the ideal of 
autonomy altogether.
What, then, of those liberals who claim the latter? What of those theorists who reject individual 
autonomy entirely, preferring instead to ground liberalism in a commitment to tolerating different 
cultural or religious or ethnic groups even if the internal organisation of these groups are illiberal% 
Given what was said in the previous chapter, it is possible to predict the way in which we must
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approach this important question if the resulting argument is to remain consistent with liberal 
principles as I define them. Yet, it might be argued, it still remains to be seen exactly why we 
should value autonomy (as conceived to be incorporating both positive and negative liberty) and 
not some combination of ‘negative’ freedoms which seek to provide persons with exactly the kind 
of private ‘space’ that they might require in order that they might make spontaneous and 
meaningful choices without the ‘help’ of the state (as libertarians and classical liberals from a 
Hayekian perspective might argue).1 And why should not liberals take as their primary goal the 
accommodation of radically divergent ways of life within principles which aim at 'neutrality' or 
'impartiality' among different conceptions of the good (regardless of whether or not these 
conceptions of the good arise from the 'autonomous' choices of individuals)?
The reason why liberals cannot reject the notion of individual autonomy in favour of a more 
generalised commitment to ‘toleration’ or the establishment of ‘negative’ freedoms is that 
individual autonomy is a pre-requisite both of liberal justification, and the ability to ‘exit’ one’s 
community. We have already claimed as much in part one, but it is now necessary to substantiate 
these claims more fully in this and the following chapters in response to those prominent liberal 
and non-liberal theorists who argue otherwise. I argue that the idea that liberalism can or should 
be concerned above all with the accommodation of diversity instead of encouraging autonomy is 
untenable and that the liberal state must, in the end, be committed to tolerating only those groups 
and communities which encourage the ideal of personal autonomy (and thus the establishment of 
autonomy-supportive measures in both the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ realms).
The argument unfolds in two stages. This chapter is devoted to extending and fleshing-out the 
notion of ‘exit’. It explores those issues which concern one’s ability to reflect upon, and revise, 
those ends and attachments which constitute and shape one’s life. This builds on the conception 
of autonomy presented in the introduction to this thesis and expanded in part one. By filling in 
some of the gaps in this account now, we will by the end of this chapter, be in a position to
1 Friedrich August Hayek, The Constitution o f Liberty (London: Routledge, 1960).
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discuss the deeper and more philosophically complex issue of liberal reasoning and justification. 
In that chapter, I tie together what has already been said in order to show that individual 
autonomy operates at both levels, and hence represents a far more fundamental and necessary 
commitment to liberalism than many liberals believe.
Consequently, I develop those criticisms that I have already raised against Rawls, Macedo, 
Nussbaum, and Larmore in order to show more convincingly that the conventional debate 
between ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ liberals, or between ‘toleration-based’ liberals and 
‘autonomy-based’ liberals regarding the ethical limits of cultural toleration or recognition, is false, 
because only so-called ‘comprehensive’ liberalism (rooted in the principle of personal autonomy) 
is capable of securing those basic freedoms that all liberals (should) support. Hence, in section 12 
I discuss the account of liberalism advanced by William Galston, with the aim of showing that, 
despite his claims to the contrary, his argument necessarily invokes the principle of personal 
autonomy. I then go on (in the section 13) to discuss the notion of ‘exit’ with specific regard to 
the work of Chandran Kukathas, who is perhaps the most ardent critic of autonomy-based 
liberalism, and show that he, like Galston, fails to provide a justification of liberalism which is not, 
ultimately, rooted in the principle of autonomy. In sections 14 and 15,1 develop and extend a 
number of the points made at the end of the first chapter by addressing a number of related 
problems concerning the idea of ‘consent’ and liberal education (in relation to cultural 
membership), before bringing together the threads of the discussion in the final section.
12. William Galston and Cultural Diversity.
12.1 Two Concepts o f Liberalism?
William Galston shares the political liberal’s rejection of substantive, comprehensive values. Too 
often, he argues, liberals have sought to make universal claims regarding the nature of humankind, 
or of rationality, or of the way in which individuals relate to their ends.2 Some have claimed that
2 Charles Larmore, Patterns o f Moral Complexity. See also ‘Political Liberalism’ and ‘Pluralism and
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humanity is characterised by an intrinsic and radical individuality,3 others have sought to establish 
the ideal of autonomy,4 others still have questioned the nature of freedom at the heart of liberal 
politics,5 others the nature and scope of equality,6 or of rights,7 and, these theorists argue, the 
outcome of these debates have too often pointed to the justification of some substantive 
conception of value which is supposedly intrinsic to humanity and which must therefore be 
pursued and expressed in the social and political world in which persons find themselves. This 
substantive value, Galston argues, is too often conceived to be personal autonomy.
Consequently, we find in Galston the claim that we also find in Kukathas and Larmore, namely, 
that liberals face a choice over exactly what kind of liberal they want to be. They can either choose 
to advance the notion of individual autonomy (even if this means encouraging persons to 
understand themselves in a particular way), or they can instead seek to encourage and protect the 
diversity of ends that exist in society, even if these ends are not the product of autonomous 
choices. The overwhelming tendency among liberals, he argues, is to choose the route of 
autonomy.
Reasonable Disagreement’ in The Morals o f Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
p. 121-151, and 152 - 174, respectively.
3 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974); F.A. Hayek, The Constitution o f  
Liberty. See also John Gray, Hayek on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), and B. Crowley, 
The Self the Individual, and the Community: Liberalism in the Political Thought o f F.A. Hayek and Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
4 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture', and Multicultural Citizenship. See also W.
Kymlicka, ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality’ in Ethics 99 (1989), p. 883-905, ‘The Rights of 
Minority Cultures: A Reply to Kukathas’ in Political Theory 20 (1992), p. 140-146, and ‘From 
Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism’, unpublished paper delivered to the ‘Liberalism 
at the Millennium’ conference in political thought, Gregynog, University of Wales, 1998; Stephen 
Macedo, Liberal Virtues', Amy Gutmann, ‘Civic Education and Social Diversity’, Ethics 105 (1995),
p. 557-579; Joseph Raz, The Morality o f Freedom and Ethics in the Public Domain)', and John Rawls,
A Theory o f Justice.
5 Most famously Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969). See also Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985).
6 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberalism’, A Matter o f Principle (London: Harvard University Press, 1985),
‘What is Equality? Part One: Equality of Welfare; Part Two: Equality of Resources’, Philosophy &
Public Affairs 10/3-4, p. 185-246 and 283-345, ‘What is Equality? Part Three: The Place of Liberty’,
Iowa Law Review 73 (1987), p. 1-54, ‘What is Equality? Part Four: Political Equality’, University o f 
San Francisco Law Review 22 (1988), p. 1-30, ‘In Defence of Equality’, Social Philosophy and Policy 1 
(1983), p. 24-40.
7 Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Jeremy Waldron (ed.) 
Theories o f Rights (Oxford University Press, 1984).
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This, he argues, is a mistake. Like the later Rawls and the other political liberals, Galston argues 
that the principal goal of liberalism should not be the cultivation of some specific conception of 
the good, or the encouragement some particular understanding of our ends and values, but rather 
the resolution of those inevitable conflicts that arise out of what Rawls called the ‘fact of plurality’ 
(or, more recently, the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’).8 “Properly understood,” he argues, 
“liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not the valorization of choice.”9 Liberalism, 
therefore, should not seek to orient itself around the goals of the ‘Enlightenment’ project (that is, 
the emancipation of individuals from imposed authority), but around the goals embodied in the 
‘Reformation’ project, which sought above all else to enshrine the principle of toleration between 
radically conflictual beliefs. We should not, Galston argues, invoke the good of autonomy (in the 
way that Kant, Mill, Locke and those “Americans writing in an Emersonian vein” did10), because 
“to place an ideal of autonomous choice. . .  at the core of liberalism is in fact to narrow the range 
of possibilities available within liberal societies.”11 That is to say, any theory which takes diversity 
seriously (and which truly seeks to create a moral community in which everyone is able to pursue 
radically different ends without being forced to understand these ends (or themselves) in any 
particular way) must necessarily reject any principle which enforces certain understandings (and 
certain values) upon the whole of society. “The autonomy principle,” Galston argues, “represents 
a kind of uniformity that exerts pressure on ways of life that do not embrace autonomy.”12 
Liberals must realise that “autonomy is one possible mode of existence - one among many others; 
its practice must be respected and safeguarded; but the devotees of autonomy must recognize the 
need for respectful coexistence with individuals and groups who do not give autonomy pride of 
place.”13
8 John Rawls, Political Liberalism’, See also Charles Larmore, ‘Reasonable Disagreement’ in The Morals 
o f Modernity. This shift is significant, as we will see in the next chapter.
9 William Galston, ‘Two Concepts of Liberalism’, Ethics 105 (1995), p. 516-534, p. 523.
10 W. Galston, ‘Two Concepts of Liberalism’, p. 521.
11 Ibid. p. 523.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. p. 525.
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Unfortunately however, Galston, like Nussbaum and Macedo (and, as we will see, Larmore), fails 
to show exactly how liberalism can avoid appealing to this principle. For example, Galston states 
that it should be the primary goal of liberalism to derive “public principles, institutions, and 
practices that afford maximum feasible space for the enactment of individual and group 
differences” but he also seeks to set ethical limits on this diversity. The two qualifications he 
makes to his initial commitment to diversity are that, firstly, it should be “constrained.. .  by the 
requirements of liberal social unity,”14 and secondly, that all individuals should be afforded the 
capacity to leave the community or group in which they find themselves if they find that it no 
longer accords with their beliefs about value (that is, if they lose their faith, or come to disagree 
with any or all of the practices that are embodied in that group). I discuss this first constraint in 
the remainder of this section before exploring the implications of the second in section 13.
12.2 Social Unity and the Content o f Liberalism.
In developing the first qualification, Galston claims that the liberal state (or what he prefers to call 
the ‘Diversity State’) manifests, in the interests of establishing social unity, an “unyielding defence 
- and (where necessary) enforcement - of principles, institutions, and practices that constitute the 
core requirements of shared citizenship” and a ‘strong system of toleration’ encouraged by a 
“vigorous system of civic education that teaches tolerance...  and helps equip individuals with the 
virtues and competences they will need to perform as members of a liberal economy, society, and 
polity.”15 He makes the very valid point -  suggested in part one of this thesis - that cultural, 
ethnic, and religious groups in a single society cannot exist in isolation from one another; he 
argues that individuals will be implicated in cultural groups, but he rightly points out that these 
cultural groups will necessarily be embedded in a wider social framework which “both protects 
and circumscribes the enactments of diversity.”16 He is right to point out that it is not realistic to 
talk about cultures and groups as isolated from each other and from society as a whole, because 
members of different groups will inevitably five amongst each other, and groups themselves will
14 Ibid. p. 524.
15 Ibid. p. 528.
16 Ibid. p. 529.
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necessarily be encompassed and linked by over-arching rules and principles which regulate 
conduct between and within them. Thus, Galston concurs with the general argument made in the 
previous chapter: that liberal social unity requires the cultivation of certain attitudes and virtues in 
all individuals, regardless of their cultural, religious, or moral beliefs because all individuals will 
require equal and fair access to the social, economic, and political structures and institutions 
which compose the wider society. Consequently, he argues, cultural groups should not take 
responsibility for their own education; education is a means of cultivating not only those values 
and virtues which are needed if society is to remain unified and stable, but also the academic and 
vocational skills necessary if individuals are going to be in a position to compete realistically in the 
job market and contribute meaningfully in a unified society. It is therefore in the public interest 
(and in the interest of each and every individual), he argues, that everyone is brought up 
respecting certain values, possessing certain skills, and conceiving themselves as citizens of the 
same moral and political community.
Galston’s account of a ‘liberal’ education will be explored in the next section. For now, however, 
it must be said that if we take seriously his claims concerning the importance of a universal 
commitment to toleration, of a programme of civic education, and of common citizenship, then 
we are not necessarily led to a conception of liberalism that embraces diversity at all (at least in the 
way that Galston would support). Far from providing groups with an increased capacity to exist 
according to their own values and beliefs (and far from avoiding judgements about the way in 
which communities organise themselves), Galston’s theory explicitly rules out a great many internal 
practices (and, more importantly, far more than he himself believes).
All communities, for instance, are compelled to accept the good of (civic) education for all the 
reasons we discussed in the previous chapter (and, as we will see, for certain others). 
Consequently, claims by cultural or religious groups that advocate the removal of children from 
education (or which argue that their children should be allowed to leave school earlier than 
others) must be ruled out because in denying individuals equal access to education, these groups
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are robbing society of the resources it needs to remain unified and stable. The same must be said 
for those 'unreasonable' groups which claim that the idea of citizenship (that is, loyalty to the 
liberal polity) conflicts with the more significant loyalties they feel toward their own cultural or 
religious ways of life (for example, the Amish, or the Hutterites). Religious and cultural practices 
which, by their very nature, conflict with the idea of equal citizenship (for example, the cultivation 
of intolerance or hatred toward certain individuals or groups within society) or which deny that all 
individuals have an equal right to access the common goods and institutions of the wider society 
(as in many of the cases we discussed in part one), are similarly ruled out. And also considered 
inadmissible are claims which contradict the various basic ‘purposes’ which the state is entrusted 
to pursue (like the ‘protection of human life’, and ‘the protection and promotion of normal 
development of basic capabilities’).17
Galston’s commitment to respecting ‘deep diversity’ is therefore compromised by his subsequent 
commitment to social unity. It might appear then, that he is faced with a choice between ‘taking 
diversity seriously’ and encouraging common citizenship. If he opts for the latter, we might argue, 
he must give up the pretence that he is interested in embracing deep diversity and must seek 
instead to encourage those necessary commonalities which all citizens will need if they are to 
contribute to a unified and stable society, even though this will often entail a certain amount of 
intrusion into the internal organisations of cultural groups. If however, he opts to respect deep 
diversity, it would seem that he is compelled to drop his commitment to social unity and common 
citizenship and fall back on his second qualification of diversity (that every community must 
enshrine the individual’s right to exit). However, as we will see in the next section, Galston is 
faced with no such decision because it is precisely his commitment to common citizenship that 
makes his second qualification possible.
17 See William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtue, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York:
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13. Pluralism, Cultural Libertarianism, and the ‘Right to Exit*.
13.1 Kukathas and The Claims o f Community.
We have already begun to realise (in this and the previous chaper) the extent to which the 
encouragement of even the most basic of liberal freedoms requires the fostering of autonomy- 
supportive conditions in both the public and the private lives of individuals, and that liberal 
toleration is limited and circumscribed by a prior commitment to giving all persons the ability to 
consent to those values, practices and customs in which they engage. This will become even more 
obvious when we explore the notion of exit and consent more fully. Galston (like many liberals) 
sees the ‘right of exit’ as the fundamental prerequisite of all legitimate groups and associations, 
and -  like us - sees it as the most important standard by which the legitimacy of these groups can 
be judged. As Larmore puts it, “[p]rivate associations cannot violate the rights of citizens. . .  [y]et 
they can continue to conduct their internal, extrapolitical affairs according to ‘illiberal’ principles - 
principles that deny their members equal rights and require them to defer to traditionally 
constituted authority. . .  [T]he principle of equal respect requires that people as citizens not be 
kept a part of any private association against their will. That is, they may leave such organizations 
without any compromise of their legal and political standing. But this right to exit does not imply 
endorsement of the general idea that people should regard even their most basic commitments as 
open to revision.”18
In this section I propose to challenge this claim, and similar claims made by Galston, by 
examining the views of a third liberal whose argument turns on this notion of the ‘right to exit’ 
and represents perhaps the most adamant and extreme attempt to ground liberalism in toleration.
Chandran Kukathas understands cultural groups as ‘associations’ of individuals who are members 
of that community because they choose to be. Individuals, possessing the fundamental right of 
association (and realising that membership in communities is ‘essential’ to individual well-being)
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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freely associate with others and in doing so they affirm and endorse the internal practices of the 
communities they join.
Kukathas therefore understands the individual to be largely free to determine for herself the kind 
of community she will five in. He argues that individuals will very often understand themselves to 
be closely tied to their cultural community but that, despite this, they must always be aware that 
they are capable of leaving this community if they come to decide that the customs and practices 
that it embodies conflict with their interests.19 What every community must enshrine and support, 
then, is the equal right of every one of their members to exit (or disassociate from) the community 
in which they live and associate with another which better satisfies their interests. By enshrining 
this ‘inalienable right’ of all members to ‘leave - to renounce membership of - the community’ 
groups can claim a legitimate justification for their internal practices and customs, namely, the fact 
that, by their continued membership of them, they consent to them. Consequently, Kukathas 
argues, the interests of the individual are balanced with those of the group; “by regarding the 
group as having as its basis the acquiescence of individuals with its cultural norms,” he states, his 
theory “rejects the idea that the group as such has any right to self-preservation or protection. 
Nonetheless, by seeing the right of association as fundamental, it gives considerable power to the 
group, denying others the right to intervene in its practices - whether in the name of liberalism or 
any other moral ideal.”20
In Kukathas then, we find perhaps the most radical expression of the now all too familiar claim 
that liberalism should be concerned above all else with the protection of diversity rather than 
individual autonomy. If we want to take diversity seriously, he argues, we should realise that some 
groups will not afford a high priority to autonomy and that forcing them to do so will only force 
them to become more like the majority (thus undermining diversity). This is why he believes
18 Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, p. 140.
19 See Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’; and ‘Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to 
Kymlicka.’ See also ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: A Critique of Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, 
Journal o f Political Philosophy 5/4 (1994), p. 406-427; ‘Cultural Toleration’ in W. Kymlicka & I. Shapiro 
(eds.) NOMOS 39: Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
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Kymlicka’s ‘liberal theory of minority rights’ fails. “What is wrong with [Kymlicka’s] version [of 
liberalism],” he says, “is that it has at its core a theory of justice upholding the value of 
autonomy.”21 In contrast, Kukathas argues that the liberal state should respect the right of groups 
to organise themselves in ways that do not encourage their members’ capacity for autonomy as 
long as those groups can be seen to exist by the consent of those who belong to them. If the 
group provides its members with a right of exit, and it continues to exist and to act in ‘illiberal’ 
ways, then it must be because its members have freely consented to these practices by virtue of 
their continued membership of the community. Indeed, Galston concurs (echoing Larmore), 
groups may be illiberal in their internal organisation “as long as the freedom of entrance and exit 
is zealously safeguarded by the state”22 Such a view, Kukathas argues,
obviously gives a great deal of authority to cultural communities. It imposes no requirement on 
those communities to be communities of any particular kind. It does not require that they become 
in any strong sense ‘assimilated’, or even ‘integrated’ into the mainstream of modern society. It in 
no sense requires they be liberal societies; they indeed may be quite illiberal. There is no 
justification for breaking up such communities. . .  If members of a cultural community wish to 
continue to live by their beliefs, the outside community has no right to intervene to prevent those 
members acting within their rights.23
In addition, and contrary to Galston’s view, then, the liberal state should not concern itself greatly 
with the encouragement of social unity or some notion of common citizenship. "The wider 
society," he says, "has no right to require particular standards or systems of education within such 
cultural groups or force their schools to promote the dominant culture.”24 Rather, it should
20 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’, p. 117-118.
21 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness’, p. 426. There are fundamental problems with 
Kymlicka’s ‘liberalism’ (which I will set out in chapter 7), but they are not the fact that it is committed 
to autonomy.
22 William Galston, Two Concepts o f Liberalism, p. 533.
23 Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, p. 117.
24 Ibid. The additional claim that slips past almost unnoticed in this statement is that groups have ‘their’ own 
schools. Hence, it would seem (following the logic of his argument) that groups should be allowed to 
educate their children in segregated schools. This will be explored more fully in a later chapter.
121
merely seek to enshrine the principle of toleration between groups who choose to live their lives, 
and understand the world, in radically different ways, and who may or may not value autonomy as 
an important component of leading a ‘good’ life.
In this, of course, we again see the similarity of the diversity-based liberals' approach to that 
adopted by political pluralists like Bhikhu Parekh and John Gray, for whom the point of politics is 
to protect those attachments and ideals which define the agent's identity (and thus the aspirations 
and projects and ends conferred upon them by their 'community').25 The problem, however, is 
that both Parekh and Gray (and Kukathas and Galston) under-theorise the requirements of exit. 
Parekh, for example, argues that communites “which are cohesive, have democratically 
accountable self-governing institutions, and allow their members a right of exit play a vital role in 
giving their members a sense of rootedness, harnessing their moral energies for common 
purposes, and sustaining the spirit of cultural pluralism.”26 But then he argues that the ‘autonomy 
principle’ is a “standard assimilationist argument” which must be rejected in the interests of 
protecting cultural diversity.27 But is it not also ‘assimilationist’ to demand that all groups should 
‘have democratically accountable self-governing institutions’? After all, this would appear to rule 
out a great many communities, including all world religions. And is it not incoherent to believe, as 
Parekh obviously does, that it is possible for members of groups to be able to reject the prevailing 
values, and their particular roles within their religious, ethnic, or cultural community, and pursue 
new ones without being able to reflect upon these values and roles autonomously? We will reveal 
the incoherence of this argument in the next section.
Gray does not require groups to be ‘democratic’ in this sense. And neither does he insist on the 
importance of a ‘right of exit’. For Gray, 'freedom' is not defined as the ability to work out for
25 See, for example, John Gray, Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought (New York: Routledge, 1993); 
Endgames: Questions in Late Modem Political Thought (London: Polity Press, 1997); Enlightenment’s 
Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close o f the Modern Age (New York: Routledge, 1995); The Two Faces 
o f Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
26 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy’, in D. Beetham (ed.) Defining and 
Measuring Democracy, p. 213.
27 Ibid. p. 214.
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oneself what one believes to be valuable and what one does not against a background of universal 
rights or freedoms (for such an idea is intrusive and inevitably undermines and corrupts many 
groups), rather it is simply the ability to live according to one’s cultural values. In claiming as 
much, of course, Gray is consciously setting himself against the liberal tradition for precisely the 
reason that we are allying ourselves with it (namely, because he acknowledges the centrality of 
personal autonomy to liberal theory). “In the new liberalism [of Rawls, Dworkin etal]”, he claims, 
“cultural difference is seen through the distorting lens of the idea of choice . . .  In the real world 
of human history, however, cultural identities are not constituted voluntaristically, by acts of 
choice; they arise by inheritance and by recognition. They are fates rather than choices.”28
We have already seen that this claim is false. As we will see more clearly in part three, liberalism 
does not suppose that cultural and religious identities are chosen in any real sense, but it does 
require that all persons possess the capacity to interpret the worth of their inherited ends for 
themselves in the light of their own experiences and complexities and wider commitments. If 
liberalism really did commit one to conceiving all one’s various ends and most deeply-felt 
attachments to be objects of choice, then Gray would be right in pointing out its incoherence. But 
it does not. It simply presupposes that one’s inherited values and attachments should be open to 
question, and that they do not obtain authority or legitimacy simply because they exist or because 
certain persons tell us they are legitimate. It presupposes that one should not be compelled to live 
a particular form of life simply because one was born into it. Our ends are not biologically 
determined by our ethnicity or our race (as Herder and post-Herderians like Charles Taylor might 
argue), but are instead shaped and altered by our various attachments, relationships, and reflective 
judgements. As such, they are not -  and should not be considered -  ‘fates’ in anything like the 
way Gray believes.
28 John Gray, ‘After the New Liberalism’, in Enlightenment's Wake, p. 124.
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13.2 The Assumption o f Autonomous Individuality.
Kukathas accepts that communities should be allowed to act and to organise themselves 
according to their own particular values and ideas about the good life, but -  like Parekh and 
Galston, and unlike Gray - acknowledges that freedom cannot simply mean following or 
accepting the prevailing values of the group blindly. All persons in all groups, he argues, must be 
provided with a right of exit which allows them to disassociate themselves with that group if they 
so desire.
The first problem with this, given that its central aim is to provide a liberal justification for 
respecting cultural diversity which specifically rejects any appeal to autonomy, is that it inevitably 
assumes that the individual is (and should be) capable of revising and rejecting its current ends and 
attachments. Kukathas, Galston, Parekh, and Larmore agree that we will be “born into certain 
communities and groups to which we do not choose to belong” and which we will not have had 
any hand in creating, but assume also that we are able to extract ourselves from these 
communities and join others if we so desire.29 Individuals are understood to possess the right of 
association (and hence, of Association) and so, if we come to realise that the customs and 
practices which embody the community in which we live conflict with our beliefs about value, 
then we can leave and attempt to join a different community which better concurs with our 
beliefs (and which allows us to pursue our ends most efficiently). That is, as Nozick puts it, “if a 
person finds the character of a community uncongenial, he needn’t choose to live in it.”30
Given then, that we are born into a cultural community (and that we have no choice in 
determining the nature of the community into which we are bom), and given also that our cultural 
community will, to some extent, shape our identity, our ends, and our understanding of the world 
by providing the context in which we are socialised, then the capacity to ‘leave’ this community 
must necessarily be dependent upon our capacity to subject it (and the ends and attachments that 
we currently possess) to scrutiny. We must be capable of achieving the requisite standpoint with
29 W. Galston, ‘Two Concepts of Liberalism’, p. 533.
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regard to the ends and attachments conferred upon us by our community (and by the roles we 
occupy within this community) to subject them to deliberation and to decide whether or not we 
wish to remain a member of the community which embodies them.31
Clearly, Kukathas, Galston, Larmore, Parekh, and Nozick all feel that this is something that all 
persons will be able to do simply by acknowledging their formal right of association. Once people 
have been told that they have a right to leave the community in which they find themselves, they 
seem to assume, then all people will be equipped with the capacity to access this right and act 
upon it. This belief in the natural capacity of all individuals to act rationally and freely in response 
to their own particular circumstances has been assumed by so many theorists that it has led many 
to assume that it is a central presupposition of liberal political theory. Hence Isaiah Berlin felt able 
to claim that liberalism is rooted in a ‘negative’, Hobbesian conception of freedom as absence of 
external restraints by other human beings.32
Berlin was wrong about this, but his mistake has been exacerbated by contemporary libertarians 
like Kukathas and Nozick, for it is precisely this assumption that makes any notion of a ‘minimal 
state’ coherent. If either Kukathas or Nozick, for example, were to acknowledge that individuals 
require more than merely the allocation of formal rights and an absence of external restraint to be 
free (and to give meaningful consent to particular forms of authority), then they would have to 
admit that the state has a responsibility not only to ‘protea’ individual rights but also to provide 
those more substantive conditions necessary for persons to reflect meaningfully upon their ends 
and ideals.
When understood in this way (and given what we have already said in the previous section) 
freedom becomes something that cannot be easily characterised as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’,
30 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell, 1974), p. 323-324.
31 This need not entail the kind of radical abstraction that many critics believe, however, as we will see in part 
three.
32 Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concept of Liberty', The Proper Study o f Mankind (London: Pimlico, 1998), p.
191-242.
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but rather as a conjoining of the two; as the potential to choose a course in life that is uniquely 
our own, from a wide range of options and alternatives, without arbitrary restraint or coercion. 
Consequently, Kukathas and Galston (and Larmore and Nozick) must realise that providing the 
individual with a means of exit requires more than affording it a combination of ‘negative* 
freedoms and waiting for it to make its own way in the world (as the political liberals seem to 
advocate). Rather, it requires providing it with the tools it needs to reflect upon its ends and to act 
upon the consequences of this reflection.
Interestingly, Kukathas appears at one point to acknowledge this when he claims that an 
individual who is “so completely settled in the way of life of a community that the idea of leaving 
is inconceivable . . .  is in a sense unable to leave.”33 What this statement appears to endorse is 
precisely the idea that a commitment to a ‘right of exit’ requires the encouragement of certain 
“appropriate mental [or psychological] abilities” in individuals and not merely the establishment 
of certain political or legal rights.34
But this of course, will often require the state to make exactly the kind of intrusions into 
communities which these theorists wish to condemn. After all, given that we cannot be said to 
have any real ability to ‘leave’ a community if we are not encouraged to develop the skills 
necessary to subject our ends and attachments to deliberation and judgement, it follows that only 
a community which develops these skills in its members truly provides the grounding for a 
meaningful exit. A means of exit, that is, is not something that can be simply added onto an 
illiberal community, it cannot be conveniently (or unproblematically) grafted onto a community 
which has already organised itself around customs and practices which cannot accommodate it. 
Rather, it must be accommodated within the community, it must be encouraged and it must be 
shown to exist to all members of the community by virtue of the place it occupies in the customs 
and practices of that community. This is why the allocation of formal rights to oppressed 
minorities (and hence, a strictly ‘political’ conception of justice) is not enough.
33 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?, p. 677.
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All communities, then, are required to structure themselves in such a way as to allow each of their 
members to revise and interpret their ends and attachments, and to understand themselves and 
others possessing this ability. Therefore, they must do more than merely affirm the existence of 
formal rights. The ability to question one’s cultural and political roles and values cannot be 
assumed to exist in all persons to the degree that liberalism demands; it must be encouraged and 
supported by liberal institutions.
14. Civic Education and the Teaching of Autonomy.
14.1 Galston and Teaching National Values.
One important way in which the ability to question one’s values could be encouraged, for 
example, is the requirement that all individuals receive a basic education which makes them aware 
of the alternative ways of life that exist outside their community, and which encourages 
individuals to believe that these alternative ways of life are attainable. Such a strategy has been 
adopted recently by a number of liberal theorists who have conceived some form of 'civic' or 
'citizenship' education to be an important means of encouraging in children the capacity to think 
for themselves and to engage critically with the values which prevail not only in their own 
'community' but in the wider society.
Amy Gutmann, for example, has argued that all children in a liberal democracy must be educated 
in those values of deliberation and autonomy which secure their freedom, and in those political 
virtues which are necessary for the flourishing of liberal democracy. In doing so, of course, she 
acknowledges precisely what Rawls denies: that liberalism is necessarily a doctrine that makes 
demands of individuals which reach beyond the 'political' realm.35 Harry Brighouse too, points to
34 Sawitri Saharso, ‘Female Autonomy and the Cultural Imperative: Two Hearts Beating Together’.
35 Amy Gutmann, 'Civic Education and Social Diversity', Ethics 105 (1998); 'Children, Paternalism, and 
Education: A Liberal Argument', Philosophy and Public Affairs 9/4, p. 338-358; Democratic Education 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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the importance of education in cultivating in children "the opportunity to become autonomous", 
as do Callan and Macedo.36
But not all theorists who argue for some notion of civic or liberal education believe that schools 
should encourage autonomy. Indeed, some have argued for a form of civic education which 
explicitly avoids the encouragement of autonomy and which instead aims at fostering social unity 
and a sense of patriotic virtue.37 This is particularly important for us at this stage because this is 
precisely the kind of education that Galston envisages: an education which does not seek to 
encourage critical thought or engagement with one’s past and one’s own traditions and values so 
much as to instil and perpetuate a "noble, moralizing history: a pantheon of heroes who confer 
legitimacy on central institutions and constitute worthy objects of emulation."38
This reveals a great deal about Galston’s conception of ‘social unity'. Social and political unity, for 
Galston, is secured through the collective identification with a shared and ennobling history, 
which is to say that history itself is conceived as instrumental to (and a means to) this greater end. 
To learn the history of our own society, he argues, is to acquire a knowledge of those 'heroes' to 
whom we should look for moral guidance; it is the necessarily and inherently selective process of 
holding certain individuals and movements as worthy of emulation and admiration at the expense 
of other (equally important, yet less admirable) persons and practices.39 Consequently then, while 
Galston would no doubt support classes devoted to the Declaration of Independence, to the
36 Harry H. Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and 
Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens. Brighouse's phrasing of this question can be seen to beg the question 
in the same way as do the political liberals. For persons to be given the 'opportunity' to be autonomous 
(and hence, to 'choose' to live an 'autonomous life' or not, depending upon their own interests and values) 
they must be provided with the tools necessary to make such a decision from among the options available. 
Indeed, the idea that autonomy is even an 'option' depends upon persons being encouraged to understand 
their relation to their ends in a certain way.
37 For example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism', Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and Moral 
Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). However, even these theorists do not seek 
to argue for an education system which does anything less than provide all children with the 
opportunity to pursue an adult life on a free and equal basis with others. Autonomy, after all, is not 
merely a matter of encouraging certain 'internal' aspects of the mind, it is also about providing 
people with the economic and material resources (or the opportunity to acquire them) that they need in 
order to live a life free from economic hardship.
38 William Galston, Liberal Purposes, p. 243-244.
39 Ibid.
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Founding Fathers, and to figures like Martin Luther King, he would presumably share with 
conservatives like Peter Salins an antipathy toward any idea that children should be taught about 
such things as the genocide of the native American population at the hands of white settlers, or 
the perpetration of atrocities in Vietnam by American soldiers, or the 'peculiar institution' of 
slavery which was so much a part of American history. Indeed, if the purpose of education is 
conceived to be the cultivation of social and political unity over and above providing children 
with a basic knowledge of their own society and history in all its complexity and moral ambiguity, 
then it would seem to follow that children should never be encouraged to think too greatly about 
those social and political problems which divide society and which undermine the very unity that 
Galston seeks to encourage.
None of this, it seems to me, is a particularly 'liberal' position. After all, unity, when it is gained 
through a misrepresentation and manipulation of facts (and hence, of individuals) is not, for the 
liberal, a goal worth achieving precisely because liberalism is surely committed to providing all 
persons with the resources and the information they require to overcome past prejudices rather than 
to ignore them or wish them away, to learn from their mistakes, and to pursue lives that are 
rooted in a deep knowledge of their own society and history. Far from robbing “children of their 
most precious birth-right. . .  [namely], a justifiable pride in the American idea that the generally 
enlightened.. .  trajectory of America’s foreign and domestic policies,” providing children with a 
true picture of their own history and showing that even the most ‘enlightened’ of foreign and 
domestic policies are sometimes mistaken, or go wrong, or become corrupted by those who enact 
them, enables persons to see and interpret their birthright for themsleves in all its complexity.40 
Unity might well be more easily established if all persons were taught to ignore the existence of 
poverty, or the economic gap between rich and poor, or the concentration of poverty within 
certain ethnic and racial groups, or if they were encouraged to ignore the economic and political 
inequalities that exist between women and men, or the marginalisation and stigmatisation felt by 
many gays, lesbians, blacks, and ethnic and cultural minorities at the hands of the ‘mainstream’
40 Peter D. Salins, Assimilation American Style (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 81.
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majority, but the cultivation of a collective indifference to acute and pervasive social problems 
should not be a part of any liberal project, be it in the name of unity, or patriotism, or anything 
else.
Of course, rooting one’s self-identity (and the unity of the political community) on such a 
selective and misleading history would not be too great a problem if one was also provided with 
the resources necessary to question and to expose the inaccuracies of what one has been taught. 
After all, as David Miller and, before him, Ernest Renan have pointed out, it has long been a 
crucial aspect of nations (and, we might say, smaller cultural groups within them) that they ‘get 
their history wrong’ in the sense that they interpret it in a way that may or may not have any real 
bearing on actual events, and to construct myths and traditions around certain characteristics and 
attributes which are conceived to ‘define’ or to shape one’s identity more than anything else.41 But 
this is precisely the reason why liberals argue for institutions which enable persons to subject their 
history, their values, and their own understanding of themselves to scrutiny and reflection. What 
Galston appears to support is a system of education which robs persons of the capacity to make 
up their own minds about their lives (and about what they believe to be valuable and what they do 
not) by forcing them to adopt a false and distorted understanding of their own history (and thus, 
their own identities). In this, it would seem that he has dropped any pretence of being a liberal 
and would instead appear to occupy a position more akin to that adopted by communitarians and 
nationalists whereby freedom (that is, the ability to make meaningful and informed choices about 
the content of our own lives and ends) is subordinated to the need for stability and social unity 
founded upon the protection and perpetuation of (certain selected) historical traditions and 
misrepresented legacies. If these legacies happen to marginalise and subordinate those minorities 
that exist within them, his argument appears to claim, then that may (or may not) be unfortunate 
but it is certainly not something that education need condemn, or that political institutions need 
redress.
41 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 34. Renan, quoted on Miller,
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The problem, then, is that Galston’s conception of civic education not only seeks to misrepresent 
world history for the purposes of securing social unity, but that it also fails to secure those 
capacities necessary if persons are to be capable of realising that their history is being 
misrepresented. It fails to secure those attitudes and reflective capacities that persons need to 
decide what is valuable and what is not - what is worth supporting and what is not - from among 
the various perspectives and narratives which constitute their own identity.
Galston may not be unduly perturbed by any of this, given that he rejects the idea of autonomy. 
But in failing to enable all persons to interpret and understand their own history and their own 
identity for themselves, Galston fails to provide the resources that persons need if they are to 
possess a meaningful right of exit from the community to which they belong. While Galston is 
adamant that “the civic institutions and education characteristic of the Diversity State will suffice 
to secure the substantive as well as the formal requirements of meaningful exit from the 
associations that this state cherishes and proteas,”42 it is difficult to see how they will do this 
when they are barred from prescribing “curricula or pedagogic practices that require or strongly 
invite students to become sceptical or critical of their own ways of life.”43 Indeed, it is difficult to 
see exactly how the ‘diversity state’ could provide or encourage any of the requisite conditions 
that persons require in order to possess a ‘meaningful right of exit’ given that, elsewhere, he 
claims these resources to include “knowledge conditions, offering chances for awareness of 
alternatives to the life one is living; psychological conditions, including freedom from the kind of 
brainwashing practised by cults;fitness conditions, or the ability of individuals to participate in 
ways of life other than the one in which they want to leave; and social diversity, affording an array of 
meaningful options.”44 There is nothing objectionable in this list from the point of view of 
comprehensive liberalism, but it surely points to a more substantive conception of freedom and 
exit than the rest of Galston’s theory can sustain. Here again, then, we can see the internal
ibid. This is a crucial point and will be explored more fully in part three.
42 William Galston, ‘Two Concepts of Liberalism’, p. 534.
43 Ibid. p. 529.
44 William Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Political Liberalism’, Report from the Institute o f Philosophy 
and Public Policy 16/2 (1996), p. 4.
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inconsistency of Galston’s argument. He rejects the principle of autonomy only to invoke it in his 
description of the conditions that must prevail in order for one to be in a position to make free 
choices. And he argues for the protection of diversity, only to commit himself to establishing social 
unity and autonomy. If it is a purpose of the liberal state (and of education) to encourage social unity 
and common citizenship at the expense of providing a genuine awareness of one’s own history, 
then it is difficult to see exactly how Galston’s ‘Diversity State’ would protect ‘diversity’ at all.
14.2 Kukathas and the Privatisation o f Education.
Kukathas, meanwhile, is against civic-education (of an ‘autonomy-promoting*, ‘autonomy- 
facilitating*, or any other kind) because it ‘promotes the dominant culture’.45 Education, like so 
much else, should be devolved away from the state and toward groups (which are conceived as 
collections of consenting individuals). But while this might be acceptable to libertarians (in view 
of all their assumptions about the inherent capacities of individual human beings), the absence of 
external barriers to action is not enough to secure the freedom that liberals should be striving for. 
Freedom to act, for the liberal (I argue), means little if one’s capacity to envisage alternative ways 
of life has been thwarted and constrained by prevailing values and practices. It is one thing to be 
denied the opportunity to follow a particular route to ‘the good life’ by external restraints and 
threats, it is quite another however, to have all but one or two of these routes (and the ends to 
which they lead) rendered unimaginable or unrealisable to us due to lack of imagination or 
intellect. Here, what should perturb us is not the ‘road untaken’ but the road never realised, the 
road hidden from us by our lack of ideas or knowledge or skills, and our thwarted horizons.
Consequently, Parekh, Kukathas, Galston, and Larmore all face the same question, namely, how 
can an individual who has been born into a community, and raised according to its values and 
customs, choose meaningfully to leave that community if its ability to scrutinise, interpret, and 
revise its customs and practices is not supported? And how can this individual be expected to be
45 Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights? The distinction between ‘autonomy-facilitating’ and ‘autonomy- 
promoting’ education is invoked by Harry Brighouse in his book School Choice and Social Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). The distinction is spurious however, for the reasons pointed out in footnote
132
able to compete ‘freely’ and ‘equally’ with others for jobs, resources, and skills if he has not been 
provided with an education equal to that possessed by those with whom he is competing? And 
how can the various ways of life that one encounters in the world represent meaningful 
‘alternatives’ to one’s own way of life if one is never encouraged (or actively discouraged) to think 
of them as such? Once we realise that they cannot, and once we understand the extent to which a 
commitment to a ‘right of exit’ cannot be divorced from a commitment to autonomy, we begin to 
see the extent to which Kukathas and Galston (and, presumably, Larmore, although he does not 
address them explicitly) are compelled (by the logic of their own arguments) to adopt quite 
different positions to the ones they do regarding the example cases they give. Indeed, once we 
realise that Galston, in actual fact, believes that the right of exit constitutes a ‘higher order 
political goal’ which must be encouraged by ‘affirmative state protection,* and once we realise that 
a right to exit can only be secured when the community provides (among other things) a standard 
of education high enough to allow its members to deliberate meaningfully upon the content of 
their ends and the legitimacy of their cultural practices, and also to compete realistically for jobs, 
and to access public goods and institutions, on an equal basis with others outside their own 
community should they leave, then it becomes a matter of principle that this education should be 
provided for all individuals equally. According to their own arguments then, Kukathas and Galston 
cannot support the British Gypsies who want to remove their children from half of the required 
school sessions,46 and neither can they support Old Order Amish communities in their desire to 
remove their children from formal education at fourteen (contrary to US State laws).47 Supporting 
these claims (on whatever grounds) would inevitably erode the ability of these individuals to freely 
exit their community and participate in the wider society on an equal basis with others, and so 
must be rejected.
Consequently, if Kukathas, Larmore, and Galston (and Nozick) are serious in their claim that all 
individuals should be afforded a means of exiting their community, then they must commit
41, above. For a discussion of this distinction see Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens.
46 Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity Law, and Human Rights: The English Experience.
47 Ian Shapiro, Democracy’s Place (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
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themselves to the idea that the state has a responsibility to provide all individuals with the 
resources they need in order to subject their ends and attachments to scrutiny and that if this 
requires encouraging groups to change their customs and practices then so be it. Kukathas, 
Galston, and Larmore all argue (to varying extremes) that communities can somehow be left to 
organise themselves as illiberally as they wish as long as they provide a means of exit, yet they fail 
to realise that providing this exit requires the state to limit (and, in some cases, to rule out entirely) 
certain practices and customs (which may well be deeply ingrained in the beliefs and the history of 
the community in question), and to encourage persons to understand themselves as capable of 
criticising and assessing the worth of those values which prevail in the ‘group* to which they 
belong. All communities must, after all, understand their members as ‘individuals’ and that 
furthermore these ‘individuals’ possess ‘rights’ on an ‘equal’ basis with others regardless of 
prevailing community attitudes towards gender roles, and so on. As Ronald Dworkin might put it, 
these rights cannot be ‘trumped’ by appeals to such things as cultural beliefs or religious values.48 
The ‘common good’ cannot be pursued by the many at the expense of the few unless the few 
have the opportunity both to leave if they so desire, and to participate in the formation of this 
common good on an equal basis with others. Therefore, we can see that the provision of a right 
of exit necessarily entails the liberalisation of groups and communities in order that all individuals 
are provided the resources they need to revise and reject their ends (and to interpret their own 
ideals and ways of life, and the traditions in which they are embedded) autonomously. A liberal, 
autonomy-supporting education can, as a component of a wider, inclusive society, play an 
important part in helping to encourage those attitudes and skills that all persons need in order to 
subject their ends and commitments to scrutiny in a way required by liberalism. It can provide 
them with an awareness of those issues which affect them, and the manifold ways in which 
different persons and groups approach political and social problems.
48 See Dworkin’s ‘Rights as Trumps’, Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 153-167.
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15. Exit, Social Unity, and Toleration.
15.1 Kukathas and the Need for Liberal Social Unity.
This leads us inevitably to a second problem with Kukathas* ‘cultural libertarian’ position, namely, 
that (despite his claims to the contrary) it necessarily requires a commitment to social unity. 
Kukathas, of course, argues that any attempt to establish a single, unified moral community as a 
response to moral and social pluralism is inevitably driven by the mistaken assumption that all 
beliefs and ways of life can be reconciled under one set of principles. Establishing a single moral 
community through the encouragement of a shared unity of all individuals (regardless of their 
cultural beliefs) serves only to constrain the very diversity that liberalism is supposed to protect, 
he argues, and therefore the best that a liberal state should aim for is to enshrine a principle of 
toleration between radically pluralistic (and often incommensurable) groups. “Rather than 
conceive of the public realm as embodying an established standpoint of morality which reflects 
the desirable level of stability and social unity,” he argues, “we should think of the public realm as 
an area of convergence of different moral practices.”49 Stability, he points out, can “only be 
bought at the expense of toleration” and so we should not attempt to impose one set of moral 
principles upon groups which may not be capable of accepting them.50
The conception of the public realm which emerges from this idea then, is, as Kukathas admits, 
one in which there exists a “number of cohesive but oppressive communities: islands of tyranny 
in a sea of indifference.”51 However, he argues (in a predicably libertarian vein), this 
‘decentralisation’ of tyranny is still to be preferred to the ‘centralised’ tyranny of a state which 
seeks to advance a certain set of moral principles over and above the wishes of those groups and 
individuals who do not accept them. What Kukathas fails to realise however, is that social unity is 
necessary if the individual is to enjoy a ‘substantial’ right of exit from its community. We have 
already suggested that all individuals, if they are to be understood as possessing a meaningful right
49 Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, p. 84.
50 Ibid. p. 85.
51 Ibid. p. 89.
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of exit from their communities, must be equipped with both the intellectual and vocational skills 
necessary to participate equally in the wider society, and the requisite interactive skills necessary to 
co-operate fruitfully not only with members of their own community but with members of other 
communities too. Kukathas* conception of the public realm as a ‘sea of indifference* containing a 
number of ‘cohesive’ and individuated groups (all engaged in their own potentially incompatible 
ways of life) is unsatisfactory because it misunderstands society as constituted by isolated groups 
which need have no (or minimal) contact with one another. In the real world, however, groups 
simply cannot be isolated from one another in this way because they will co-exist within a wider 
social framework which inevitably compels different groups, communities and individuals to co­
operate with one another. Members of different communities will live amongst one another, or 
near one another; they will compete for the same jobs, they will be governed by the same state, 
they will require equal access to the same power structures. No community, however strictly it 
maintains its own customs and however strongly it discourages change, can stop its members 
from witnessing and internalising the practices and customs of those communities and groups 
that they live beside. People are not blind, as much as their communities might wish them to be. 
They will react to the practices of other communities; they will form opinions and make 
judgements about them; they will understand themselves, their customs, and their beliefs, in 
relation to those who act and worship differently. Communities will change and develop as those 
who belong to them gain new experiences and interpret their values in the light of new 
developments in society and the world outside it. The way in which a community understands 
itself (and the way in which its members understand themselves within it) will to some extent 
depend upon the way in which they believe their cultural values and beliefs can articulate a ‘true’ 
understanding of the world, and this will inevitably entail changes and evolutions in these beliefs 
as the world around it changes.52
All this is to say that communities do not (and cannot) be understood to be isolated from all the 
other com m unities which co-exist in the wider society because the nature of each community will
52 This is elaborated more fully in the next chapter.
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to some extent be affected and shaped by the beliefs and interactions of other communities (and 
other individuals) and because the individual will be unable to pursue its ends fully in a wider 
society fragmented by disunity. In a society containing a diversity of ways of life and cultures and 
communities, the barriers between groups (between the ‘subject’ and the ‘other’) become blurred 
and indistinct. Communities which require their members to isolate themselves from others (and 
to be suspicious of other groups) fail to realise that their own cultural values (and the values and 
ideals and understandings held by their individual members) will be, to some extent, shaped and 
affected by the values and ideals of others precisely because members of different communities 
cannot ignore the actions and beliefs of others that exist around them and with which they are 
confronted everyday.
What is more, and what Galston, Larmore, Kukathas and Nozick fail to realise is that groups 
which attempt to isolate themselves from others would not (even if they managed such a thing) 
provide their members with a substantial right of exit. After all, a group which seeks to bar its own 
members from knowing anything about the outside world, and which rules out any form of 
education which teaches children about other cultures and ways of life, cannot be said to be 
respecting the right of its members to leave that group for all the reasons we mentioned in the 
previous chapter: the fact that a ‘right’ or ‘freedom’ is enshrined in the overarching constitution 
means all but nothing unless the individual is provided with the resources to avail herself of this 
right. As Jeff Spinner-Halev puts it, a ‘‘community which tries to prevent its children from having 
any contact with outsiders,” for instance, “is using the community to stifle autonomy.”53 As we 
mentioned earlier, the ability to accept and accommodate people’s differences is crucial if the 
individual is to be truly able to pursue its ends in the wider society (and if it is to be able to leave 
its present community).
53 Jeff Spinner-Halev, ‘Extending Diversity: Religion in Public and Private Education’, Will Kymlicka & 
Wayne Norman (eds.) Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 68 -  
95, p. 77.
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15.2 The Limits o f Toleration.
Furthermore, the acceptance and accommodation of diversity through open debate and education 
in this way is also crucial if we are to establish the principle of toleration that Kukathas takes to be 
of such importance. It is difficult to see, for instance, how members of different communities 
could be capable of tolerating the customs and practices of others if they have not been 
encouraged to learn about these customs and appreciate the important role that they play in 
people’s fives. After all, “one can hardly develop empathy for those one only knows as alien and 
strange.”54 Surely if toleration represents anything, it represents the ability of individuals to accept 
that while certain practices, certain beliefs and acts, appear disagreeable to them, they nevertheless 
should be tolerated because these acts are important to the members of the community that 
engages in them.55 That is to say, we must be given reasons why we should tolerate acts and 
customs which conflict with our own conceptions of right and wrong. We cannot simply tolerate 
everything blindly, assuming that we should tolerate every action or custom or practice that we 
see around us merely because a group or an individual expresses a desire to act in that way. Such a 
conception of toleration would surely undermine the very notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
themselves by rendering all actions permissible by virtue of the fact that they have been performed 
and all customs acceptable because they are claimed to be so by certain people. This, quite 
obviously, would imply moral relativism of the kind examined in chapters four and five and 
would stand in contradiction to a liberal account of politics and dialogue (and indeed, any other 
theory which sought to justify limits to the actions of groups and individuals by appealing to 
substantive moral claims) takes as valuable.
It would, in fact, look very much like the kind of pluralism that Gray envisages. The liberal 
conception of toleration does not presume that all actions and practices are in and of themselves 
worthy of toleration; rather it presupposes that what makes an act or practice worthy of toleration 
is the fact that it can be justified by reasons that others cannot reasonably reject through dialogue
54 Adeno Addis, ‘On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration’, in W. Kymlicka & I. Shapiro (eds), 
Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York: New York University Press, 1997, p. 112 -  153, pp. 121.
55 The issue of toleration is complex and central to this thesis, and therefore I will explore it more fully
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within an open and inclusive public sphere. This idea obviously invokes an important claim 
embodied in contemporary liberalism and will be developed further below and in the chapters 
four, five, and six. For now, though, enough has been said to show at least some of the ways in 
which liberal toleration, like autonomy, requires communities to educate their members about 
other ways of life, other values, and the importance of other practices in the beliefs of others.
If this is correct, it is difficult to see exactly how Kukathas will be able to encourage the level of 
toleration he demands if he understands society to be composed of a number of isolated 
communities which are necessarily understood to be separated from one another. After all, let us 
not forget, Kukathas requires individuals of all groups to be capable of tolerating not only minor 
differences but also those which entirely conflict with their own ways of life and their own 
fundamental beliefs about right and wrong.
One solution to the problem might be to point out, contrary to what has been said above, that in 
actual fact the best way to encourage toleration between groups which radically oppose one 
another is to actively keep those groups from knowing too much about what goes on in other 
communities. That is to say, it is much easier for a group which practices racial equality to tolerate 
a racist community if they do not know that it is racist. But this defence would not only be 
unrealisable (given what we have already said about the interactive nature of society and the 
communities within it), it would also contradict almost everything else that Kukathas argues in 
that it would undermine the ability of that group’s current members to leave it (and thus it would 
sanction the oppression of a minority while robbing it of the corresponding right to leave).
The solution Kukathas supports most readily then, is the idea that groups deserve to be tolerated 
because their existence proves that their members endorse and affirm these practices. As long as 
individuals are given a right of exit, he says, we need not concern ourselves with the relative 
justice or injustice of certain practices because these practices are themselves rendered ‘just’ or
in chapter five.
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‘unjust’ by virtue of the fact that those engaged in them freely consent to them. However, as we 
have already stated, this right to leave requires the community to liberalise itself and to introduce 
the kind of measures which support personal autonomy. If we are to take the ‘right of exit’ as his 
central justification for toleration then, and if we are to understand it as his means of determining 
the limits of this toleration, then we must conclude that Kukathas (like Larmore and Galston) can 
only support the toleration of communities which in turn support and encourage personal 
autonomy.
16. Culture, Choice, and Consent.
It could be argued, of course, that in all that I have said so far I am merely conflating the notion 
of ‘choice* with the idea of ‘autonomous choice’ and that, therefore, I am loading the term with 
an unnecessary and superfluous moral component. Critics might want to point out that 
individuals in the real world make all manner of choices which cannot be understood to be the 
product of conscious deliberation and reflection, and that, in concentrating solely on one kind of 
choice, I have failed to appreciate the diverse and problematic and complex roots from which 
actions and decisions spring. Afterall, they might say, individuals often make choices which are 
born out of panic, or fear, or ignorance; we might make snap decisions with no regard for the 
consequences of what we decide; we make mistakes, we sometimes make decisions that appear to 
contradict everything we have ever been taught, everything we know to be valuable. Our choices, 
they might say, are often frivolous, rash, trivial, mistaken, and yet should not the state seek to 
protect our capacity to make these kinds of choices as committedly and as resolutely as it seeks to 
protect our capacity to make choices based upon the consequence of rational deliberation? Does 
not the state have a responsibility to protect the right of the individual to make frivolous choices?
The answer, of course, is (a qualified) yes, but that this has little bearing on my argument. The 
point of the discussion thus far has not been to explore the nature of choice or autonomy, rather 
it has been to determine the extent to which ‘toleration-based’ and ‘political’ liberals like Galston,
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Larmore, Kukathas, Rawls, Nussbaum, and Macedo must be committed in principle to the right 
of the state to interfere in the internal practices of cultural and religious communities in the 
interests of securing certain basic freedoms for their members. My conclusion has been that, 
despite their claims to the contrary, these theorists are required to endorse a principle of 
interference because their theories value the capacity of individuals to make informed, 
autonomous choices about the extent to which they want to remain a part of that community. I 
do not wish to say that all choices must be conceived to be the product of deep reflection and 
deliberation, but I am saying that if the arguments put forward by these liberals are to remain 
coherent on their own terms, then they must provide all individuals with the capacity to question 
the worth and value of those ideas and commitments that they consider important to them and 
which shape their individuality. And this is important because it builds on what we have already 
said in part one about the issue of consent.
The question of consent is crucial, of course, because, as we have seen, it underpins the liberal 
commitment to a right of exit, and to the nature of liberal justification and dialogue. For 
Kukathas, Galston, Larmore, and Nozick, after all, the legitimacy of a community is determined 
by whether or not its members can be said to consent to the practices and customs which 
characterise it. In this sense, they all concur with the central argument of chapter two, namely, 
that each individual must be able to understand their current views as open to revision and 
intepretation, and must be able to act on these decsions and revisions without fear of arbitrary 
restraint or domination. The ‘right of exit’, once firmly established, provides a kind of ‘opt out’ 
clause which individuals can exploit as and when they feel that they can no longer endorse 
community practices, and so the continued existence of specific customs (and, we might say, of 
the community itself) depends upon individuals choosing not to leave the community of which 
they are a part, and by consequence, consenting to these practices.
But what are the moral and political requirements of consent here? That is, what kind of choice 
provides a moral basis for consent (and thus the moral legitimacy of cultural and religious
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practices)? Can we say, for example, that any choice, no matter how frivolous, or rash, or ignorant, 
represents a legitimate moral basis for consent? Does the fact that we recognise the problematic 
(and often trivial or impetuous or foolhardy) nature of choices necessarily lead us to the idea that 
any of these choices should be taken as proving consent to prevailing cultural or religious practices 
and customs? Clearly, for liberalism, it does not. While it is undoubtedly true that individuals will 
often make rash decisions about their lives, born out of fear or panic or a simple lack of regard 
for the consequences, we cannot say that, in acting in this way, they have necessarily ‘consented* 
to anything; they have not truly consented to the legitimacy of their community practices because 
we cannot say that individuals who are only members of their community because they once 
made a blind or uninformed choice to do so have consciously and deliberately affirmed and 
endorsed the practices of their community.
Consequently, we might say, it is not the exercise of choice itself which provides consent but 
rather the individual’s pursuit of ends within a social and political environment which supports 
their right of exit. The individual can only be understood to be capable of consenting to cultural 
customs and practices if they are aware that a meaningful right of exit exists for them should they 
need it. Often they will not. Often, members of communities will live their daily lives, and engage 
in practices and customs and conversations without radically questioning their values and 
commitments. They will, during the course of their daily interactions with others, inevitably make 
countless choices and decisions which need not (and should not) be understood as great exercises 
in self-reflection or deliberation, or as important stages in some on-going process of ‘self-creation’ 
or ‘self-realisation’. The ‘‘self-ruling individual,” that is, “may run on automatic pilot much of the 
time, acting on beliefs and desires that originate in forgotten times and pressures.”56
Consequently, the exercise of largely unreflective choices (or choices which are based on only the 
most superficial of deliberations) are often entirely appropriate responses to everyday dilemmas 
and puzzlements. However, choices take on a particular significance when they concern the values
56 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory o f Freedom and Government (Oxford University Press,
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and beliefs which implicitly circumscribe these smaller, less substantial choices and decisions. The 
fact that we are sometimes called upon to make important decisions which affect our deeply-held 
ideas about value (and assuming that we all have some interest in protecting our values and the 
capacity for freedom that they facilitate) will mean that some choices will be far more important 
to us than others; their consequences more far-reaching, their outcomes more significant. 
‘Everyday’ choices are those choices which can be made easily within the framework of our over­
arching values and which do not, to our own minds, threaten or jeopardise or call into doubt 
these values. For many, decisions regarding what to wear in the morning, or what to eat, for 
example, may not represent quite the innocuous or unproblematic choices that they do for others 
(due to the requirements of certain over-arching beliefs or commitments (to eat only halal or 
kosher meat, for example, or to wear a turban or a yarmulke or chador, etc.)), but these ‘choices’ 
are largely uncontroversial in that (by obeying these cultural or religious requirements) our 
background ideas and values are affirmed implicitly, and thus passively.
The rejection of these values and practices, however, may well prove to be far more problematic 
and harrowing. It might entail ostracism or condemnation from the wider community; it might 
provoke retribution or anger or it might cause sadness or guilt or despair in those who care for us 
and who we in turn care about. The sanctions that follow the rejection of fundamental values will 
not always manifest themselves physically, that is, and they might not be universally identifiable 
and, consequently, they cannot be easily legislated against. The state can outlaw the death penalty 
as a punishment for apostasy, for instance, but it cannot as easily outlaw the shame or despair that 
a mother or father might feel at their child’s rejection of the church, or the anger or hurt that a 
husband or wife might feel at their partner’s inability (or unwillingness) to be a ‘good’ father, or 
brother, or daughter, or wife in the way endorsed by the prevailing ideas and values of the cultural 
or religious community of which they are a member.
1997), p. 186.
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The point I am trying to make here, then, at this stage, is actually quite simple. Choices which 
involve the questioning of accepted values and beliefs will not, for many people, be frivolous or 
superficial in the way that their smaller and more insubstantial choices might be, and as such, it is 
the responsibility of the state to encourage those conditions which allow all members of society to 
make important and fundamental decisions about the lives they wish to lead, based upon the 
understanding they have of themselves and of the world in which they live. Choices and decisions 
are taken at all levels of human life -  in public and in private -  and hence, institutions must 
strengthen ‘informal’ and ‘non-political’ networks and norms in which we might exercise our 
autonomy.57 ‘Frivolous’ and ‘trivial’ choices will go on without the help of the state; they do not 
require the establishment of any particular or specific conditions (except, perhaps, for the 
requisite ‘space’ in which these choices can be freely enacted). Such choices are, to some extent, 
self-regulating in that the limits of what is ‘trivial’ or ‘frivolous’ will be circumscribed and bounded 
by the wider values and commitments which claim the individual at any one time (some of which 
will be derived from their cultural membership, some of which will not), and which constitute its 
understanding of the world. But groups must not deny their members the capacity to make 
meaningful decisions about fundamental issues such as their religion, their culture, and their 
values because many people will not consider these decisions to be frivolous; they will consider 
them to be of fundamental importance, and carrying with them the potential of bringing great 
hardship. But the individual must be free to suffer this hardship if they feel that it is worth it. Exit 
is not costless, and perhaps can never be, because one will invariably leave behind certain aspects 
of the community that one valued; friendships and relationships will inevitably change (or dissolve 
completely) as the individual’s commitments and values change and there is much to regret in 
these changes and dissolutions. But the state should not seek to protect people from them, 
because, in their promise of a new life based upon truly valued commitments and beliefs, they are 
also liberating. It is for individuals themselves to make the decisions that shape their lives, against 
a background of values and ideas and beliefs which make them who they are; they must make the 
required trade-offs and suffer the consequences of their actions, for better or worse.
57 This links with the central claim made in part three of this thesis.
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17. Conclusion.
The notion of ‘exit’ is central to liberal political theory because it expresses the fundamental liberal 
claim that inequalities and burdens (including inequalities conferred by certain cultural or religious 
values) are only permissible if they can be justified to those who suffer under them. That is, 
inequalities -  like structures of authority - are only justifiable if they are consented to and are thus, 
in an important sense, self imposed. This gives more formal substance to a claim that we have made 
a number of times in this thesis so far. If a woman chooses to subordinate herself to her husband 
and to suffer what we as outsiders might consider outrageous indignities as a consequence, then 
there is nothing inherently wrong in this from a liberal point of view, just as there is nothing 
inherently wrong in following the dictates of a religious leader, or taking a position in a 
hierarchical organisation which undermines one’s ability to act as freely as we otherwise might. 
What liberalism rejects (and, I believe, what each of the theorists we have thus far discussed do 
reject) is that these inequalities and constraints can be imposed upon persons against their will or 
better judgement in the name of a particular account of ‘the truth’. It is, after all, one thing for a 
woman to confine herself to the home because she believes it is required of her by her religion, or 
for a gay man to choose to keep his sexuality a secret from others because he believes it is no-one 
else’s business, while it is quite another for certain powerful outsiders or elites to force women to 
stay at home, or for gays and lesbians to feel compelled to keep their sexuality a secret in order to 
avoid sanction or condemnation, or because they want to succeed in a particular endeavour. 
Cultural and religious groups inevitably make moral claims about gender roles, about sexuality, 
about the way in which persons should live their lives, and so on, and it is not the business of the 
liberal state to show that the beliefs which animate these claims are false or untrue. Similarly, it is 
not its business to deny people the right to subject themselves to culturally-endorsed constraints 
on their actions if they so desire. But it is the responsibility of the liberal state to establish those 
conditions which enable people to make genuine decsions about their lives and to genuinely 
consent to (or reject) the inequalities and constraints which their cultural values demand of them. 
As Raz has put it, “[l]iberal multiculturalism insists on a right of exit, that is, the right of each
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individual to abandon his cultural group. Many cultures do all they can to stop their members 
from drifting away, or leaving their communities [by denying them the ability to cultivate their 
capacity for self-criticism and the criticism of their own particular values and traditions]. On this 
front. . .  they will find themselves under pressure to change in a liberal multiculturalist society.”58 
This is indeed an inescapable requirement of liberalism. Groups are only justified in requiring 
conformity from their members if they also allow individuals to make up their own minds about 
the role and status and importance of those beliefs and ideals which prevail in the group to which 
they belong, and to make meaningful decisions about whether or not they are willing to submit to 
these ideals and the burdens that they carry with them.
But the capacity to make these decisions meaningfully, and to make these trade-offs must be 
encouraged and supported by liberal institutions. It does not simply exist and perpetuate itself 
independent of the institutions which govern us and which regulate and constrain what we can 
and cannot do, and what we can and cannot know. Liberalism does not seek to deny that we 
often make choices which are rooted in apparently irrational or haphazard reasoning, but it does 
seek to deny that these choices necessarily constitute a moral basis for consent, and it does seek to 
show that all persons must be able to change their minds if they come to realise that a choice they 
made was mistaken or contrary to their wider interests. To this end, autonomy-supportive 
measures must be encouraged and perpetuated by the state if individuals are to be understood as 
capable of truly consenting to the commitments and practices that prevail in the community to 
which they belong.
This will require provisions which allow persons not only to envisage an exit from their community, 
but, as we suggested in chapter two, provisions which make it possible for persons to exercise this 
right meaningfully in the world. And this is where positive legal and political rights come in. 
Abused wives, for example, may well possess the psychological and intellectual disposition to 
intepret their situation as a bad and unnecessary one, but may be unable to leave their abusive
58 Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, in Ethics in the Public Domain, p. 181.
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husbands (and, perhaps, the cultural or religious group which condones their abuse), because they 
have no-where to go and no independent means of income. The freedom to ‘contribute to the 
way in which one’s life unfolds’ and to escape from arbitrary and imposed forms of life is 
therefore dependent on the possession of those attitudes and capacities necessary to interpret the 
validity of one’s roles and the forms of authority under which one lives, and the political and 
economic resources necessary to exercise one’s choices in the light of one’s interpretations and 
deliberations. It is, we might say, dependent upon a conception of freedom which cannot be 
understood simply as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ in character.
Hence, our discussion of exit and consent can be seen to feed directly into wider debates about 
the nature and content of liberal egalitarianism more generally. We have argued that persons 
should be able to explore their own identities, and interpret their own memberships and 
allegiances, for themselves, within a supportive society governed by institutions which provide all 
persons with the intellectual, economic, and political resources necessary to make genuine choices 
about what kind of life they want to lead and what kind of institutional arrangement they feel best 
represents their interests. Persons must therefore be able to act upon those choices that they 
make, and should not be thwarted in their ability to lead a life that they believe to be meaningful 
and worthwhile by economic hardships, ill-health, or arbitrary structures of domination or 
oppression. Any inequalities or hardships that an individual faces must be conceived to be 
‘justifiable’ to that person under liberal conditions and hence, consensual. We can see this idea 
embodied, for example, in Rawls’ difference principle.59 An important component of 
egalitarianism (and of liberal reasoning), we have argued, is that all persons are encouraged to 
learn about their own values and identities, and the values, customs, and histories of those with 
whom they share society. Civic education is not a panacea. It cannot alone cure or resolve 
enmities between groups and religions, but as a component of a much wider liberal strategy which 
encourages the universal values of free choice and opportunity for all, it can go some way in 
creating a genuinely open and inclusive society which enshrines respect for other cultures but
59 See John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, especially part one.
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which also cultivates those values of tolerance, autonomy, and equality to which liberalism is 
necessarily and inevitably wedded.
And in encouraging these attitudes and virtues, liberal institutions make it possible for all persons, 
regardless of their particular cultural or religious attachments, to engage in those processes of 
discourse and agreement upon which liberalism is founded. In the interests of encouraging 
genuine and inclusive liberal dialogue on such fundamentals of political association as the limits of 
toleration, the content and shape of social and political institutions, and the ways in which wealth 
should be distributed in a diverse society, all persons need to be educated in both the ways and 
values of the group(s) to which they belong, and the “history and traditions of other cultures in 
the country.”60 Liberal discourse cannot occur unless persons are afforded the psychological and 
political resources to engage in them, and to justify their beliefs and commitments to others 
according to liberal constraints. And this means that it cannot occur unless persons are 
encouraged to conceive themselves and others as free and equal autonomous individuals.
60 Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, p. 189.
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Chapter Four
Impartiality, Dialogue, and the 
Pre-Conditions of Liberal Justification
[0]ne cannot legitimately regard criticism and discussion as a simple affront to 
some aspect of one’s cultural identity. Humans and human groups take their norms 
seriously, and to take them seriously is to think of them as embedded in something 
like a structure of reasons and reasoning . . .  [This form of reasoning may be unlike 
ours in many ways but] it is like ours at least in this: that it represents or claims to 
represent some repository of human wisdom as to the best way of doing things. As 
such, it necessarily makes [itself] available -  though . . . not always easily or 
comfortably available -  to understanding and assessment on the basis of, and in 
comparison with, what else there is in our society in the way of human wisdom and 
experience on questions such as those that the norm purports to address.
Jeremy Waldron, ‘Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility’, 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies, p. 170-171.
We saw at the end of the previous chapter that liberalism is committed to individual autonomy 
(understood as more than merely one’s freedom to act without arbitrary legal, political, or physical 
restraint), equality, and to social unity through common, universal citizenship. Consequently, we 
argued that the limits of what a liberal state can and cannot tolerate are set by these prior 
commitments; all persons, regardless of their particular commitments and memberships must be 
able to question and interpret the structures of authority under which they live and, hence, to consent 
to them on a free and equal basis with others. Liberalism is rooted in the idea that all persons must 
be able to consent to the practices and customs embodied in their particular cultural groups and 
that this necessarily requires all people to be ’autonomous' in the sense that they are able to assess 
the worth and status of these practices and customs for themselves. And we argued that this is 
important because liberalism can only accommodate those inequalities which can be justified to 
those who would experience them. But this obviously raises the question of how such principles (or 
indeed, any principles or actions) might be justified, and how dialogue or collective deliberation 
should be framed if it is to satisfy the ethical requirements of liberalism.
Many liberals claim that liberal principles can be justified via a process of deliberation which need 
not invoke the notion of autonomy and that, consequently, personal autonomy is not a central or
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necessary component of liberal political theory. But in what way - and by what means - might 
liberal principles be justified independent of any substantive commitment to autonomy? I address 
this question - and tease out its philosophical and political implications - in this chapter by laying 
out, and criticising, the arguments advanced by those ‘neutralist’ or ‘impartialist’ liberals who seek 
to reject the idea that liberalism must (or should) be rooted in some overarching commitment to 
personal autonomy at the level of political justification, before discussing in chapter 5 how these 
commitments are also held by critics of liberalism (like difference theorists and pluralists) who 
reject liberal politics for supposedly making universalist claims about the self and agency which 
serve to ‘reduce difference to unity.*
In sections 18, 19, and 20 I discuss the normative preconditions of liberal public reason and 
justification. I argue that liberalism necessarily presupposes individual autonomy and equality at its 
heart and that, as such, liberals who claim that it is possible to construct an account of liberalism 
which avoids or eschews these commitments cannot remain coherent. I argue as much against the 
background of the Charles Larmore’s argument for ‘liberal neutrality*. I then go on in section 21 to 
discuss a particular and influential group of contractualist thinkers who have sought to re-invent 
and re-construct Rawls' 'original position' (and hence, his account of public reason) in a way that 
better fulfils the requirements of 'procedural neutrality' by emptying the agreement process of any 
implicit or explicit appeal to the notion of autonomy. I argue that these theorists present a 
compelling and persuasive account of liberal deliberation (and hence, of liberal politics) but fail to 
do so in a way which avoids a substantive commitment to personal autonomy. I argue that these 
thinkers necessarily appeal to the principle of autonomy because they all presuppose that parties to 
the discourse (or contract) will be both willing and able to adopt a 'reasonable' standpoint with 
regard to their own ends and that consequently, they will also be capable of justifying their claims 
and actions in such a way as is demanded by this standpoint of reasonableness. This reasonable 
standpoint, I argue, requires that persons be autonomous in a particular, and quite substantial, sense 
and that, as such, the ideal of autonomy is built into the structure of liberal justification itself. 
Liberal justification, I argue, necessarily presupposes that we are informed about our particular
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identities and interests {contra Rawls) but that we are able to overcome our more fundamental 
differences and justify our claims and actions in a way that others (who do not share my particular 
beliefs) might accept as reasonable in the face of deeper disagreement about the nature of the world 
and our place within it. I will argue, therefore, that the notion of ‘reasonableness* expressed in, and 
required by, the liberal agreement process embodies the twin notions of individuality and 
autonomy.
18. Charles Larmore and the Content of Liberal Dialogue.
Like Galston, Kukathas, Rawls, and those other liberals that we have so far discussed, Larmore 
argues that the modern world is necessarily characterised by ‘reasonable disagreement* about the 
content of the good life, about the ends to which our lives should be directed, and about the way in 
which we relate to our most deeply-held values, beliefs, and self-understandings and that these 
disagreements will not always be limited to questions regarding the social and political environment 
that surrounds us. Often they will extend to more fundamental concerns regarding our place in the 
universe, our physical and spiritual origins, and our obligations to the world (and ecological 
environment) in which we live.1 That is to say, modern societies are characterised by a diversity not 
only of ideas and attitudes concerning our political obligations to one another, but also of the more 
fundamental, “deep features of morality” which shape and animate our political beliefs.2
Consequently, he says, a coherent conception of political justice must be both resilient to the 
changeable and restless nature of a diverse and potentially unstable world, and capable of resolving 
those conflicts which are bom out of it, which is to say that it must not seek to define the nature or 
content of justice in terms of a single controversial value or set of values. Rawls’ formulation of
1 This is evidenced in the moves made by many normative political theorists into areas such as the 
environment, intergenerational justice, sustainability, industrialisation, and our moral responsibilities 
toward non-human animals. See, for example, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon 
Books, 1975); David E. Cooper & Joy A. Palmer (eds.) The Environment in Question: Ethics and 
Global Issues (London: Routledge, 1992); R. I. Sikora & Brian Barry (eds.) Obligations to Future 
Generations (Cambridge: White Horse Publications, 1978).
2 Charles Larmore, ‘Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement’, p. 170.
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political liberalism fails, Larmore says, because, in the end, he is unwilling to relinquish his hold on 
the ideal of personal autonomy and argues that autonomy should bt  politicised in order to allow non- 
autonomy-supportive groups to flourish in a society which secures only basic freedoms for its 
members in the political realm.3 Rawls therefore falls into the trap of exalting the good of 
autonomy above all other goods and all other accounts of value, and hence, requiring all groups to 
conceive themselves as ‘liberal individuals’. In this, given what we said in chapters one, two, and 
three, Larmore must also reject the ideas of Nussbaum, Macedo, Okin, Galston, Parekh, and 
Nozick, given that they fall into the same trap. ‘Expressivist’ liberalism, Larmore says, does not take 
seriously enough the deep and inevitable plurality of moral, religious, and social values which are 
present in society. It therefore renders itself unable to resolve the inevitable conflicts born out of 
“reasonable disagreement about the good life” and instead becomes “simply another part of the 
problem” (and therefore an inherently controversial and inadequate basis for the derivation of 
principles of justice).4 What liberalism must do therefore, is distance itself from the universal ideal 
of autonomy in favour of establishing a stable accommodation of divergent (yet reasonable) 
conceptions of the good life, which is confined to the political sphere and which rejects ‘thick’ 
foundations in favour of a ‘thin’ commitment to the idea that all individuals are deserving of ‘equal 
respect’.5 For Larmore, pluralism is only accommodated (and freedom secured) when individuals 
are freed from the imposition of having to understand themselves as ‘contingent’ to their ends and 
beliefs and commitments (i.e. as autonomous), and when the liberal state is rooted in, and regulated 
by, principles which are themselves ‘neutral’ with regard to different conceptions of the good life.6
3 Charles Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’.
4 Ibid. p. 131.
5 Charles Larmore, Patterns o f Moral Complexity, ‘Political Liberalism’, and ‘Pluralism and Reasonable 
Disagreement’
6 This claim, as we will see in the next chapter, is rooted in an acceptance of the claim (made most 
explicitly by communitarians, but adopted most recently by difference-theorists) that the ideal of 
personal autonomy presupposes a conception of the self as ‘unencumbered’ of its ends and beliefs and 
values. This will be examined in more detail throughout this thesis, and especially in part three. For 
now, however, it is sufficient to say that this claim is false (both as a description of the liberal position, 
and as an understanding of personal autonomy itself). Consequently, much of Larmore’s critique of 
autonomy-based liberalism (quite apart from the critique of his argument that I develop here), is entirely 
misplaced.
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Larmore’s theory, then, is rooted in establishing a conception of justice so ‘minimal* that its ability 
to accommodate diversity and disagreement is constrained only by the two ‘uncontroversiaP 
principles of ‘equal respect’ and ‘rational dialogue*. The problem, however, is that it is not at all 
clear that either of these principles are as ‘minimal’ or as ‘uncontroversial’ as Larmore believes, or 
that they do not presuppose the more ‘controversial’ principles of individuality and autonomy.
Larmore admits that his theory can only be applicable, in the end, to a person who already “accepts 
the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect, and accords them supreme importance,” and he 
admits also that “those who reject the norm of equal respect or rank their view of the good life 
above i t . . .  will usually be unable to converge on any political (coercive) principles.”7 In this 
regard, he says, “there is a limit to the rational transparency liberalism can hope for in its political 
principles. The public justification a liberal polity offers for its principles must presume that 
citizens share a form of life that embodies a commitment to equal respect.”8 Also, he states, his 
argument for liberal neutrality “applies only to people who are interested in devising principles of 
political association. It assumes that they share enough to think of themselves as engaged in this 
common enterprise . . .  In short,” he goes on, “the people to whom this argument for liberal 
neutrality applies must already think of themselves as ‘a people’ or ‘a nation’.9 They must have a 
common life before they can think of organising their political life according to liberal principles. . .  
without a common life the disagreements [that are inevitably born out of moral conflict] would 
give ample grounds for the individuals to disband or to switch their allegiance elsewhere.”10
Consequently, Larmore can be seen to root his account of liberal neutrality in the presupposed 
validity of two distinct (and yet closely interwoven) arguments. The first is an ‘information’ 
argument, whereby individuals are expected to endorse neutrality as a result of what they know 
about themselves (i.e. that they are a member of a ‘nation’ pursuing some form of ‘common life’ 
and that they are able to value the norms of equal respect and rational dialogue higher than any
7 Charles Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, p. 142.
8 Ibid.
9 The appeal to the ‘nation’ is explored in detail in chapter seven of this thesis.
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other aims that they may have). The second, however, is a ‘motivational’ argument, which 
presupposes that, in the end, persons will strive to overcome their disagreements about the good 
life in the hope that they will, in doing so, establish a social and political arrangement which allows 
them to pursue their more substantive conceptions of the good as fully and as completely as 
possible within an inclusive political sphere. These two arguments, though formally separate, can 
be seen to be mutually dependent, in that it is conceived to be the agent’s knowledge of herself (as a 
participant in a common non-political life and as a possessor of certain beliefs and ends which she 
has an interest in pursuing) that leads her to engage in rational dialogue with others about how to 
go about organising the political institutions of the state. And, conversely, it is the desire (or 
motivation) to establish an inclusive and fair system of government (which will allow her to pursue 
her ends, and practice her beliefs, as fully as possible within the boundaries set by principles which 
are themselves derived from out of rational agreements) which provokes her to temper her 
demands in order to satisfy the principle of equal respect and to sustain rational dialogue in the 
face of reasonable disagreement about the good life. That is, it is the desire for agreement which 
leads individuals to ‘set aside’ their more controversial beliefs about the good life in order that 
rational dialogue (and therefore the process of arriving at substantive principles of political 
association) does not merely break down in the face of insurmountable and incommensurable 
disagreement. To this end, the ‘information’ argument and the ‘motivation’ argument converge to 
provide an account of why persons would adopt a ‘reasonable’ position with regard to others, 
rather than merely one of domination or dogmatism.
But it is at this point that Larmore is forced to confront two distinct questions regarding those 
norms internal to, or embodied in, the norms of 'equal respect' and 'rational dialogue'. How should 
these norms be understood? And what do they entail? In unpacking Larmore's two norms, that is, 
we are compelled to ask exactly who we should afford equal respect to (that is, who is conceived to 
be party to the discourse) and how exactly must this 'rational dialogue' be conducted? Larmore 
cannot simply invoke equal respect and rational dialogue as the two 'norms' which underpin
10 Charles Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, p. 142-143.
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liberalism because these norms themselves presuppose certain other, deeper, claims about what 
each entails. Leaving aside the second of these until section 21, what does Larmore say about the 
notion of equal respect?
19. Equal Respect: The Argument for Inclusion.
Larmore is quite forthright in his claim that liberal neutrality (as he conceives it) “depends upon 
moral commitments, but on ones that are neutral with respect to the general ideas of individualism 
and tradition.”11 Consequently, he says, while it may make general assumptions about the kind of 
agents that will be engaged in the process of rational dialogue, about the most important beliefs 
that these agents will hold, what they know about themselves, and what their motivations are, his 
argument “does not assume the validity of individualist views of the good life” (such as personal 
autonomy, or the requirement that all agents are capable of reflecting upon and/or rejecting their 
various aims and commitments).12
But how can the principle of ‘equal respect* fail to embody anything other than the kind of 
‘controversial* ideal that Larmore seeks to reject? Clearly, Larmore does not wish to conceive the 
participants in the dialogue to be representatives of communities (such as village elders, or high- 
ranking officials, or symbolic leaders) who are seen as 'spokesmen' for the particular group to 
which they are a member. Such a conception - whereby powerful individuals come together and 
broker a mutually beneficial arrangement between different cohesive groups - would inevitably 
violate the requirements of neutrality by violating the idea embodied in the notion of equal respect 
that all persons must be treated as ends in themselves rather simply means to some other end. 
Remember after all, we are not talking here about the possibility or coherence of representation at 
the level of policy or institutions, but rather who should be involved in those dialogues and 
processes of deliberation from which specific policies and institutional arrangements are derived. 
The way groups are represented in particular institutions is a distinct but related question which we
11 Ibid. p. 142-143.
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discussed in chapter one (and discuss again later in this chapter). What we are trying to determine 
here is who should and who should not be allowed to think about these issues. Members of a 
political community may well end up agreeing upon particular group-based policies at an 
institutional level (like quota systems for marginalised groups, for example, or blanket legal 
exemptions for adherents to certain religious or cultural communities) but these agreements are 
only valid and justifiable if they are bom out of a process of reasoning which is genuinely inclusive 
and fair to all persons, regardless of their particular views about the good life. The question for 
Larmore, and for Rawls and the contractualists that we encounter later, is how should we frame 
our deliberations about justice? And who should be able to engage in these deliberations and who 
should not? To argue that dialogue should be conducted between ‘representatives’ here would be 
to argue that, in effect, certain persons should be excluded from the process of justification and 
that therefore, principles and institutions and policies need only be justified to some people and 
not others. Liberalism requires more than this. As Larmore himself says, it must be committed to 
the idea that political institutions, policies, and economic arrangements -  the ‘fundamentals of 
political association’ - must ‘be justifiable to all to whom they are to bind.’
Consequently, all persons must have the status and the ability to engage in meaningful dialogue 
with others about questions of justice. “To respect another person as an end,” Larmore tells us, “is 
to insist that coercive or political principles be as justifiable to that person as they are to us. Equal 
respect involves treating in this wayallpersons to whom such principles are to apply.”13 To claim that principles 
of justice must be justifiable to all persons, and then to argue that only certain powerful persons or 
symbolic leaders should be party to the discourse, would be to claim that groups are internally 
homogeneous and would presume also that a single individual could successfully articulate the 
myriad interpretations, understandings, and beliefs contained within the group he represents. 
Indeed, it would necessarily presuppose that groups are able to articulate their 'core values' and 
beliefs collectively as a single mind or perfect, internally coherent unity, via a particular 
representative. Not even the most fervent of nationalists or communitarians have claimed as much,
12 Ibid. p. 144.
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and it hardly needs to be said, surely, that religious, ethnic, and cultural groups are not cohesive or 
homogeneous in this way.14
Consequently - given the internal diversity of groups - the only way to fulfil the normative 
requirement of 'equal respect' (i.e. that principles are genuinely justifiable to all persons equally, and 
not merely to the heads of particular communities) is to allow all individuals to be party to the 
discourse in order that they might deliberate on equal terms with others both within their group 
and outside it. In order that they are not simply treated as means rather than ends (in order, that is, 
that they are not forced to submit to principles and institutions which they would not themselves 
endorse if given the opportunity to speak for themselves), all persons "must. . .  be free to explain 
to one another in full their comprehensive visions of the good life" which are their own and which 
cannot simply be subsumed within - or identified with - the particular 'community' or 'culture' to 
which they belong.15 Even persons who 'share' the particular values derived from membership in a 
particular 'culture' or 'community' will often understand and interpret these values differently, 
depending upon their own particular felt experiences, and no representative or symbolic leader can 
articulate these as understandings (and the claims which arise from them) as effectively as the 
bearers of these experiences themselves, no matter how enlightened they are considered. Larmore’s 
notion of equal respect, that is, requires that discourse be conducted between and among complex, 
culture-bearing individuals who are seen to possess a way of life, and a set of beliefs and interests, 
which is genuinely their own, and hence it must be seen as a principle which governs and regulates 
dialogue not only between groups but also within these groups themselves. Liberalism does not 
necessarily seek the abandonment of political representation at the institutional level, then. Rather it 
seeks to enshrine the idea that the process of dialogue by which we deliberate and discuss the 
nature, role, and status of this representation (and the form it might take) must conducted between 
individuals who are afforded equal respect in the sense that they are conceived as ends in 
themselves.
13 Ibid. p. 137.
14 As I will point out more fully in chapter four.
15 Charles. Larmore, 'Political Liberalism', p. 135. See also C. Larmore, Patterns o f Moral Complexity.
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20. From Dialogue to Politics: The Requirements of Equal Respect.
Now, this, of course, is not something that Larmore would necessarily seek to deny. After all, he 
might (and does) say, public, rational dialogue is merely a means of deriving “principles of political 
association, which fix the basic rights and duties of citizens” and so he might feel that he can 
commit himself to individuality in public without implying that people necessarily need to 
understand themselves as individuals in private.16 However, given what we have already said (in the 
previous chapter) about the public/private distinction (which it is not my intention to reprise here), 
and given also what he says about Rawls’ political liberalism, Larmore must realise that his 
commitment to public dialogue between individuals makes considerably more substantive 
assumptions about the ability of persons to reflect upon their ends (and to understand themselves 
in a way demanded by liberalism) than he thinks. This is implied in the claim we made above. If we 
take the parties to political dialogue to be individual members of larger ways of life then the norms 
of ‘equal respect’ and ‘rational dialogue’ would seem to require that all members of all communities 
are afforded the resources they need in order to participate in public, political discourse on an 
equal basis with others regardless ofthe particular values or desires which prevail within these groups. That is, 
dialogue must be conceived as an ongoing process of debate and agreement between not merely 
those members of a community who are thought to be ‘in charge’ or in an ascendant majority, but 
also those members who may have been previously excluded from such participation (either in the 
derivation of public principles of justice or in the formation and interpretation of norms within 
their religious or cultural group itsell). The commitment to the political equality of all individuals to 
enter into political dialogue regardless of what those elites within particular cultural groups might 
say, and the idea that all persons possess an equal normative status independent of the particular 
group to which they belong (as demanded by the norm of 'equal respect'), requires that persons are 
actually enabled to conceive themselves in a way that renders these equalities (and the benefits they 
generate) accessible and intelligible to them.
16 Ibid. p. 126.
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We can see this most clearly if we descend from the level of abstraction (albeit briefly) in order to 
consider some of the ways in which social and political movements have actually sought to affect 
and shape the conduct of political discourse in Western liberal democracies. The history of these 
societies can often be seen to be characterised in large part by internal struggles for recognition and 
equality by groups and individuals who were previously systematically excluded from participating 
in the constitution of their own political and social structure. The struggle for equal civil rights by 
women and ethnic minorities, for example, represents an overwhelming desire by these ‘groups’ to 
secure both the basic political conditions that they need in order to participate in the constitution of 
their political and social structure on an equal basis with others and also, we might say, the basic 
conditions that characterise the lives of these groups mprivate which make these political freedoms 
accessible to them. In this, it would seem, these groups appear to have a grasp of the dynamics of 
freedom and equality which political liberals lack. Hence, calls for universal suffrage have often 
gone hand in hand with calls for a widening and improvement of education, such that groups who 
have been excluded from the political sphere (and perhaps from education) in the past can make 
meaningful decisions about the way in which their political institutions should be structured, how 
their interests might be best represented and what kind of lives they want to lead, and with calls for 
greater representation of marginalised groups in decision-making bodies and institutions.
For example, as Anne Phillips has pointed out, one of the most significant implications of the 1965 
U.S. Voting Rights Act was that it “created a framework within which to campaign for more 
minority representatives in legislative chambers.”17 With the widening of political rights to suffrage 
(which had been denied African Americans as late as the 1960s), political equality became 
increasingly seen "to include the equal right to elect a representative of one's choice, and this right 
was increasingly interpreted as the right of minority citizens to be represented by minority 
politicians."18 As a consequence, other 'minority' groups began campaigning both for greater economic 
equality and for an accompanyingpo/zrica/ equality. The Women's Movement in Britain and the U.S.,
17 Anne Phillips, Which Equalities Matter? (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 20.
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for example, not only campaigned in favour of strikes for equal pay and for better employment 
protection for part-time women workers, but sought also to combat
misrepresentation of women in the media, the sexual harassment of women.. .  the bullying 
and violence of their husbands . . .  [and] the patronage visited on women in political 
meetings and parties. Despite their formation of a counter-cultural movement that despised 
the conventions of establishment politics, feminists eventually turned their attention to 
women's exclusion from the conventional political arena. . .  Where earlier generations had 
given the impression that all was now fine on the political front. . .  but pretty depressing in 
social and economic life, contemporary feminists have argued that sexual inequality pervades 
the very definitions and practices of politics as well as the conditions of economic fife.19
It is for precisely these reasons that many feminists have sought to radically reconstruct the way in 
which we understand and internalise and discuss our most basic and fundamental political, legal, 
economic concepts and ideals.20
Similarly, in countries which contain an Islamic population we can see the ways in which 
traditionally marginalised groups have sought greater equality and freedom not merely through the 
public recognition of political rights, but in the increased capacity to participate in the formation of 
those private norms and values which make these political rights accessible to them. In India, for 
example, this has often taken the form of a struggle for wider education and increased 
representation in (traditionally male-dominated) political and religious institutions in order that 
subordinated minorities become more included in the interpretation of traditions and customs and
18 Ibid. p. 21.
19 Ibid. p. 21-22.
20 See, for example, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference’, Nancy Fraser, Unruly 
Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory; and Seyla Benhabib, 
Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1992).
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sacred texts which (at least in theory) provide the foundation for both private morality and public 
law.21
In this way, newly won equalities both in our own society and in those which are apparently rooted 
in very different values to ours, are not only changing the way in which members of different 
groups understand their political status in society, but also the way in which society as a whole 
understands those concepts and ideas which lie at the heart of its politics and the way in which its 
members understand themselves in relation to the world in which they exist. Consequently, the 
continuing quest for greater social and political equality (and hence, greater inclusion among 
marginalised groups and individuals) embodies also the wider and more substantive will to alter the 
way in which persons understand their history, their beliefs, and their relationship to the past (and 
to the pasts of those religious, cultural, and ethnic groups which co-exist among them).22
Larmore’s principle of equal respect then, on his own terms, requires that all individuals be capable 
of engaging in meaningful discourse concerning the legitimacy of substantive, regulative principles 
of political association and also that these persons be capable of discussing and reflecting upon the 
nature of their private beliefs and self-understandings on 'reasonable' terms. For liberal neutrality to 
be truly fair (and inclusive of diverse ways of life), it must be rooted in the capacity of individuals 
to participate equally, not only in the derivation of principles of political association, but also in the 
interpretation and revision of those practices and ways of life which constitute their ‘private* lives, 
and in the way in which those practices may be accommodated and represented in the wider 
political community. Equal respect, that is, necessarily contains within it the commitment to 
ensuring that all individuals, regardless of their particular religious or cultural beliefs, and regardless 
also of the prejudices or discriminatory attitudes which might prevail in the community to which 
they belong, are allowed access to political dialogue and are provided with the resources they need
21 Sebastian Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs', M.N. Srinivas, ‘The Changing Position 
of Indian Women’, Man 12/2 (1977), 221-238, p. 227; Z. Bhatty, ‘The Status of Muslim Women and 
Social Change’, in B. R. Nanada (ed.) Indian Women: From Purdah to Modernity (New Delhi: Vikas, 
1976).
22 This is picked up in chapter seven.
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in order to debate meaningfully about their own ideas about value, the importance of their beliefs 
to them, and the extent to which these beliefs are of continued worth. It represents, that is, a 
commitment to dialogue between equal individuals, who are capable of engaging in 'reasoned' 
dialogue with one another, and justifying their claims and actions in a manner that others might 
find 'reasonable'.
21. The Requirements of Reasonableness.
What, though, are the requirements of ‘reasonableness’? What does it mean to adopt a ‘reasonable’ 
standpoint with regard to our particular ideas and commitments within the context of political 
dialogue and justification? Now that we have addressed the question of inclusion via a discussion 
of the norm of equal respect, it is necessary now to turn to the question of what is embodied in 
Larmore's notion of rational dialogue, and what the commitment to 'reasonableness' implies for 
liberalism more generally.
For Rawls, we must remember, adopting a ‘reasonable’ standpoint with regard to our commitments 
and ideals within the agreement process is precisely to accept that our deliberations about justice 
should be conducted in a particular way, subject to certain constraints. To be reasonable, for the 
liberal, is to accept those constraints built into the original position and to negotiate within an 
agreement process conducted between others who are similarly motivated and subject to the same 
constraints. Hence, the reasonable, Rawls claims, "is incorporated into the background set up of 
the original position which frames the discussions of the parties and situates them symmetrically."23 
Those who do not - or cannot - deliberate in this way due to the fact that their comprehensive 
doctrines do not or cannot endorse any or all of the constraints built into Rawls’ account of public 
reason are considered ‘unreasonable* from the point of view of justice and (hence) their claims are 
excluded from the deliberative process. An ‘unreasonable’ doctrine, therefore, is any doctrine or set 
of beliefs which would frame public deliberation regarding the nature and requirements of justice
23 John Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', John Rawls: Collected Papers, p. 316.
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in a way which is contrary to that laid down by Rawls (and which would, consequently, lead to the 
derivation of principles which differ from the two principles embodied in justice as fairness).24
But if we are correct in our claim (made in chapter one) that Rawls’ account of ‘reasonable 
agreement’ among ‘politically autonomous’ agents necessarily presupposes the value of autonomy 
more widely, then we must conclude that Rawlsian political liberalism necessarily requires all 
persons to be provided with the substantive resources and capacities they need in order to be 
autonomous ‘outside’ the political realm (and hence, able to examine and interpret their ends and 
commitments freely, and to justify their claims on terms that others might find reasonable).
So much, of course, is also true of Larmore, in the sense that his conception of political dialogue 
presupposes an individualism that cannot be confined merely to the political sphere. But Larmore’s 
argument also presupposes autonomy in its requirement that persons deliberate from a ‘reasonable’ 
perspective regarding their ends. We can see this most clearly if we turn our attention for a 
moment to the contractualism advanced by Thomas Scanlon and those non-Rawlsian impartialists 
who followed him.
Thomas Scanlon has sought to re-cast the constraints built into Rawls' original position in a 
manner which more adequately satisfies the requirements of procedural neutrality. By re­
configuring the structural requirements of the Rawlsian contract (and thus presenting an alternative 
account of public reason and agreement to Rawls), Scanlon believes it possible to derive 
substantive, regulative principles of justice (or, more widely, of morality) which are genuinely neutral 
in the sense that they gain their legitimacy independent of any particular account of the good including 
autonomy.25
24 See Ibid., especially part 5 (p. 315-318 in John Rawls: Collected Papers).
25 See T. M. Scanlon, ‘Utilitarianism and Contractualism’, in A. Sen & B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism 
and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To 
Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
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The way he does this, of course, is (like Larmore) to reconceive the way in which parties to the 
agreement are motivated. Contractors are no longer understood to be motivated purely by a desire to 
advance their own individual ends (as Rawls maintained), but are instead conceived to be 
motivated to reach agreement on “principles that others. . .  could not reasonably reject.”26 Hence, 
as contractors, we are conceived to have a direct interest in, and thus a desire to understand, the 
points of view of those others with whom we are deliberating “not because we might, for all we 
know, be them [as in Rawls' argument], or because we might occupy their position in some other 
possible world [as in Hare's], but in order to find principles that they, as well as we, have reason to 
accept.”27 Consequently, each contractor is understood to be capable of transcendingxhe standpoint 
of their own particularity (their own ‘personal’ standpoint, the standpoint of their own ends and 
values and interests)28 in order to find generalisable principles which are agreeable to all, and 
therefore they need not (and indeed, must not) be conceived to be unaware of their particular 
interests in the way Rawls maintains. Once we conceive contractors to be motivated above all to 
reach agreement with persons who possess different ends and beliefs, rather than merely to advance 
their own ends at the expense of others, then the information constraints built into the Rawlsian 
original position become superfluous (and, as we will see, self-defeating). Blatantly self-interested 
or self-serving claims (such as claims which seek the enforcement of particular traditions or ways 
of life via political institutions, for example, or claims which advocate the unfair treatment of 
particular groups or individuals on the basis of some particular religious or cultural beliefs or ideals 
which are held to be uncontrovertibly ‘true’) will be quite reasonably rejected by those who would 
suffer if those claims were to be enforced. Consequently, claims to justice cannot be ‘justified’ by 
flat assertions of the truth of certain beliefs, or claims which invoke the intrinsic value of certain 
cultural practices; claims for the ‘recognition’ or ‘toleration’ of particular beliefs, therefore, must 
necessarily be tempered and re-articulated if they are to be accepted by all parties to the agreement
26 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, p. 191.
27 Ibid. See R. M. Hare, Essays in Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), and Essays on 
Political Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
28 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality. See also The View From Nowhere, and The Last Word.
164
process, which is to say that their justification must rest not upon their ‘truth’ alone, but upon 
reasons which others (who do not accept the ‘truth’ of these beliefs) can accept.29
Therefore, Scanlon and Larmore can be seen to converge in their claim that ‘reasonableness’ is 
intimately tied to one’s willingness to voluntarily ‘set aside’ one’s more controversial ideals and 
commitments in the interests of reaching agreement with those with whom one is deliberating. 
Indeed, given the fact of pluralism, and given also that our primary motivation is to reach 
agreement on substantive principles of justice, adopting a reasonable perspective with regard to our 
own ends is, for them, actually the most ‘rational’ thing to do. To dogmatically assert the 
superiority of our own ideals and beliefs over others, or to demand that our own particular beliefs 
or values should be embodied in (and enforced by) the state would, in the face of a diversity of 
ultimate ends, either end in stalemate, or the imposition of particular ways of life on persons who 
do not accept them. In either event, it would be clear that the “construction has broken down, 
since it has failed to produce a principle capable of adjudicating a conflict.”30 If, as Scanlon argues, 
our acknowledgement of diversity leads us to seek a stable, well-ordered society via common 
agreement on the basic principles which regulate our pursuit of our own ends (and which provide 
the standard by which we measure the legitimacy of political institutions), then it is rational to look 
beyond our own interests, and find principles which apply impartially (in the sense that they appeal 
to no particular account of the good for all) on terms that others might find acceptable given their 
own ideas about the good and ‘the truth’ and so on. Consequently, Scanlonian impartiality (like 
Larmore's political liberalism) is itself only possible among persons who are aware of their identities 
(and who are conscious of what their various ends and attachments and commitments demand of 
them in particular circumstances), but who are willing and able to set aside the more controversial 
or demanding aspects of these ideals in the interests of finding substantive, reasonable agreement 
on the content of justice. For Scanlon and Larmore, then, our deliberations are not constrained by 
our lack of information about our identities but rather the constraints we voluntarily impose upon
29 This is discussed in relation to the role of ‘culture’ in normative dialogue in the next chapter.
30 Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 69.
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ourselves in the interests of seeking genuine agreement on principles of justice in circumstances of 
diversity.
Scanlon, of course, is not alone in thinking that his account of contractualism better fulfils the 
requirements of procedural neutrality than Rawls’, as we can see in the recent work of Brian Barry, 
Thomas Nagel, and Charles Beitz.31 For all their subtle differences, these writers can be seen to be 
united in their commitment to “the fundamental equality of human beings”, just as they can also be 
seen to be united in their belief that the Scanlonian construction is the most coherent and 
intemally-consistent means of expressing what this commitment entails in terms of justice.32 Hence 
none of these writers fall into the trap of conceiving the Scanlonian agreement position as entirely 
neutral in the sense that it avoids any commitment to the good of certain substantive principles. As 
Brian Barry puts it, the Scanlonian construction “requires the importation of an ethically-driven 
baseline” which enshrines the fundamental equality of every reasonable individual to engage in the 
agreement process and then goes on to define what 'reasonableness' entails.33 What these theorists 
seem less willing to acknowledge, however, is that in addition to its commitment to fundamental 
equality, the Scanlonian position necessarily assumes that individual persons will be able to assess 
and interpret their ends autonomously and that, consequently, they are as guilty of assuming (and 
presupposing) the value of autonomy as Rawls.
The reason for this is that Scanlon, Larmore, Rawls, and post-Scanlonian impartialists advance a 
conception of public reasoning and deliberation about justice which pre-supposes the ability of all 
persons to find agreement on principles which are acceptable to others regardless of which cultural 
group or community they belong to, and regardless of their more substantive ideas about the good 
life. Liberalism, that is (whether it is advanced in a contractualist or a discursive, deliberative form) 
presupposes - and demands - that persons be capable of doing more than merely articulating the 
shared values of their 'community'. It demands that all persons occupy a standpoint which draws
31 Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality; Charles Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic 
Theory\ and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality.
32 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 59.
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upon their own experiences but which allows them to construct reasons and justifications for why 
their particular claims should be respected that appeal to others on terms that they themselves can 
accept as reasonable.34 Liberal impartiality demands that, once persons have asserted their own 
particular beliefs and found no agreement, they move to a 'higher' - or more 'neutral' - level of 
discourse or deliberation which seeks to find principles which can be accepted even though there is 
no agreement on the fundamental nature of the world, or on the 'truth' of particular values or 
beliefs. And to do this, persons must necessarily offer justifications and reasons which do not 
appeal directly to the validity or truth of their 'comprehensive' doctrines; they must be capable of 
adopting the requisite standpoint or perspective from which they might advance justifications for 
their accommodation or toleration which others (who disagree - perhaps vehemently - with the 
substantive beliefs that others might hold) can accept. This is not, of course, to say that reasoning 
about justice presupposes an understanding of the self as 'unencumbered' of its ends in the way 
that communitarians and difference-theorists allege (as we will see more clearly in part three). 
Rather, the point is simply that for the liberal, political discourse is not exhausted once everyone 
has stated the values embodied in their own particular community. Rather, this represents merely 
the beginning of a much longer and more complex series of negotiations and arguments designed to 
discover exactly what persons can agree upon in the face of their more fundamental differences.
But, again, embodied in this idea is the claim that persons are (and should be) able to achieve a 
degree of distance from those specific ends that they are deliberating upon in order that they might 
engage in meaningful discourse among persons who disagree fundamentally about the good life. 
That is, while they need not be conceived as capable of abstracting themselves from all those 
values and commitments and ideals and motivations which make them who they are at once, they 
must be understood as able (in the right circumstances) to move from the perspective internal to 
their own culture or role or office, to a more general standpoint from which they might examine 
their own beliefs and the beliefs of those others with whom they are deliberating. It is this move 
which affords persons the critical distance from certain of their own particular commitments to
33 Ibid.
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construct independently valid arguments in favour of the toleration or accommodation of their 
own customs and traditions and ways of life, and it is this move which, in turn, renders people 
open to the possibility of accommodating the claims of others with whom they disagree. It is this 
move, that is, and hence the ability to examine a particular end or commitment or ideal in a way 
that others might see it (and then to debate with others from this standpoint) which defines one as 
'reasonable'.35 Consequently, liberal justification requires all persons to be autonomous in the sense 
that they are able to achieve enough distance between themselves and any of their own ends (but 
not, importantly, all of them at the same time) in order that they might transcend (but not to ignore 
or deny or ameliorate) their most fundamental ideas about the good when seeking agreement on 
principles of justice.36
22. Conclusion.
‘Neutralist’ or ‘Impartialist’ liberalism is as committed to individual autonomy, then, as 
‘perfectionist’ or ‘comprehensive’ liberalism because it presupposes an account of justification and 
public reason which presumes certain abilities and capacities in all persons. Given its central 
commitment to the public justifiability of principles and institutions, liberalism must support and 
encourage those conditions under which public justification and reasoning can take place in the 
appropriate way. This requires the support of those conditions of individual autonomy and equality 
which allow all persons to adopt the requisite ‘reasonable’ standpoint with regard to their own ends 
and the ends of others. For liberals, it is precisely the fact that one has the ability to find agreement 
on the content of second-order principles and institutions in the face of deep disagreement about 
the ‘true’ nature of the good life at a first-order level that allows liberalism to accommodate radical 
diversity. Without the commitment to individual autonomy (and therefore, the commitment to 
supporting and encouraging autonomy in the lives and self conceptions of each and every
34 This will be discussed in more detail later.
35 See chapters four and five.
36 This is examined more fully in chapter four.
168
individual in society, as discussed in the previous chapter) the liberal account of public reason and 
public justification collapses.
Liberal impartiality, then, is only ‘impartial’ among those ways of life -  those comprehensive 
doctrines -  which are compatible with the ethical requirements of liberal political dialogue and 
collective deliberation, which is to say that it is only ‘impartial’ or ‘neutral’ among ways of life 
which are compatible with individual autonomy. Many have taken this to imply the failure of 
liberalism to live up to its aim of avoiding the imposition of controversial understandings and 
values upon members of liberal societies, as if merely stating that liberalism embodies particular 
values or ideals which it takes to be valuable and worth promoting represents a ‘criticism’ that 
could not be levelled at any other normative doctrine. I will argue in the next chapter that, if this 
criticism holds, then it is equally as damaging to difference theory, pluralism, republicanism, and 
any other non-liberal response to diversity as it is to liberalism because these theories all appeal to 
individual autonomy in the same way -  and for the same reasons -  as liberalism.
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Chapter Five
Politics, Discourse, and the 'Cultural Defence1:
Liberalism and the Politicisation of Difference
[T]he appeal to ‘culture’ establishes nothing. Some cultures are admirable, 
others are vile. Reasons for doing things that can be advanced within the 
former will tend to be good, and reasons that can be advanced within the latter 
will tend to be bad. But in neither case is something being a part of the culture 
itself a reason for doing anything.
Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 258.
In chapters three and four, we argued that liberalism necessarily presupposes certain constraints 
upon what can and cannot be accommodated in diverse societies (according to the principle of 
autonomy), and that it also imposes constraints upon what can and cannot count as a justification 
for particular acts or practices. To be acceptable, justifications must be agreeable within a process 
of reasoning framed by the twin principles of individual autonomy and equality. Institutions, 
policies, and constitutional measures must be justifiable to all tndhxdud persons in the sense that 
these measures can be rejected by any individual regardless of what their ‘group’ or ‘community’ 
would argue to the contrary. In this, we find embodied the familiar liberal notion that no group 
or collectivity may impose burdens upon individuals that they themselves do not find justifiable.1 
And it is precisely the principle of autonomy -  the idea that persons should be capable of 
reflecting upon their beliefs for the purposes of judging their worth and explaining them to 
others -  that allows the process of reasoning and deliberation to get started, to keep moving, and 
in the end to yield substantive resolutions to questions of justice.2
Central to liberal dialogue and politics, then, is the idea that it does not take a stand on the 
coherence or ‘truth’ of particular first-order beliefs or commitments or ends in and of themsehes. 
Rather it simply requires that institutions support those second-order goods of individual 
autonomy and equality which allow all persons to make up their own minds about such matters
1 See also chapter two.
2 See chapter three.
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and debate them meaningfully and coherently within a liberal model of public reason. 
Consequently, groups (or the state) are not permitted to force their members to accept the 
prevailing wisdom by denying them the resources they need in order to subject it to meaningful 
scrutiny.
This is the strategy of ‘privatisation* upon which liberalism is founded, and which is embodied in 
liberal dialogue and politics. It is the strategy outlined in chapter one, in response to Rawls. 
Liberalism ‘privatises’ diversity in the sense that it leaves the validity or worth of particular values -  
and the nature of specific communities -  to individual conscience. It does so, firstly, because any 
account of justice rooted in a particular ‘thick’ account of the good would -  as critics of liberalism 
are so keen to point out - impose understandings and ideals upon members of groups who could 
not accept them. And it does so, secondly, because -  as we will see more clearly in part three of 
this thesis -  no outsider can determine the truth or validity of a particular way of life or 
membership or end for an individual; this is something that only individuals themselves can do in 
the context of their lives as a whole. Liberalism seeks to encourage those values in public and in 
private which enable persons to make up their own minds about the world and their place within it 
and hence it leaves the validity or ‘truth’ or coherence of particular ends and ideals to one’s 
conscience. It recognises that this requires groups to accept certain constraints upon the way in 
which they organise themselves, and then leaves persons to decide for themselves whether or not 
the ideals embodied in the groups to which they belong demand their continued allegiance. As we 
saw in chapters one, two, and three, this does not represent the intrusion that anti-liberals and 
neutralist liberals believe it to be because autonomy does not in and of itself represent a whole way 
of life or thickly-determined, first-order account of the whole good for all people. Rather, it simply 
represents the idea that all persons should be free from imposed and arbitrary constraints upon 
their deliberations about who they are and what is valuable to them and that they should be 
capable of changing their minds about the worth of their ends and the commitments they hold. If 
autonomous persons wish to impose certain forms of authority upon themselves, then this is not
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something that liberalism need outlaw. Indeed, this idea of the consensual acceptance of authority 
underpins the liberal justification for the state and for the principles which animate it.
But a number of theorists have recendy criticised liberalism for its antipathy toward publicly 
‘affirming’ the ends and ways of life of different groups in society, and have sought to reconceive 
the process of dialogue and agreement by which agents decide upon the structure of political 
institutions and the way in which questions of justice are resolved. They have argued that a “just 
form of constitution,” and hence, of political dialogue, “must begin with the full, mutual 
recognition of the different cultures of citizens.”3 Their reasons for arguing as much differ. Charles 
Taylor, for example, argues that agents must presume that the “customs and creations of . . . 
different cultures” are of equal worth in the name of equal respect. And Iris Marion Young believes 
that liberal dialogue of the kind conceived by the likes of Larmore, Scanlon, and the Scanlonian 
contractualists belitdes the significance of groups by reducing them to the status of individual 
preferences or equating them with self-interested conceptions of the good.4 Consequently, Young 
and Taylor converge (with theorists like James Tully and Axel Honneth - who we discuss later - in 
their belief that political dialogue and agreement must take account of difference in a far more 
substantive way than liberal dialogue is able.
For these theorists, the fact that that individuality and autonomy are embodied in the structure of 
liberal reasoning and discourse is simply a further argument in favour of replacing liberalism with 
some other form of politics which eschews such substantive and controversial value claims. Such a 
strategy has been advocated by various anti-liberals who seek to advance a ‘politics of difference*, 
or a ‘politics of recognition’, or some form of pluralism. But the strategy of politicising difference 
in the way these theorists advocate is ambiguous and incoherent both in terms of its philosophical 
foundations and its implications for politics. Indeed, the strategy of politicising differences actually 
fails to protect the very diversity that these theorists believe we should be encouraging and fails
3 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age o f Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), p. 8
4 See Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
172
also to provide a coherent means of adjudicating political conflicts or resolving questions of justice. 
In fairness to these theorists, however, it must be said that their central arguments can actually 
respond quite adequately to this charge of incoherence. However, the only way they can do so is by 
dropping the most significant and interesting aspects of their critique of liberalism and adopting 
the liberal approach toward accommodating diversity. Indeed, once we realise exactly what 
advocates of a strategy of politicisation defend, it becomes clear that the form of politics for which 
they argue is all but indistinguishable from that of liberalism. We can see this most clearly if we 
once again examine the kind of politics that grows out of liberal and non-liberal dialogue, as we did 
in our discussion of Larmore.
23. The Strategy of Politicisation.
If all that the politics of difference, or recognition, or cultural recognition embodied was the idea 
that group differences should be subject to political debate, or that persons should not experience 
any unfair hardships on account of their membership of particular groups, then liberals would have 
little problem with them. After all, as we have already seen, liberals believe that the nature and 
status of groups should be subject to political scrutiny and investigation, just as they also believe 
that community practices are properly subject to justice and within the reach of political 
institutions. This is embodied in the idea that individuals debate political issues and determine the 
nature and content of regulative principles as informed members of particular communities, 
possessing interests and ideals and motivations which are shaped and affected by the memberships 
they possess and the obligations these memberships confer. There is no requirement that each and 
every participant in the dialogue ‘respects’ or ‘affirms’ the ways of life of those with whom they are 
deliberating, there is simply the requirement that each and every participant confronts one another 
on ‘reasonable’ terms, which is to say that each person must acknowledge that different people are 
reasoning from different points of view determined by the various commitments and memberships 
of which each is constituted, and that these claims demand a fair hearing.
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Consequently, the politics which emerge from the liberal agreement process acknowledges that 
persons hold particular ways of life and cherish particular values and ideals, but does not require 
that all persons affirm or respect these values. The requirement of reasonableness is aimed 
precisely at overcoming the fact that no individual can hope to affirm or respect the values of 
everyone else at once. Any form of dialogue or agreement which requires each and every 
participant to openly and genuinely respect the first-order values and beliefs and ends of all those 
others who are party to the agreement will inevitably end in stalemate. It is precisely the fact that, 
in the face of such diversity and disagreement, parties to liberal dialogue can search for other, 
thinner, more general, grounds for agreement (while leaving the validity or truth of particular first- 
order ways of life themselves open) that keeps liberal dialogue from collapsing into an unrealistic 
and utopian search for common agreement on the truth and coherence of each and every 
individual’s particular beliefs and ideals.
The problem with those who advocate the politicisation of difference is that they appear to require 
persons to engage in exacdy the kind of utopian search for agreement on the respectability and 
coherence of ends that liberalism strives to avoid. Iris Marion Young, for example, argues that “a 
culturally pluralist democratic ideal. . .  supports group-conscious policies not only as a means to 
the end of equality, but as also as intrinsic to the idea of equality itself. Groups cannot be socially 
equal,” she goes on, “unless their specific experience, culture, and social contributions are publicly 
affirmed and recognised.”5 Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth agree, with Taylor claiming that the 
state must “accord equal respect to actually evolved cultures.”6
But, as we have already implied, this argument is at best too demanding of a diverse public and at 
worst, entirely incoherent. The reason for this is that it requires persons with radically different 
beliefs and understandings of the world to ‘affirm’ or embrace those values held by others that they 
believe are entirely mistaken, wrong, and perhaps, evil. It is one thing to respect the right (or,
5 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, p. 174.
6 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism: Debating 
the Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 42; Axel Honneth,
The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar o f Social Conflicts (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995).
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perhaps less controversially, the ability) of all persons to pursue the particular way of life that they 
believe to be valuable, while it is quite another entirely to respect that way of life itself. It is one 
thing, for example, to hold that Muslim women should be able to cover themselves if they so wish, 
or that male Sikhs should be allowed to wear turbans, or that persons should be free to follow the 
teachings of the Catholic church, but quite another to hold that the covering of women, or the 
wearing of turbans, or the teachings of the Catholic church are in themselves valuable or admirable 
or worthwhile.
It is an inconvenient, yet crucial, fact that we cannot ‘affirm’ all forms of difference because they 
will cancel one another out. How can a state - or, for that matter, any one of its citizens - ‘affirm’ 
the value of homosexuality at the same time as affirming the values of those religious and 
homophobic groups who believe it is sinful or evil or disgusting? How can one respect Blacks at 
the same time as respecting or ‘affirming’ the values of right-wing groups like the Ku Klux Klan 
who believe they deserve little or no respect at all? And how can one ‘affirm’ at once the values of 
the feminist movement, the socialist movement, anarchism, liberalism, conservatism, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Buddhism, Atheism, nihilism, and all those other ideologies and creeds and ways of 
life which exist in diverse societies? How can an individual or the state be both for and against 
abortion, or for and against the death penalty, or gender equality, or freedom of speech, or any 
other stance or issue or value on which there is disagreement in society? Simply claiming that the 
state and its members should ‘accommodate’ or ‘affirm’ difference tells us nothing about the way 
in which we should respond to conflicts between differences. Young, Taylor, the deliberative 
democrats, the Habermasians, and the postmodernists might well hope that these conflicts will be 
resolved and negotiated via open and inclusive debate, but again, this strategy itself requires that all 
persons (regardless of their group memberships) be afforded the intellectual and political resources 
that they need to engage in this dialogue in the first place.7
7 See the next chapter.
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Given the internal incoherence of their claims, it is perhaps unsurprising that advocates of a 
politics of difference or recognition are notoriously silent when it comes to explaining which 
differences in particular institutions should tolerate (or ‘accommodate’ or ‘include’), and which they 
should seek to eradicate. Instead, they prefer to speak in more vague terms about a general need to 
‘accommodate’ or ‘affirm’ or ‘respect’ or ‘recognise’ difference. But, as we have said, the question is 
(and has never been) should we accommodate diversity, but rather, which forms of diversity 
should we accommodate or tolerate, and what reasons might we give for favouring some customs 
and not others. No individual - and no state - is able to simply ‘affirm difference’ because it will be 
impossible to affirm the values of certain groups without constraining or restricting the actions or 
values of others. We can either affirm the truth or respectability of Catholicism or we can deny it, 
just as the state can either enact policies which encourage the values embodied in Catholicism (by 
passing laws against abortion, for example), or it can do the opposite.
Liberalism’s strategy, of course, as embodied in the Scanlonian, Rawlsian, and Larmorean 
agreement situation (or discourse) is to do neither. Liberalism leaves these kinds of decisions to 
individual conscience, and seeks to establish a framewoik of principles which can be agreed upon 
and understood by all persons regardless of their particular allegiances and commitments. Liberal 
political theory recognises that certain values are important to certain persons, as is the ability of 
every individual to work out for themselves what the values of their group are and what they mean 
to them. Liberalism therefore claims that all persons should possess the same rights and status in 
order that they might all access those intercultural and intracultural debates and dialogues from 
which they derive their understanding of themselves, their ends and their ideals, and that they 
should be free to pursue these ends in a manner which is consistent with everyone else doing the 
same (according to rules that they themselves conceive to be justifiable). It does not require 
different groups to respect or affirm values or beliefs that they are fundamentally opposed to, it 
simply requires that persons affirm or recognise the fact that the values held by those with whom 
they share society (and with whom they are engaged in public reason) are important or valuable to 
these people, and that they should therefore be left to get on with their lives in the same way that
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they get on with their lives within limits which are publicly justifiable to all. Liberals, therefore, 
‘recognise* not the validity or truth of values in and ofthemsekes (because this would be incoherent 
given the diversity of these beliefs) but rather the right or the ability of each person to form, revise, 
and pursue a particular way of life for themselves and to have that way of life tolerated (but not 
necessarily embraced or celebrated) by others.
Advocates of the politicisation of group identities (like Young, Taylor, Tully, et al) believe that this 
approach belies a deeper ‘cultural imperialism’ and a desire to ‘reduce difference to unity* by 
understanding all persons and groups in terms of a classificatory, conceptual, and normative 
framewoik from which they are alienated. But how does the commitment to the right of all 
persons to pursue their valued ends ‘reduce difference to unity*? And what might such a thing 
mean? As we have already seen throughout this thesis (and as we will see more clearly in part three), 
liberalism certainly does not ‘reduce difference to unity* by requiring all persons to adopt an 
abstract and dislocated - and therefore, identical - viewpoint with regard to their own ends and 
values. And neither does it do so by forcing persons to understand themselves as atomistic or 
abstract individuals who possess no attachments or ties to others.
There are, perhaps, two ways in which liberalism might be said to ‘reduce difference to unity*. The 
first is the now familiar liberal claim that we are all equals in the sense that we all have an equal 
right to lead our lives according those values that we have freely and meaningfully endorsed for 
ourselves and that do not involve the violation of the rights of others rather than merely follow the 
arbitrary dictates of others. We all have an equal right, that is, to those abilities and freedoms 
necessary for us to question and revise those ends afforded to us by our social and cultural roles 
and reject them if we so desire. In this, liberalism is indeed invoking a universalist frame of 
reference: all persons, regardless of their more particular attachments and ends, are understood to 
be rights-bearing, autonomous individuals who must be defended from arbitrary domination and 
subordination by institutions that they themselves find justifiable.
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The second (related) liberal impulse toward ‘reducing difference to unity* might be said to be its 
drive to establish a genuine common ground over which different persons, regardless of their 
more substantive beliefs or commitments, can engage in meaningful dialogue and agreement 
regarding political conflicts and questions of justice. But in this, as in the claim above, the 
difference between liberals and non-liberals is wholly ambiguous, because both ‘sides’ in fact seek 
the same goal. With close analysis, it becomes clear that Young and the antiliberals are as guilty of 
‘reducing difference to unity* in these ways as liberals. This will become apparent in the next two 
sections.
24. The Preconditions of Political Discourse.
What, for example, are we to make of the second claim; that liberalism reduces difference to unity 
by seeking to establish a genuine common model of public reason circumscribed and regulated by 
overarching principles, in which all persons -  regardless of their particular memberships and first- 
order commitments -  can deliberate as to the rightful outcome of political questions? Quite clearly, 
this ‘criticism* is hollow, because this is an aim shared by Young, Taylor, Tully, and all those other 
theorists who argue for the protection of group identities.
24.1 John Gray and the End o f Politics.
Consider, for example, the pluralist argument advanced by John Gray. This is slightly different 
from the theories advanced by Young et al, but it shares the same goal, namely, the protection of 
group identities and customs. In his most recent work, Gray argues that liberalism cannot 
respond coherently to value-pluralism because it conceives all differences as “arising in the 
formation of personal plans of life rather than in conflicts among whcleways o f life”* The variety of 
“value-pluralism that is most salient in the context of the world today [however] is not of this . . .  
diluted and individualistic variety, but arises from the plurality of whole ways of life, with their 
own associated moralities and exclusionary allegiances. The liberal ideal of neutrality is,” he
8 John Gray, 'After the New Liberalism', Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close o f the 
Modem Age, pp. 120-130, p. 121. Emphasis added.
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continues, “a wholly inadequate response to this form of value-pluralism . . . because the 
conceptions of the good in which it is expressed resist legal privatization."9 Therefore, he says,
"the institutional forms best suited to a rrndus vhxndi may well not be the individualist institutions 
of liberal civil society, but rather those of political and legal pluralism, in which the fundamental 
units are not individuals but communities."10 In a society which contains a plurality of 
communities and cultural groups, then, it is quite clear that the best we can hope for - and all we 
should aim for - is the establishment of a stable and peaceful accommodation of 
incommensurable group interests, or, as Gray himself puts it, “that different cultures should 
dwell on the Earth in peace without renouncing their differences.”11
But on what terms might such a peace be brokered? And who is to do the brokering? And why? 
Gray is curiously silent on these issues which is particularly problematic because it is precisely 
these fundamental issues of principle (at the level of justification) that must be established before 
we can even begin to talk about what political and legal institutions might look like in a pluralist 
society. Why, for example, should persons agree to some form of pluralist modus vzuendi as 
opposed to an arrangement which seeks to impose their own way of fife upon others who think 
differently? Gray argues that they will do so out of a desire for peace. But how can we be so sure?
And even if he is right about this, he must surely realise that the appeal to peace will itself demand 
that all acknowledge and accept not only the value of peace, but the value of a certain jbtm  of 
peace rooted in the mutual respect of ways of life different to their own via a process of dialogue 
and agreement, and that all persons must agree to constrain their pursuit of the good in 
accordance with the requirements of this peace. It is not enough for Gray to argue that groups 
will be fine as long as they leave one another alone in the interests of peace and stability precisely 
because it is built into the structure of certain groups to do anything but leave others alone.
9 Ibid. p. 136-137. We have already discussed the liberal strategy of privatisation, and will have cause to do so 
more fully in the chapters that follow. Liberalism necessarily appeals to some notion of privatisation in the 
sense that it leaves the truth or coherence of particular ways of life to individual conscience. Clearly, Gray 
believes this strategy to be incoherent and unsupportable. In many ways, this thesis can be understood as a 
defence of precisely this strategy.
10 Ibid. p. 136.
11 John Gray, ‘Enlightenment’s Wake’, in Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close o f the 
Modem Age, p. 180.
179
Religious groups committed to proselytising or actively recruiting non-believers, for example, 
must, if they are to ‘leave others alone* in the interests of peace and stability, gue up a central 
component of their religious and cultural beliefs. These groups must be persuaded to do this -  via 
some form of dialogue or discussion - in the interests of a particular higher value (i.e. peace) by 
persons who may or may not share these values.
But either groups are able to communicate with one another in mutual dialogue or they are not. 
They cannot be conceived to be incommensurable with one another, and defined by their own 
internal standards of reason and deliberation, while at the same time capable of deriving a 
mutually acceptable modus uuendi among them because deriving such a (minimal) political 
arrangement necessarily presupposes that different groups (or, more accurately, the individual 
members of these groups) will voluntarily agree to forego certain customs and practices and to 
respect - and thus to understand - the claims of other peoples in the interests of converging upon 
a particular form of peace and stability (which must itself be valued over and above those 
practices and values which threaten this peace). For Gray, it seems, it is very important that all 
persons constrain their own pursuit of the good in line with the requirements of peace and 
stability and that, therefore, they are able to understand, respond to, and debate meaningfully, 
claims which invoke this value. But if they can respond to claims in favour of peace - if the 
meaning of peace is somehow recognised and agreed upon (as a good) universally - then why can 
they not respond to claims in favour of other values?
Furthermore, it is not at all clear how a modus wxndi of the kind defined and defended by Gray 
would respond to the very real conflicts which arise and occur at the level of politics (with which 
political philosophy is so preoccupied). That is, not only is Gray*s normative response to diversity 
incoherent at the level of dialogue and justification, it is also incoherent at the level of institutions 
and policies. Consider Gray’s remarks in an earlier essay. "Conflicts among incommensurable 
elements,” he says, “ . .  . will be resolved in different ways, [by different people] in accordance
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with their different cultural traditions.” 12 But this entirely misses the point and offers no guide as 
to how we should resolve conflicts between groups in the same society who seek access to the 
same resources. Different groups and individuals within the same society inevitably require and 
demand access to those common resources and benefits that society has to offer. They demand 
access to the same job market, for example, to the same system of welfare, the same system of 
education, and so on, and as such, the conception of justice which regulates and distributes these 
resources will need to be capable of settling those conflicts which arise out of competing claims 
for these resources among different groups or communities or individuals, and this is not 
achieved by simply arguing that people will resolve these questions differently, depending on 
what cultural group they belong to. Political philosophers must recognise that very real conflicts 
arise between groups and individuals who make competing claims for scarce resources, but it is 
an important point (if not the point) of political philosophy to find some way of resolving these 
conflicts in way that does not in turn provoke even greater enmity or conflict.
Of course, it might be argued that not all groups will 'require access' to common resources, but 
will instead demand that (in the interests of justice) they be entitled to construct their own 
agencies and administer their own public services (perhaps arguing in favour of religious 
schooling, or culturally-specific welfare organisations which cater directly to the needs of their 
own members by bypassing the 'majority' institutions, and so on). This argument is advanced by 
Bhikhu Parekh, who suggests that “[t]he state can adopt group-related welfare policies and invite 
minority communities to participate in planning community centres, health and social services, 
and so on.”13 Such a claim owes a great deal to the kind of arguments advanced by early political 
pluralists like Dewey, Barker, Figgis, Cole, and Laski, through to the more contemporary 
pluralism of Dahl, Mouffe, Walzer, and Rosenblum.14 But even these (quite radical) measures will
12 John Gray, 'Agonistic Liberalism', Enlightenment's Wake, p. 81.
13 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy’, in Gurpreet Mahajan, ed., Democracy, 
Difference, and Social Justice (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 217. Quoted in Brian 
Barry, Culture & Equality, p. 89.
14 See Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro (eds.) The Political Writings o f John Dewey (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1993); Paul Q. Hirst (ed.) The Pluralist Theory o f the State: Selected Writings o f G.D.H. Cole, J.N. 
Figgis, and H.J. Laski (London: Routledge, 1989); David Nicholls, The Pluralist State (London:
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arise out of, and be subject to agreement within, common discourse and dialogue between 
diverse others concerning a wealth of complex and conflicting opinions and ideas about their 
justifiability (or practical applicability, or moral standing). There will be issues involving funding, 
for example, which will inevitably invoke (and require) a debate about the best (and the most 
justifiable) way of using public money, which may itself spill over into more fundamental debates 
about the way in which public money is raised and what its moral and economic purposes are and 
should be. And debates such as these do not stop at the level of policy, but rather extend to 
deeper debates about the nature of society, the normative responsibilities of the state and the 
citizenry, and how these fundamental definitions should be defined and interpreted.
It is not clear, however, how the claims made by pluralists like Gray inform these debates, other 
than in their claim that we should simply accommodate the demands of different groups 
(unchallenged) in response to our inability to understand, or communicate with, others. But while 
relativist or pluralist philosophers (perhaps steeped in post-modernist notions about the 
breakdown of meta-narratives and established forms of discourse in the face of inevitable fluidity 
and change) might claim that we can do nothing more than articulate the shared values embodied 
in our own particular cultural perspective, politics demands that we do more than this and that we 
accommodate differences (and debate them meaningfully) within an inclusive dialogue which can 
provide some kind of resolution or answer to the problems which face diverse, contemporary 
societies. These answers need not be conceived to be 'true' in any first-order or ethically thick 
sense (indeed, liberalism itself shuns the pursuit of ethical 'truths' in this way), but they must be 
capable of resolving those conflicts which divide groups and individuals in contemporary 
societies and which often threaten the very fabric of these societies themselves. That is, they must 
be capable of resolving conflicts which occur at the most fundamental level of principle, and at 
the most practical level of everyday political experience, and at all points in between. The 'unity*
Macmillan, 1975); Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989); Chantal Mouffe, The Return o f the Political (New York: Verso, 1993); Michael Walzer,
Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre-Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1994); Nancy Rosenblum, ‘Pluralism and Self-Defense’, Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989), and Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal 
Uses o f Pluralism in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
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that liberalism seeks, then (and which Young so vehemently opposes), is simply the idea that 
political problems and conflicts must be resolved - and institutions designed and understood - 
through common and genuinely inclusive dialogue among diverse individuals who have their own 
beliefs and commitments and ideals but who are nevertheless able to justify these commitments 
to others on terms that they might accept as reasonable. And this, we will see, is a goal shared by 
Young, pluralists, and democrats of all types.
24.2 Communitarian-Republicanism and The Politics o f Difference.
Communitarians, of course, do not especially commit themselves to some notion of 'peace' 
unless this emerges as one of the 'shared values' or 'common ideals' embodied in the community 
as a whole. But again, for communitarians, the central question must be: how exactly do we find 
out what a community's 'common values' are, and how might we work out how to design 
institutions in such a way as they support, perpetuate, and protect these values? Interestingly, the 
solution that Sandel, Taylor, MacIntyre, and Walzer offer (together with those more explicidy 
political communitarians or 'liberal communitarians' like Amitai Etzioni and Robert Bellah) is that 
we should deliberate about these values collectively along republican or deliberative-democratic 
lines. As Sandel puts it, political institutions must encourage our capacity to "negotiate our way 
among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations which claim us" by 
engaging in public deliberation with others regarding what these obligations mean to us, how they 
should be best understood and articulated, and how they should be supported or expressed in the 
political institutions which govern us.15 What we need, that is, as Iris Marion Young has put it, 
are "real participatory structures in which actual people, with their geographical, ethnic, gender, 
and occupational differences, assert their perspectives on social issues within institutions that 
encourage the representation of their distinct voices."16 But, again, we must ask: on what grounds 
should persons deliberate with one another? How are the deliberations framed? Who is involved 
and who is not? And why?
15 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search o f a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 350.
16 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, p. 116.
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Young, of course, rejects the republicanism that Sandel advocates for precisely the same reason 
that she rejects liberalism, namely, that it "reduces difference to unity" by foregrounding common 
standards of reasoning and deliberation rooted in the idea of impartiality.17 But what does this 
'impartiality' look like? And how does Young's argument avoid making exactly the same 'mistake'? 
After all, having argued that all groups possess their own (sometimes incompatible) standards of 
reasoning and deliberation - their own 'distinct voices' -  Young (like Gray, Sandel, and the 
communitarians) goes on to argue for a conception of dialogue which requires all groups to seek 
genuine agreement with others on common standards of ethical conduct which will in turn 
animate and circumscribe their more specific deliberations about the rightful structure and 
purposes of the state. As Young puts it, participants in political dialogue must ‘talk past their 
differences’ in order to arrive at some kind of consensus or agreement on how questions of 
justice should be resolved.
This is a coherent and admirable enough aim, but it is difficult to find anything in it that liberals 
need disagree with. In fact, if our claims in the previous chapter about the content of liberal 
justification and public reason are correct, then Young would appear to be arguing for precisely 
that form of political discourse and justification that liberals support. But if that is the case then, 
as we saw in chapters one and two, difference theorists and pluralists like Gray are required to 
encourage and support those very same institutional and constitutional measures which enable all 
individuals to contribute to political dialogue, and to reflea meaningfully upon their ends and 
ideals. And this is where Gray and Young run into problems, due to the faa that they conflate 
claims about policies and claims about the justification  of those policies.
In Gray's case, for example, it is clearly one thing to argue that the state should leave different 
groups to govern their own affairs free from external domination or judgement, but it is quite 
another to claim that groups are imxrimensurable and that inter-cultural debate or criticism is
17 Ibid.
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neither possible nor desirable. The second claim would appear to rule out precisely the kind of 
common discourse and agreement that Gray himself relies upon in order to get his pluralist 
politics off the ground. In the case of Sandel and Young, however, it is quite clear -  if we are 
right that the ability to justify one’s ends and debate the resolution of political conflicts requires 
individuals to be autonomous in the way suggested thus far -  that inter-cultural dialogue (which 
aims at the derivation of principles and institutions which are acceptable to all persons regardless 
of their wider beliefs and commitments) must be circumscribed and regulated by those 
overarching principles of individual autonomy and equality even if these values are not especially 
valued by the ‘cultures’ of those involved.
Young rejects this, of course, believing instead that persons can resolve conflicts and questions of 
justice without having first arrived at a particular over-arching account of justice which regulates 
the deliberative process. “Members of a polity,” she says, “need not seek and arrive at agreement 
on a general account of justice in order to argue productively about their problems and come to 
morally legitimate resolutions” to political conflicts.18 But what constitutes a ‘morally legitimate’ 
resolution as distinct from merely a ‘resolution’? Young tells us some time later. “Political 
outcomes can only be considered morally legitimate” she says, “if those who must abide by or 
adjust to them have had a part in their formation.”19 Clearly, then, whether or not a resolution to 
a political question or conflict is ‘morally legitimate’ depends, for Young, on the extent to which 
it was arrived at through an inclusive and fair process of democratic dialogue. And what does she 
claim to be the pivotal virtue which stops the deliberative process from collapsing into stalemate 
(and hence, the political virtue that institutions are required to encourage)? Predictably, it is the 
ability of all individuals to “explain their particular background experiences, interests, or proposals 
in ways that others can understand” and to “express reasons for their claims in ways that others 
recognize could be accepted even if in fact they disagree with the claims and reasons.”20 For all 
her protestations to the contrary, then, it seems that Young’s ‘politics of difference’ stands or falls
18 Ibid. p. 29.
19 Ibid. p. 53.
20 Ibid. p. 25.
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on the somewhat familiar claim that, in order for persons to resolve questions of justice in a 
‘morally legitimate’ way, they must be willing and able to adopt a reasonable standpoint with 
regard to their own ends and commitments, and to keep talking even when faced with apparendy 
incommensurable disagreement. What Young assumes, then, is that all persons who are party to 
the dialogue will be ‘reasonable’ in the sense that they are willing and able to articulate, debate, 
and justify their particular ends and commitments in way that others can accept, and to have an 
open mind about the values and commitments of others. The politics of difference can therefore 
be seen to embody both the Scanlonian (and Larmorean) agreement motive and the 
reasonableness requirement.
Young may not consider this too controversial a claim or too damaging a critique, of course. 
After all, she explicitly argues that it is an important aim of a ‘politics of difference’ to ensure the 
self-determination of persons through institutions which allow them to “decide on their goals 
and interpret their way of life.”21 But this surely represents a universalist claim in favour of 
individual autonomy of precisely the kind that she believes undermines liberalism. Young tells us 
that liberalism ignores cultural and social group differences by making universalist claims about 
all persons in abstraction from the groups to which they belong. Liberalism, she says, therefore 
reduces difference to unity in requiring all persons to be able to subject their lives and ends to 
criticism and to be capable of thinking critically about their group memberships and ideals and 
beliefs. But having argued as much, Young then goes on to argue for precisely the same thing, 
claiming that the ability to think critically and autonomously about one’s life should be possessed 
by all persons regardless of the particular group or community to which they belong. She 
explicitly argues that every agent’s ends must be revisable and rejectable in the sense that they are 
not merely imposed from the outside as unquestionable truths or facts. Rather, all persons must 
be supported in their ability to think meaningfully for themselves about the validity and 
coherence of their particular ends, regardless of whether or not the group or community to which 
they belong (or, more accurately, the elite within this group) would prefer otherwise. Hence, she
21 Ibid. p. 259.
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argues that institutions should encourage in all persons the ability to structure their “relationships 
so that they support the maximal pursuit of agent ends.”22
But if what we have argued thus far about the preconditions of dialogue and public reasoning 
about justice is correct, then the desire among difference theorists, deliberative democrats, 
pluralists, and advocates of a politics of recognition to establish a common form of deliberative 
reasoning embodies a concurrent requirement to encourage individual autonomy in the way we 
outlined in chapter three. An autonomous person is a person who lives under structures of 
authority which are in an important sense self-imposed rather than imposed from the outside. An 
autonomous person must -  if they are to be genuinely conceived as autonomous -  be capable of 
consenting to those forms of authority which govern them, whether political, religious, cultural, 
or from any other source. Consequendy, it is a primary liberal aim to establish the kind of 
conditions in which persons can debate the content of the political institutions that govern them 
(and hence, consent to them), and to work out, revise, and reject their wider attachments in order 
that their relationship to them is also one of consent.
So while Young may not find our critique too controversial or damaging, she must surely 
recognise that in admitting as much, she renders her critique of liberalism hollow. After all, it 
would seem that in her more recent work, she is not in fact arguing for the affirmation or 
recognition of first-order group identities and differences at all, but is rather arguing for a form of 
politics which defends those basic second-order freedoms and capacities which allow persons to 
interpret their own lives in their own way (against the background of their lives as a whole) and 
allows persons to ‘talk past their differences’ in the interests of reaching agreement about politics, 
justice, and the limits of toleration. If Young and the antiliberals argue for individual autonomy in 
both the senses that we laid out in chapters three and four (as they must if they are in favour of 
establishing a framework of common debate and dialogue among different groups and 
individuals about questions of justice, and against the arbitrary imposition of customs and ideals
22 Ibid. p. 258.
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upon individuals that they do not endorse), and they argue that the participants in these personal 
and political deliberations are indmdmk rather than groups or communities or cultures, then why 
do they feel the need to distinguish themselves (so unsuccessfully) from liberals? The answer for 
Young (and other critics of liberalism like Taylor) lies in her critique of liberal reasoning, and we 
will discuss this more fully in the next chapter.
Before that, however, it is necessary to illustrate another assumption to which Young appeals and 
which she shares with liberals.
25. The Assumption of Equality.
Young is by no means alone in appealing to liberal principles that she claims to reject, then. But 
the reason this so often goes unnoticed is that so many ‘alternatives’ to liberalism are under­
theorised and under-determined. This finds its most obvious expression in culturalist liberalism 
(as we will see in part three), but it strikes at the heart of anti-liberalism too. After all, all those 
who eschew ‘non-democratic’ justifications for particular institutional arrangements (such as 
military rule or totalitarian regimes unchecked by such procedures as free elections) in favour of 
the idea that institutions and principles should be justifiable to those individual human beings 
that they are to govern (Le. all the liberal and non-liberal theorists discussed in this thesis) are 
required to describe exactly what kind of dialogue they envisage, what arguments count in this 
dialogue, and why. All the critics discussed thus far support the idea that state institutions (and 
the principles which regulate them) should be justifiable to the people they govern. Indeed, the 
pluralist strategy of devolving political power to groups would appear to be motivated above all 
by the desire to make central political institutions as representative and as justifiable as possible. 
But this means that difference theorists, deliberative democrats, and communicative democrats 
(as well as republicans and pluralists) are all required to provide some account of who should be 
involved in political dialogue, how this dialogue is to be conducted, and why it should be 
conducted in this way as opposed to any other. They must tell us what principles we must appeal
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to when seeking to defend the institutions that we support. All these thinkers emphasise the 
importance of dialogue and public deliberation. But who deliberates? And why?
The common thread in all these arguments -  however well-disguised -  is, of course, the 
commitment to formal equality which Young believes ‘reduces difference to unit/. Young argues 
that the deliberative process should not be premised upon or, or circumscribed by, over-arching 
moral principles, only to argue sometime later for “an expanded conception of political 
communication” which is open to all and which does not exclude certain persons on the basis of 
their group memberships or characteristics.23 Young argues that social difference should be 
understood as a ‘political resource’ which allows persons to reveal collectively a genuinely 
inclusive and democratic politics from which no-one is arbitrarily excluded.24 All persons, then, 
are conceived to be equal in the sense that they all possess the right (and, we must assume, the 
capacity) to contribute to, and affect, the outcome of political deliberation.
Philip Pettit, too, argues for a form of open and inclusive democratic politics founded upon the 
equality of each and every member of the polity to contribute to the resolution of political 
questions and conflicts.25 And so too do Gutmann, Thompson, other deliberative democrats like 
Dryzek, and communitarians like Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer who -  as we will 
see more clearly in the next chapter -  have increasingly seen the political expression of their 
commitment to community to be some form of republicanism.26 Gutmann, of course, claims that
23 Ibid. p. 80.
24 Ibid. p. 81-82.
25 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory o f Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). See 
also, Phillip Pettit, ‘Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization’.
26 Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996); John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, 
Contestations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent:
America in Search o f a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Charles 
Taylor, ‘Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere’, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
Also useful are Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan, Jr. (eds.) Debating Democracy’s Discontent: Essays 
on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), and 
Stephen Macedo (ed.) Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
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political deliberation is a duty which must be fulfilled by all persons.27 Pettit disagrees, arguing 
that such an idea is an unwelcome (or, at least, an unnecessary) throwback to an Aristotelian 
notion of virtue and the idea that one’s telos lies in politics.
For all their differences, however, Pettit, Gutmann, the deliberative democrats, and the 
communitarians necessarily converge on the claim that all individuals must be provided with the 
resources they need in order to participate in political dialogue. Whether they understand 
participation in these dialogues as a duty (as Aristotle did) or as merely a means by which persons 
might resolve those questions and conflicts that affect them personally (as the Romans did), they 
must each commit themselves to designing institutions which provide all individuals with the 
resources necessary to enter into political discourses when they feel it is neoessary to do so. And 
therein lies the commitment to equality. Both Gutmann and Pettit converge (with other 
deliberative democrats) on the idea that all persons should possess the right to enter into political 
dialogue on an equal basis with others regardless of whether the communities or groups to which 
they belong would prefer otherwise, just as they -  like Young -  believe that all persons should be 
able to interpret and revise their own beliefs and commitments if they so desire. That is, while 
deliberative democrats, republicans, communicative democrats, and pluralists can all allow 
persons and groups to "voluntarily exclude themselves . . .  [from] affairs of state” if their particular 
views and beliefs prohibit them from participating, they cannot support claims for legal 
exemptions or 'group rights' or devolved powers which would deny any or all of their members 
the capacity to participate if they felt the need or desire to do so.28 Institutions -  and the 
principles which circumscribe them -  must be justifiable to all individuals, and not merely to a 
minority or faction within the polity as a whole. Pettit’s republicanism shares with liberalism the 
fundamental aim of “commanding allegiance of the citizens of developed, multicultural societies, 
regardless of their more particular conceptions of the good.”29
27 Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), and 
‘Civic Education and Social Diversity’.
28 David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000), p. 76.
29 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory o f Freedom and Government, p. 96 -  97.
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Young, Gutmann, Pettit and the deliberative democrats agree, therefore, that all persons should, 
as a matter of principle, be afforded the capacity to question and determine which forms of 
authority they are bound by both at the level of the state, and in other, more personal areas of 
their lives too, and all argue therefore, that those political deliberations and debates from which 
the justifiable limits of authority are derived should be accessible to all. Not only are they 
therefore necessarily committed to individual autonomy (for all the reasons that we have 
described in part two of this thesis), but they are also inevitably committed to the equality of all 
persons (as a fundamental, structural component of discourse) in the same way, and for the same 
reasons, as liberals.
26. The Cultural Defence
26.1 Relativism and the Brute Appeal to Culture.
Thus far, then, we have seen that, despite their claims to the contrary, difference theorists, 
republicans, deliberative democrats, and advocates of a ‘politics of recognition’ converge on the 
idea that all individual persons must be enabled to reflect upon their aims and ends and 
attachments autonomously, in order that they might enter into public discourse about politics, 
and that they might interpret and consent to the customs and authorities that bind them. For all 
their claims to the contrary, then, these theorists all converge with liberals in their claim that an 
inclusive politics, capable of accommodating diversity within reasonable constraints, must 
necessarily value the second-order principles of individual autonomy and equality and not 
particular customs, traditions or group identities in and of themselves.
The consequence of this is clean the brute appeal to culture does not represent a claim that any 
of the liberal or non-liberal theories so far discussed could conceivably recognise as a jiistification 
for anything. This is because an appeal to the existence of certain cultural beliefs is not in itself a 
normative claim. Rather, within the context of the deliberative processes outlined and defended by 
those liberal and non-liberal theorists we have thus far discussed, the appeal to a particular ‘way
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of life* or ‘culture’ is merely a statement of fact which may or may not be true. We could argue 
about whether or not this statement is factually correct, but in order to argue that, if true, this 
justifies certain actions or proposals we would have to engage in further discussions and 
deliberations according to the constraints of public reason. It would require us to add something 
extra -  some claim that added normative weight to the original claim about the existence of 
certain customs or practices. After all, it is one thing to say that persons are members of groups 
and that, therefore, their deliberations will be shaped by the values embodied in these groups, 
while it is quite another to say that, in virtue of this, the groups to which they belong should be 
'respected' or 'protected'. Of course, it is possible to argue that the appeal to culture does represent 
a reason for tolerating or accommodating the claims arising out of this membership, but the most 
it can represent is one reason among many others. The fact that one’s parents, grandparents, and 
great-grandparents participated in the social practice of hunting, for example, does not in itself 
justify one in doing so, and neither does it alone require the state to allow fox-hunting. Similarly, 
the fact that a man’s father and grandfather beat their wives does not make it acceptable for that 
man to beat his wife, even if it can be shown conclusively that his father and grandfather were 
violent. His particular history and circumstances might render his claims to do so more 
intelligible (we might understand more clearly why he thinks he should be allowed to do so by 
looking at his background and the environment in which he was raised) but this would not make 
his claims any more justifiable or acceptable.
The fact that a particular practice is part of one's culture, then, may well represent an important 
claim in favour of its toleration, but it does not do so in and of itself. After all, it may just as easily 
represent a compelling claim in favour of its abolition, especially if it can be shown to hinder the 
legitimate right of each member of this group to access the wider society on an equal basis with 
others. That is, once we subscribe to the idea that deliberation can transcend the barriers between 
cultures (which are, themselves, far more ambiguous and complex than many believe) in the way 
that liberals like Larmore and Scanlon believe, and difference theorists like Young and pluralists
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like Gray are forced to admit, then the appeal to culture becomes merely a single claim which 
must be subjected to criticism and interrogation in the same way as any other.
Deliberation and dialogue must be capable of determining, firstly, whether or not the claim ‘it’s a 
part of my culture’ is true (rather than a spurious excuse for acting in a particular way, or an 
erroneous appeal for leniency), and secondly, whether or not the claims that arise from this 
statement (e.g. claims for legal exemptions, institutional reforms, or constitutional guarantees) are 
actually justifiable. These two questions are ontologically and normatively distinct.
A full-blooded relativism regarding the sources and nature of value would, of course, hold that 
these two questions are the same. That is, relativists might hold, as long as we can show that 
certain claims or actions are ’a part of our culture', then our attempt to provide adequate 
justification for the validity or permissibility of these claims or actions has necessarily come to an 
end. Consequently, if it is a ‘part of my culture’ to hunt whales then that, they might say, is in 
itself sufficient justification for the repeal of anti-whaling laws.30 Similarly, if it is a part of my 
culture to slaughter cattle inhumanely,31 to hunt foxes with hounds,32 to pit bulls against armed
30 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 254-255. For more on the moral and political issues surrounding 
the hunting and slaughter of whales, see Richard A. Caulfield, Greenlanders, Whales, and Whaling: 
Sustainability and Self- Determination in the Arctic (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 
1997); Peter J. Stoett, The International Politics o f Whaling (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997); and Arne 
Kalland, Japanese Whaling: An End o f an Era? (London: Curzon Press, 1992).
31 Muslims and Jewish groups are already granted exemptions from existing British laws regarding the 
humane treatment and slaughter of animals. This is a response to their claim that they can only eat 
animals which are slaughtered according to methods which are consistent with their religious beliefs, 
and that these methods are inconsistent with existing laws. Britain therefore sanctions the inhumane 
treatment of animals in the name of respecting cultural beliefs. There are, of course many arguments
for and against the practice of halal or kosher butchery which cannot be discussed here. For more details, 
see Brian Barry, Culture & Equality, especially chapter 2; and Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law, and 
Human Rights: The English Experience.
32 For more details see Roger Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs (London: DEMOS, 1996). It is my 
intention in this chapter to examine the cultural defence as a justification for protecting particular 
customs or ways of life. However, the debate over fox-hunting illustrates one crucial purpose of 
politics and dialogue, namely, politics must allow us to work out whether or not a particular claim about 
the importance of a custom or practice is true. For example, the Government Inquiry into fox hunting 
throws doubt on the claim that “hunting provides the social glue in many communities because it 
provides a valid purpose for socialising.” According to the report, hunting only plays a single -  and 
minimal -  role in unifying rural communities. There are, it says, “a wide range of other activities taking 
place [in these communities], organised by different groups, [as well as] other individual pursuits such
as walking, gardening, and going out for the evening. It is plain, therefore, that any claim . . .  that hunting 
is the main source of social activity is exaggerated. In other rural communities, particularly larger 
villages and market towns, it is likely to be even less significant.” The Final Report o f  the Committee o f
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men on horseback for public entertainment -  if it is a part of my culture that I can many off my 
daughters at thirteen or fourteen years old to men twice or three times their age without their 
consent,33 or that I can kill my child by withholding life-saving medical treatment,34 or that I can 
psychologically or physically abuse my wife or my children35 -  then that is itself a sufficient 
justification for my being allowed to do so. Not only do such claims represent an obvious and 
fundamental challenge to those political theories which implicitly or explicitly commit themselves 
to the substantive principles of equality, individual autonomy, and consent (i.e. liberalism and 
those ‘non-liberal’ theories that we have thus far discussed), they also fail to address precisely 
those very real and complex problems which exist in diverse contemporary societies, for all the 
same reasons as Gray’s pluralism.
Claims for special representation or legal exemptions are not justified simply by establishing that 
they are required by a culture in order that they can protea particular customs or practices: it 
could well be ‘a part of one’s culture’ to aa  in a particular way, but this is not in itself a 
justification for respecting or allowing this action. And conversely, the justifiability of a claim 
need not depend on it being an element of someone’s culture: the appeal to culture does not 
trump other (perhaps contrary) reasons or considerations but instead represents a contributing 
faaor to any deliberation on the resolution of political conflias which must be weighed against 
other, competing factors.
Inquiry into Hunting With Dogs in England and Wales (Norwich: HM Stationery Office, 2000). At the 
time of writing the British government has pledged to introduce legislation banning hunting with dogs 
in the next session of parliament. It remains to be seen whether or not they will do so. In any case, 
however, the issue shows clearly a point that I have been trying to make throughout this thesis (and 
which I will make more clearly in part three), namely, that individuals engaged in political dialogue 
must be capable of questioning, understanding, and criticising the beliefs and practices of others, or else 
there would be no way of finding out whether or not a particular custom really is an important aspect 
of a culture, or whether the claim was simply false.
33 See chapter two.
34 As with the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Britain and the US. As mentioned earlier, the ban on 
Jehovah’s Witnesses receiving blood transfusions has recently been lifted by the church, although before 
this year, members of the religion were entirely within their rights to deny themselves and, more 
importantly, their children life-saving medical treatment by justification of the ‘cultural defence’.
35 See chapter two. Other forms of physical and psychological abuse perpetrated in the name of culture 
include ritual scarring and cliteradectomy. See Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, especially 
chapter 4. For a number of essays discussing cliteradectomy -  from both a positive and negative 
perspective - see J. Cohen, M. Howard, and M. Nussbaum (eds.) Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women? 
Susan Moller Okin with Respondents. For more on ritual scarring, see Chandran Kukathas, ‘Cultural 
Toleration’.
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The point, of course, as we saw in the previous section, comes down to who exactly is appealing 
to culture, and thus, who is participating in the dialogue in the first place. The idea that we should 
listen to, and take seriously, the claims made by members of cultural minorities in favour of 
tolerating their cultural beliefs presupposes that such a claim has been voiced in the agreement 
process. But, as we have already shown with regard to Gray and Larmore, the point is precisely 
that the question concerning who participates in the dialogue is itself inherently controversial. 
Minority groups will themselves often contain minorities who are as 'defined' by their group 
memberships as any other, but who may be considered ‘naturaUy* unable or unsuited to 
participate in dialogue regarding the interpretation of their own values, and the wider political 
implications of these values.36 A person may be 'defined' by values and assumptions which he or 
she might reject, if given the chance to say as much, or to develop their own opinions for 
themselves. For example, women have often been excluded from participating in the 
interpretation of the history and values of the group to which they belong (as have the poor and 
the uneducated), and yet they might still consider themselves 'defined' by these values. It just so 
happens that the self-image they derive from their membership in this group affirms their 
unequal and subordinate status within it and also that, due to these prevailing beliefs, they are 
denied the resources by which they might escape or re-interpret this impoverished self-image.
On its own, then, the appeal to the brute fact that certain ways of life exist cannot act as a 
justification for the accommodation or toleration of these values (or of the actions or claims to 
which they give rise), because it leaves no way of determining who shares these values, and who 
would reject them if given the chance. It should come as little surprise, of course, that ‘cultural* 
groups which grant their women so little status that they allow men to verbally abuse them and 
beat them do not tend to allow them to enter into those debates and discourses through which 
they might meaningfully question or reject these abuses. Liberalism rejects the arbitrary exclusion 
of certain persons from public deliberation about politics and justice. It supports the individual
36 Leslie Green ‘Internal Minorities and Their Rights’ in Judith Baker (ed.) Group Rights (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 100 -  114.
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right of all members of the polity to interpret and pursue their ends over the ‘right’ of the ‘group’ 
to stop them from doing so. Showing that a particular practice is a part of a particular set of 
cultural beliefs is indeed a reason for its toleration, but it can never be the only reason for doing so. 
There may be better reasons for oudawing or restricting it. The only way in which we discover 
the validity of these claims however, is through open and inclusive dialogue among all those who 
are affected by the outcome. The equality and the ‘individualism’ at the heart of liberal dialogue 
embodies precisely this claim, namely, that normative claims must be justified to all persons 
equally and not merely to those who happen to occupy positions of power or influence. The idea 
that ‘individuals’ take part in agreement on the validity of normative proposals on a free and 
equal basis with others simply embodies the claim that practices, policies, and principles must be 
justified to each and every individual to whom they are to apply, and not merely the leaders of the 
‘group’ or ‘community’ or ‘culture’ to which they belong.
26.2 Cultural Recognition and Self-Respect.
If the brute appeal to the existence of cultural values is not sufficient to justify the toleration of 
cultural practices (and is, in any case, unable to resolve those genuine, complex political problems 
that exist in diverse contemporary societies), then further reasons must be given as to why one's 
culture should be respected. But what reasons might be given? The most widely invoked 
justification for the 'cultural defence' is that cultural membership is a pre-requisite of 'self respect' 
and that, therefore, respect for persons necessarily "entails respect for their cultures and ways of 
life."37 Failure to 'recognise' the values which determine our identity, Charles Taylor informs us, 
inevitably saddles us “with a crippling self-hatred. ”38 Non-recognition “or mis-recognition [of 
particular memberships and group affinities] can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.”39 And James Tully points 
out that "citizens can take part in popular sovereignly, by having a say in constitutional
37 Bhikhu Parekh, 'Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism for Mill to Rawls', The Times Literary 
Supplement, Feb, 1994, p. 11 -13, p. 13.
38 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, Philosophical Arguments, p. 225.
39 Ibid.
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negotiations, and exercise their civic and private freedom only if they have a threshold of self 
respect. . .  [derived from the fact that] others recognise the value of one's activities and goals."40
We have already discussed and rejected the idea that citizens of a polity, or political institutions, 
should be required to ‘affirm’ particular ends or values, and we have already seen that those who 
advocate the ‘politicisation’ of group identities and cultural norms reject this too, arguing for a 
more liberal approach which protects those background, second-order freedoms and equalities 
while leaving the content and worth of particular first-order goods open. What concerns us now 
is this equation of 'being a member of a culture' with 'possessing self respect'. Is it true that we 
should value or protect cultural groups because the background freedoms and equalities that we 
should be defending presuppose our membership in cultural groups?
This is explored more fully in part three of this thesis, but at this stage it is necessary to state that 
it is by no means clear that cultural membership affords its members ‘equal self-respect’ at all, 
and that, therefore, it is not at all clear that it should be the business of the state to protect or 
perpetuate cultural group identities for this reason. For example, Axel Honneth argues for the 
‘recognition’ or ‘affirmation’ of cultural values because non-recognition “impairs . . .  persons in 
their positive understanding of self.”41 And Bhikhu Parekh argues that “[s]ince human beings are 
culturally embedded, respect for them entails respect for their cultures and ways of life.”42 But 
often, surely, the principle of equal respect demands that we igpore or auer-ride the prevailing 
understandings embodied in a particular cultural group. It could be argued that one’s 
membership in a particular culture or group need not, in actual fact, contribute to one’s self 
respect or dignity at all and that, far from conferring a ‘positive understanding of self, cultures 
often rob persons of any respect they might otherwise have. It could be argued, for example, that 
women who are confined to rigid (and subordinate) gender roles by the prevailing values of their
40 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age o f Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 189-190.
41 Axel Honneth, ‘Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on a Theory 
of Recognition’, Political Theory 20/2 (1992), p. 188-189.
42 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Superior People’, p. 13.
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community might relish the opportunity for a certain amount of ‘indignity* if this meant they 
were afforded the resources they need in order to make genuine decisions about what they want 
from life and what they believe to be worthwhile. They might, for example, prefer the ‘indignity* 
of being uncovered in public to the ‘dignity* afforded by the veil, and even if they did not, they 
might enjoy the ’indignity* of being given the choice. Similarly, gays and lesbians might welcome 
the ‘indignity* that accompanies their being open and honest about their sexuality, when faced 
with the alternative of being ‘dignified’ in their secrecy and their fear of what reprisals such 
honesty and openness might bring.
What theorists like Taylor, Tully, Honneth and Parekh argue, rightly, is that self-respect is at least 
partially about being able to stand up for who you are, rather than what others might wish you to 
be; it is about being honest and open about your views and your identity, and it is about not 
having to deny your particularity or your ‘difference’ or make light of those commitments and 
characteristics which you hold to be important (perhaps defining) of the person you are. But 
what these theorists neglect to acknowledge is the fact that it is often precisely one’s cultural group 
which demands the suppression or denial of these important, defining attitudes and 
characteristics, and hence that it is often the values which prevail in one’s cultural group which in 
fact undermines one’s dignity as a person.
This, in effect, is Susan Moller Okin’s argument against the protection of minority traditions via 
the application of ‘group rights’: in ‘protecting’ or ‘affirming’ the values of particular ‘groups’, she 
says, we are in fact protecting and reifying those values internal to the group which force persons 
to deny who they are, and what they feel or believe, in order that they might avoid reprisal or 
sanction.43 Kymlicka (himself a supporter of group rights) responds that such rights should only 
be granted to groups which do not seek to “limit the right of group members to question and 
revise traditional authorities and practices,” and we can, I think, infer from this that he would 
reject the granting of group rights to communities which force any or all of their members to
43 Susan Moller Okin, ‘Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions’. We will discuss this later.
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deny significant or defining aspects of their identity for fear of sanction or ostracism.44 But 
cultural groups simply do often require their members to do this, in various different ways and 
for various different reasons because the values they embody necessarily entail claims about what 
is right or wrong, what is admirable or loathsome, and what is ‘true’ and what is ‘false’.45 The 
point is whether or not individual members have the ability to reject these assumptions, or to 
voice their opinions about them, or to leave the group if they feel that their continued 
membership would undermine aspects of their fives which they consider to be more important.
Kymficka argues that a precondition of asking these questions, and interpreting our own ends 
and attachments and ideals is our membership in an individuated and viable cultural group. For 
him, cultural membership is a ‘primary good’ in the explicitly Rawlsian sense, namely, that 
persons need it regardless of what else they may or may not want or need.46 Indeed, he argues, 
being a member of a viable culture is in fact a structural pre-requisite of knowing what we want 
and need, as it provides the context in which we determine our more specific ends and ideals and 
commitments.47 Now, I disagree with this for a number of important reasons (and discuss this 
issue fully in the final part of this thesis). Despite its unworkability, however, Kymlicka’s 
argument does at least seem to capture something important about what is at issue in the debate 
about culture, and does at least try to formulate a response which is consistent with liberal 
principles. Kymlicka’s principal claim is that liberalism should be committed to individual 
autonomy, and that it is this principle which renders it the most supportable of all the political 
doctrines. Persons do not simply gain ‘self-respect’ by being a member of a particular community 
or culture or group, rather they only do so by living a fife in pursuit of ends and commitments 
which they themselves have genuinely endorsed as worthwhile. That is, like Tully, Taylor, 
Honneth, and Parekh, Kymficka argues that cultural membership is a precondition of self respect 
but, unlike them, he only does so because he believes cultural membership is a precondition of 
personal autonomy. Consequently, it is not culture itself which, affords us self respect, but rather the
44 Will Kymficka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 37.
45 As we will see more clearly in part three.
46 Will Kymficka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, especially part one.
47 Ibid.
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ability to “assess our conceptions of the good in the light of new information or experiences, and 
to revise them if they are not worthy of continued allegiance.”48 This is why he believes that 
culture represents a ‘social base* of self respect and not self respect itself.49 Culture provides 
tools -  the raw materials, the context -  in which we can determine which ends and ideals are 
worthy of our support. It is living a life in pursuit of these autonomously endorsed ends and 
ideals free from arbitrary constraint and domination which affords us self-respect, not merely our 
membership of a culture (especially if this culture impedes us from pursuing such a life). Culture, 
to put it another way, can make self respect possible but it does not in itself define it.
Kymlicka rightly argues that groups which impose understandings upon their members without 
also providing them with the capacity to assess and interpret these understandings for themselves 
in the light of their own felt experiences do not in actual fact secure their members’ self respect 
or dignity at all. Women who are forced by their cultural values to occupy subordinate roles to 
men and are then denied the ability to interpret or question these roles are not having their self 
respect protected, and neither are gays who are forced to deny their sexuality in order to fit in 
with the prevailing beliefs of their culture. This is because 'self respect' is only secured when 
persons live according to values that they themselves have endorsed in the light of their wider 
beliefs and ideals and experiences. As we claimed in response to Nussbaum and Macedo in 
chapter one, wllingjy subordinating one aspect of your self (one attachment, one part of who you 
are) in order to live a life that one genuinely believes is more important is quite different from 
being denied the opportunity to make such a decision in the name of certain cultural values. 
There is nothing in liberalism which requires Catholics to ‘affirm’ or recognise the value of 
homosexuality, for example, just as there is nothing which states that persons cannot choose to 
place their religious beliefs above their sexuality in terms of their life as a whole. As we saw in 
chapter four, if equality demands the equal and active ‘recognition’ or ‘affirmation’ of each 
person’s cultural, religious, social, and ethnic identities -  as Young, Taylor et al believe - then 
equality is impossible. But it does not. Equality demands that all persons (regardless of their
48 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 81.
49 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, chapters one and two.
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particular memberships, and regardless of the cultural group of which they are a member), be 
given the ability to make these choices (and to rank the various aspects of their lives) and to 
determine the nature and content of the political institutions which govern them for themselves in 
response to their own individual experiences and interests and attitudes. It is only when persons 
are afforded this ability, and when they are not forced to live a particular form of life (or live 
under a particular set of institutions) determined for them by values that they have no ability to 
assess or evaluate for themselves, that cultural membership can be seen to afford any dignity to 
human life, and hence, any self respect to those who live in them It is this commitment to 
individual choice and interpretation (and the idea that all persons should be free to interpret the 
worth of their own lives and to pursue their own ends) which is embodied in the structure of 
liberal dialogue and politics, and in those principles of individual equality and autonomy which 
underpin it. And it is this form of equality, autonomy, and individuality which is, in the end, 
shared by liberals and anti-liberals alike.
27. Conclusion.
In this chapter, it has been my intention to argue that liberal justification and dialogue does not 
suffer from the kind of internal incoherences -  or lead to the kind of political conflicts -  that 
would necessarily characterise a strategy of politicisation. By providing those conditions under 
which persons might genuinely work out for themselves the value and content of their ends (and 
hence, leaving the validity or worth of particular ends and values to be decided by one’s individual 
conscience), liberal politics provides a far more stable and inclusive means of accommodating 
diversity than any response which requires persons or the state to ‘affirm’ or ‘recognise’ the truth 
or validity or respectability of particular cultural identities, customs, or group norms. In retreating 
from such judgements, liberalism is able to provide a framework of principles which regulate the 
background conditions against which persons act and deliberate upon their ends for themselves. 
One need not agree with a particular way of life, and need not accept a particular set of beliefs as 
true or coherent, to accept the ‘reasonable’ assumption that people have the right to pursue this
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way of life, or to adhere to this belief, if they so wish. For the liberal, whether or not a view or set 
of beliefs is sensible or coherent or mistaken is immaterial. What matters is that it is freely accepted 
by those who hold it, and that persons are able to change their minds about the worth or 
coherence of these beliefs if they so desire. And for the liberal, the fact that society contains 
conflictual ways of life and values is important but does not entail insurmountable disagreement. 
This is because liberal dialogue is premised upon the idea that individuals will be willing and able to 
reach beyond their differences in their search for agreement on principles of justice and institutional 
arrangements.
Liberalism therefore seeks to establish the requisite background conditions -  of freedom, equality, 
and autonomy - that persons need in order to find their own way to what is valuable to them. 
These background conditions are necessarily determined in dialogues between persons who are 
aware of their identities and motivations, and who necessarily reason from these identities, but who 
are also able to voluntarily constrain their deliberations in the interests of reaching a manageable 
agreement on the way in which particular questions of justice should be resolved. And the more we 
examine the claims made by those ‘critics’ who reject liberalism for modelling political discourse in 
this way, the more we realise that they actually argue for the same thing. The idea that the state and 
all the various different people within it, are able to ‘affirm’ the truth or validity of all the ends and 
practices and traditions that they see around them is incoherent and utopian. Consequently, the 
only alternative -  and the alternative to which pluralists, difference theorists, republicans, 
deliberative democrats, and advocates of a politics of recognition subscribe -  is to encourage state 
institutions and individual citizens to ‘affirm’ or ‘recognise’ those background freedoms and 
equalities which allow people to make up their own mind about the life they want to lead and what 
their various memberships and attachments mean to them.
If this is what is meant by a ‘politics of recognition’, then liberalism is -  and has always been -  
precisely that. It recognises, for example, that all persons are distinct and separate and that no 
individual can be legitimately thwarted in their ability to lead a life they believe to be worthwhile by
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those who would compel them to live lives or pursue ends that they do not value if this life is 
compatible with those wider constraints bom out of inclusive, public deliberation and agreement. 
It recognises that all persons possess an equal status before the law, and that they should be free to 
live according to their own beliefs in a way that is consistent with everyone else doing the same. 
And it recognises that certain ‘groups’ (like the poor, the uneducated, the unhealthy) suffer 
disadvantages as a consequence of their group memberships and that it is a proper concern of 
justice to rectify these disadvantages. Differences in education, in wealth, in health, in political 
status, and so on, are, for the liberal, problems that must be overcome, not protected or ‘affirmed’. 
No doubt, those who advocate some politics of difference or recognition would agree. But this 
only shows that for them as for liberals, the question is not (and has never been) whether liberalism 
should tolerate diversity and difference, but rather what Jbrms of difference should it support and 
which should it should seek to eradicate.
Critics of liberalism are silent on this issue precisely because answering it requires them to take 
sides, and to make decisions, about which groups in particular are worthy of respect and which are 
not. Anti-liberals are comfortable when speaking about ‘groups’ like ‘women’, or ‘the disabled’ or 
‘the civil rights movement’, but noticeably less comfortable when discussing the ‘affirmation’ of 
right-wing movements, oppressive fundamentalisms, and sexist religions. Which of these groups 
are worthy of respect and which are not? And, more importantly, if we are to respect and affirm 
‘groups’ in and of themselves, then by what logic can difference theorists and others condemn 
groups which practice discrimination?
In the end, we saw that they cannot help but condemn oppression by invoking the values of 
individual autonomy and equality. If we are right in claiming that liberal dialogue presupposes and 
requires a structural commitment to individual autonomy (and that, therefore, it is an important 
role of liberal institutions to encourage and protea individual autonomy in order that members 
of the polity might engage in public reasoning about justice) then the same must apply to those 
other theorists who rejea liberalism but argue for a similar form of dialogue.
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The decision that all these theorists face is not between a liberal form of dialogue rooted in 
individual autonomy and a ‘politics of difference* or ‘recognition’ or ‘presence’ or ‘pluralism’; 
rather it is between a form of politics in which institutions and principles are conceived to be 
bom out of -  and justified by -  some form of agreement process conducted by free and equal 
individuals who possess their own ideals and values but who also possess the ability to ‘talk past 
their differences’ in order to instantiate a particular regime which is justifiable to all, or a regime 
which does not draw its legitimacy from its public justifiability. There have been such regimes in 
history, of course. There have been regimes which have shunned the notion that legitimacy is 
drawn from ‘the people’ who are governed by them -  there have been totalitarian and military 
regimes backed up and perpetuated by military power, terror and propaganda -  and these regimes 
were and are certainly and genuinely opposed to individual autonomy and equality (and hence, 
liberalism) in obvious and fundamental ways. But these are not the kind of regimes for which 
difference theorists, republicans, deliberative democrats, and pluralists argue. Rather, they argue 
for institutions and principles which are justifiable to each and every individual who is governed 
by them, and which therefore, protea and enshrine those principles which make this public 
justification and dialogue possible and intelligible. Hence, the ‘debate’ between these various 
factions is in fact far less substantive or instructive than they themselves believe.
Pulling together the various threads of part two, then, we can see that the implicit commitment to 
individual autonomy found in liberalism and much ‘anti-liberalism’ embodies an explicit claim 
about the nature and justifiability of authority. Chandran Kukathas makes a crucial mistake, then, 
when he claims that “autonomy-based liberalism can tell us very little, if anything at all, about the 
fundamental problem of political society (and so of political philosophy) which is the problem of 
authority. The problems here,” he says, “are: ‘who should have authority*. . .  and why and how 
much?’”50 But if what we have said thus far is coherent, then autonomy-based liberalism should 
be understood as providing an answer (indeed, the quintessentially liberal answer) to precisely
50 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, Journal o f  
Political Philosophy 5/4 (1994), p. 406-427, pp. 426-427.
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these questions. It claims that authority is only legitimate if it has been willingly endorsed as such 
by those over whom it would rule. Inequalities must be justifiable to the individuals who are to 
suffer them, just as political institutions, constitutional arrangements, laws, policy measures, 
cultural traditions, and fundamental principles must acquire the ‘consent’ of those affected by 
them if they are to be legitimate. Comprehensive, autonomy-based liberalism embodies precisely 
the idea that all individuals must be afforded the intellectual, political, and economic resources 
they need to work out for themselves what is valuable and what is not, and hence, which forms 
of authority are just (and worth subordinating oneself to) and which are not.
This has been a central commitment of liberals since the beginning of the social contract tradition 
and something like it can be seen to animate the liberal’s response to all forms of authority, from 
the state down. Just as institutions are unjust if they are derived from anything other than the 
consent of those governed by them, so cultural, religious, and social groups act unjustly if they 
attempt to force any or all of their members into acting in ways that they do not support, or 
compel them to engage in customs or practices to which they do not consent. This is embodied 
in the fundamental liberal requirement that all groups provide persons with the ability to ‘exit’ the 
group if they so desire. Liberal institutions are necessarily committed to encouraging autonomy 
because it is only through exercising autonomy that persons determine which forms of authority 
are legitimate and which are not. In order to deliberate upon such questions, in order to engage in 
the kind of reasoning required by liberals (and by pluralists, difference theorists, deliberative 
democrats, and republicans), we must be capable of examining our own beliefs in the context of 
the beliefs of others, and explaining these beliefs to others with whom we my share little more 
than a common society.
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PART THREE
Chapter Six
Who ‘Needs’ Culture?
Identity, Autonomy, and the Rejection of Essentialism
In immigrant societies (and also now in nation-states under immigrant pressure), 
people have begun to experience what we might think of as a life without clear 
boundaries and without secure or singular identities. Difference is, as it were, 
dispersed, so that it is encountered everywhere, everyday. Individuals escape from 
their parochial entanglements and mix freely with members of the majority, but 
they don’t necessarily assimilate to a common identity. The hold of groups on 
their members is looser than it has ever been, but it is by no means broken 
entirely. The result is a constant commingling of ambiguously defined individuals, 
intermarriage among them, and hence a highly intensive multiculturalism that is 
instantiated not only in the society as a whole but also in a growing number of 
families, even in a growing number of individuals. Now tolerance begins at home, 
where we often have to make ethnic, religious, and cultural peace with our 
spouses, in-laws, and children -  and with our own hyphenated or divided selves.
Michael Walzer, On Toleration, p. 87.
In the modem age, we have come to understand our own selves as composites, 
often contradictory, even internally incompatible. We have understood that each 
of us is many different people. Our younger selves differ from our older selves; 
we can be bold in the company of our lovers and timorous before our employers, 
principled when we instruct our children and corrupt when offered some secret 
temptation; we are serious and frivolous, loud and quiet, aggressive and easily 
abashed . . .  And yet usually we have a relatively clear idea of who we are. I agree 
with my many selves to call them all ‘me’.
Salman Rushdie, The Observer, 10th August 1997, p. 15.
In part one, we argued that individual autonomy must be encouraged and defended in both 
the political and the non-political realms, or not at all. In part two, we argued that 
autonomy represents an account of freedom which incorporates both ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ aspects, and that this is precisely the reason why certain liberals believe it to be 
too controversial, too demanding, to sustain liberal principles. We argued, however, that 
these very same liberals are compelled to argue for precisely such an account of freedom if 
they are to reach the conclusions that they do, and that liberalism is necessarily committed 
to this more substantive account of freedom. We argued, therefore, that it is a 
responsibility of liberal institutions to foster conditions in which all persons might
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interpret and revise their existing ends, and engage meaningfully in public reasoning about 
justice.
But what ‘conditions’ support individual autonomy? We have suggested a number of such 
conditions already. We have agreed that persons must possess the capacity -  the 
knowledge, the frame of mind -  to interpret their own particular ends and commitments 
meaningfully in the context of their lives as a whole. These knowledge conditions include a 
grasp of their own history (in all its ambiguity and complexity) and the histories of others. 
And it includes an awareness of ways of life and beliefs and ideals different to one’s own, 
such that individuals can respond intelligibly and sensibly to those others he or she meets 
and lives among. They must possess the ability to adopt a reflective standpoint with regard 
to their own lives, from which they might examine their own ends and attachments, 
interpret their worth, and justify them to others on grounds that they might find 
intelligible and acceptable. And they must possess some level of financial and economic 
security which protects them from having to live a life -  and submit to relations of power 
and domination -  through economic necessity.
These conditions, as set out here, are deliberately vague. It is not my intention to define 
autonomy in a way that could respond to the deep philosophical and metaphysical analysis 
of a Feinberg, or a Benn, or a Dworkin.1 Rather it is to suggest that liberalism is necessarily 
committed to more than merely a ‘negative’ account of freedom, and that it is required to 
encourage and foster those background conditions -  both within the individual, and in the
1 See, for example, Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds o f Liberty: Essays in Social 
Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), and Joel Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’, in J. 
Christman (ed.) The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989); S. I. Benn, A Theory o f Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); 
Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice o f Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), and G. Dworkin (ed.) Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970). For another interesting, but ultimately unsatisfactory, account of autonomy, 
see Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (New York: St.
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society in which he or she exists -  which render liberal rights and liberties accessible to 
them.
In this and the final chapter, I discuss (and ultimately reject) another claim about 
autonomy. This claim, increasingly common among liberals and non-liberals, is central to 
our wider discussion of culture and the toleration of different ways of life. The claim is the 
one we encountered at the end of part two, namely, that in order to be capable of 
interpreting and judging the worth of our particular ends and attachments, we must be 
members of flourishing, individuated cultures, and that therefore, it is a responsibility of 
liberal institutions to protect or defend cultural groups in the interests of defending 
individual autonomy.
I argue that while culturalist liberals like Kymlicka and Raz are right in arguing that 
personal autonomy need not be understood as inimical to one’s embeddedness in social and 
political roles, they are wrong to think that a necessary pre-condition for autonomy is 
membership in a distinct and individuated cultural group. Or at least, I try to show that 
culturalist liberalism requires a much more substantive and detailed account of what 
‘culture’ is and what it is not if it is to represent a new and instructive insight into liberal 
political theory, and that as it currently stands, ‘culture’ is too vague and ambiguous a term 
to be helpful in our deliberations about justice, politics, and the responsibilities of the state.
I begin in this chapter by examining the context in which the culturalist argument for 
autonomy has arisen. I do so by discussing the rise of culturalist liberalism as a response to 
difference theory and communitarianism and will explore the conflicts between them. I 
argue that while there is a greater and more substantive convergence in the liberal and
Martin’s Press, 1986).
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communitarian accounts of agency and the self than is often acknowledged, they are in the 
end divided (or should be divided) in their conception of exactly where agents acquire their 
understanding of the world from and the way in which they are ‘constituted’ by their ends. 
Therefore, I explore the arguments of those who have been conceived to be the most 
influential contributors on both sides of the liberal/communitarian debate in order that we 
might tease out their many similarities, especially in the way in which these theorists 
understand agency (section 28). Having shown that liberals and communitarians are united 
in the way in which they conceive the formal structure of agency, I argue in section 29 
that, in the end, they diverge in the way in which they conceive the agent’s relationship to 
its ends and commitments, and that this has significant implications for our normative 
theorising about justice and the recognition of ethnocultural groups. In section 30 ,1 flesh 
out this conception of ‘embeddedness’ by subjecting it to a number of criticisms before 
discussing the normative political implications of our argument thus far. Having done so, 
we will be in a position to discuss the role and status of culture in our normative theorising 
about politics in more detail.
28. Voluntarism, Cognitivism, and Liberal Agency.
28.1 Confronting the Voluntarist/Cognitivist Dichotomy.
In the first chapter, we saw how Rawls and certain other political liberals seek to confine 
controversial moral and religious beliefs to the private sphere in an attempt to 
accommodate diversity within a ‘free-standing’ conception of justice. And we saw also that 
this attempt fails to capture what is at stake in debates concerning the claims for 
recognition made by minority cultural and religious groups in liberal democratic states, 
and necessarily invokes an untenable conception of moral agency and of the agent (either as 
capable of understanding itself, and acting, in completely different ways in the public and
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the private realms, or as capable of revising its ideas about value without understanding 
itself as autonomous).2 Such statements are often taken by anti-liberals (most obviously 
communitarians and difference-theorists like Young) as proof that we are in some way 
‘constituted* by our various ends and commitments and that, therefore, the aim of 
establishing a liberal conception of justice is necessarily doomed to failure. All too often, 
that is, theorists who want to undermine liberalism do so by falling back on old arguments 
about the ‘constitutive’ nature of community-ties and about the supposed fact that 
individuals are too embedded in social practices and networks to abstract themselves from 
these networks for any reason (including the resolution of political or ethical conflicts and 
including also the derivation of principles of justice).3
The mistake these theorists make, however, is that they conceive the process of reflection 
and reasoning embodied in liberalism to require this radical abstraction. They assume that 
liberalism presupposes that any assessment of ends and values can only take place once we 
have separated ourselves from all of our various attachments and ideals and relationships in 
order that we might look at them from a standpoint of disengaged and unfettered reason. 
Reflective deliberation in the liberal sense, they believe, necessarily requires one to abstract 
oneself “from all the particularities of the circumstances on which moral reason reflects,”4 
and to ‘bracket’ or ‘transcend’ one’s “particular social location [in order to adopt] a view 
from nowhere.”5 However, they argue, we cannot understand autonomous deliberation or 
the ideas that one has about the world without understanding those attachments that the
2 See chapters 1 & 2.
3 See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982) and ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory 12 (1984);
Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 
especially ‘Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, and 
‘The Politics of Recognition’; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study In Moral Theory 
(London: Duckworth, 1996); and Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and I t ’s Critics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993).
4 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990), p. 100.
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self shares with the world. These attachments provide the raw materials for reflection and 
deliberation, they argue, and so consequently, any normative theory which demands 
reflection unfettered by empirical circumstance (like liberalism), or any theory which 
requires desires and preferences to be agglomerated and weighed by a purely impartial 
standard or ‘Archimedean Point* (like utilitarianism), must be false.
What emerges in the literature as a consequence of this understanding of deliberation, then 
(this idea that ‘reasoning on one’s ends’ requires us to occupy some abstract plateau of 
reflection), is a dichotomy between two radically opposing accounts of agency. According 
to this dichotomy we can either choose to understand agency as ‘voluntarist’, whereby 
persons are understood to stand prior to, and independent of, their various chosen ends and 
commitments, or we can understand it to be a ‘cognitive’ process in which persons discover 
which ends they are to pursue, which ways of life they are to lead, and how they should 
act, by fulfilling those roles and duties that are conferred upon them by the cultural and 
historical narratives in which they find themselves implicated (and which wholly constitute 
the self).6 Consequently, we are told, the voluntarist (i.e. liberal) account of agency 
advocates an extension of liberal justice into the private realm of faith and culture, and that 
we are justified in invoking an ‘impartial’ mechanism (such as Rawls’ original position, or 
Scanlon’s ‘agreement situation’) as a means of resolving disputes in our private, non­
political lives, while, conversely, the cognitive (i.e. communitarian) account advocates the 
extension of private or affective morality into the political realm in order that we might 
arrive at a conception of politics which expresses (and encourages) the embeddedness of 
persons in their wider community and which does not seek to divorce people from their 
ends and commitments in a way that they can never be. That is, we are encouraged to 
choose between a political sphere held together by substantive, regulative principles of
5 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 113.
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justice which are grounded in universal standards of reason (and which stand prior to, and 
abstracted from, the particular ends and ideals of those to whom they are to apply), and a 
political sphere bounded and regulated by the obligations and duties which arise out of 
shared sentiments of belonging to a specific (political) community. By pointing out the 
mistake in understanding the political and the non-political realms as separable, at least in 
the political liberal sense, then we are assumed to be buying into one of these normative 
strategies, and the account of agency that it presupposes.
This assumption is mistaken, however, because the radical dichotomy established and 
perpetuated by the continuing debate between liberals and communitarians (and, more 
recently, between liberals, identity theorists and difference-theorists) regarding agency is 
false. As we saw in parts one and two, the point is not that we must choose between a form 
of politics rooted in common standards of reason or a political sphere held together by a 
sense of belonging. Rather, it is to establish a moral community to which persons feel a 
sense of belonging by virtue of the fact that they have contributed to its shape and 
structure -  and consented to its major institutions -  through common deliberation. What 
liberalism seeks -  in ideal terms - is a community which is shaped and determined by the 
open and inclusive deliberations of those who belong to it. This, we saw, is an aim that 
liberals share with many non-liberals, and is also why, in the past at least, liberals have 
advocated universal citizenship rights and, as we will see, is why they should continue to 
do so.
The voluntarism/cognitivism dichotomy, then, is perpetuated by fundamentally mistaken 
claims about the nature of the self and its relations to its ends. A purely ‘voluntarist’ 
account of agency presupposes an understanding of the self which is always and necessarily
6 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, p. 57-59.
213
separate from the world in which it exists. It presents the self as a subject o f possession “whose 
ends are chosen rather than given, who comes by his aims and purposes by acts of will as 
opposed to . . . acts of cognition” such that “the subject, however heavily conditioned by 
his surroundings, is always, irreducibly, prior to his values and ends.”7 Meanwhile, the 
cognitive account presupposes a similarly radical conception of the self as inescapably 
determined and bounded by the ends and values that it inherits from the cultural and 
historical community in which it finds itself (that is, as wholly implicated in, and defined 
by, the world it inhabits). In order to buy into either account then, we would have to buy 
into the conception of the self that it implies and we cannot do this because both are 
fictions, incapable of truly capturing the way in which we act and understand ourselves in 
the modern world.
The reason for this - as we have already suggested, and as we will see more clearly in this 
and the next chapter - is that deliberation on ends (and on the content of justice) does not 
occur in a vacuum or in a space occupied entirely by something called 'reason' and nothing 
else. Rather it takes place against (and within) the complex network of commitments and 
attachments which together constitute our individual view of the world.8 That is, our 
deliberations about what we want (from others, from institutions, from justice itself) begin 
in our understanding of who we are. As Nagel puts it, we inescapably understand our ends, 
interests, and memberships (and the world in which they exist) from the standpoint of our 
own subjective location in this world (and amongst these commitments); we view the 
world “from here.”9 Our ideas about what we want from life, and what we value, and what 
we expect from principles of justice, will inevitably be shaped by the wider understanding 
we have of the world and of our place within it, and this view of the world will therefore
7 Ibid. p. 22.
8 See Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, in A. O. Rorty (ed.) The Identities o f  
Persons (London: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 197-216.
214
provide the raw materials which not only shape the outcome of the choices we make, but 
which provide the very basis upon which these deliberations and choices are made possible 
and intelligible.10
When reflecting on the validity or significance of a particular belief or ideal or end, that is, 
(just as when we reflect on the validity or coherence of a particular set of institutions or 
principles) we do not entirely disengage ourselves from the world in which we exist (as 
liberals are commonly thought to believe), but neither do we find our deliberations wholly 
defined and determined by it. We are capable of reflecting upon our ends and resolving 
questions of justice by “figuring out which considerations are relevant to a given decision” 
in the light of, rather than in abstraction from, those values and commitments which make 
us the people we are and which make these deliberations intelligible.11 As Feinberg put it, if 
authentic, autonomous deliberation (as demanded by liberalism) required “that all 
principles (beliefs, preferences, etc.) be [together] examined afresh in the light of reason on 
each occasion then nothing resembling rational reflection [could] ever get started . . .  a 
person must already possess at least a rudimentary character before he can hope to choose a 
new one.”12 Indeed, as Iris Marion Young concurs, while moral reason certainly requires 
"an ability to take some distance from one's immediate impulses, intuitions, desires, and 
interests in order to consider their relation to the demands of others . . . this does not 
require that one adopt a point of view emptied of particularity."13 This is true, but it is as 
true for liberals and communitarians as it is for difference-theorists, as we see if we examine 
their arguments more closely.
9 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 10.
10 Bernard Williams, Problems o f the Self (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Stuart 
Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (London: Penguin, 1992); Thomas Nagel, The View From 
Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
11 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 52- 
53.
12 Joel Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’, The Inner Citadel, p. 31.
13 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, p. 105. Emphasis added.
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28.2 Liberal Agency and Communitarian Selves: Dissolving the Dichotomy.
Much has been made in the literature of SandePs claim that subjects are defined by various 
attachments and commitments which are ‘given in advance’. Indeed, SandePs claim that 
“community describes not just what [subjects] have as fellow citizens but also what they 
are, not a relationship they choose . . . but an attachment they discover,”14 has led many 
critics to denounce his conclusions as necessarily grounded in determinism and a denial of 
freedom.15 However, Sandel does not want to argue that the subject is so deeply implicated 
in its communal environment (and that the individual is so intrinsically defined by the 
attachments it discovers about itself) that it is incapable of escaping or transcending these 
attachments. Indeed, as we have already seen, SandePs account of political dialogue -  and 
his commitment to republican debate and deliberation among ‘encumbered selves’ -  
necessarily presupposes that persons will be capable of reflecting upon and interpreting 
their own commitments and projects and encumbrances. As he himself states, the identity 
of the subject is defined “to some extent by the community of which it is a part;”16 that is, he 
argues, “as a self interpreting being I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to 
distance myself from it.”17
As subjects, then, it would seem that we are capable of partially detaching ourselves from 
our ends but we are not “bearers of selves wholly detached from our aims and attachments .
. .  [because] certain of our roles are partly constitutive of the persons we are.”18 Despite the
14 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, p. 150.
15 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, chapter 3.
16 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, p. 150.
17 Ibid. p. 179. Emphasis added.
18 Michael J. Sandel, ‘Morality and the Liberal Ideal’, The New Republic (1984), p. 245. See also 
SandePs ‘The State and the Soul’, The New Republic (1985), ‘Democrats and Community’, The 
New Republic (February, 1988), ‘The Politics of Community: Robert F. Kennedy vs. Ronald 
Reagan’, The Responsive Community 6/2 (1996), p. 14-27. There is also a symposium on Sandel’s 
‘Democrats and Community’ in The New Republic (May, 1988) containing a number of instructive 
responses to his communitarian-republican thesis. See also, A.L. Allen & M.C. Regan, Jr. (eds.)
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all too common view to the contrary then, Sandel does not believe that we are wholly and 
inescapably defined and trapped by our aims and purposes, rather he states that “we are 
[only] partly defined by the communities we inhabit.”19 The socially-constituted self can 
"turn its lights inward upon itself, making the self its own object of inquiry and reflection," 
and, in doing so (in establishing ‘a certain space between it and me’) it is able to discover 
the various ends and attachments conferred upon it by its community and subsequently to 
interpret the meaning and significance of these attachments.20 As a consequence, Sandel 
says, I come to understand that “the contours of my identity will in some ways be open 
and subject to revision, they are not wholly without shape. And the fact that they are not 
enables me to discriminate among my more immediate wants and desires.”21 In 
understanding itself as ‘partly’ constituted by ‘certain’ roles then, the subject is 
“empowered to participate in the constitution of its own identity,” and in the derivation of 
those principles and institutions which govern it and which impose constraints upon its 
actions.22
This is true too, of Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. For 
MacIntyre, of course, human agency is intrinsically limited, shaped and bounded by the 
prevailing beliefs and understandings inherent in the communities to which persons 
belong. Like Sandel, he argues that it is our occupation of culturally and historically 
endorsed roles which animates and informs our actions in the world and that our lives (and 
our actions) are only intelligible in relation to these roles. “[W]e all approach our own 
circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity,” he says, “I inherit from the past of 
my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts and obligations. These
Debating Democracy’s Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
19 Michael Sandel, ‘Morality and the Liberal Ideal’, p. 245.
20 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, p. 58.
21 Ibid., p. 34.
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constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life 
its own moral particularity.”23 Consequently, to understand who I am, and what I want 
from life, and thus what I demand or require from political institutions, I must first grasp 
the ways in which my membership of different communities (and my occupation of 
various different roles within these communities) converge to make me the person I am 
(and thus how they shape and circumscribe my understanding of my own identity).
But, again, we must remember, MacIntyre does not consider us to be hopelessly trapped by 
these constitutive roles and attachments; he does not want to suggest that the course of our 
lives is entirely written for us by the communities to which we belong, or that our ends 
and preferences are not subject to revision. His point is rather that we are capable of choice 
and decision, but that these choices and decisions will necessarily and inevitably be taken 
against a background of inherited values and beliefs and understandings which will shape 
and constrain our deliberations about value and will to some extent circumscribe the 
understanding we have of the world. The “fact that the self has to find its moral identity in 
and through its membership in communities . . . does not entail that the self has to accept 
the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community,” he argues, it 
simply means that, when deliberating upon a course of action, my deliberations must be 
carried out against a framework of internalised values. “Without those moral particularities 
to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving forward from 
such particularity that the search for the good, or the universal, consists.”24 That is, in After 
Virtue, just as in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and in his more recent work (which we 
will discuss more fully later), MacIntyre clearly argues that not even our most radical or 
fundamental choices and decisions are made in abstraction, but are instead made by an
22 Ibid. p. 179.
23 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory), p. 220. Emphasis added.
24 Ibid. p. 221. Emphasis added.
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individual agent who inevitably finds its current decisions and ideas mediated by the 
various commitments which compose its identity. The capacity to contribute to the way 
in which my life unfolds by making genuine decisions about it is not replaced or eclipsed by 
the process of ‘discovering’ the ends and ideals which shape us, but rather is made possible 
by these discovered ends and commitments, and by discovering the way in which these 
commitments and ends fit with the prevailing values which are embodied in the political 
community. After all, even “rebellion against my identity is always one possible mode of 
expressing it.”25
Similarly, Taylor argues that even our most fundamental moral intuitions are inevitably 
shaped by the often subtle, often implicit ‘frameworks’ of value and meaning in which we 
find ourselves implicated. “My identity,” he says, “is defined by the commitments and 
identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine 
from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose. In other words, it is the horizon in which I am capable of taking a stand.”26 
Consequently, it is precisely the fact that I am embedded within a particular framework of 
values and commitments and beliefs that I am truly able to act in the world at all. Indeed, 
without these constitutive frameworks, my actions are rendered unintelligible; when 
persons understand themselves as rooted within a framework of values, “they can 
determine where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or 
of value . . . were they to lose this commitment or identification . . . they wouldn’t know 
anymore, for an important range of questions, what the significance of things was for 
them.”27 They would not, that is, be capable of evaluating ’strongly' or even 'weakly' on
25 Ibid.
26 Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 27.
27 Ibid.
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their various aims and ideals because these aims and ideals would be unknown to them.28 
As Walzer concurs, without those traditions and communities which afford our lives 
meaning “we would never acquire the minimal endowment (of identity, character, world­
view) that makes coherent choice possible.”29 Indeed, Walzer argues, “[ajgainst religious 
orthodoxy and social conformity, the demand for free choice, the defense of experiment 
and innovation, is legitimate, important, [and] stirring. But even the freest of men and 
women will experience and innovate under moral constraints which derive from their 
social and political world that is their inheritance as well as their burden . . . They inherit 
projects and arguments which they then join, elaborate, revise, and reject.”30
Most importantly for these writers, then, is the idea that our capacity for agency is 
thwarted or encouraged by the attitudes and ideas of those with whom we share 
constitutive bonds via the political sphere, and that therefore, the political environment in 
which we find ourselves should not seek to undermine these bonds, or to dislocate us from 
them. The choices we feel able to make, the values we espouse, the ends we pursue, will be 
constrained and shaped by the prevailing attitudes and values of those who constitute the 
wider political community in which we are implicated. Taylor articulates this in 
deliberately Hegelian (or even Rouseauean) tones when he tells us that “one is only a self 
among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround 
it.”31 Indeed, I can only make sense of even the most basic and fundamental emotions and 
concepts “like anger, love, anxiety, the aspiration to wholeness, etc. . . . through my and 
others experience of these objects for #s, in some common space.”32 Only through engaging 
with others in this ‘common space’ will I be in a position to answer fundamental questions
28 Charles Taylor, ‘Responsibility for Self, in A. O Rorty (ed.) The Identities o f Persons.
29 Michael Walzer, ‘Pluralism and Social Democracy’, Dissent, Winter, 1998, p. 51.
30 Ibid. p. 48.
31 Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self p. 35.
32 Ibid.
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about who I am and what I want from life, and only in seeking these answers through 
interaction and dialogue with others will I be able to move forward on the basis of my self- 
understandings. “A human being can always be original,” after all, and “can step beyond 
the limits of thought and vision of contemporaries.” Indeed, he “can be even be quite 
misunderstood by them. But the drive to original vision will be hampered, will ultimately 
be lost in inner confusion, unless it can be placed in some way in relation to the language 
and vision of others.”33
Neither Taylor, Walzer, MacIntyre, nor Sandel value belonging in and of itself, then. 
Rather they value the idea that one should belong to a community that allows one to 
interpret one’s own ends and commitments freely and openly through political 
participation and contestation. Consequently, as we saw in chapter five, there is little to 
separate liberals, communitarians, and difference-theorists on the normative implications of 
their ideas about the self given that political dialogue and contestation pre-supposes some 
account of autonomy.
The idea that the self is rendered able to deliberate meaningfully on its ends as a 
consequence of its embeddedness recurs in the work of those more recent communitarians 
(or ‘liberal-communitarians’) who have sought to dissolve this dichotomy between 
voluntarism and cognitivism. We can see it, for instance, in Amitai Etzioni’s claim that 
communal membership describes “a person who is an integral part of a community yet not 
consumed by it or submerged within it."34 We can see it in Philip Selznick’s assertion that 
“persons are at once socially constituted and self-determining. To be socially constituted,”
33 Ibid.
34 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Old Chestnuts, New Spurs’, New Communitarian Thinking (Virginia: The 
University Press of Virginia, 1996), p. 16-34. p. 18. See also A. Etzioni, A Responsive Society: 
Collected Essays on Guiding Deliberate Social Change (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991); Rights 
and the Common Good: The Communitarian Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); The
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he says, “is not, in itself, to be imprisoned or oppressed; it does not require that people be 
puppets or act out prescribed roles in excruciating detail . . . the theory of the social self 
makes plain that a morally competent self must be a product o f affirmative social 
participation and of responsible emotion, belief, and conduct.”35 And we can see it in 
Elshtain’s eloquent assertion that “the communitarian individual is very much an 
individual. She is an individual who does not stand as an isolate but as a being emerging out 
of a dense social ground, with its rough edges and ill-defined boundaries, its ties that bind, 
[and] its hold that paradoxically releases us into a wider world” by providing us with the 
background resources which make our choices, and our capacity for freedom, intelligible.36
And we find this claim too in the work of liberals. For communitarians and difference- 
theorists like Young, as we have already said, the central flaw running through liberalism is 
that it is grounded in a commitment to autonomy (and hence, of political dialogue) which 
appeals to a notion of disengaged reason and presupposes a conception of the self which is 
robbed of the very traits and conditions which allow it to question and interpret the aims 
and attachments it discovers about itself. That is, that liberalism presupposes and invokes 
“a specific account of the subject as knower as a self-present origin standing outside of, and 
opposed to objects of knowledge -  autonomous, neutral, abstract, and purified of 
particularity.”37 Indeed, as we have already seen, it is precisely this view that is supported 
by liberals who reject autonomy for being ‘too controversial’ or ‘sectarian’ to sustain 
liberal principles. But, as we have already intimated, the liberal commitment to personal 
autonomy does not presuppose a prior commitment to disengaged reason, and neither does
Spirit o f  the Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 1993); and The Third Way to a Good Society (London: DEMOS, 2000).
35 Philip Selznick, ‘Personhood and Moral Obligation’, New Communitarian Thinking, p. 110-125. p. 
125. Emphasis added.
36 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘The Communitarian Individual’, New Communitarian Thinking, p. 99-109.
p. 108.
37 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, p. 125.
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it presuppose the capacity of individuals to decide how they should act, or what they want, 
and so on, from a purely objective standpoint.
When deliberating upon our ends, or when deciding how we should act in response to the 
circumstances which face us, we do so in response to the circumstances that exist within us; 
we choose and decide and deliberate in accordance with those values and obligations which 
claim us at any one time. Ideals and 'conceptions of the good' and principles of justice are 
not plucked from the air; they cannot be deduced in abstraction from the people we are or 
the values we already have, or - in terms of just principles -  the ends and concerns that 
they must address. Our choices and deliberations will be constrained and facilitated by the 
range of options that we conceive to be available to us. Our ideas about value will be 
formed in the light of our already internalised conceptions of the world and our place 
within it. In order to find out for ourselves what is valuable and what is not, what we want 
from life and what we do not, we must first understand who we are by understanding the 
way in which our various commitments interact and conjoin to form our identity, how 
these commitments and ideals have changed throughout our lives, and how they differ 
from the commitments and ideals of those around us. The two questions ('what do I want?' 
and 'who am I?') are separate but mutually-dependent, and being capable of asking both 
presupposes an account of agency which incorporates voluntarism and cognitivism. Pure 
cognitivists believe we are only capable of asking the latter (and that we have no capacity 
to question or assess our particular roles or values); pure voluntarists (existentialists, maybe) 
only the former. But neither is a meaningful question in abstraction from the other, and 
asking one without the other leaves agency hopelessly impoverished.
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283 Whose Liberalism? Which Liberals?
It is precisely this idea of embeddedness (as a necessary prerequisite of deliberation and 
ethical judgement), of course, which anti-liberals claim as their own in response to what 
they see as the unrealistic abstractionism at the heart of contemporary liberalism. Group 
memberships shape our conception of the world and thus our preferences, needs, ideals, 
and so on, and liberalism (they say) ignores this.38
But if what we have said thus far (in this and earlier chapters) is correct, then liberalism 
must necessarily appeal to the importance of group memberships and attachments (and 
must necessarily incorporate these attachments into the process of political justification 
and dialogue), given that these attachments circumscribe, animate, and inform the agent's 
understanding of the world (and thus make autonomous deliberation possible). Indeed, it is 
difficult to find a liberal who does not claim the importance of group memberships to 
autonomy. For example, if the importance of embeddedness in groups is ignored by 
liberals, it is certainly not ignored by Rawls, who claims that, when deciding how to live 
our lives, we examine “definite ideals and forms of life that have been developed and tested 
by innumerable individuals, sometimes for generations.”39 Indeed, as we have already seen, 
Rawls conceives citizens to have “attachments and loves that they believe they would not, 
or could not, stand apart from” and that it is these attachments which make autonomous 
agency possibleZ0 Neither, it would seem, is it ignored by Raz who explicitly argues that 
“[o]nly through being socialized in a culture can one tap the options which give life a
38 See, for example, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference in addition to ‘The 
Ideal of Community and the Politics and the Politics of Difference’, Social Theory and Practice 
12/1 (1986), ‘Impartiality and the Civic Republic: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral 
and Political Theory’, in S. Benhabib & D. Cornell (eds.) Feminism as Critique (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1987), ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, Ethics 
99/2 (1989), pp. 250-274, and ‘Democracy as a Resource for Democratic Communication’, in J. 
Bohman & W. Rehg (eds.) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (London: MIT 
Press, 1997).
39 John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 563-564.
40 John Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, Journal o f Philosophy 77. p. 515-572. See
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meaning. By and large,” he says, “one’s cultural membership determines the horizon of 
one’s opportunities, of what one may become, or (if one is older) what one might have 
been . . .  In this way, one’s culture constitutes . . . one’s identity;"41 or by Kymlicka, who 
states that "for meaningful individual choice to be possible, individuals need not only 
access to information, the capacity to reflectively evaluate it, and freedom of expression 
and association. They need access to a societal culture;"42 or Nagel, who claims that "each 
of us begins with a set of concerns, desires, and interests of his own" which often includes 
"strong personal allegiance to particular communities or interest or conviction or 
emotional identification;"43 or Dworkin, who claims that "[c]itizens are by and large born 
into their political communities and most have no real prospect of leaving the one they are 
born into."44 It is certainly not ignored by those so-called 'liberal-nationalists' who seek to 
ground liberal principles in shared national aspirations and notions of belonging (like 
Mazzini and, more recently, Miller, Margalit, Tamir, and Brinkley);45 and neither,
also Rawls’ Political Liberalism, and John Rawls: Collected Papers.
41 Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 170-191. p. 178. See also The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988); ‘Liberating Duties’, Law and Philosophy 8 (1989), p. 3-21; ‘Facing 
Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 19/1 (1990); 
‘Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy’, Iowa Law Review 74 (1989); ‘National Self- 
Determination’, Journal o f Philosophy 87/9 (September, 1990); ‘Reform or Destroy?’, Boston 
Review 22/5 (Oct/Nov, 1997), p. 38. See also Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 2000).
42 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 84. See also Liberalism, Community, and Culture 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Finding Our Way: Re-Thinking Ethnocultural Relations in 
Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998); The New Debate Over Minority Rights 
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1997); ‘Introduction’ in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, W. 
Kymlicka & W. Norman, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); ‘Liberal 
Complacencies’, Boston Review 22/5 (Oct/Nov, 1997), p. 29; ‘Introduction’ in Ethnicity and Group 
Rights, I. Shapiro & W. Kymlicka, eds., (New York: New York University Press, 1997); 
‘Introduction: An Emerging Consensus?’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1998); 
‘Introduction’ in The Rights o f Minority Cultures, (ed.) W. Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995); ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures’, Political Theory 20 (1992); ‘From Enlightenment 
Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism’, unpublished paper, presented at Gregynog, University of 
Wales, 1998; ‘The Evolution of the Anglo-American Debate on Minority Rights and 
Multiculturalism’, unpublished paper, 2000;
43 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p. 10-14. See also The View From Nowhere .
44 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberal Community’, in S. Avineri & A. de- Shalit (eds.) Communitarianism and 
Individualism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 205-223, p. 214. See also Law’s 
Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986).
45 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); J. Raz and A. Margalit, 
‘National Self-Determination’, re-printed in J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain; Yael Tamir, Liberal 
Nationalism (Princeton University Press, 1993); Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
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interestingly, is it ignored by those liberal 'cosmopolitans' like Barry, Charvet, Pogge, 
Nussbaum, Beitz, Jones, and Waldron, who have so often been (mistakenly) accused of 
seeking the universal destruction of particularist communities through their commitment 
to global 'individualism';46 or by 'libertarian' or classical liberal individualists like 
Gauthier, Nozick, or Hayek, who believe that it is precisely the fact that individuals are 
constituted by their talents and abilities that makes them entitled to what is produced by 
them.47
The crucial question for many, if not all, of these liberals is not whether persons find 
themselves 'constituted' by allegiances and attachments which affect and shape their 
deliberations about their own ends and the way in which they want their lives to unfold. 
Rather it is: who defines and determines the nature and limits of these attachments and 
groups? Should the ideals and ways of life conferred by these memberships and allegiances 
form the basis of a conception of justice? And, as we have already seen, does the principle of 
autonomy play any substantive role in the deliberative process? None of the liberals that 
we have thus far mentioned seek to deny that we find ourselves in communities which 
shape our interests and preferences, and neither do they argue that the kind of life we 
envisage for ourselves, or the ends we seek to pursue, will be formed in abstraction from 
those wider commitments and ideals which inevitably affect and circumscribe them. Some 
view our memberships and allegiances as more significant than others, of course; Kukathas
46 Brian Barry, ‘Do Countries Have Moral Obligations? The Case of World Poverty’, Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values 8 (University of Utah Press, 1987), ‘Spherical Justice and Global Injustice’, in D. 
Miller & M. Walzer (eds.) Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), and ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, Is Social Justice Obsolete?
(forthcoming); John Charvet, The Idea o f an Ethical Community (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1995); Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (London: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles Beitz, 
Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1979); Charles Jones, 
Global Justice: Defending Cosmpolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jeremy 
Waldron, ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures: A Cosmopolitan Alternative’, in W. Kymlicka (ed.) The 
Rights o f Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Martha Nussbaum, Sex 
and Social Justice.
47 David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford University Press, 1995); Robert Nozick, Anarchy,
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and Nozick, conceive group memberships primarily as objects of choice, which persons 
can reject or accept as they so desire, while Dworkin, Kymlicka, Raz, and the liberal- 
nationalists conceive these memberships as expressing something more fundamental about 
identity and about the structural conditions necessary for meaningful choice itself, but 
none wish to reject entirely the notion that our specific memberships and commitments 
affect our preferences and projects.
There is a distinction to be made, then, between what liberal theory has to say about the 
nature and significance of one's group memberships, and what it has to say about what 
these memberships mean for deliberations about justice. For liberals, the fact that we 
possess certain memberships and attachments does not -  and should not -  foreclose the 
possibility of deliberating upon the importance or worth of these attachments, or the 
ability of each agent to participate in the derivation of those principles which regulate the 
conduct of individuals and institutions. For liberals (and, as we saw, difference theorists 
and communitarians), principles must be justifiable to all to whom they are to apply, 
which is to say that all persons must be capable of entering into debate and deliberation 
about the content of justice and their own ends. Group membership does not in itself 
foreclose deliberation and autonomy, then; rather, it grounds such deliberations and makes 
them possible. The problem comes when groups seek legal exemptions or collective ‘rights’ 
which would deny their members the information and resources necessary to make 
meaningful and genuine decisions about their inherited ends, or to participate in dialogues 
as complex, distinct individuals as opposed to merely bearers of some imputed and 
arbitrary identity. Liberals must necessarily reject any such claims, even if this means that 
particular ways of life or customary practices will be constrained or ruled-out. And, we 
saw, this is a strategy also necessarily supported by advocates of a politics of difference, of
State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974); and Friedrich von Hayek, The Constitution o f Liberty
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recognition, of cultural recognition, pluralism, or cultural pluralism. This will be discussed 
in more detail below; for now, however, it is sufficient to emphasise the claim that neither 
liberals nor communitarians (or difference theorists) fit easily within the conventional 
voluntarist/cognitivist dichotomy because neither, in actual fact, conceives agency or the 
derivation of principles of justice to be a wholly cognitivist or a wholly voluntarist 
process. As J. Donald Moon has put it, “a complete account of the self would combine 
cognitive and voluntarist aspects. We can agree that the self is necessarily ‘encumbered’ in 
the sense that one does not merely will but also discovers one’s ends. However, the very 
process of self-discovery can free one from the ‘givenness’ of any particular ends. Self- 
understanding,” he says, “can provide a critical distance on one’s ends, so that they are not, 
or do not continue to be, one’s ends unless one acknowledges - that is, wills - them.”48 
Reflection, that is (in the words of Yael Tamir), "always begins from a defined social 
position, but contextuality need not preclude choice."49 In this, it would seem, liberals, 
difference-theorists, and communitarians are as one.
29. The Real Problem: Liberalism, Community, and Multiple Embeddedness.
29.1 Rejecting Essentialism and the Selective Elevation o f Value.
Once we realise, then, that liberals do not conceive one’s deliberation on ends or principles 
to take place in a realm of isolated abstraction (but rather as beginning within one’s 
particular understanding of the world), and also that communitarians and difference 
theorists do not conceive persons to be hopelessly trapped by those values and attachments 
that they ‘discover’ about themselves (but rather view agents as capable of participating in 
the way in which their life unfolds in the light of their other particular attachments and
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944).
48 J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community, p. 49.
49 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 33.
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experiences) we can see that the dichotomy between voluntarism and cognitivism appears 
to vanish all but entirely. Liberals, communitarians, and difference-theorists conceive 
agency to be a process both of ‘discovering* those ends and commitments which claim us at 
any one time, and of making genuine decisions about the way in which we want our lives 
to develop in response to what we find, just as they appear to subscribe to the idea that all 
persons should be able to participate meaningfully in the process of ‘discovering’ or 
‘determining* those values embodied in the political community as a whole.
If liberals and communitarians are divided on the matter of agency then (as, in the end, I 
believe they are), it is not over its formal structure. What divides the two factions is the way 
in which they conceive the individual's ‘view of the world’ to be derived, and where people 
get it from. This is especially important because the internal structure of this view of the 
world imposes limits upon what an individual can do and what she cannot by placing 
limits on what she can know (about herself, her capabilities, her talents, and the world in 
which she might exercise them) and what she cannot. And it is important too because, as 
we will see, it holds immediate implications for the way in which we should understand 
the role and responsibilities of political institutions.
For the communitarians, for example, our view of the world (the context in which we 
locate our conception of who we are and what we want) is ultimately derived from our 
membership of a particular community over and above all others, namely, our ‘political’ 
community. True, they admit that we will also be members of other, more specific 
communities and groups and associations (religious groups, for example, or ethnic or 
gender groups), but these more specific groups will “derive their moral worth from the 
extent of their contribution to the (politically defined) common good, or, at least, their
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compatibility with it.”501 am, therefore, a citizen over and above anything else, and thus I 
approach any situation or conflict or decision as a citizen. My role as a citizen unifies my 
self and hence, it will provide the lens through which I examine not merely my political 
roles and ideals but everything else as well.
But it is by no means clear why this particular membership (i.e. one’s membership of a 
specific political community) is necessarily any more definitive of a person’s identity (and 
thus their interests and aspirations and ideals) than any other. Indeed, it is not at all clear 
why one particular value need be (or should be) conceived as more important than any 
other or, if it is, exactly who decides which role or membership occupies this important 
role.
Historically, the tendency to define certain groups and individuals by virtue of particular 
‘essentialisable’ facts or traits about them is all too apparent. Aristotle’s claim that women 
and slaves were ‘naturally’ unsuited to political office is, perhaps, the most obvious 
example, but we can find it too in Platonism, Nietzscheanism, and some contemporary 
feminism.51 More recently, however, essentialism has been widely denounced for its 
exclusionary implications. Essentialising one’s ethnicity or gender or sexuality, for 
example, as the most important or defining aspect of one’s identity has been rightly 
criticised for misconstruing social constructs and labels as natural facts about persons and 
hence opening the way to quite substantial exclusions and inequalities. The kind of
50 Neera K. Badhwar, ‘Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality’, Social Philosophy & Policy 
13/10, p. 7.
51 The idea that political theorising needs to be ‘gendered’ (and hence, rooted in an appeal to a 
particular, shared account of ‘women’s experience’) perhaps finds its most explicit expression in 
feminist ‘standpoint theory’. See Susan J. Hekman, The Future o f Differences: Truth
and Method in Feminist Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). See also Hekman, ‘Truth and 
Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Re-Visited’, Signs 22/2 (1997), p. 341-365. Martha Nussbaum 
invokes a similar kind of essentialism in her claim that all women possess certain basic 
‘capabilities’ which are both transcultural and transhistorical. See Martha Nussbaum’s Sex and 
Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Women and Human Development:
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argument that claims women are naturally unsuited to political office, for example, is cut 
from the same cloth as those which claim that blacks are naturally more lazy than whites, 
that Jews are naturally selfish, and that gays are naturally promiscuous. Such arguments 
have always been popular among racists, anti-Semites, and homophobes who find it easier 
to justify socially-constructed inequalities in terms of biology or natural fate.
Thus, essentialism in this biologically determinist sense has been widely (but not wholly) 
rejected in contemporary political philosophy in favour of an approach which avoids 
ascribing particular ends and interests to persons by virtue of their particular memberships 
or traits, and rightly so. But while the tendency to convert ‘social identities’ into ‘natural’ 
identities is rare, the strategy of selectively elevating certain social or political roles as more 
important -  and more defining of one’s interests and aspirations and self-understandings -  
than any other is still widespread. Outside communitarianism the strategy of selective 
elevation finds its most obvious normative and ontological expression among the more 
radical advocates of ‘identity politics’ (which in academic discourse is itself born as much 
from the communitarian critique of liberalism as it is from the ‘new social movements’ 
that have arisen in Britain and the US), and in those who have sought to invoke the 
importance of 'nationality' or 'culture' (or 'national culture1) to identity and freedom. For 
many radical feminists, for example, persons (both women and men) are conceived to be 
ultimately defined by their membership of a particular gender group, in the sense that their 
more specific goals and projects, and their wider understanding of who they are and what 
opportunities are open to them, are ultimately determined by their gender. For feminists 
like Andrea Dworkin and Catherine Mackinnon, and many first-wave feminists, the social, 
political, and cultural significance afforded to gender by society is so pervasive and 
inescapable that it represents the implicit structure (the ‘objective standard’) against which
The Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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we come to understand our various, more personal goals and projects (including our 
membership of a particular ‘political* community).52 Consequently, despite their religious 
or cultural or racial differences, women are conceived to be united by their shared 
experience of subordination and domination (universally defined) at the hands of a male 
elite, and by their inability to articulate their sense of domination within a conceptual and 
classificatory framework constructed and perpetuated by this elite. Hence, they say, any 
politics which genuinely seeks to emancipate women from domination must be openly and 
specifically ‘gendered’ in a way that liberalism aims not to be, and must seek to challenge 
those vocabularies and structures of discourse which deny women the ability to contribute 
to the way in which their lives, and the history of their own society, develop.53
For other writers and political activists, meanwhile, it is a person’s membership of a 
particular ethnic or cultural community which dominates their identity, which structures 
their more particular goals and ideals, and which (under conditions of discrimination and 
exclusion) denies them access to political discourse by excluding them from those resources 
or goods which make these discourses accessible to them. Will Kymlicka, for example, 
states that our cultural membership provides the necessary context in which we can make 
“judgements about how to lead our lives. In this sense,” he goes on, “our culture not only 
provides options, but it also provides [what Dworkin called] the ‘spectacles through which 
we identify experiences as valuable.’”54 Similarly, Joseph Raz has argued that one’s
52 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987); Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (London: 
Women’s Press, 1981). See also, Judith Squires, Gender in Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1999).
53 See, for example, Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy and Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas 
o f Gender, Political Philosophy, and Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Nancy 
Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1989); and Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1982). Again, the idea that legal and political theorising should be ‘gendered’ finds perhaps its most 
explicit formulation in feminist standpoint theory.
54 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 8. Internal quote comes from Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberal
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“individual freedom and well-being [depends on] unimpeded membership in a respected 
and prosperous cultural group.”55
Some persons, of course, may conceive their lives to be so dominated by a single 
attachment or role or ideal that this informs and constrains other significant aspects of 
their lives. Indeed, in such circumstances these groups may be forced to suffer under an 
ascribed and demeaning self-image determined and imposed by those who have access to 
these public resources.56 For all these thinkers (as for the communitarians), then, the fact 
that an individual is a member of a particular ‘community’ or ‘group’ shapes also the more 
specific decisions they make about their lives, from the company they choose to keep, to 
the relationships they feel able to have, to the area in which they choose to live, to the job 
they feel able to hold. Oppression and inequality thwart free-choice, they argue, and so 
oppressed groups should be provided with those political and economic resources they 
need in order that they might do more than merely act out those roles defined for them by 
others. For these writers (as for advocates of a politics of ‘recognition’, ‘difference’, 
‘presence’, or ‘cultural recognition’) justice is intimately tied to protecting and encouraging 
our dignity as persons and as such, they believe, it is concerned with encouraging those 
social, political, and legal conditions which protect those groups from which we derive our 
identity from misrepresentation, discrimination, or exclusion. In failing to recognise (and, 
generally, to make specific legal, economic, or political provision for) that group which 
affords me my character, they argue, conventional liberal institutions fail to acknowledge 
the nature or the extent of the marginalisation and exclusion that I feel and which I share 
with the other members of my group.
Community’, A Matter o f Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 228.
55 Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, Ethics in the Public Domain, p. 78.
56 Anne Phillips, Which Equalities Matter? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Charles Taylor, ‘The
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To this end, the selective elevation of particular attachments or commitments found in 
communitarianism, in radicalised forms of identity politics, and in culturalist liberalism can 
be seen to support widely opposing normative ends, depending upon which membership is 
held to be most significant, and upon the political sensibilities of the theorists in question. 
For the communitarians, who conceive our various allegiances to be understood through 
the lens of the shared values embodied in our political community, I have a duty to 
reconcile my various memberships (to order my self) in such a way that they are in line 
with the thick, constitutive values embodied in this community. Consequently, my 
understanding of what it means to be a ‘man’, a ‘father’, a ‘friend’, a ‘Christian’, and so on, 
will be derived from what the shared values of the political community tell me these roles 
mean. In order to be a ‘good father’ or ‘friend’, that is, I must first be a ‘good citizen’ in the 
sense that my role as a citizen takes precedence over all other aspects of my life by 
providing the framework in which these other aspects are rendered intelligible. In this 
sense, citizenship is conceived to provide unity to the self; being a ‘good citizen’ simply is, 
in large part, the ordering of the self in the appropriate way (with our more ‘partial’ 
allegiances conceived through the lens of out political memberships).
For many identity and difference theorists, however, it is precisely this appeal to ‘shared 
values’ as a basis not only of grounding institutions, but of providing unity to the self (by 
requiring all persons to conceive of their own lives as an ordered hierarchy such that their 
telos, their end in life, is embodied in, and pursued by, the political institutions which 
bound and circumscribe them), that leads to the potential exclusion and marginalisation of 
certain groups and, consequently, the domination of many members of society. For many 
identity theorists, that is, rules of justice (or, less controversially, ethical principles) cannot 
be deduced simply by identifying the overarching values of the political community
Politics of Recognition’; see also Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy.
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because it is also important to ensure whether or not the way in which these values are 
determined is fair and inclusive. This is why liberals have argued -  and should continue to 
argue -  that public discourse should not merely aim at the articulation of ‘shared* values, 
but also the interpretation of these values themselves, how they are shared, and who shares 
them.
In this, of course, identity theorists reject the moral ontology of communitarianism for 
precisely the same reason as do liberals (and for the same reason that many liberals reject 
utilitarianism); ‘justice’ cannot be merely the articulation of shared values (or the 
agglomeration of preferences) unless the means by which we come to know what these 
shared values are is premised upon the equal ability of every individual agent to contribute 
to debate meaningfully and fairly. For liberals, identity theorists, and difference theorists, 
that is, the shared values embodied in the political community cannot be determined by 
elites or majorities, but by common agreement within a genuinely inclusive system of 
dialogue and justification which itself enshrines certain fundamental values at its heart.57 
This is the sense in which liberals and advocates of identity politics seek the same 
‘communitarian’ goal; for liberals especially, it is not the project of establishing a ‘common 
good’ which must be rejected, but the idea that certain persons can be excluded from the 
derivation of this common good by virtue of certain arbitrary factors like ethnicity, 
religious membership, and so on. To put it another way, shared values for the liberal -  and 
for difference theorists and many identity theorists - are only valid as regulative principles 
of justice if, as we have already suggested, they are genuinely seen to be publicly justifiable
57 It should be noted that Iris Young distinguishes a ‘politics of difference’ from a ‘politics of identity*. 
In doing so, she is making a similar point to mine, namely, that the self cannot be understood as 
essentialisable or wholly determined by a particular membership or group affinity over any other.
The normative implication of this, however, is liberalism: a politics in which individuals work out 
through common deliberation the nature and content of political institutions. We have already 
explored as number of the parallels between Young’s argument and liberalism, and we will have 
cause to do so again later in this chapter. See chapter three of Iris Marion Young’s Inclusion and 
Democracy.
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to all to whom they are to apply, and this is only possible if all these persons are enabled to 
contribute meaningfully to the process by which these ‘shared values’ are revealed or 
determined.
29.2 Agency, Individuality, and Multiple Obligations.
Communitarians and certain identity theorists are therefore united in the strategy of 
selectively elevating certain memberships or commitments as more defining of personal 
identity than others, just as they are united in the claim that political institutions should be 
constructed in such a way as to ‘recognise’ or ‘affirm’ certain traits or memberships above 
all others. But this is a mistake precisely because it embodies a universalising tendency to 
denigrate or to transcend those other communities and attachments and memberships 
which shape and animate one’s interests and ideas about the world. Indeed, the claim that 
certain attachments are more important than others in the conferral of identity is as 
universal in intent as any made by liberals. For the communitarians, for instance, all 
persons are shaped by the shared values of the political community in which they live; for 
many radical feminists, all persons are defined by their gender; for culturalist liberals, all 
persons are defined by their ethnocultural or national group, and so on. When beginning 
from such foundations, it is not difficult to establish the link between these particular 
defining memberships and personal autonomy. If one’s identity or self-understanding is 
understood to be inextricably tied to one’s ‘religious’ or ‘national’ membership, for 
example, it follows logically that one’s ability to reflect upon and interpret one’s ends, or 
to make meaningful choices about one’s life, will be undermined or thwarted in the event 
of this membership being denied, or robbed, or rendered inaccessible.
But neither the agent nor autonomy should be understood in this way. Persons will often 
find themselves faced with dilemmas and conflicts arising precisely out of the fact that they
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draw their identity from a multiplicity of roles and communities and memberships at any 
one time, and that often no single role or value among them holds the answer to what they 
should do, or how they should act, in response to the specific circumstances which face 
them and hence, no single role or attachment in itself secures or guarantees or facilitates 
personal autonomy.58
Consider members of comparatively ‘conservative’ or ‘traditional’ communities, for 
instance. The ‘Muslim’ or ‘Sikh’ or ‘Jew’, for example, will indeed understand herself as a 
member of a particular church (or a possessor of certain religious beliefs), but she will also, 
at the same time, often be a ‘mother’, a ‘daughter’, a ‘wife’, a ‘friend’, a ‘woman’, a 
‘citizen’; she may be a member of a particular club or social group; she may have a job, or 
occupy some other office or role. Now, it is still possible to argue here, of course, that one 
of these roles is more important than any other (depending upon our own particular view 
on this). However, the idea that one of these memberships or roles can be defined as more 
important, or itself a precondition for autonomous reflection and choice is undermined 
when we realise that even in such communities, persons will often find themselves forced 
to make decisions which cannot be resolved merely by an appeal to a single membership or 
allegiance.
We need not be a radical value pluralist to hold that success in one sphere of our lives 
requires us to make sacrifices in others or that it is possible to find ourselves in 
circumstances which force us to decide between different, and perhaps conflictual, interests 
and obligations. It may not be possible for us to be, for instance, both a ‘good father’ and a 
successful ‘lawyer’ (or musician, or poet, or journalist, or anything else) because we can
58 See Ayelet Shachar, ‘Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar? Women’s Rights and the 
Multicultural Dilemma’, in W. Kymlicka & W. Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse Societies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 199-223.
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only do so much with the limited time and resources that we possess. Optimal success in a 
particular endeavour demands a certain implacability in the face of alternative demands; it 
requires a doggedness, a persistent willingness to forsake other ways of life and other 
courses of action in the interests of achieving that goal or end which motivates one above 
all else, as Williams’ Gauguin example illustrates.59 The virtues (or vices) required for the 
pursuit of divergent ends might exclude one another, entailing the need for decisions to be 
made between them and these decisions will often not be easy or costless.60
The important point here is that conflicts of this kind can occur in any agent who occupies 
more than one role at any time, and that the dilemmas and indecisions which arise within 
her as a consequence cannot be merely ‘reasoned away’ or dissolved by an appeal to the 
over-arching values which prevail in the ‘community’ to which she belongs because, often, 
these values will be as much in the balance (to be weighed against others) as any other value 
or obligation or commitment that he feels. We can choose to subordinate certain of our 
ends to certain others, of course, but what we cannot do is claim that these certain ends 
will be the same for all people (or all members of a particular group) or that these 
attachments lie outside the deliberative process (and thus unquestionable and fixed).
As Iris Marion Young correctly states, “interests frequently conflict not only between 
agents but in the actions of a single agent.”61 Or, as Berlin (who was certainly no difference- 
theorist) put it “values may easily clash within the breast of a single individual . . . [and 
when they do] we must engage in what are called trade-offs - rules, values, principles must
59 Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973 -  
1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
601 follow Joseph Raz in calling this ‘value pluralism’. See Ethics in the Public Domain. For 
other views on value-pluralism see, for example, John Gray, Berlin (London: Fontana Press, 1995); 
H. Hardy & R. Hausheer (eds.), The Proper Study ofMankind: An Anthology o f Essays by Isaiah 
Berlin (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997).
61 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 134.
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yield to each other to varying degrees in specific situations."62 The Jehovah’s Witness who 
is faced with the decision of either allowing her son a life-saving blood transfusion or 
letting him die, for instance, is genuinely faced with a tragic and agonising choice between 
(at least) two aspects of her self.63 Her commitment to her religious beliefs might lead her 
to the conclusion that the ‘ingestion’ of blood is morally wrong, but she will also be a 
‘parent’ who loves her son, who has hopes and aspirations for him, and who does not want 
to see him die. She might also be a ‘wife’ who must take into account the views and feelings 
of her husband, and so on. Similarly, the member of a strict religious community who 
must decide whether to send his child to an orthodox school which will prepare him for a 
life of strict religious observance (at the expense of providing the child with the capacity to 
compete for jobs and pursue a living of his own choice on a free and equal basis with 
others), or to a non-orthodox school which has a better reputation for its teaching in 'non- 
religious' subjects like mathematics, science, and languages, is compelled to choose between 
two conflicting accounts of what the 'best interests of his child' might be. Again, 
depending upon that individual’s grasp of his or her own beliefs and ideals these various 
roles might all be understood in terms of her membership of her religious community. The 
Jehovah’s Witness might, for example, conclude that acting ‘in her son’s best interests’ 
requires letting him die (if she understands her son’s ‘best interests* are entirely determined 
within the context of the orthodox religious beliefs that she holds), just as the religious 
person might believe that his child's best interests are served by sending him to a religious 
school, even though this might be at the expense of him gaining certain qualifications that 
he might have obtained if he had gone elsewhere.
62 Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, The Proper Study o f Mankind, p. 10-15.
63 It should be noted again that Jehovah Witnesses in Britain have recently reinterpreted their doctrine 
so as to allow the receipt of blood transfusions in particular circumstances.
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The point that concerns us here is not what these people should decide (or indeed, whether 
in cases such as these the choice should be left to the parents), but that the resolution of 
such a complex and agonising moral and personal problem arises out of a process of 
deliberation which pits the various roles and obligations one feels at any one time against 
one another. Such decisions cannot be simply or easily resolved by an appeal to over­
arching cultural or religious or moral beliefs (or, for that matter, to the shared beliefs 
embodied in the political community); to argue that they can is to underestimate the 
deeply complex and problematic nature of these decisions, and is to underestimate also the 
extent to which the agent will occupy a multiplicity of roles (and will, consequently, feel 
claimed by a multiplicity of obligations and commitments and loyalties) which pull him in 
different directions at one and the same time. One’s roles and obligations need not always 
conflict in this way, of course. But it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
they do, and in these circumstances our dilemmas are not easily resolved by referring to a 
single set of values or beliefs which wholly define the solution. In such circumstances, 
"[w]e are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss,” because the 
obligations in question cannot always be subsumed within a larger system of value, or be 
measured against a single standard.64
If this is true of persons who live in ‘traditional’ or relatively homogeneous societies, of 
course, then it is even more obviously true of those who live in complex societies which 
contain a great diversity of peoples and beliefs and ways of life, as the quote from Walzer at 
the beginning of this chapter eloquently suggests. Inhabitants of such complex societies will 
be forced to confront a diversity of beliefs and ways of life on a scale that far exceeds those 
who inhabit smaller societies. Through experiencing diversity, by living and working 
beside and among others who understand themselves and the world differently, and by co­
64 Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’, p. 11.
240
operating and interacting on a formal and informal basis with others who hold different 
beliefs and values and ideals, many individuals will find it more difficult to maintain and 
perpetuate fixed barriers between ‘their own’ values and the values of ‘others’. Groups 
become more diverse as their members come into contact with (and react to) the difference 
and diversity which exists around them. Our deliberations about value may well be rooted 
in our understanding of ‘who we are’, then (as we argued in section 28), but in complex, 
diverse societies -  as in smaller, more homogeneous societies - our understanding of ‘who 
we are’ becomes blurred and ambiguous, as we seek to reconcile our own ideals and 
commitments with those which co-exist both within us and within the society which 
surrounds us.
This idea is embodied in the account of autonomy advanced by a number of anti- 
essentialist feminists including, interestingly, Iris Marion Young. Indeed, in her most recent 
work, Young appears to advance not only an account of political deliberation which is 
compatible with liberalism (as we saw in the previous chapter), but also an account of 
autonomy which is compatible with liberalism. An “adequate conception of autonomy,” 
should, she claims,
promote the capacity of persons to pursue their own ends in the context of 
relationships in which others may do the same. While this concept of autonomy 
entails a presumption of non-interference, it does not imply a social scheme in 
which atomized agents simply mind their own business and leave each other alone. 
Instead, it entails recognizing that agents are related in many ways they have not 
chosen, by virtue of kinship, history, proximity, or the unintended consequences
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of action . . .  Relational autonomy consists partly, then, in the structuring of 
relationships so that they support the maximal pursuit of individual ends.65
This is all very well, of course, but if she actually believes this then it would seem to 
represent final evidence of her conversion to liberalism. Young argues that liberal 
autonomy fails to take account of the importance of group memberships by requiring 
persons to abstract themselves from all such memberships in the interests of exercising 
choices. Her theory of autonomy requires no such thing, she says, and indeed, it 
presupposes that “the ability to separate and be independent of others is rare if it appears at 
all.”66 But, as we have already shown, this is a presupposition shared by liberals who, like 
Young, argue for an institutional and constitutional arrangement which protects the ability 
of the individual to work out what is most important to it in the light of its other 
allegiances and attachments and obligations, and to pursue its own individual ends on a free 
and equal basis with others. For Young as for liberals, persons work out their preferences 
and ideals by working out how their various attachments and obligations fit together to 
make them who they are. Hence, liberalism -  like Young’s politics of difference -  seeks an 
open and stable political environment in which persons might explore their own identity -  
and pursue their ends -  freely, beside and among others who are capable of doing the same. 
For Young and for liberals, that is, autonomy requires a rich and varied structure of 
commitments and attachments from which individual agents can examine particular aspects 
of their own lives. If persons are to reason meaningfully about politics then they must find 
themselves in circumstances which allow them to freely explore their own identities and 
commitments for themselves.
65 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 231. Emphasis added.
66 Ibid.
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In the next chapter, we explore the implications that the argument for multiple­
embeddedness holds for our understanding of the role of 'culture' in our normative 
theorising about justice. For the remainder of this chapter, however, I wish to flesh out this 
notion of 'multiple embeddedness' in more detail by subjecting it to a number of 
criticisms. For example, does not our argument thus far imply that, at some deep level, the 
agent is irrevocably 'divided' into 'multiple selves'? That is, if - as we have suggested - 
'groups' are more internally diverse than many theorists believe them to be (for the 
purposes of our theorising about justice) because their individual members are more 
internally-diverse than these theorists believe, then why should these individuals be any 
more worthy of 'protection' or priority than the 'groups' to which they belong? That is, 
how meaningful is it to talk about 'individuals' at all, rather than merely those experiences 
or memberships which 'constitute' them?
30. Multiple Attachments and the Liberal Individual.
30.1 MacIntyre Re-Visited: Narrative Unity, and the 'Compartmentalisation' o f the 
Self.
The claim that we should, in the light of what we have said thus far, dispense with any 
notion of a unified 'self' in favour of multiple or plural selves would appear to be rooted in 
the idea that the conception of the agent thus far presented is internally and irreparably 
fractured such that its identity is entirely determined by the particular perspective it adopts 
at any particular time. I do not merely deliberate differently in different circumstances (as a 
single, multiply-constituted self) but rather I am, in a fundamental sense, a different person 
in different circumstances. My various interests and commitments do not converge to form 
a specific person that is we, but exist separately in the different roles that I occupy. Hence, 
my friends know the Phil that is their friend, my parents know the Phil that is their son,
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and my students know the Phil that is their teacher, but none of them know Phil because 
there is no such person, only different Phils in different situations.
As we have seen, such claims are popular both among those philosophers and historians of 
thought who lament the rise of ‘modernity’ as destructive of the unified, pre-modern self of 
the polis or the village, and of those 'post-modernist' thinkers who emphasise the 
breakdown of those 'narratives' which render human personhood coherent and unified (or, 
more accurately, the breakdown of those foundations which underpin and justify these 
narratives). For the postmodernists, normative political theory must acknowledge the 
internally diffuse and changeable structure of human personhood and foreground those 
non-dominating, discursive forums in which persons can discover for themselves the nature 
and the limits of their own ideals and values.67 For those others (for example, 
communitarians), however, normative political theory should not seek to accommodate or 
celebrate the changeability or fluidity of personal experience but should rather seek to 
reclaim that sense of unity of self which has been left shattered and broken in the wake of 
the enlightenment and its attendant notions of ‘progress’ and ‘freedom’ and universal 
reason which have, as MacIntyre puts it, effectively liquidated the “self into a set of 
demarcated areas of role-playing.”68
Indeed, very recently, MacIntyre has extended this argument by claiming that the modern 
world is split (or ‘compartmentalised’) into separate spheres of activity which are conceived 
to exist in isolation from one another.69 Such a world, he says, forces us to understand our
67 For example, William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f  Political 
Paradox (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: 
Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992); and 
Anna Marie Smith, Laclau & Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary (New York: Routledge, 
1998).
68 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 205.
69 Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency', Philosophy 74 (1999), p. 
311-329.
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various memberships and embeddednesses as so divided and separate that they acquire an 
independence and autonomy of their own; different aspects of my life do not ‘converge* to 
form the person I am because I  am merely different persons in different circumstances and 
at different times. Indeed, it is a paradox of modernity, MacIntyre argues, that it imposes 
divisions upon the self while at the same time exalting a conception of the agent as ‘unified’ 
and ‘autonomous*. In order to understand myself as a moral agent in the modern world, he 
says, I
have to understand myself as and to present myself to others as someone with an 
identity other than the identities of role and office that I assume in each of the roles 
that I occupy. I have to understand myself as someone who brings with him or 
herself to each role a quality of mind and character that belong to her qua individual 
and not qua role-player. . .  [T]he lives of individuals are constituted in large part by 
the various roles they play, although they are generally able to reflect upon their 
role-playing in ways that are not dictated by these same roles . . .  It is 
characteristically, even if not only, in how they play out their roles that individuals 
exhibit their individual character.70
So much, it would seem, represents a clear enough summary of the conception of the agent 
for which I have been so far arguing; an agent, that is, which derives its identity from many 
different sources at any one time but which “can never be dissolved nor dissolve itself 
entirely into the distinctive roles that it plays.”71 But MacIntyre then goes on to argue that 
such a conception of the agent (if it is to provide a substantive, unified basis for individual 
agency) requires that the agent ignore or play down those divergences and differences that 
exist within it in the interests of establishing some sense of unity within itself. “The divided
70 Ibid. p. 315.
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self of a compartmentalised social order,” that is (an order which forces us to understand 
our lives as composed of different aspects which share no real or necessary unity or 
continuity), “ . . .  has to have developed habits of mind that enable it not to attend to what 
it would have to recognise as its own incoherences, if it were to understand itself apart 
from its involvements in each of its particular roles in each distinct sphere.”72 
Consequently, it would seem, self-deception (far from representing something that must be 
overcome for autonomy to flourish) is actually required if persons are to be autonomous in 
any real sense.
But it is not clear why this should be the case at all. If what we have said so far about the 
agent is viable, and if it really is capable of deciding for itself the course of action it will 
take (and what it believes to be true or worthwhile or valuable) on the basis of those values 
and attachments that it ‘discovers’ about itself then it is not clear why it must seek to 
impose unity on itself at the expense of acknowledging the complexity of its various 
obligations and roles and allegiances. Indeed, as we have already seen, it is precisely 
through recognising the complex and diverse demands made of us by our various 
memberships and roles that we are enabled to make meaningful choices about our lives.
And, as we suggested earlier, it need not be the case that our various roles and memberships 
will conflict at all. After all, a single individual may exhibit very different qualities and 
attitudes in different aspects of his life without rendering himself hopelessly divided or 
confused about his own identity or wider interests. He could be competitive while playing 
football, co-operative when sharing in housework, determined when pursuing his career, 
passive and amiable when among friends, and yet still be able to conceive himself as a single 
person or ‘self. True, the various aspects of our lives often embody their own norms and
71 Ibid. p. 325.
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assumptions and codes of conduct but acknowledging as much does not compel us to 
conceive persons as fractured or unable to understand their lives as anything more than a 
series of dislocated roles or commitments. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that our various 
roles require us to conduct ourselves differently at different times that their convergence 
can often cause such anxiety and confusion; when ‘work’ intrudes upon the realm of the 
‘family’, for example, or when stresses or worries in our family lives encroach upon our 
ability to act as we might like in our ‘working’ lives, and so on, we might find ourselves 
unsure of how to act or which norms to follow. We need not ‘reason away’ the complexity 
of the relationship between our various memberships and obligations and preferences in 
order to understand ourselves as a single agent. True, we might do so as a means of 
rendering our decisions less difficult or painful or agonising (we might choose to live our 
lives in denial of our own inconsistency on certain matters), but it would be wrong to 
claim that such self-deception is required in order for us to make meaningful decisions 
about our lives (and in order for us to be held responsible for these decisions). Indeed, 
liberalism actually attempts to mitigate instances of self-deception or self-delusion by 
insisting that persons be given as much information as possible upon which to base their 
decisions.73 'Autonomous' choices, for the liberal, are necessarily choices made in the light 
of as much information as possible in the circumstances, and autonomous agency is born 
out of a process of deciding and acting in as 'informed' a manner as possible. Hence, the 
familiar liberal claim that persons should be educated to a level at which they are enabled 
to evaluate and assess those circumstances in which they find themselves and to take 
advantage of those resources that society has to offer on a free and equal basis with others.74
72 Ibid. p. 326.
73 Joseph Raz., The Morality o f Freedom.
74 Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Eamonn 
Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997); Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press,
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30.2 Postmodernism and the Destruction o f Identity.
Postmodernists like Seyla Benhabib and William Connolly, however, are (like libertarians, 
classical liberals, and those liberals who argue merely for the protection of negative liberty) 
curiously silent on the issue of what conditions must exist within individuals if they are to 
be capable of reconstructing and rewriting their identity in response to the breakdown of 
those unifying narratives which in the past held their identities as fixed and coherent. 
There is, it would seem, a general willingness to assume that the collapse of such narratives 
as "reason, authority, trust, the sense of authenticity, sincerity, belief in leadership, depth 
of feeling and faith in progress" will herald the ability in persons to . inscribe, erase, and 
rewrite their identities as the ever-shifting ever-expanding and incoherent network of 
relationships invites or permits."75 But it is difficult to see exactly how persons could 
develop such a capacity for self-creation (through assessing and questioning the content of 
their own character) if all the standards to which they might appeal in doing so are entirely 
contingent, shifting, and inherently unreliable.
Given their general claims about the unreliability of conventional theorising and the 
breakdown of those metanarratives which structure our lives, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that postmodernists are generally reluctant to turn from critique to the advancement of any 
coherent (or, for that matter, incoherent) alternative to liberal normative theory. Like the 
pluralism that we encountered in chapter five, postmodernism is most effective (if it is 
effective at all) in pointing out the limits of what we can and cannot achieve through 
politics. But for all their talk of ‘irony’ and the dissolution of the self, it is striking that 
many postmodernists invoke a model of politics which shares a great deal with the kind of 
liberalism for which I have thus far argued. Indeed, the normative implications of
2000).
75 K. Gergen, The Saturated Self (New York: Basic Books, 1991), p. 228, quoted in Ian Craib,
Experiencing Identity (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 6.
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postmodernism seem to rest upon the claim that identities are not fixed or immutable or 
essentialisable but rather are 'constructed' dialogically through shared discourses and 
interaction with others (both within and between particular groups and communities), and 
that, therefore, political institutions must facilitate a form of public discourse and 
deliberation which allows all persons to interpret their various memberships and 
commitments for themselves.76 Liberals and postmodernists are necessarily sceptical about 
the nature and coherence of groups, and hence of those claims which appeal to ‘shared’ or 
‘collective’ values, and consequently both seek to emphasise the capacity of individuals to 
engage in dialogue about substantive moral and political issues, and both, importantly, 
value the capacity of individuals to understand their lives in a way that enables them to 
engage in meaningful debate and discussion about their values and ideals and ways of life 
with others who may or may not share them. As we said in response to Larmore, Gray, 
and the impartialists in chapters four and five, ‘dialogue’ cannot simply mean the dogmatic 
assertion of the value of different ways of life or cultural practices, rather it describes a 
process of debating the importance and significance of these ways of life via a common 
medium of discourse and communication in which all persons (regardless of their 
particular memberships and commitments) can join. The recognition of differences among 
persons that they seek thus develops as a consequence of each person learning about the 
particular beliefs and ideals of (‘concrete’) others as they themselves describe them through 
open debate and discussion. Consequently, it would seem that postmodernists seek a 
system of dialogue and deliberation which is genuinely inclusive and which is capable of 
establishing clear and defensible principles which are publicly justifiable to all to whom 
they are to apply. However, in claiming as much they can be seen to be invoking precisely 
the ideal (or metanarrative) of individual autonomy that they seek to reject.
76 For example, William Connolly, Identity/Difference, and Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self.
249
For postmodernists, as for liberals, pluralists, and democrats, then, the ‘cultural defence’ is 
not, in itself, any defence at all because it relies on resolving and explaining the prior 
question of what a cultural group is, how it might be understood, and whether or not the 
claim ‘it’s a part of my culture’ is actually true.
303 Unity and Complex Individuality.
It is one thing, then, to claim that our lives are ‘divided’ or ‘distributed’ among different 
and potentially conflictual obligations and commitments, while it is quite another to claim 
that these divergent commitments necessarily exist separately from one another (to the 
extent that they cannot be combined within a single agent). The first claim, as I’ve already 
said, is true of agents who live in complex, diverse societies like our own, and, conceivably, 
of those who live in much smaller, more traditional societies in which diversity is not as 
acute or as deep. The other, however, is surely an exaggeration (and certainly not an 
implication of the argument that I have so far presented). True, the ‘modern’ self does find 
itself implicated in different roles and communities and groups at any one time, but it does 
not follow from this that these different roles cannot (and do not) converge to form a 
single identity (or ‘character’, or ‘self).77 As we have said, when deciding how to respond 
to the specific circumstances which face her, the agent will sometimes find herself torn by 
conflicting obligations and commitments derived from the various roles she occupies, and 
the decision she makes will depend upon the way in which she understands and values 
these different aspects of herself in those specific circumstances. In doing so she inevitably 
“draws upon an immense accumulation of interacting memories and associations” which, I 
have so far argued, combine and recombine to form a “network which will not be 
duplicated in any other mind” and which therefore defines her individuality™ But the 
aspects of the self which together define the individuality of the agent in this way are not
77 B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’ in Moral Luck.
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easily separated or individuated because in converging to form the identity of the 
individual as a whole, their limits become blurred and indistinct and their structure 
becomes dependent upon (and wedded to) those other allegiances and roles which compose 
her. When confronting a particular set of circumstances, for example, we do not 
consciously consider which aspect of our self provides the most viable source of action. If 
we did, then we might be described as having ‘one thought too many’.79 Rather, we simply 
consider what the best (or most justifiable, or right) thing to do in that situation would be 
(all things considered). When reflecting on what we should or should not do in certain 
circumstances, we do not retreat into a realm of pure reason, rather we advance into the 
realm of lived experience (the realm of obligation, value, conflict, and membership). By 
occupying a particular perspective (or set of perspectives) within me, I am able to grasp the 
way in which this perspective fits with the wider network of preferences and commitments 
which make me who I am, and weigh my competing interests and inclinations and duties as 
a result.
It is, therefore (in an important sense), agency itself which brings together our various 
experiences. By deliberating upon the validity or significance of our particular ends and 
allegiances and attachments from the perspective of those other attachments that claim us, 
we bring the various aspects of ourselves together into a whole. By working out for myself 
what my various values and commitments and ideals mean to me (and how I should act in 
response to them) by examining them from the conjoined perspective of my other values 
and commitments, that is, the various aspects of my life are brought together through the 
very process of reasoning and acting in the world. Certain circumstances, of course, will 
reveal the incompatibility of my commitments in all their clarity and complexity. But it is
78 Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, p. 123.
79 Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’. I have used this term in a different way to 
Williams, but I believe it fits nonetheless.
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in bringing these values together, in reconciling them as best I can in order that I might 
decide what to do in such circumstances, that they most obviously come together to form 
the understanding I have of the world and of my own interests and preferences and ideals 
and ends. Far from displacing the 'unity of the self1, then, the modern autonomy- 
supportive state forces us to acknowledge the complex interaction of ideals and values and 
obligations which occurs within us (by providing us with the resources, and the requisite 
‘space’ in which to explore these values and obligations for ourselves), to recognise the 
important demands that these (impersonal and personal) claims make of us, and to bring 
these competing aspects of our lives together in such a way that their convergence can 
provide a basis for meaningful decision and action in the world.
And this convergence is visible, too, in the way in which we respond to changes in 
particular aspects of our lives. During the course of my life I will undergo many changes; 
my opinions will alter, my allegiances and affiliations will shift (perhaps minutely, perhaps 
radically) as a result of changes in my circumstances or through exposure to new ways of 
life or new understandings and ideas about the world. And as a result of these changes I will 
often find my commitments tested and questioned in ways that they have never been 
before. I may live the majority of my life believing one aspect of my identity to be supreme 
among all others only to find myself in a situation which forces me to reconsider my 
allegiances and beliefs in ways that throw all I have ever assumed or valued into doubt. I 
might suffer the affects of a personal tragedy, for example, and be plunged into doubt about 
my religious beliefs as a result, or I might be betrayed by someone I love or consider 
important to me in some other way and I might feel myself changed or corrupted or 
degraded as a consequence. In such circumstances, importantly, the affects of these losses or 
betrayals often transcend the boundaries between specific aspects of my life and affect me as 
a whole. The failure of a relationship or the death of a loved-one, for example, does not
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simply change one aspect of who I am, it changes me as a whole person. The despair or 
sadness I feel when confronted with tragedy inevitably pervades many (if not all) aspects of 
my life. The death of a son or daughter, for example, will not merely affect the way I 
understand my role ‘as a father’, but may also change the way I understand my relationship 
to the other members of my family, my God, my friends, and the world in general. At the 
very least, we can say that such tragic events will often cause me to question my wider 
commitments and views regarding many things, just as uplifting and pleasurable events will 
cause me to do the same.
Indeed, it is precisely the fact that changes in certain aspects of our lives transcend their 
own boundaries and affect our lives more generally (coupled with the fact that these 
changes often occur gradually over a long period of time) that makes sudden change or loss 
so bewildering and painful in a way that only a self possessed of some unity could 
experience. Often without realising it, our lives (and our interests and commitments) 
become moulded around the social attachments and predicaments in which we find 
ourselves (such as a new job, or partner, or set of friends), and the sudden absence of these 
significant others leaves a hole in us that cannot be filled merely by going back to the 
values and projects that we left behind, or by pretending that that particular aspect of our 
lives never happened or did not exist. In re-adopting our old habits after such upsets we 
often find them inadequate in a way we never did before precisely because our goals and 
commitments and interests have changed without us realising it. Similarly, our attempts to 
avoid or escape personal traumas and losses by concentrating on other aspects of our lives 
(like forgetting a relationship by concentrating on our career, or getting over the loss of a 
job by concentrating on our personal lives and our families) is often thwarted by the 
pervasive sadnesses arising from the aspect of our lives that we are trying to forget. With 
the disappearance of important others, that is (and the extended social frameworks that
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they bring with them), and as a consequence of changes and disruptions in our private 
lives, we may (as Taylor, Sandel, Walzer and Young argued) often find our capacity for 
reasoned thought, or judgement, or agency itself threatened or, perhaps, rendered suddenly 
groundless or lacking in coherence. And this occurs not only in response to events that 
happen to us (and which lie outside our control), but of events that we initiate.
Once we realise that we can and should commit ourselves to the idea that individuals are 
(and should be) able to deliberate upon their ends - and upon the nature, content, and 
status of justice - without committing ourselves to the subsequent claim that this 
presupposes a radically disembodied self, or a realm of abstract consciousness, then we are 
left with a conception of the agent which is genuinely capable of judging what it ought to 
do, and what it believes acceptable against the background of its own particular 
experiences, beliefs, and desires “in a way that does not merely flow from those desires and 
beliefs but operates on them.”80 This “step back, this opening up of a slight space between 
inclination and decision [through the adoption of a different perspective within the self] is 
the condition that permits the operation of reason with respect to belief as well as with 
respect to action.”81 By examining a particular ideal or belief or course of action from the 
perspective of my other values and beliefs and ideals, that is, I am able to decide on the 
validity or significance of these beliefs and values for myself, not from a separate and 
dislocated plateau of pure reason, but from the perspective of those other commitments 
and perspectives which shape my deliberations and make me who I am.
80 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, p. 109.
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31. Liberalism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Multiple-Embeddedness.
Our various attachments, therefore, can be seen to genuinely interact by the fact that 
changes or actions or events in one area of our lives often change or affect our lives as a 
whole. Changes or losses in one or more of our attachments or roles (and the understanding 
of ourselves, of the world, and of justice that we derive from them) causes the general 
structure of these roles and attachments to change as a consequence. Changes in one part of 
our lives alters - perhaps imperceptibly, perhaps radically - the way in which we 
understand ourselves and the world (and our relationship with others) and so, 
consequently, it alters not only the outcomes of our deliberations, but the way in which 
we conduct these deliberations themselves. The bigger the change to our particular view of 
the world (the more significant the upset or loss or gain) the more difficult it becomes to 
deliberate or decide anything at all, precisely because our motivational structure (our 
'evaluative system', or framework of values, or narrative unity) becomes dislocated from 
us, its content rendered confusing and ambiguous and ill-defined. In circumstances of deep 
crisis, when many of our attachments are affected, our capacity to decide between 
conflicting values is undermined; in such circumstances we may lose the perspective (s) 
within us from which we can make sense of our particular goals and values, and 
(consequently) we might lose our grasp of what these goals and values mean to us (and how 
they conflict), and thus we might lose any clear sense of 'who we are'.
In such circumstances, that is, we might not only lose our capacity to work out for 
ourselves what we take to be right or wrong, or just or unjust, but -  as we saw in chapter 
three - the capacity to engage in public justification and discourse itself,?2 It is precisely the 
fact that we do not draw our view of the world from a single attachment or membership
81 Ibid.
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that enables us to reason from different perspectives as appropriate. We are not ‘fractured’ 
because our various commitments affect and shape one another and overlap. We are 
capable of occupying different perspectives in different circumstances as appropriate. We 
will not resolve disputes among family members in the same way that we resolve disputes 
between work colleagues, for example. We will invoke different rules and we will think 
and act and justify our actions differently. Among family members, for example, we will 
invoke sentiments and sympathies which have no place or relevance in business meetings. 
Among friends we will resolve conflicts by appeals to bonds of loyalty and trust which do 
not apply in the same way among people with whom we are differently associated. The 
fact that we are differently constituted therefore allows us to use those methods of 
reasoning which are appropriate to the situation at hand, in a way that is not allowed by 
communitarianism or essentialism. The consequence of MacIntyre’s suggestion that we 
derive our identity from our political community above any other is, as we have already 
suggested, that we must necessarily reason in all circumstances in the same way. We must 
view all our relationships and resolve all our conflicts through the lens of the political 
community. We must always resolve conflicts, and always make decisions, as a citizen of a 
particular community.
But if we subscribe to a liberalism which acknowledges our multiple-embeddedness and 
which does not seek arbitrarily to elevate one of these attachments above all others as 
necessarily most defining of our identity, then we need do no such thing. Liberalism of the 
kind I am outlining captures something important about persons, namely, that they will 
not always reason in the same way, but will instead reason differently depending on who 
they are talking to and what outcomes they desire. The argument for multiple- 
embeddedness makes it possible for individuals to deliberate according to the different
82 This is discussed more fully in the next chapter.
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contexts in which they find themselves, but because their attachments and perspectives are 
linked, the ideals and concerns embodied in their other memberships will always remain in 
the back of their mind, perhaps constraining them, or perhaps animating or facilitating 
them. And here again, there may be conflict. No-one can just reason ‘as a father’ or ‘as a 
citizen’ because one’s understanding of what these attachments mean will be shaped and 
affected by those other memberships and groups in which one finds oneself. What is -  or 
should be -  important for liberals is that persons have the ability to adopt the perspective 
of a citizen when considering certain questions about justice and politics and that this 
perspective is located within us and not some abstract and disembodied realm of 
consciousness.
At first sight, this may contradict the argument advanced in chapter one of this thesis, 
which claimed that political liberalism is rendered untenable by its commitment to the idea 
that persons can and should deliberate in different ways in different circumstances. It is, 
after all, the normative core of political liberalism that persons should be able to engage in 
public reasoning about justice as and when they need to, but that the way in which they do 
so should not necessarily apply to those other, ‘non-political’ aspects of people’s lives. But 
the problem with political liberalism is not its claim that we can and should reason 
differently about politics to the way in which we reason in other areas of our life. Rather, 
the problem is that political liberals underdetermine (and misunderstand) the preconditions 
of such public reasoning. They believe that one’s ‘political’ autonomy (i.e. one’s ability to 
engage in public reasoning about justice) can be secured independently of one’s ‘full’ or 
more substantive autonomy, and argue that one can simply engage in the necessary 
deliberations about politics regardless of one’s wider attachments and beliefs. But our 
attachments interact and overlap, they affect and shape and intrude upon one another, and
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hence they will constrain and animate our more specific deliberations in the political 
sphere and other spheres too.
What we are arguing for is a middle ground between communitarianism and political 
liberalism which recognises the importance of -  and is rooted in -  the comprehensive 
principle of individual autonomy. Communitarians argue that we are defined primarily by 
our political community (and hence, by those ideals and commitments which arise out of 
political deliberations with others). Consequently, they argue, our political community 
necessarily shapes, circumscribes, and determines our grasp of those other, more personal, 
attachments which constitute our identity. Political liberals argue the opposite: they claim 
that we are able to engage in the appropriate form of public reasoning about justice and 
politics regardless of what we believe and feel in other aspects of our lives, and regardless of 
the constraints placed upon us in these other, more personal, areas of our lives. For the 
political liberal, reasoning about politics in the way demanded by liberalism is possible and 
necessary regardless of what is happening in our lives as a whole.
The account of public reason for which we have argued thus far, however, recognises that 
persons will (and should) reason differently in different circumstances -  depending on who 
they are talking to and what they are trying to achieve -  but that these deliberations 
presuppose and require the agent to be autonomous in the sense that they are able to 
genuinely reflect upon their various ends and attachments, and to explain and justify their 
position in a way appropriate to the circumstances. Whether they are reflecting upon their 
religious beliefs, their ascribed social roles, their career choice, their responsibilities as a 
father or friend, or the rightful character of the state, persons will need to be able to 
examine the content of its life in the light of their various other attachments and the
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attachments and concerns of others. And as such, they must do so as multiply embedded, 
autonomous individuals.
There is a sense, of course, in which this position could be said to require one’s 
identification with a single community, namely, a liberal political community. That is, it 
could be argued that in presenting the argument in the way I have thus far, and in requiring 
all persons to deliberate according to constraints imposed by liberal principles, I am as 
guilty of ‘selectively elevating’ the value of certain memberships as any of the other 
theorists that I have thus far criticised. This is not true in any sense that undermines my 
argument, however. Liberalism embodies a ‘thin’ theory of the good -  a framework of 
second-order principles which allows persons to deliberate meaningfully upon the content 
of their ends and to discuss these ends, and justify them, across various spheres depending 
upon the circumstances at hand. It therefore represents the overarching framework of 
principles which encompass those smaller, ‘thicker’ groups governed and regulated by first 
order claims about the world and which seek accommodation or toleration from the wider 
society. The ‘liberal community’ to which an individual belongs will therefore be diverse 
and will include the ideals and ends and customs of many different individuals and groups. 
To be ‘defined’ by one’s membership of a liberal community is therefore to be defined by 
the various cultural, religious, ethnic, and social groups that it contains.
A liberal community is open and inclusive; it draws its character from the actions and 
interactions of the various groups and individuals which exist within it. Hence, to be 
defined by a ‘single’ liberal community is in fact to be defined by many communities at 
once. While it may be true that liberalism requires persons to deliberate in a way that is 
determined and constrained by their membership of a ‘liberal community’, this merely 
represents another way of arguing that our deliberations about ends (and the content of
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justice) will be shaped and animated and constrained by the many and various groups with 
whom we share society. Liberalism does indeed presuppose an open, inclusive and free 
society governed and regulated by particular second-order principles. This does not 
undermine or contradict the liberal aim of encouraging individual autonomy and equality, 
however. Rather, it facilitates it. I discuss this issue in detail in the final chapter.
32. Conclusion.
We have made a number of claims in this chapter. The first is that it is an error to conflate 
‘individualism* - to which liberalism is necessarily committed - with ‘abstract’ 
individualism (or ‘atomism’) -  to which it is not. This is because it is precisely the fact that 
one is not abstracted from others and from the various ends and ideals and commitment 
which together distinguish one from others that renders it an ‘individual’ in a substantive 
(and not merely a formal, physical) sense. And it is also as a consequence of our 
embeddedness in multiple and diverse allegiances that we are able to examine our particular 
goals and ideals and projects from within the context of those other allegiances and 
memberships and commitments which together constitute the sum of “our total 
experience, our whole course of life up to now,” and which, consequently, provide the 
standard against which we come to know for ourselves what is valuable to us and what is 
not, and what is worth pursuing and what is not.83
Consequently, our choices (and our identity) can be seen to be importantly shaped and 
animated by the attachments we share with the world in which we find ourselves, but not 
determined by them in the sense that we are unable to reflect upon their content and 
significance. Because autonomous agency is both a voluntarist and a cognitivist process,
83 John Rawls, ‘The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus’, John Rawls: Collected
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that is, our argument stands opposed to any claim that our lives are inevitably and 
inescapably determined for us by our social, cultural, or political environment (as pure 
cognitivists or relativists or pluralists might claim), or that our lives are necessarily defined 
by a particular membership or commitment over and above all others (as communitarians 
and certain identity theorists believe). Instead, it emphasises the capacity of persons to 
contribute to the way in which their life unfolds - and to interpret and order the various 
memberships by which one is constituted - by making genuine and meaningful decisions 
about their lives in the light of those attachments and capacities that they already possess. 
In doing so, therefore, we are emphasising the capacity of the agent to make its “actions 
and values . . .  wholly,” and authentically, its “own” without invoking an account of the self 
as radically disembodied, or dislocated, or ‘unencumbered’ of its various attachments and 
ideals.84
The only person truly capable of grasping what is of highest importance to them, or what 
they find valuable, or worth pursuing, or most definitive of their deepest feelings and 
values and notions about the good, then, is that individual him or herself and, as a 
consequence, liberal institutions should be concerned above all else with providing those 
individual freedoms, and encouraging those conditions, in which each individual is enabled 
to interpret and to reconcile their various commitments and allegiances and obligations for 
themselves within a wider moral and institutional framework which respects them as 
independent beings, capable of participating in the development and conduct of their own 
lives. Liberal institutions should not seek to ‘protect’ communities or groups from change, 
rather they must provide all persons (regardless of their particular religious or cultural 
values) with the capacity to live a life that they themselves have endorsed as worthwhile
Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 473-496, pp. 477.
84 Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 65.
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(by interpreting and assessing the content of their ends and values within the context of 
those other allegiances which claim them and which make them who they are).
Persons can, of course, understand their interests and projects as rooted in one or more 
attachment or goal or membership, and they can conceive their lives (and consequently, 
their more specific projects and aims) as given content by some over-arching set of beliefs 
derived from a particular membership or role; we are not claiming, that is, that a person, 
given the freedom and resources to reflect upon the content of their ends and to determine 
for themselves their relative importance, could not come to think of one of these as more 
important to him than any other.85 Rather, we are simply pointing out the folly in 
attempting to make generalisations or assumptions about which of a persons particular 
roles and memberships will be most important to him, and questioning the idea that what a 
person conceives to be most important to him will remain unchanged throughout his life. 
Persons experience crises of faith, for instance; they experience disruptions and changes in 
their lives which force them to understand themselves (and their commitments) differently. 
Individual identity cannot be understood to be derivative of a single community in the way 
communitarians and certain identity theorists believe (and hence it cannot be ‘essentialised* 
in the way that some, but not all, of these theorists claim) because circumstances will often 
force or encourage us to reinterpret the way in which we understand our lives and the 
values which give it shape, especially when we find ourselves members of different and 
perhaps conflictual communities at once.
And because we do not draw our identities from a single source, the location at which our 
deliberations about value and identity take place will be multiple and diverse. Sometimes 
our deliberations will take place among our family members, sometimes among our
85 K. Anthony Appiah paper to Bentham UCL seminar.
262
friends, sometimes among our fellow church members, or work colleagues, or members of 
a particular club or association. Wherever these deliberations take place, they will be 
affected and shaped by our other attachments and the obligations we believe they confer. 
Our memberships overlap. They encroach upon and affect one another, for just as I am a 
member of several groups at once, so the persons with whom I am deliberating will be 
multiply-embedded too. Despite what the communitarians and identity theorists claim to 
the contrary, then, our identities are not determined by our actions and interactions in the 
‘political’ sphere, but by our deliberations and experiences in many other (more ‘private’) 
areas of our lives too. Hence the political liberal aim of ‘politicising’ autonomy actually 
shares the central failure of communitarianism, namely, that it fails to acknowledge the 
complexity and inter-relatedness of our particular attachments and memberships. Hence, it 
fails to acknowledge the extent to which a person’s deliberations about politics and justice 
(and everything else) will take place at many and various levels of his or her experience and 
at different locations and that, therefore, autonomy must be protected and encouraged at 
all these levels and in all these locations. Consequently, the political sphere should not be 
conceived as wholly constitutive of our identity in the way communitarians believe, but as 
the arena in which our other, more personal (yet no less important or complex) 
interactions and deliberations take place.
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Chapter Seven
Cultural Politics and the Political Culture: 
Comprehensive Liberalism, Nationalism, and Diversity
Think how much we owe in history and heritage - in the culture or the cultures 
that have formed us - to the international communities that have existed among 
merchants, clerics, lawyers, agitators, scholars, scientists, writers, and diplomats. 
We are not the self-made atoms of liberal fantasy, certainly, but neither are we 
exclusively products or artefacts of single national or ethnic communities. We are 
made by our languages, our literature, our cultures, our science, our religion, our 
civilization - and these are human entities that go far beyond national boundaries 
and exist, if they exist anywhere, simply in the world. If, as the communitarians 
insist, we owe a debt of provenance to the social structures that have formed us, 
then we owe a debt to the global community and civilization, as well as whatever 
we owe to any particular region, country, nation, or tribe . . .
We may pretend to be self-sufficient atoms, and behave as we are 
supposed to behave in the fantasies of individualistic economics; but the pretense 
easily is exposed by the reality of our communal life. And similarly - though we 
may drape ourselves in the distinct costumes of our ethnic heritage and immure 
ourselves in an environment designed to minimize our sense of relation to the 
outside world - no honest account of our being will be complete without an 
account of our dependence on larger social and political structures that goes far 
beyond the particular community with which we pretend to identify ourselves.
Jeremy Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan
Alternative’, p. 103-104.
If the foregoing discussion of embeddedness, agency, and political deliberation is coherent -  
and if we are right that particular ways of life, customs and practices can be legitimately 
constrained by the prior liberal commitment to personal autonomy - then we are faced 
with a number of important questions about the role and status of ‘culture’ in our 
normative theorising about justice. After all, if we are constituted by many and various 
commitments at any one time, then what particular significance, if any, does our cultural 
membership hold over and above our other allegiances and attachments? Does culture 
represent a single attachment among many? Or is it a collection of several -  or all -  of our 
particular memberships? We have already encountered the concept of culture in the 
context of justification, and have argued that an appeal to the existence of culture 
represents merely one factor to be considered among many others when determining the 
character of political institutions and constitutional arrangements, and the outcome of
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specific questions of justice. Similarly, I argue in this chapter that -  contrary to claims 
made by culturalist liberals like Kymlicka and Raz -  cultural membership represents either 
one attachment among many which together compose one’s ‘view of the world’ or ‘context 
of choice’ (and consequently does not in itself represent a structural pre-condition of 
freedom and meaningful choice in the way they think it does), or it refers to the more 
general social or political community in which one lives (in which case it adds little or 
nothing to our understanding of the way in which we should understand liberalism, or our 
normative theorising more generally).
As I said in the introduction to this thesis, the multiculturalist debate is characterised by an 
overwhelming antipathy toward providing any kind of philosophically coherent or 
compelling explanation of what ‘culture’ is (and thus, how we might recognise a ‘cultural’ 
group as distinct from any other kind of group or association to which one might belong). 
I argue that it is precisely this unwillingness to define the normative and ontological 
content of culture that explains the popularity of recent culturalist and liberal-nationalist 
theory. As soon as the notion of culture is subjected to any kind of rigorous analysis, it 
quickly becomes clear that it does little or no work in liberal theory at all. Consequently, I 
argue, rather than contributing anything meaningful or new to continuing debates about 
the role and responsibility of liberal institutions, culturalism (and liberal-nationalism) 
simply represents an unnecessarily complex and contrived way of arguing for a liberal state 
circumscribed by the conventional principles of equality, individuality, and autonomy.
I begin in section 33 by analysing closely the liberal-culturalist definition of culture. This is 
difficult because, as I said, such definitions are scarce. I therefore concentrate on the most 
thoroughgoing attempt which is found in the work of Will Kymlicka, thus building on 
what we have already said about Kymlicka in chapters five and six. I link this discussion to
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recent debates about liberal-nationalism. I argue that the move by certain liberals to ground 
liberal principles in the value of nationhood is fallacious, and that the nation (like culture) 
is too underdetermined in the literature to tell us anything meaningful about the nature of 
freedom, or the preconditions of meaningful choice. I then, in sections 34 and 35, discuss 
two further arguments which have been made in defence of liberal-nationalism, and find 
them both untenable. Section 34 discusses the claim that a developed national culture 
provides the criteria by which we can work out the limits of toleration within a particular 
polity. And section 35 picks up the autonomy argument again and links it to the claims we 
made in chapter six. I argue that our conclusions thus far lead us to adopt an account of 
agency and embeddedness which acknowledges the internal complexity of individual 
identity and which does not seek to place arbitrary limits on where we draw our self- 
understandings from. I argue -  like Waldron in the quote with which we began this chapter 
-  that the sources of our deliberations about ends and ideals, and about politics and justice, 
may -  and often do -  extend beyond national or cultural borders and connect with 
communities and groups existing in other countries and communities. I argue that, if 
correct, this argument holds a number of important implications for our understanding of 
politics, justice, and the accommodation of cultural and social diversity. I argue that if the 
multiculturalists are right, and that as a consequence of migration and movement between 
nations modern societies now contain an unprecedented diversity of cultural, religious, and 
ethnic groups, then the nature and importance of existing national boundaries are now 
more blurred and ambiguous and questionable than ever before. As different individuals 
and groups interpret the history and content of their ‘nation’ differently, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to discern exactly what one’s nation embodies, and where its 
boundaries lie. In the face of such diversity, it becomes difficult to maintain that it is one’s 
nation -  as opposed to any other group or association - which affords one the resources to 
choose meaningfully and act freely in the world. The fact that many people identify with
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this or that nation does not render nationhood a fundamental pre-requisite of freedom, 
especially when the conception each person has of their ‘nation* need bear little or no 
relation to the conception held by anyone else.
33. Liberal Culturalism.
33.1 Culture as a {Context o f Choice\
The elevation of ‘culture’ as the aspect of ourselves which renders our more particular 
values and projects intelligible can be seen in the work of many (primarily liberal) theorists 
who have, like us, sought to reject the conventional polarity between liberalism and 
communitarianism in favour of a liberalism which takes difference and embeddedness 
seriously. But like those who seek to selectively elevate one’s gender, or sexuality, or any 
other aspect of one’s identity over and above all others, culturalists concede too much to 
the communitarians by sharing their mistaken claim that persons derive their 
understanding of the world (or their identity) from a single community, or a particular set 
of values that are ‘shared’ by the group or ‘culture’ to which they belong. For example, 
Kymlicka argues that it is only through knowing our place in the history of the cultural 
community into which we were born, and only through understanding ourselves as 
cultural beings, that we “come to an awareness of the options available to us, and their 
significance.”1
Similarly, for Raz, one’s “individual freedom and well-being [depends on] unimpeded 
membership in a respected and prosperous cultural group” because it is through being a 
member of a such a culture that one gains one’s understanding of the world and one’s 
interests and ideals and commitments, and it is only through being a member of a cultural
1 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.
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group that one is able to pursue these ideals meaningfully.2 Furthermore, he states (in an 
article written with Avishai Margalit) that one’s ‘group culture’ will affect one’s tastes and 
options as well as the “types of career open to one, the leisure activities that one . . .  is able 
to choose from, the customs and habits that define and colour relations with strangers and 
with friends,” and a great many other factors which affect and regulate our dealing with 
others, and which inform and animate our understanding of ourselves and the world in 
which we exist.3 And Dworkin too, claims that our ability to make meaningful choices 
depends upon our rootedness within a particular ‘culture’.4 For Kymlicka, then, as for Raz, 
Dworkin, and Margalit, our membership of a unique and individuated culture is what 
makes individual choice, and thus individual autonomy, possible.
Paradoxically, however, these theorists appear to believe that our culture is ‘constitutive’ of 
our identities in a way that renders it largely unquestionable and inseparable from the 
people we are. As we have seen, for example, Dworkin argues that culture represents the 
‘spectacles through which we identify experiences as meaningful’ and hence cannot itself be 
questioned.5 Kymlicka concurs, claiming that “someone’s upbringing cannot be erased, it 
is, and will remain, a constitutive part of who that person is. Cultural membership,” he 
tells us, “affects our very sense of personal identity and capacity.”6 From childhood -  from 
the moment of birth itself -  cultural symbols and motifs are presented to us through 
socialisation and education. We assume roles and learn of our place in the history of our 
culture in accordance with accepted practices and norms, and consequently, he claims, our 
‘culture’ provides the medium through which we come to understand ourselves and the
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2 Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism’, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p.
178.
3 J. Raz & A. Margalit, ‘National Self-Determination’, Ethics in the Public Domain, p. 129.
4 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberal Community’, A Matter o f Principle (London: Harvard University Press, 
1985).
5 Ibid.
6 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 175.
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world we inhabit.7 It provides not only our ‘reasons’ for choosing certain ways of life over 
others, it also constrains and determines the ‘options’ open to us.8 Hence, cultural 
membership represents a basic ‘need’ that we all possess,9 or a ‘primary good’ that each of 
us requires in order to live an autonomous life.10
But how can culture provide us with the capacity to ‘revise and reject’ our current ends 
autonomously if it represents a constitutive aspect of our self that lies beyond criticism or 
scrutiny? Do our cultures provide us with the capacity to change our minds about the 
validity of those beliefs and ends that they present to us or not? If cultures anchor us in the 
world, and provide the lens through which we come to understand ourselves and our 
environment, then how are we able to question or interpret this culture itselfi Culturalists 
seem equivocal. Certainly, as we have already said, cultures will not facilitate autonomy (at 
least, to the degree that Kymlicka and the liberal-culturalists demand) unless they are 
embedded within - and impelled to constrain their actions and customs according to - a 
wider normative framework of autonomy-supportive measures. But what about the more 
fundamental point: if our ‘cultural’ membership is so ‘constitutive’ of our identity that we 
cannot subject it to criticism and revision, then it would seem that culture is anything but a 
prerequisite of autonomy. It would seem, rather, to preclude the possibility of revising 
those ends embodied in the community of which we are constituted (and hence, the ends 
and commitments we currently pursue).
33.2 Kymlicka’s Changing Definition o f Culture.
In many respects, Kymlicka’s work on minority rights can be understood as a sustained 
attempt to resolve this dilemma. There is, however, like Rawls, an ‘early’ and a ‘late’
7 Ibid. See especially chapter three, and part three.
8 Ibid.
9 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
269
Kymlicka and it is important that we chart the ways in which his initial definition of 
culture -  and hence, his response to the dilemma - has changed in the years between 
Liberalism, Community, and Culture, and Multicultural Citizenship. In Liberalism, 
Community, and Culture, Kymlicka argues that if we are to protect and stabilise culture 
without slipping into conservatism, we must “distinguish between the existence of a culture 
from its character at any given moment.”11 That is to say, he argues, it is not sufficient to 
“refer to the character of a historical community” and to assume that this character 
represents the culture itself}2 Kymlicka argues that the “norms, values, . . . and attendant 
institutions” which characterise the way a particular culture looks at a particular moment 
in history is not constitutive of culture, and hence changes in these norms or values or 
institutions does not threaten our sense of self or undermine our capacity for freedom. 
Kymlicka equates culture with the factors and conditions which lie behind these norms and 
institutions, namely, the ‘historical’ narratives in which individuals root themselves, and 
the language that articulates and describes these narratives. By equating ‘culture’ with the 
language and history which lie behind (and give substance and shape to) norms, values, and 
institutions, Kymlicka wants to emphasise the “cultural community or cultural structure 
itself. On this view,” he says, “the cultural community continues to exist even when its 
members are free to modify the character of the culture, should they find its traditional 
ways of life no longer worthwhile.”13
This distinction between cultural character and cultural structure is crucial to Kymlicka’s 
argument -  at least, in his early work - because it embodies his commitment to personal 
autonomy and the rejection of what he later calls ‘internal restrictions’ on group members.14
10 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture.
11 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 104.
12 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 166. Emphasis added.
13 Ibid. p. 167.
14 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, especially chapter three. See also John Tomasi,
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After all, if culture is understood to represent the accepted norms, values, and institutions 
which compose the community at any given time, then any commitment to the protection 
and perpetuation of culture would necessarily represent a commitment to preserving or 
conserving established roles and values and institutions. It is this understanding of culture 
(this unwillingness to separate the character of the community from the cultural structure 
which lies behind it), Kymlicka argues, that leads groups like Islamic fundamentalists to 
claim that “without restrictions on the freedom of speech, press, religion, sexual practices, 
etc. of its own members, their culture will disintegrate, thus undermining the self-respect 
individuals derive from cultural membership,”15 or Devlin to argue that the moral structure 
of a community will be endangered if those within it are afforded the freedoms needed to 
question and challenge existing norms, institutions and roles.16 On such an understanding, 
any notion of cultural progress or evolution or renewal is to be feared because of the 
irrevocable and damaging effects that such renewal could cause to the culture (and to the 
identity of those within it). Indeed, ‘renewal’ in this sense, is nothing less than a dilution or a 
destruction of culture (and thus of the individual’s understanding of itself and the world).
Kymlicka rejects this understanding of culture because it entails an overtly communitarian 
and conservative conception of the self and politics; it necessarily entails the need to protect 
the community from the “eroding effects of our own individual rational scrutiny.”17 Persons 
belonging to a community which denies individuals the ability to interpret and revise the 
values and ends arising from their social and cultural roles are, he says, effectively imprisoned 
within a historically unchangeable, static structure of coercion. While it is crucial that one’s
‘Kymlicka, Liberalism, and Respect for Cultural Minorities’, Ethics 105 (1995), p. 580 -  603.
15 Ibid. p. 168.
16 Peter Devlin, The Enforcement o f Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). Kymlicka 
points out that Devlin later “made it clear that he simply meant to say that one could never rule out 
the possibility that such freedoms could undermine the very existence of the community”
(Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 166) however this does not change the fact that Devlin 
makes no distinction between the cultural structure and the way in which this structure embodies 
itself in practice at any given moment in history.
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culture (i.e. one’s language and history) be secure and stable, he argues, it is not justifiable for 
a group to impose restrictions on what its members may think or decide in the course of 
deciding the course of their own lives in the name of prevailing values. A community which 
seeks above all to maintain its existing character by denying its members the resources they 
need to question the value of the roles they inhabit, stands in contradiction to what 
Kymlicka rightly sees as the fundamental liberal commitment to personal autonomy. For 
Kymlicka, ‘culture’ simply must mean something other than ‘the social and political 
community in which one lives’ because if this is what culture is, then we could not protect it 
(or make sure that it was ‘secure’ and ‘stable’ in the way Kymlicka believes it must be) 
without slipping into conservatism. Kymlicka argues that our language and history are prior 
to the ‘norms, values, and institutions’ that they animate and describe in that they shape and 
determine the nature of our cultural character. It is for this reason that we do not lose the 
capacity to make choices about our lives, or the capacity to revise and reject our ends and 
values, in the event of changes in the character of our community. While changes in the 
values and institutions of the community will affect our understanding of our particular 
social roles, it is our language and history which provide us with the ontological and 
normative tools we need in order to act autonomously.18
While Kymlicka’s motives for invoking the character/structure distinction are clear, there 
are fundamental problems with it. Indeed, he actually drops this distinction in his later 
work, as we will soon see, but it is instructive to discuss it nevertheless as it provides the 
context in which we might discuss several crucial issues about culture, language and 
community more generally. For example, what are we to make of Kymlicka’s claim that a 
community’s language is a part of culture (and hence, is important to autonomy) but that a
17 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 62.
18 In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka talks of language “underlying a flourishing culture” (p. 78).
Emphasis added.
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community’s norms, values, and institutions are not? How can language be isolated 
normatively from the community in which it is used in this way? If language is the medium 
through which we come to understand the world and our communities, and if this 
understanding comes to us through linguistic motifs and references and symbols which refer 
to our communities and the roles we inhabit, then changes in our community and in the 
social roles which compose it will alter the way in which we use language.
That is, language changes as it attempts to articulate and describe the changes in the social, 
political, and cultural community in which it is used, just as the wider society changes in 
response to public discourses and the way language itself is used. With this in mind, it is 
difficult to support Kymlicka’s desire to understand language as separable from the character 
of the community in the way he does. If language articulates (and gives form to) the values 
and norms and institutions of the community, then how can he relegate one to contingency 
while exalting the other to constitutive, cultural status? No doubt, Kymlicka would argue 
that what gives language its constitutive status is that it continues to exist in some form even 
in the event of massive upheavals in the character of the community. Despite radical changes 
in the norms and values and institutions of a community, he might say, the existence of 
language is never really threatened in any substantive sense, because it stands apart from -  
and prior to - the community itself. Yet we can surely imagine a great many cases in which 
changes in the institutional and normative circumstances of the wider community has a 
profound -  and inevitable -  effect on the way in which languages are used. Kurds living in 
Turkey, for example, are required to give their children Turkish names or else be 
prosecuted; they are not permitted to claim that Kurdish is their mother-tongue or speak 
Kurdish in public.19 In Canada, the debate over independence for Quebec stems largely from
19 Tove Skutnabb-Kangas & Sertac Bucak, ‘Killing a Mother Tongue: How Kurds Are Deprived of 
Linguistic Human Rights’, in S. Skutnabb-Kangas & Robert Phillipson (eds.) Linguistic Human 
Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994).
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fear among many Quebecois that the public use of French would be undermined and 
marginalised by English-speaking institutions.20 And in many other countries like Belgium, 
for example, we can witness the attempts that institutional reforms have had upon the way 
in which persons converse, the language they speak, and the way they understand themselves 
and their relationship to others. Kymlicka must concede that imposing a normative 
separation between language and the community in the way he does is severely problematic 
and raises complex issues concerning the nature of language itself.
Take Kymlicka’s example of the change in the English homosexuality laws, for instance. 
Kymlicka argues that “liberalizing the homosexuality laws in England changed the character 
of the cultural structure” without jeopardising or altering the nature of culture itself. 21 This is 
because, according to the character/structure distinction, changes in the wider community are 
contingent to cultural change; changes in one need not entail changes in the other. But 
Kymlicka fails to realise that these changes in law represented both a change in the 
community and in the way in which we understand our language and history. He fails to 
realise the extent to which homophobia (in this example) was prevalent in both the character 
of the community and in its language and history. Laws were homophobic certainly, and 
hence the institutions which upheld these laws were rendered exclusionary and dominating. 
But homophobia was also entrenched within much of England’s cultural history; it was 
assumed in religious orthodoxy, it was handed down implicitly (and often explicitly) 
through generations of socialisation. It was represented in the character of the community 
because it was part of the cultural structure itself (that is, it was embodied in English history
20 See C. Michael Macmillan, The Practice o f Language Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998); Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community and 
the Canadian Constitution (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994); Richard Y. Bourhis 
(ed.) Conflict and Language Planning in Quebec (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1984). See also 
Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993); Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Re-Thinking 
Ethno-cultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Will Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship.
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and in the language one used to understand oneself and one’s political environment). So the 
liberalisation of the homosexuality laws in England represented far more than a transient, 
contingent change in the ‘norms, values, and institutions’ of the community, rather it 
represented a change in the way in which individuals interacted and in the way they 
understood their own cultural values, norms, ideals, and in the way in which they 
understood the responsibilities of state institutions.
And it is for precisely this reason that other marginalised groups have increasingly sought to 
instigate social and political reforms by advocating changes in the way persons use language. 
Contemporary feminists, blacks, and gay rights activists, for example, have often sought to 
show the extent to which language is not a neutral medium of communication, but an 
important tool for the setting of agendas and debates, and the passing on of dominant (often 
discriminatory) ideas and hegemonies within society. Hence, social reformers and minority 
pressure groups have increasingly lobbied for a change in the use of language -  for example, 
through the censoring of what is often termed 'hate speech' - in order that derogatory and 
prejudicial ideas and images are not given currency in society. What is particularly 
interesting to note here is that these groups and activists are striving to change language for 
exactly the same reason that Kymlicka wants to protect and stabilise it (i.e. that it is laden 
with entrenched and partial cultural understandings).
Kymlicka’s distinction also appears to underestimate the extent to which an individual’s 
ability to choose and genuinely to pursue a particular way of life (or to change its mind about 
the worth of the life that he or she currently leads) will be constrained and limited by the 
prevailing norms and values and institutions of the wider social, political, cultural, and 
economic community in which she exists. Kymlicka argues that it is an individual’s language
21 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 169.
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and history which provides her with the requisite tools to form life-plans and to live a 
valuable life. However, while it is true that one’s language and history have a certain role to 
play in providing a full and varied range of options to choose from, the individual’s actual 
ability to choose certain options (let alone act upon them) will be constrained by the social 
and political roles it inhabits (and by the wider framework of roles, values, and norms of 
which they are a part). That is, it could well be true that individuals gain a sense of ‘who 
they are’ from the set of values and ideals that they call their ‘cultural’ heritage, and it might 
also be true that these ‘cultural’ values enable them to envisage a particular way of life for 
themselves, but -  as we suggested in chapter three - their ability to uproot themselves from 
their current way of life and from the social roles that they currently occupy and to actively 
pursue new and different goals will rely upon their present circumstances providing them 
with the requisite political, economic, and intellectual resources to do so. As we saw in 
chapters two and three, the pursuit of certain ends may be denied by circumstances beyond 
the individual’s control; for example, they might be blocked by deeply entrenched social or 
political values, or by financial considerations or as a consequence of a denied access to 
important power structures, or a lack of education. Autonomy in this sense will be 
constrained by objective factors existing in the wider society such as a lack of money or 
time, but will also be constrained by the subjective norms and social conventions which 
characterise the community in which the individual lives its daily life and which affects and 
shapes its identity, by the constitutional provisions which regulate and animate public 
institutions, and by the specific legislation that these institutions enact. 'Cultural' 
communities will be held together and regulated by a myriad of moral and political 
assumptions which may well constrain and deny the ability of the individual to pursue new 
ways of life; they might deny certain (or all) of their members the education necessary to 
determine what they believe to be valuable, for example, or they might seek to discourage 
certain or all of its members to think too deeply about the ends that they are told they must
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follow, or they might embody formal punishments for disobedience, as in the case of 
shunning among the Amish.22
In all these cases it is not our language or history in and of itself which provides us with 
meaningful options but rather the diverse alternative understandings and ways of life which 
exist outside our particular sub-group or community which our community may prefer us to 
ignore. In all these cases, that is, the choices that we feel able to make are often made at the 
interface between what our culture tells us to choose and what we are encouraged to choose 
or explore in the light of other, different and perhaps conflictual, understandings and 
explanations. And the resources we need to make these choices are often provided by our 
confrontation with ways of life which exist in the world outside of the life we know, and 
cannot be understood simply by reference to the ideas about the world handed to us by the 
sub-group or community into which we were born. As different persons from different 
‘groups’ confront one another, as they witness and internalise the actions and interactions of 
those with whom they share society, they will be forced to assess their feelings toward those 
others and their different practices, and hence they will be forced to look again at their own 
values and ideals and customs. Responding to social diversity therefore requires one to 
develop a reflective, reflexive attitude toward one’s own commitments and to the 
commitments of others. Consequently, the ‘context of choice’ that we consult when 
deliberating on our ends and values necessarily incorporates those wider factors and 
conditions in society and the world at large which shape our understanding of ourselves and 
the world we inhabit.23
22 See John A. Hostetler, Amish Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968); and 
Donald B. Kraybill (ed.) The Amish and the State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993).
23 We will return to this point in section 35.
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Finally, what are we to make of Kymlicka’s claim that ‘culture’ can be understood 
independently of those norms and values to which its members subscribe? Is there not some 
truth in the notion that culture makes certain (often powerful) demands of its members not 
only to participate in its shared history and to speak its language, but to accept the values 
and norms which characterise it at any given time? Surely, an important factor in 
determining whether or not an individual is speaking from within a certain distinct culture, is 
the extent to which that individual subscribes to the values and norms and principles 
embodied in the cultural community. For instance, is a ‘Catholic’ who has sex before 
marriage and encourages the use of contraception still a ‘Catholic’ in any meaningful sense? 
Is their Catholicism, their membership of the Catholic community, diminished in some 
important way? What if she also argues in favour of abortion? Or believes that suicide is not 
a mortal sin? What if he or she is gay?
Kymlicka would perhaps argue here that the fact that the individual makes these decisions 
even within a relatively strict religion such as Catholicism, is testament to the notion that 
individuals are capable of achieving the requisite distance from their social and cultural roles 
(and from the ends which accompany them) to choose new ways of life that they believe to 
be more valuable.24 It shows, he might argue, the extent to which the individual is capable of 
changing the character of the community by revising and rejecting its ends against the 
background of its shared language and history. But what language do Catholics speak? 
Italian? Latin? And what history do they share? Catholics from different parts of the world 
will speak different languages and have different histories. Does this mean that Catholicism is 
not a ‘culture’ in the way that, say, Englishness is? And if not, then is the reason for this the 
fact that different individuals from different places, with different histories and different 
languages interpret their history -  and use language -  differently and that they therefore do
24 This is not to imply that one’s sexuality is a ‘decision’ or a ‘choice’ in any simple sense however,
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not share the same identity? If so, then are we to assume that all English people understand 
‘their history’ in the same way? Quite apart from the fact that Kymlicka claims that this is 
not true, and that members of a particular nation or culture will understand their culture 
differently, such a claim would appear to contradict Kymlicka’s pivotal contention that 
‘national’ or ‘societal’ cultures are becoming increasingly populated by immigrants who do 
not ‘share’ the language or history of their host nation in any real sense at all. And even after 
a number of generations, when immigrants come to identify with the host nation as their 
own, their understanding of what it means to be a member of such a nation will be shaped 
and affected by their own particular histories and those experiences which arise as a 
consequence of their own complex heritage and the interwoven legacies of those who have 
gone before them.
333 From 'Culture* to National Culture*.
The thrust of the foregoing discussion, then, is that we deliberate in a certain ‘context’ and 
that when making decisions about how to live our lives or what we believe to be valuable, 
our deliberations begin in our particular understanding of who we are and what we currently 
value. If our language and history are important to this (and I believe they are) then so are 
those norms, institutions, and roles which necessarily shape and effect the way I understand 
this history and the way I use language. If ‘culture’ provides the ‘context’ in which we come 
to understand the world and our ends, and in which we make our decisions about value, then 
‘culture’ must be understood more widely than merely a single, particular group or 
community. No single culture (defined in terms of a specific language and history) can exist 
in isolation from all those other cultures which exist among and beside it. The desire by a 
group to protect its historical and linguistic purity when it is surrounded and affected by 
others will be thwarted by the fact that the way in which its members understand their
having stated this, I cannot discuss it further here.
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culture will change and evolve and develop in response to the perceptions and 
understandings of others. One’s understanding of one’s particular allegiances and 
commitments will be refracted through the understandings and views and ideals of others, 
and by the way in which one relates to others who understand themselves and the world 
differently. Changes of language and history will change the normative and institutional 
framework built upon it, just as changes in the institutional and normative structure of the 
wider political community will affect the way people understand their own history and use 
their own language.
So culture, if it is to be at all helpful in our normative theorising, must be conceived in terms 
of the wider political community in which different, multiply-embedded, complex 
individuals exist. Just as individuals cannot be understood to be isolated from one another as 
pure and singular unities with their own identities and interests which have been formed, 
once and for all, independent of the context in which they find themselves, neither can 
cultures be understood to embody values and norms which are determined in abstraction 
from the world in which they exist. This is because the people who determine these values, 
and who discuss and interpret and perpetuate them, do so in response to the values and ways 
of life that exist around them and which animate and shape their own deliberations about 
value. Groups must be understood as changeable structures embedded in the wider 
community, and hence subject to the pressures, changes, and understandings of others in this 
community.
Interestingly, this is exactly the conclusion that Kymlicka offers in his later work. In 
Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka claims that religious groups and other sub-national 
groups are not, in fact, cultures in the sense in which he is interested (i.e. as the kind of 
communities we need in order to be autonomous) precisely because they do not possess their
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own specific values and norms and institutions. After experiencing what appears to be a 
staggering change of heart, Kymlicka argues in Multicultural Citizenship that cultures must be 
‘institutionally complete’ and that language and history must be “institutionally embodied -  
in schools, media, economy, government, etc.”25 And after everything he said in his early 
work about the character/structure distinction, he now defines culture as not only in terms 
of a shared language and history, but as a system of substantive values, norms, and principles 
which provide “members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human 
activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, 
encompassing both public and private spheres,” and rooted in a particular territory.26
This is a major leap, and it confirms once and for all what we should have suspected all 
along, namely, that the kinds of culture that he is interested in are not the kind of ‘cultures’ 
we discussed in chapter two. They are not religious or gender groups, for example, but 
nations, or national cultures. As he himself says in Multicultural Citizenship, he is using the 
term ‘culture’ as “synonymous with a ‘nation’ or a ‘people -  that is, as an intergenerational 
community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, 
sharing a distinct language and history.”27 It is membership in such a ‘societal culture’ -  as 
opposed to any other group or community -  that we need in order to be autonomous in a 
liberal sense, and “societal cultures . . . tend to be national cultures.”28 Hence, it is our 
national membership, above any other, which provides us with what Yael Tamir calls the 
‘evaluative criteria’ against which we measure what is valuable and what is not.29 It is our 
national culture, argue Raz and Margalit, which, through tacit conventions and implicit 
understandings, imparts to us our ideas regarding “what is part of this or that enterprise and
25 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 76.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. p. 18.
28 Ibid. p. 80.
29 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 29.
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what is not, what is appropriate and what is not, what is valuable and what is not. 
Familiarity with a culture,” they argue, “determines the boundaries of the imaginable. 
Sharing in a culture, being a part of it, determines the limits of the feasible.”30
Importantly, however, while Tamir, Raz, Margalit, and Kymlicka all believe that it is our 
national membership above any other which provides us with the conceptual and 
normative tools to be free, they do not believe that nations necessarily contribute to -  or 
facilitate -  individual autonomy. Rather, they believe that a national or societal culture 
only facilitates autonomy if the values which prevail in it are liberal. So the argument is 
not in favour of nations per se> but nations which are defined in a particular, narrow way 
(i.e. as governed by liberal institutions and founded upon liberal principles). But this is 
hardly instructive or new. In fact it is a tautology: it suggests that liberal principles are best 
defended by institutions which aim to defend liberal principles.
Indeed, the more we examine the account of the nation to which liberal-nationalists 
subscribe, the more we notice that it looks very much like the kind of open and inclusive 
(and not necessarily national) state that liberals have always sought to encourage in the 
past, and which non-nationalist liberals still rightly seek to encourage. For Kymlicka, and 
for liberal-nationalists more generally, a nation should “not be defined by race or 
descent”.31 Rather it is, in the words of Tamir, a “communal domain . . . construed not 
only as an arena for co-operation for the purposes of securing one’s individual interests, but 
also a space where one’s communal identity finds expression . . . [without undermining] 
the cultural, religious, and linguistic identity of minorities.”32 It is a 'civic' nationalism 
rooted in a general loyalty to the social and political institutions which afford persons
30 J. Raz & A. Margalit, ‘National Self-Determination’, in J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, p. 125 — 
145, pp. 134.
31 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 22.
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citizenship and which bind persons together within a polity which protects individual 
freedom, autonomy, rights, and equality. It describes a “public sphere in which individuals 
can share a language, memorise their past, cherish their heroes, [and] live a fulfilling 
national life.”33 Therefore, Kymlicka concurs, it should be understood as a political 
community which “not only allows people to pursue their current way of life, but also 
gives them access to information about other ways of life (through freedom of expression), 
and . . .  requires children to learn about other ways of life (through mandatory education), 
and makes it possible for people engage in radical revision of their ends (including apostasy) 
without legal penalty . . .  [A liberal nation] does not compel such questioning and revision, 
but it does make it a genuine possibility.”34
Quite clearly, then, it is not the liberal-nationalists* aim to offer an account of ‘nations’ as 
they exist in the world, but rather it is to describe how they would like them to be. Or, 
indeed, if they are trying to provide some generic and universal account of what a nation is, 
then they are certainly guilty of ignoring all those existing nationalisms which do not fit 
their culturalised, liberal account of the nation as liberal community. It is doubtful, for 
example, how many Palestinians, Israelis, Serbs, or Kurds would share Kymlicka’s view 
that what defines a nation is that they “provide a meaningful context of choice for people 
without limiting their ability to question or revise particular values or beliefs.”35 Indeed, it 
would be difficult to find any self-confessed nationalist outside the Academy endorsing 
anything like the sanitised, cultural definition of nations advanced by the likes of Tamir, 
Kymlicka, and Miller.36 These theorists, it is crucial to remember, are not seeking to define 
or defend ‘nations’; they are defending ‘liberal nations’. Their definitions are not meant to
32 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 74 -  76.
33 Ibid. p. 8.
34 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 82.
35 Ibid. p. 92-93.
36 Brian Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, in I. Shapiro & L. Brilmayer
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capture some universal or generic idea of nationhood, rather they are intended as 
normative descriptions of the kind of nations that are congruent with liberal principles of 
freedom, autonomy, and equality.
But this leaves their argument for nations hollow. The more we examine the claims made 
by the liberal-nationalists, the more it becomes clear that they spend a great deal of time 
outlining the importance and desirability of ‘the nation’ only to define this nation in a way 
that is almost entirely congruent with the kind of non-nationalist state that liberals have 
always supported and should continue to support. In asking us to be ‘nationalists’, Tamir, 
Miller, Kymlicka, Raz, and Margalit are asking us merely to be liberals, to value liberal 
principles, and to support social and political institutions which defend these liberal 
principles. A loyalty to the liberal nation does not appeal to blood ties or a deep ethnic 
identity, rather it simply implies a loyalty to the principles and institutions which govern 
us (and which are, in turn, publicly justifiable to us in the way we outlined in part two of 
this thesis). But how is this different from what liberals have always argued? How does 
calling a liberal political community a 'nation'37 or a 'societal culture'38 or a 'pervasive 
culture'39 shed any new light on what the purpose of liberal institutions are, or how 
persons might be encouraged to be loyal to these institutions? After all, liberals have 
always been concerned to establish those conditions under which persons can pursue their 
own lives according to values and ideals that they themselves have endorsed as worthwhile 
(within limits which protect individual freedoms and the structure and stability of the 
society as a whole), and consequently, they have sought to establish and perpetuate 
precisely that ‘context’ in which all persons are able to know for themselves what is
(eds.) NOMOS 41: Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1998), and Is Social
Justice Obsolete? (forthcoming).
37 See Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, and David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995).
38 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship.
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valuable to them and what is not, and to pursue these goals and projects on a free and equal 
basis with others. Calling this context a ‘nation* as opposed to a ‘state’ or ‘society’ fails to 
take the debate into new or instructive territory, and ultimately leaves the argument for 
the importance of the nation redundant.
33 A  Liberal Nations and Liberal Communities.
Kymlicka clearly believes that the need for a national identity is clear in the history of the 
liberal tradition. In an attempt to show as much, he cites Mill’s claim that “among a people 
without fellow-feelings . . . the united public opinion necessary to the working of 
representative institutions cannot exist” and Dworkin’s claim that one’s ‘community’ 
provides the context in which one comes to understand oneself and the world in which one 
lives, and Mill’s claim that “the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with 
those of nationalities.”40 But again, it is not clear in any of these claims exactly how the term 
‘nation’ is being used and what its priority is, and hence it is not clear what Kymlicka can 
actually draw from them. Much is revealed, I think, by Dworkin’s reticence in calling the 
political community for which he argues a ‘nation’. Quite clearly, Dworkin’s ‘liberal 
community’ embodies and enshrines almost everything that Mill, Green, and the more 
contemporary liberal-nationalists call ‘the nation’, and rejects everything that ‘blood and 
soil’ nationalists would support. There is, in Dworkin’s argument, no appeal to racial purity 
or blood ties or ethnic hatreds, just as there are no such appeals in the arguments advanced 
by Mill or any other contemporary liberal-nationalists. What there is instead is a general 
commitment to common and inclusive institutions which defend the ability of each and 
every individual to work out and pursue their own ends and cherished ideals for themselves
39 Joseph Raz & Avishai Margalit, ‘National Self-Determination’.
40 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberal Community’, quoted in W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 81.
John Stuart Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’, in H. Acton (ed.) Utilitarianism, 
Liberty, Representative Government (London: J.M. Dent, 1972). Quoted in W. Kymlicka,
Multicultural Citizenship, p. 52.
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in an environment of freedom and equality. Instead of a privileged set of partial and 
exclusionary historical truths which serve merely to justify the dominant national identity, 
there is a commitment to the idea that all individuals are embedded in an unfolding and 
evolving history which they each have an equal capacity to interpret and contribute to on 
their own terms free from arbitrary constraint. There is a commitment to the idea that 
persons understand themselves by understanding the history of their community on their 
own terms.41
Like Mill, then, Dworkin does not understand ‘the nation* or, in his words, the ‘liberal 
community’ as wholly or substantively constitutive of one’s self or identity or understanding 
of the world, rather he sees it as that political environment in which persons explore and 
pursue their various interests and ideals for themselves. Indeed, he concurs with the central 
argument made in the previous chapter and the rest of this thesis; persons, he says, will, or 
may, “belong to a variety of communities and most people can belong to many more if they 
choose. They belong -  or may belong -  to families, neighbourhoods, alumni groups, 
fraternal associations, factories, colleges, teams, orchestras, ethnic groups, expatriate 
communities, and so forth.”42 Consequently, he argues, what we need are liberal institutions 
that afford people the freedom to belong to these different groups -  and to explore their 
identities and interests and aspirations freely -  and which does not claim that one of these 
attachments is necessarily or inevitably more important or defining of one’s interests and 
self-understandings than any other (and therefore worthy of protection). What we need is an 
institutional arrangement which does not privilege a particular history or a particular 
account of what is true or valuable about a polity (of the kind Galston and Salins advocate), 
but which instead equips persons with the ability to contribute to the way in which the
41 Ibid. See also Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice o f Equality (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), especially chapter 5.
42 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice o f Equality, p. 230.
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history of the polity - and all their other group allegiances - unfolds, and to understand for 
themselves how these various histories overlap, conflict, and evolve.
It is often said that liberal societies harbour greater diversity than they once did. This is 
indeed true, but not as instructive as is often thought. Liberal societies -  like any other -  
have long harboured diversity. They have long been populated by complex, multiply- 
embedded individuals who understand the world differently from one another. The 
difference is that liberal societies have become progressively more ‘liberal’ such that this 
latent diversity is now more obvious and public than ever before. With advances in women’s 
rights, gay rights, and rights for blacks, ethnic minorities, and different religious groups, 
liberal societies have become progressively more open to the diversity that has always existed 
within them and as such their very nature -  the way in which we understand and define 
these societies -  has become more open and affected by the previously silenced and 
marginalised voices of the excluded. As we saw in section 33.2 with regard to the 
liberalisation of the British homosexuality laws, and in chapter four with regard to the 
women’s movement and the campaign for equal rights for blacks, the struggle for greater 
equality among marginalised groups represents in large part a struggle by these groups to free 
themselves from ascriptive labels and constraints -  and the language that reifies and 
perpetuates these labels - and to articulate their needs and aspirations in a genuinely open and 
inclusive environment which respects their distinctive experiences and listens to their 
particular demands.
This is why liberalism is so committed to finding a common and inclusive politics, why it is 
(or should be) concerned about social unity, and it is why it must shun the strategy of 
selective elevation, of essentialism, and of holding group identities over and above the 
individuals who belong to them. What liberalism must do, and what it has always done, is
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create and perpetuate an environment conducive to all individuals working out for 
themselves -  in the light of their own unique experiences and motivations and 
understandings -  what memberships they find most valuable, which allegiances most define 
them, and how these self-understandings and self-definitions are challenged in the particular 
circumstances in which persons find themselves. This is the political environment or ‘liberal 
community’ that Dworkin seeks, and it is the kind of ‘nation’ sought by Mill, Kymlicka, and 
other liberal-nationalists. It is a political community in which different persons, with 
different ways of life, can live among one another under a history that truly reflects the 
complex, often ambiguous, sometimes problematic, development of their diverse polity. It is 
not a community which must be painted in the kind of conservative, nostalgic hues 
envisaged by the likes of Salin and Galston. It is an open society which -  rather than 
attempting to obscure or misrepresent its history in the name of national pride or civic 
loyalty - lays even its most cherished historical traditions and guiding principles open to the 
scrutiny of each and every individual who chooses to look. And consequently, it is a 
community governed by institutions which defend and encourage those virtues and 
capacities that all persons need if they are to interpret, debate, and engage meaningfully in 
these discussions. What liberalism seeks is the empowerment of the individual to understand 
clearly and truthfully the groups to which it belongs (even if the elites within these groups 
would prefer otherwise) and the obligations and commitments that these memberships 
confer. Hence, it seeks to encourage in all individuals the ability to understand clearly and 
truthfully their own ends and commitments and self-understandings, and to debate them 
openly and coherently with others (who may or may not share them) in an open and 
inclusive deliberative process which is carried out not only in what political liberals choose 
to call the ‘political sphere’, but in all other areas of their lives too.
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The allies that Kymlicka seeks from the history of the liberal tradition, therefore, are indeed 
united in their aim of establishing a liberal polity, governed by liberal institutions charged 
with the defence of individual autonomy and equality. But again, it is not clear how helpful 
it is -  in normative terms -  to call this society a ‘nation*. All those liberals to whom 
Kymlicka turns are clear about the ends of a liberal state, namely, that it should aim to 
provide all persons with the capacity to reflect meaningfully upon their ends and ideals, to 
interpret and question the groups to which they adhere, and to question (and hold to 
account) those institutions which govern them. Some choose to call this autonomy- 
supporting environment a ‘nation’, others a ‘community’, others still a ‘state’ or an ‘ethical 
community’ or a ‘societal culture’ or a ‘pervasive culture’; some non-liberals call it a 
‘democratic polity’ or a ‘public sphere’.43 But what ever they choose to call it, there cannot 
be said to be great disagreement about what its central aims and commitments should be. 
Once again, then, it must be said that, given this (and given also what we have said in 
previous chapters), it is not clear what the supposed debate surrounding nationality and 
culture adds to our understanding of how liberals should theorise normatively about politics 
and justice.
34. Culture, Social Unity, and the Limits of Toleration.
The argument for autonomy is not, of course, the only claim made in defence of the link 
between liberalism and nationalism. Two further -  apparently quite separate -  claims have 
been put forward in the literature. The first is that a developed national culture binds people 
together into a political community better than any other, non-nationalist form of loyalty, 
and that, therefore, it establishes much clearer and more substantive parameters for judging
43 For example, Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser, respectively. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion & 
Democracy, and Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy’, in B. Robbins (ed.) The Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis:
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what can and cannot be tolerated in a particular society. The second is that a shared national 
culture provides the criteria by which we can - and should -  set the boundaries of a political 
community itself. I will discuss the first argument in the remainder of this section before 
going on to discuss the second in section 35.
What, then, of this claim that a national culture encourages and perpetuates social unity? 
Different nationalist thinkers conceive the limits of toleration -  that is, the level of diversity 
that can be permitted in society without endangering national unity - differently. David 
Miller, for example, appears more sceptical than Kymlicka or Tamir about the compatibility 
of encouraging minority ways of life to flourish while at the same time defending a wider 
(and more important) national culture. “Radical multiculturalism [of the kind advocated by 
the likes of Young and Kymlicka],” he says, “wrongly celebrates sexual, ethnic, and other 
such identities” at the expense of national identities.44 In marginalising our national identity 
in this way, he says, ‘radical multiculturalists’ actually erode those bonds which hold the 
political community together.
There are two things to be said about this. The first is that, if indeed it is against Kymlicka 
and Young that Miller is arguing here, his argument fails on both counts. It fails against 
Kymlicka because the identity that Kymlicka wishes to exalt above all others is, as we have 
seen, precisely one’s national identity. And it fails against Young because, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, the account of agency and the self to which she subscribes is one in which 
no particular allegiance is elevated above any other. Young’s argument for relational 
autonomy could -  like mine -  fully accommodate the claim that one’s national identity may 
represent an aspect of one’s identity. What it rests upon is the notion that national identity 
may be felt as a defining aspect of identity by some people, and that for these people issues
University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
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regarding national sentiments and customs will loom large in their sense of self, but that they 
need not and, indeed, many will not consider their membership in a particular national 
group to be important at all. For Young, however, this is not something to be all that 
worried about. It will not necessarily undermine one’s autonomy or sense of self because 
persons draw their sense of self (and their capacity for autonomy) from various different 
groups at one and the same time. As Young rightly points out, “[ejveryone relates to a 
multiplicity of social groups . . . [and] every social group has other social groups cutting 
across it.”45 When examining groups and group memberships, that is, it is important to stress 
the significant effect that “individual modulation, multiple memberships, and degrees of 
identification” have upon the way in which members and non-members understand these 
groups and their relation to them.46 Young’s argument therefore highlights an important 
aspect of my own, namely, that we should be sceptical of essentialist definitions of groups 
because no outsider -  be it Miller or anyone else -  is in a better position to know what 
aspects of a person’s identity are most important to him than that individual himself, and 
that it is possible for a person to be an autonomous agent without feeling any thick national 
sentiments at all (or, at least, no attachment which could not be described just as accurately 
in terms of a non-nationalist ‘civic’ loyalty or ‘citizenship).
The second point to be made about Miller’s argument here is that, again, it is not clear how 
invoking the term ‘nation’ renders our deliberations about toleration any clearer than 
conventional, non-nationalist liberal theorising. In expressing his fears about the effect that 
‘radical multiculturalism’ will have upon national sentiments, Miller is simply voicing very 
familiar worries about the capacity of the wider community to accommodate diverse claims 
and ways of life. Miller’s worry is that multiculturalism -  understood as the politicisation of
44 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 135.
45 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 88.
46 Ibid. p. 253.
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sub-national identities -  undermines the stability and the legitimacy of those institutions and 
practices in which the national culture is embodied. Radicalised political movements rooted 
in sub-national identities threaten the ‘national culture* by casting into doubt the common 
values or shared understandings which afford legitimacy to the state. For Raz, too, the fear is 
that “[w]ithout a deep feeling of solidarity, a political society will disintegrate into 
quarrelling factions.”47
But this is as much a worry for non-nationalist liberals as it is for nationalists. Indeed, one of 
the most widespread criticisms of multiculturalist policies are that they lead to the 
‘tribalisation’ or the ‘balkanisation’ of society, whereby society is split into a series of 
culturally specific enclaves more concerned with their own ‘difference’ than their 
membership of a common, unified community.48 It is not clear how the response to this 
concern provided by Miller’s watered-down nationalism would differ from the kind of 
response advanced by a liberal who was concerned that the ‘affirmation’ or ‘recognition’ of 
group memberships might lead to the breakdown of those sentiments of reciprocity and 
common citizenship that sustain liberal principles of equality and autonomy.
Indeed, it is not clear how the appeal to a common national identity would necessarily bring 
about the kind of social unity that Miller supports. As Iris Marion Young points out, the 
“position that obligations of justice are limited to co-nationals is often taken to legitimise 
rejection of redistributive policies perceived to benefit groups with whom many citizens do 
not identify. White Anglo-Americans,” for example, “appear increasingly reluctant to 
support redistributive policies, partly because many of them erroneously believe that these
47 Joseph Raz & Avishai Margalit, ‘National Self-Government’, p. 187.
48 See Nathan Glazer, Ethnic Dilemmas 1964-1982 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 1983). 
For an alternative argument -  which claims that social disunity is not the problem that many liberals 
believe it to be -  see Chandran Kukathas, ‘Cultural Toleration’. Kukathas’ argument is discussed in 
detail in part two of this thesis.
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policies primarily benefit African-Americans and Latinos, with whom they feel few ties of a 
common culture and shared history.”49 Miller would no doubt argue that this simply 
illustrates the need for stronger national sentiments than currently exist in the US, and the 
need for greater integration on the part of the Latinos and African-Americans. Quite apart 
from asking how this might be achieved, we are forced to ask exactly what it is that these 
different groups are being ‘integrated* into. Again, it is certainly not a deep ethnic identity. 
But even if it was, it is by no means clear that such a national identity would promote or 
encourage social unity. After all, as Michael Ignatieff has argued, the “fact, for example, that 
two Serbs share Serbian ethnic identity may unite them against Croats, but it will do 
nothing to stop them fighting each other over jobs, spouses, scarce resources, and so on. 
Common ethnicity, by itself, does not create social cohesion or community, and when it 
fails to do so, as it must, nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled towards maintaining 
unity by force rather than consent.”50
The national identity for which Miller and other liberal-nationalists argue, however, is one 
rooted in one’s allegiance to a set of principles and ideas which encourage unity by 
addressing precisely these more limited sources of conflict to which Ignatieff points. It is, as 
we have said, a nationalism which is able to be expressed and worked out through fairly 
derived and publicly justifiable liberal institutions. Citizens are therefore required to be loyal 
to those liberal principles which allow them to resolve political conflicts fairly, and which
49 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 243. It is not clear exactly how many of the 
problems that arise between African Americans, Latinos, and many Anglo-Americans in the US 
actually stem from a ‘lack of shared culture and history’. As Kwame Anthony Appiah states,
it is not black culture that the racist disdains, but blacks. There is no conflict of visions 
between black and white cultures that is the source of racial discord. No amount of knowledge 
of the architectural achievements of the Nubia or Kush guarantees respect for African- 
Americans. No African-American is entitled to more respect because he is descended from a 
people who created jazz or produced Toni Morrison. Culture is not the problem, and it is not 
the solution. (K. Anthony Appiah, ‘Multicultural Misunderstanding’, New York Review o f  
Books 44, 9 October 1997, p. 36.)
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underpin and perpetuate the virtues of reciprocity and trust necessary for stability and social 
cohesion in a liberal state. The ‘nation’ is, in the words of Yael Tamir, a “communal 
framework [of free and autonomous individuals] who conceive of national membership . . . 
as a daily plebiscite.”51 Such a civic nationalism, rooted in a loyalty to and a support for 
political principles as opposed to blood ties or race, therefore creates the appropriate 
conditions for the survival of state institutions, and the forms of public dialogue and 
deliberation which justify and sustain them, while avoiding the kind of inequalities and 
exclusions implied by appeals to deep ethnicity.
Critics may claim here that I have rendered Miller’s nationalism too empty of content, and 
that Miller is in fact committed to a much thicker, more ethnicised nationalism than I have 
thus far suggested. The problem with this view lies again in this inability of ethnic 
nationalism to provide, in and of itself, a coherent response to conflicts arising from 
differences among co-nationals. Miller requires all persons, regardless of their particular 
ethnic identities, to resolve political conflicts in a way that is congruent with liberal 
principles of fairness, civility, and reasonableness. He is therefore committed to encouraging 
in all persons those virtues which allow this to happen; without these virtues, the social 
unity that Miller seeks (like the liberal institutions he invokes to protect and defend it) is left 
hopelessly unstable and fragile.
And this is important, too, because, as we have already suggested, Miller does not merely 
envisage a nation unified by a shared sense of identity and belonging, rather he defends a 
nation of autonomous and equal individuals who are capable of reflecting meaningfully upon 
their ends and engaging in public reasoning about the content of the institutions that govern
50 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (London: Vintage 
Books, 1994), p. 5.
51 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 33.
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them. If Miller does indeed defend an ethnic nationalism, he certainly does not believe that 
this ethnicity necessarily determines the structure of political institutions. Miller’s 
institutions are liberal in the sense that they must gain the genuine consent of the governed, 
on the basis of formal equality. But, as we have already argued, the ability to reason publicly 
about justice and politics in this way presupposes certain virtues and capacities and self- 
understandings among those who are to be involved.
Miller’s argument for nationalism is therefore subject to the same inconsistencies as Rawls’ 
argument for political liberalism. If he defends liberal institutions and argues that these 
institutions should be justifiable to all individuals through some form of public deliberation 
and debate, as he does, then he must also defend those virtues and conditions in the wider 
‘background culture of daily fife’ which this public reasoning requires. The claim that it is 
possible to have a thickly ethnic national culture at the same time as liberal institutions and 
dialogue is only coherent if the ethnic identity to which the ‘nation’ appeals is congruent 
with, and incorporates, the liberal principles of individual autonomy and equality. And this 
would appear to be precisely the kind of ‘ethnic’ identity that Miller defends. Consider his 
claims about individual identity, for example, and how they fit with what we have claimed 
thus far. Again, we find the claim that we belong to many groups and associations at once. 
As Miller himself states, one may be born into a particular community or group but 
discovering as much still leaves a great deal of my identity undetermined. Discovering that 
one was born a Jew, for example, leaves a great deal for one to work out for oneself, such as 
“whether to be practising or non-practising; if practising, whether to be orthodox or liberal, 
etc., in general, how much importance to attach to one’s Jewishness, whether to make it a 
central feature of one’s identity, or only a minor aspect.”52 Consequently, then, for Miller 
like so many others, agency is both a ‘cognitivist’ and a ‘voluntarist’ process; a process both
52 David Miller, On Nationality, p. 43-44.
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of discovering the attachments and roles into which one was born, and of working out for 
oneself what these attachments and roles mean, what they imply, and how they fit together 
to make one the person one is.53 Miller argues, therefore, that persons should be allowed to 
work out for themselves which of their various memberships and attachments are most 
important to them, how they overlap and affect one another, and how they fit together. And 
this, Miller argues, is as true of the national community to which one belongs as any other. 
We should be free, he says, to balance “competing demands upon us” and establish “our own 
scale of priorities between [those] different values” which shape us including the importance 
of the nation.54 These decisions should be left to the individual alone, Miller says, and there is 
“no predetermined outcome of this process.”55 Consequently, the ‘nation’ that Miller defends 
must -  like that defended by Kymlicka, Tamir, Raz, and Margalit - be organised around 
principles which conceive this self-exploration and internal questioning of one’s values to be 
important and valuable.
But again, this simply appears to equate the ‘nation’ with a conventional liberal political 
community. After all, as we have already seen, liberals argue that all persons must be 
provided with a rich and varied set of options, coupled with the requisite self-confidence 
and self-knowledge to conceive these options as realistic and attainable, such that they 
might understand and explore the various commitments and obligations which constitute 
their identity. Consequently, liberalism demands that social, political, and legal institutions 
be structured in such a way as to encourage and allow individuals to develop their 
preferences and ideals in response to their own understanding of their various beliefs and 
commitments, and in response to the circumstances in which they find themselves. It is for 
this reason, of course, that liberals conceive such goods as education and welfare to be
53 See chapter six.
54 David Miller, On Nationality, p. 44-45.
55 Ibid. p. 44.
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accessible to all members of society as a matter of right which cannot be denied or 
undermined in the name of any particular, more ethically substantive, conception of the 
good. If Miller is indeed committed to providing all persons with the ability to ‘balance the 
competing demands upon them* in the light of their various commitments and ideals and 
interests, then he must be committed to putting in place all the various autonomy- 
supporting institutions and measures advocated by comprehensive liberals. And, similarly, 
if he is committed to individual autonomy in the way he suggests, then he is surely 
committed to establishing the limits of toleration at the same point as liberals like 
Kymlicka and Tamir, namely, at the point at which individual autonomy is jeopardised. If 
he is not, and if he believes that persons will be able to retain a thick, non-liberal ethnic 
identity in private while endorsing liberal principles in public, then his defence of liberal- 
nationalism is as incoherent and as unstable as political liberalism, for all the same reasons.
35. Wider Contexts of Choice? Culture, Nation, World.
35.1 Drawing Political Boundaries: Cultural National, or Internationalf
What, then, of the second argument for liberal-nationalism, namely, that nations provide 
the criteria by which we might determine the legitimate boundaries of the state? This claim 
embodies the “aspiration to have an independent and separate political community 
coincide with one and only one distinct people or nation. [It is a call] for an independent 
state for every nation and one nation for every state.”56 Therefore, any group which can 
show that it has a genuine claim to being a nation should be allowed to establish its own 
institutions, which protect and embody their particular national customs, history, and
56 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 254.
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language, and can claim “sovereign and exclusive control over a contiguous and bounded 
territory.”57
But what is the liberal justification for such a claim? What justification do liberal-culturalists 
offer in support of affording political authority to cultural groups in this way? Some, like 
Miller, offer what is basically a pragmatic argument not unlike that made on the basis of 
national unity. States, they argue, require a degree of social unity which is best encouraged 
in bounded, sovereign communities. But quite apart from what we have already said about 
this claim, there is no reason to believe that these bounded communities should be drawn 
along ‘national’ lines, as opposed to any other. Of course, it may make more intuitive sense 
to conceive political boundaries to be drawn on these terms as opposed to, say, one’s 
membership of a particular city or village or regional district. But we do not need to go far 
back in history to find a time in which the appropriate boundaries to a political authority 
were not thought to be provided by nations, but were indeed provided by smaller 
communities like cities and villages.58 And we need look no further than the UK to witness 
the increasing devolution of political authority to regions defined in both national and 
non-national terms.
There is, of course, a great deal of truth in the claim that institutions are best at providing 
public services and tracking the needs of citizens when the community over which they 
claim jurisdiction is of a manageable size. But there is nothing in this argument which 
shows that this community must be bound by a common national identity. The claim that 
Scotland and Wales, for example, should be afforded their own institutions and governing
57 Ibid.
58 See Quentin Skinner, Foundations o f Modem Political Thought (2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978) and Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modem Society: An Historical Argument (Oxford:
Polity Press, 1992); and Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem
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powers was as much based on the pragmatic argument (for the manageable and 
representative administration of local needs and interests) as it was on a claim for national 
self-determination. And we can see that now, the same argument is being used increasingly 
to justify the establishment of regional assemblies and elected mayors in England (London 
and Birmingham being two examples). But this only goes to show that the pragmatic 
argument for the establishment of nation states (i.e. that national communities provide the 
size and unity necessary to sustain redistributive principles and the welfare state) is not 
necessarily an argument for nations at all. It is merely an argument for the establishment of 
political communities which are manageable, stable, and able to track the needs of their 
members effectively. The drawing of political boundaries along national lines need not be 
ruled out entirely (that is, to put it in philosophical terms, the appeal to a national culture 
need not be ruled out of our public reasoning as a priori unreasonable) but it should not be 
considered in itself more important or persuasive than an appeal to any other form of 
attachment or allegiance, and hence the validity of such an appeal should be weighed and 
considered in the course of our public reasoning about justice in the same way as any 
other. And, as we suggested in the previous chapter, it is precisely the fact that one does 
not draw one’s self-identity or understanding of the world from a single source, but rather 
from many different sources, that one is able to debate, interpret, and argue about one’s 
national membership meaningfully with others.59
For the defence of liberal nations to stand up, then, liberal nationalists must go further 
than offering merely a pragmatic argument: they must offer a genuine reason as to why 
nations, as opposed to any other kind of community, are the best and most appropriate 
means of drawing national boundaries. They must offer a compelling justification for the 
normative importance of nations. So what do they suggest?
Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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Once again, it is the claim that culture -  and national culture most explicitly -  is a 
necessary, structural pre-condition of individual autonomy. When reflecting upon the 
worth or validity of particular practices, customs, or ways of life, they argue, we do so by 
consulting the understandings and commitments afforded to us by our culture (i.e. our 
national culture). But what this claim ignores is, as we have already argued in the previous 
chapter, that when called upon to decide how to act or what to do in response to the 
circumstances which face us, or when called upon to decide what is ‘right’ or valuable or 
worthwhile in a particular situation, we will often be required to weigh the value of our 
‘cultural membership’ against many other commitments which claim us at any one time 
(not least, against claims made of us by the wider moral framework in which we find 
ourselves, and by our role as a citizen within a social and political environment which 
surrounds and circumscribes our more particular allegiances). That is, our membership of a 
particular cultural or religious group might be important to us, but in many circumstances 
it will represent merely one attachment among many others which affect and constitute 
our view of the world, and as such it must be understood and compared and interpreted in 
the light of these other attachments. A man who is forced to decide whether to fight in a 
war for the good of his ‘nation’, or to stay at home to look after his sick child, for example, 
is confronted with a decision which cannot simply be resolved by consulting the values 
embodied in the nation to which he belongs. In such a circumstance, his national identity 
conflicts with certain other roles (as a father, as a husband, as a Christian) which he may 
well hold to be as important, if not more important, to him than his membership of a 
particular nation. And this will hold true in countless other, less dramatic circumstances 
too -  where the dilemmas involved are not matters of life or death, or great life-altering
59 See chapters four and six.
300
moments, but simple choices in which the appeal to particular ‘national’ identity does not 
hold the answer, but in fact represents part of the problem.
This is not to say that these comparisons and interpretations must be conducted asocially 
(as a number of writers have alleged); rather, it simply means that our ‘cultural 
membership’ will often represent a single value (or cluster of values) in a much wider 
‘context of choice’ which incorporates many other considerations and perspectives which 
will shape, and which must be included within, our deliberations about our various ends. If 
I am truly ‘autonomous’ in the way that liberals require, that is, I must be able to reject the 
demands made of me by my national membership if I conceive other demands more 
important or urgent or persuasive.
Culturalists, however, would no doubt object on the grounds that it is impossible to 
conceive ‘cultural membership’ in such a way because our membership of a particular 
culture represents not merely our commitment to a single value among others in the way 
we have suggested, but rather a kind of ‘meta-value’ which binds our diverse experiences 
together and which provides the background against which our more particular roles and 
commitments are rendered intelligible. Indeed, this is precisely the way in which the 
majority of culturalists justify the elevation of culture as the most important of all personal 
attachments, and precisely explains why culturalists equate ‘culture’ not primarily with 
sub-national groups (in the way that Young does, for example), but with a substantive, 
diverse national or societal culture. Our experience of the world, they claim, is mediated 
through eyes that have been shaped and enlivened by the shared beliefs of the cultural 
group in which we are implicated; for most people, that is, “membership in their cultural 
group is a major determinant of their sense of who they are; it provides a strong focus of
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identification”60 and represents a conglomeration “of interlocking practices which 
constitute the range of options” open to them.61 By listening to stories and histories “from 
childhood on, we become aware both that we are already participants in a certain form of 
life . . .  and that there are other ways of life which offer alternative models and roles which 
we may in time come to endorse”62 by consulting the ‘cultural structure’63 or ‘pervasive 
culture’64 or ‘cultural environment’65 in which we are embedded.
But if the agent really is embedded in a multiplicity of roles in the way we have thus far 
suggested, then our own personal understanding of this ‘cultural structure’ -  its boundaries, 
its nature, and the values and practices and ideals which compose it -  will, like our 
understanding of the world in which it is located, be conceived from the combined 
perspective of all those other aspects of our lives which converge to form our identities. 
Consequently, the understanding that one person has of their (or any other) particular 
culture will not be (or, at least need not be) the same as anyone else’s. And this is as true of 
one’s national culture as it is of those other, smaller, groups to which one belongs. If what 
we have argued thus far in this and the previous chapter is coherent, then cultures and 
groups -  including national groups - are genuinely ‘imagined communities’ in the sense 
that their content and shape are determined by the individual according to their more 
general understanding of themselves, their roles, and obligations.66 The specific conjoining 
of our various ideals and memberships and obligations forms our own view of the world 
and thus it embodies the lens through which we come to understand the world as a whole, 
including the nature and content of the cultural or religious or ethnic or national group to 
which we belong, and hence, the boundaries of this national group are -  like those of any
60 Joseph. Raz, ‘Multiculturalism’, p. 178.
61 Ibid. p. 177.
62 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 165.
63 Ibid.
64 Joseph Raz & Avishai Margalit, ‘National Self-Determination’.
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other group -  open to discussion, debate, and interpretation by those who conceive 
themselves as belonging to it (and by those who do not).
National and sub-national groups are not internally homogeneous precisely because their 
members understand themselves (and their membership of the group in question) in the 
light of many other affiliations and roles and commitments which shape them and which 
set them apart from everyone else (as substantively separate individuals). Because individual 
identity (and the understanding one has of oneself) is not rooted in a single membership or 
affiliation but rather in the way that affiliation fits with all the others which shape one’s 
view of the world at any one time, it is inevitable that the ‘core values’ or ‘shared ideals’ 
embodied in the cultural, religious, or ethnic group to which an individual belongs will (or, 
at least, may) be interpreted and understood differently by each member of that group. As 
Miller points out, “social mobility, cultural mixing, and intermarriage mean that for 
increasing numbers of people, their self-ascribed ethnicity depends on choosing which of 
several possible lines of descent to highlight.”67 Within a religious community, for instance, 
different individuals will interpret the depth and significance of their beliefs in subtly 
different ways to those around them as a result of the way in which they understand the 
other commitments which claim them (and the way their religious beliefs fit with these 
other claims). They will cherish different aspects of their faith; they will possess different 
reasons for believing, or worshipping; they may disagree over the way in which worship 
itself should be conducted, or whether or not certain aspects of the prevailing orthodoxy 
should be changed or reformed. And within a national group, different persons will 
conceive the nature of their membership, and the boundaries and limits and content of the 
nation differently, depending upon how their national identity fits within their wider self­
65 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism.
66 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991).
67 David Miller, ‘Identities and Democratic Politics’, in S. Mendus & J. Horton (eds.) Toleration,
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understanding, and depending upon their own unique circumstances and experiences. They 
may emphasise different aspects of the ‘national culture’ as more significant than others, 
they may disagree entirely with others about which values define the nation, and the way 
in which its history should be understood and interpreted. They may prioritise their 
national membership very highly or not at all. They may even refuse to acknowledge that 
such a thing as ‘their nation’ exists.
Within every community (religious, national, or otherwise) there will exist a diversity of 
individuals who may or may not share common goals (and acknowledge the importance of 
certain shared practices or customs) but who may, nevertheless, interpret these goals and 
practices differently in the light of the often powerful and contradictory claims made of 
them by their other memberships and obligations. The same is true of the way in which 
individuals understand the meanings and implications of the particular gender, racial, 
sexual, and national groups to which they belong. What it means to me to be ‘a man’, ‘a 
lesbian*, or ‘black’ will depend upon the context in which I learn what these labels mean 
for me and what implications and connotations they import. And the context in which I 
come to understand these labels -  the set of motivations and preferences and ideals which 
together constitute my starting point for meaningful decision and reflection -  will not be, 
or at least need not be, the same as anyone else’s, either from another ‘culture’ or within 
my own.
Consequently, diversity is an individualist phenomenon. It manifests itself at the level of 
groups in the sense that persons cohere around labels and common systems of value. We 
say things like 'I am a Sikh', or 'I am a Christian', or 'I am a member of a bowling team', 
and in doing so we acknowledge our general acceptance of a particular set of 'shared'
Identity, and Difference (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), p, 103-125, p. 111.
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practices. But more philosophically engaging -  and more politically and normatively 
significant - is the diversity that exists within these groups as a consequence of the way in 
which these values or attachments fit with the overall set of commitments and ideals and 
obligations which constitute the individual's view of the world in its entirety.
When I appeal to ‘my culture’, I appeal to that understanding of it that I myself have 
derived in the light of all my more specific interests and aspirations and affiliations, which, 
as we argued earlier, is precisely why justification cannot end with a brute appeal to 
culture. There is no definitive or concrete definition or conception of the culture that is 
being appealed to, only that individual’s own interpretation of what that culture is (and 
what it stands for). Hence, there is always a need among members and non-members to 
work out exactly what a culture or group represents, and what its core values and claims 
are, and consequently the need for institutions to encourage the conditions appropriate for 
such deliberations and interpretations at all the various levels of one’s life and in all the 
various locations in which they might take place.
Consequently, the wider society invades the cultural sphere by first invading the 
individuals who compose it, and vice versa. As we saw in part one, individuals bring their 
(own interpretation of their) culture to the wider society through the practices in which 
they engage, the shared values they espouse, and the various forms of dress they wear. 
They also bring their ‘cultural’ groups into political discourses via the arguments and 
discussions that they have, and the agreements that they are willing to enter into, based on 
these memberships. Consequently, society is compelled to reflect anew upon those values 
and principles which constitute and regulate it in order that it can respond to these new 
values and concerns. It is forced to reflect anew on the nature and limits of toleration, for 
example, and the extent to which persons should be exempted from particular laws on the
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basis of their cultural or religious beliefs; or whether or not particular laws should be 
abolished or rejected entirely on account of their offensiveness to certain ideals or ways of 
life. And this is an ongoing process, as the membership of the polity changes as a result of 
migration, immigration, and the movement of persons around the world. Society must be 
prepared to re-examine its most fundamental commitments in the context of these changes 
and developments, and to question whether or not the institutions designed to deliver on 
these commitments are capable of doing so. But at the same time, and just as importantly, 
persons bring the wider society (in all its richness and complexity and diversity) into their 
culture as a consequence of learning about other ways of life to their own, and through 
their daily experience of meeting and living and working among persons who understand 
themselves and the world differently.
35.2 International Contexts and the Ambiguity o f Borders: Where Does M y Culture
End?
In many ways, of course, this account might be described as ‘postmodernist’, given that it 
emphasises and acknowledges diversity at all levels of society and human experience in a 
way that makes the drawing of boundaries between groups at best confusing and complex 
and, at worst, merely arbitrary. Borders cannot be ‘drawn’ by outsiders, it suggests; they 
can only be negotiated through a process of inclusive dialogue and interaction between 
individuals who each bring their own individual interpretations and understandings to the 
debate. As a consequence, borders between different cultures, communities, nations, and 
groups shift and become permeable and ambiguous. They exist in the sense that persons 
hold them to exist and so we can, at least at some level, speak meaningfully of ‘group 
membership’, but they often exist in different places for different people. From a 
philosophical point of view, then, “cultures are not internally homogeneous. They are 
continuously contested, imagined, and re-imagined, transformed and negotiated, both by 
their members and through their interaction with others. The identity, and so the
meaning, of any culture is aspectival rather than essential. . .  cultural identity changes as it 
is approached from different paths and a variety of aspects come into view. Cultural 
diversity is a tangled labyrinth of intertwining cultural differences and similarities, not a 
panopticon of fixed, independent, and incommensurable world views . . .  As a consequence 
. . .  the experience of cultural difference is internal to a culture.”68
Whether or not this view is postmodern, however, it does illustrate a fundamental problem 
at the heart of liberal-culturalism. It shows that the appeal to nation or culture represents 
an appeal to a shifting, evolving, and ambiguous association which is defined by the various 
multiply-embedded and complex individuals who conceive themselves to be members of it, 
in relation with those who do not. What we have argued thus far is that persons are 
multiply-embedded and shaped by a diversity of commitments and allegiances, and that, 
therefore, the lens through which they understand the world and which frames their 
deliberations about their own ends and the content of justice cannot be assumed to be the 
same as anyone else’s. To understand persons in this way is “not to deny the role of culture 
in the constitution of human life” but to join cosmopolitan liberals in questioning “first, 
the assumption that the social world divides up neatly into particular distinct cultures, one 
to every community,” which can be ‘protected’ and which are internally homogeneous, 
“and secondly, the assumption that what everybody needs is just one of these entities - a 
single, coherent culture - to give shape and meaning to its life.”69 Persons come to 
understand their beliefs and attachments in the context of the specific circumstances in 
which they find themselves. Being a ‘Christian’ or a ‘Sikh’ or a ‘Muslim’ means different
68 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age o f Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 11.
69 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures: A Cosmopolitan Alternative’, Will Kymlicka 
(ed.) The Rights o f Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 105. See also 
Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is Cosmopolitan?’, Journal o f Political Philosophy 8 (2000), p. 227 -  243; 
and Martha Nussbaum, For Love Of Country: Debating the Limits o f Patriotism (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1996).
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tilings to different people depending upon their own personal circumstances and their own 
ideas about the way in which their beliefs can be reconciled with other important aspects 
of who they are (their sexuality, for example, or their or their opinions on gender 
inequality inside and outside the church, or their commitment to the Sabbath, and so on), 
and as they move, as they emigrate, as they form new opinions and confront new 
circumstances, their grasp of their own beliefs (their sense of ‘who they are’) will change.
The fact that persons do sometimes conceive themselves to be shaped by particular groups 
makes the accommodation of these groups an acute and pressing issue for political theory 
and practice (as we saw in part one). But the fact also that the nature and content of these 
groups will be determined and interpreted by those individual members who belong to 
them means that our normative theorising must be focused upon the needs and freedoms of 
individuals over and above those groups to which they belong.
This is why liberalism is -  and should be -  committed to a programme of individml rights 
over group rights. The only kinds of groups acceptable to liberalism -  and hence, the only 
kind of groups which can be tolerated by liberal institutions -  are those which allow their 
individml members to make sense of the world for themselves, and to pursue those ends 
that they themselves believe to be worthwhile, without arbitrary restraint. As Yael Tamir 
argues, the “fate of a culture, a language, or a religion ought to be determined by its 
members. For that purpose one must grant . . . rights to individuals rather than the 
community as a whole.”70
No authority or elite can assume to know which of a person’s particular allegiances are 
most important to him, or which membership figures most prominently in his
70 Yael Tamir, ‘Siding with the Underdogs’, in Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?, p. 47-52, pp. 51.
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understanding of the world. Consequently, any set of institutions or regulative principles 
which seek to enshrine the ability of all persons to act freely, and to pursue ends that they 
themselves have endorsed as worthwhile, must acknowledge and protect the ability of 
individuals to interpret and understand their own allegiances (and hence, their own ideals 
and ends) for themselves, in the light of those other commitments which shape them. True, 
every person needs a ‘context of choice’ (some set of values, some framework of meanings 
and ideas which constitute their understanding of the world) from which to select the life 
they believe to be worthwhile and also the requisite political freedoms which allow them 
to pursue these ends once they have ‘selected’ them. But it does not follow from this that 
our understanding of the world will be wholly defined by a single “cultural framework in 
which each available option is assigned a meaning. . .  [M]eaningful options may come to us 
as fragments from a variety of sources” both within our own ‘nation’ or ‘culture’ and 
beyond it, in different nations, contexts, and places.71 Persons will indeed be constituted by 
‘cultural materials’, and they may well conceive their ends and projects to be affected by 
the values embodied in the ‘cultural’ community in which they are implicated, but it is a 
mistake to claim that they must do so, or that they must conceive their culture as the most 
significant of their various memberships, or that this ‘cultural’ community will present 
itself in the same way to all its members. Given this, and given the extent of diversity in 
contemporary liberal societies arising from migrations and movements of peoples 
throughout the world, borders between 'nations', as much as between other 'groups' or 
'cultures' will be ambiguous and subject to change and reinterpretation.
71 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rights of Minority Cultures: A Cosmopolitan Alternative’, p. 103.
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36. Conclusion.
If what we have argued thus far in this and the previous chapter is coherent, then, the claim 
that liberalism is structurally committed to defending particular ‘cultures’ or ‘nations’ is a 
good deal less convincing -  or, at least, a good deal less instructive -  than the liberal- 
culturalists and the liberal-nationalists would have us believe. We have not sought to deny 
the importance of social, political, and group-based attachments to people’s lives. We have 
claimed throughout this thesis that persons require a ‘context of choice’ in which to work 
out their particular aims and commitments, and that one cannot deliberate or reflect on 
particular ends or ways of life, or to reason meaningfully about justice and politics, in a 
vacuum. One can only do so from within the context of all those various allegiances and 
attachments which together make one the person one is.
What we have called for, then, is greater clarity among liberal-nationalists and liberal- 
culturalists about what a culture is, and hence, exactly what kind of ‘context’ we need in 
order to be autonomous in the way liberals demand. If culture is understood in a narrow 
sense (that is, as representing a largely homogeneous set of beliefs or ideals located around a 
particular shared religious or ethnic identity, embodied and perpetuated in certain 
traditional customs) then the culturalist argument for the ontological and normative 
significance of culture is simply mistaken. Persons do not merely act and understand their 
lives within a ‘context of choice’ defined by such a group because this group will itself be 
internally diverse and rooted within a much wider political community, the borders of 
which are changeable, ambiguous and permeable. Individual persons hold their own ideas 
about what their ‘culture’ embodies, what it means to them, and how it constrains other 
(perhaps important, perhaps trivial) aspects of their lives, and these ideas are drawn from 
their experiences with other peoples and other groups which exist around them.
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If, however, culture is viewed more widely, namely, as that over-arching structure of values 
and ideals which, in Kymlicka’s words, “provides its members with meaningful ways of life 
across a full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, 
and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres . . . [which] tend to be 
territorially concentrated and based on a shared language . . .  [and] institutionally embodied 
in schools, media, economy, government, etc.” then it would appear to offer little or 
nothing to existing debates about justice and freedom.72 As soon as we conceive culture as 
not so much a homogeneous group or community (which can be isolated within the 
political community as a whole), but as embodied in the wider, diverse, liberal social and 
political environment described in the previous chapter, then it becomes unclear as to the 
way in which ‘culture’ should affect our deliberations about justice in liberal states, or 
about the way in which we should conceive the liberal commitment to freedom and 
autonomy.
Liberal-nationalists and liberal culturalists converge with conventional ‘non-culturalist’ 
liberals (and many of those non-liberals that we have thus far discussed) in defending 
individual autonomy. We have seen as much in the work of Miller, Tamir, Margalit, Raz, 
Kymlicka, and Mill, just as we have seen it in those ‘non-nationalist’ liberals who 
nevertheless argue for free choice and publicly justifiable institutions. Kymlicka, Tamir, 
Miller, Raz, and Margalit, believe that “the world is a world of nation-states, and it is one 
in which liberalism prevails to the extent that those states represent and protect [liberal 
principles of] individual autonomy, sustaining a ‘societal culture’ of equal individuals.”73 
Hence, for all their claims to the contrary, their ‘culturalist’ liberalism is necessarily as
72 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 76.
73 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship’, 
Journal o f Political Philosophy 5 (1994), p. 406 -  427, p. 426.
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inhospitable to ‘deep cultural diversity’ as all those non-nationalist accounts that we have 
discussed throughout this thesis. Furthermore, it is no more able to accommodate or 
tolerate cultural diversity than its non-nationalist, impartialist variants. After all, if 
“cultural communities are to be regarded as having the same basis as the state -  as 
[Kymlicka] repeatedly suggests -  then they must in the end be, or be made into, liberal 
communities. If a liberal describes a nation state governed by principles of liberal justice, 
then the liberal state cannot condone practices or cultures which run contrary to these 
principles.”74 Miller, Tamir, Kymlicka, liberal-nationalists and non-nationalist liberals are 
therefore necessarily united in their claim that toleration must be limited and 
circumscribed by the prior commitment to individual autonomy.
Consequently, our rejection of liberal-culturalism is two pronged. Firstly, it seeks to 
undermine the claim that persons must be understood as defined primarily by their 
membership in a particular cultural group, although it does acknowledge that certain 
persons will conceive themselves in such a way. However, the second (and crucial) claim 
embodied in our account is that those who do appeal to culture in this way will not in fact 
be appealing to a reified, static, or homogeneous set of values or traditions, but to an 
‘imagined community’ which is defined differently in the eyes of each of those who 
compose it, and which is itself shaped and affected by the wider social and political context 
in which it is implicated. The nature and content of cultural groups, and the structure of 
the values embodied in these groups, alter as individuals confront new experiences and 
encounter new and challenging ways of understanding the world. They are challenged by 
developments in science, in the way persons communicate with one another, and by 
changes in the economy. They change as persons emigrate and settle in new nations and 
cities, and as they confront the values and the assumptions implicit in the social and
74 Ibid.
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political structure which surrounds them. What persons need is the ability to adapt and to 
interpret for themselves their ends and motivations in response to these developments, not 
to be protected or insulated from them.
The account we have thus far presented therefore endorses liberal institutions which 
encourage individuals to understand the world on their own terms and to pursue ends and 
values that they themselves have endorsed as worthwhile in the light of all their various 
memberships and commitments. It protects and encourages the ability of persons to come 
to their own conclusions about their ends and ideals, and about the relative significance of 
their cultural values, rather than protecting the particular cultural groups to which they 
belong. Liberalism therefore protects and encourages a diverse, inclusive, and open society 
in which different and complex individuals can work out for themselves what they believe 
and what they wish to pursue. If certain liberals wish to call this society a ‘culture’ then so 
be it. But doing so adds nothing to the debate concerning liberalism and freedom. The only 
way in which the use of the term ‘culture’ could possibly add anything new or challenging 
to the debate about toleration or diversity is if it was conceived as something smaller and 
more localised than society, and if it could be shown that individuals draw their identity 
and character from this sub-social group and nothing else. If they managed this, then the 
claim that we should protect the sub-social groups in the name of securing personal 
autonomy would be coherent. But persons do not draw their identity entirely from such 
groups, and in any case - following close examination - it becomes clear that culturalist 
liberals and liberal nationalists actually endorse the protection of a rich and diverse 
political community which allows people to access and interpret the various aspects of 
their lives for themselves. Consequently, the culturalists would appear to be either guilty of 
selectively and arbitrarily elevating particular memberships over others, or simply engaged 
in the very familiar liberal endeavour of creating a political community which foregrounds
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and protects individual autonomy and self-expression, and it is not at all clear why calling 
this community a ‘culture’ takes the debate into new or instructive territory.
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Conclusion
It has not been my aim in this thesis to offer a defence of liberal principles from the ground up. 
Rather, it has been to explore, clarify, and, where necessary, dissolve those disagreements among 
liberals about what liberalism should be committed to, and between liberals and certain of their 
critics about the implications of these commitments. I have tried, therefore, to make sense of 
those claims made by liberals and non-liberals regarding the role of culture and personal 
autonomy in normative theorising about justice and politics. In looking at the claims made by the 
most prominent theorists in this debate, I have attempted to clear up some of the confusion that 
exists among liberals and non-liberals regarding the toleration or accommodation or ‘recognition’ 
of cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity.
In the introduction to this thesis I suggested that debates in contemporary political theory are all 
too often conceived in terms of radical dichotomies that serve to mask the real issues at stake and 
hinder the resolution of complex moral and political problems. This is nowhere more visible than 
in the debate regarding how institutions and members of a polity should respond to cultural, 
religious, and ethnic diversity. It is manifest, for example, in the debate between ‘political’ and 
‘comprehensive’ liberals; between liberals who defend the encouragement and protection of 
diversity and those who defend the principle of personal autonomy; between those liberals who 
commit themselves to autonomy and those difference-theorists republicans, pluralists, and 
deliberative democrats who do not; and between those culturalist liberals who argue in favour of 
defending and protecting the integrity of cultural groups and those conventional or non- 
culturalist liberals who do not. Close analysis reveals these dichotomies to be unnecessary, over­
simplifying, and a hindrance to real and genuine debate about the way in which political 
institutions should respond to diversity.
Having hopefully cleared away much of the obfuscation and confusion characteristic of the 
multiculturalism debate, a clear and widely-shared normative project presents itself. This project
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is to ensure and perpetuate those conditions in which all individuals -  regardless of their wider 
commitments, memberships, and allegiances -  are able to interpret for themselves the legitimacy 
of those structures of political, cultural, and religious authority which govern them. For all those 
theorists that we have discussed in this thesis, the exercise of authority over an individual is 
rendered legitimate by that individual’s consent, either explicitly or tacitly (through their 
continued membership of the group in which this authority is claimed and exercised).
For example, all of the liberals discussed herein reject (in principle, at least) the idea that 
individuals should be compelled to live in oppressive conditions that they do not endorse, that 
they do not consent to, and which they cannot leave. None of the liberal theorists we have 
discussed thus far seek to condone the unconsensual oppression or ill-treatment of certain 
groups or individuals within particular cultural or religious communities (of the kind, for 
instance, that consequentialists might condone in the interests of achieving some higher, 
common good), just as they all support the idea that those forms of political authority under 
which they live should also be subject to their consent. Even those liberals that we discussed in 
chapters three and four who claim to support the existence of illiberal groups argue that such 
groups must provide their members with the capacity to leave if they so desire, and all argue that 
normative claims and proposals must be justifiable to each individual that is to be bound by 
them. And this notion of consent and justifiability applies not merely to political institutions of 
the state, but those social institutions of marriage and the family too. The reason for this (and 
despite what they may say to the contrary) is that they all conceive liberalism to be a doctrine 
which seeks to emancipate individuals from imposed authority and tradition.
The mistake these theorists make, however, is that they seek to protect the individual from 
imposed authority while stripping liberalism of the very principle which allows them to do so. 
And this, as we saw in chapter five, is a problem they share with non-liberals who seek a greater 
iccommodation or ‘inclusion’ of cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity. Those liberals who seek 
10 confine their commitment to individual autonomy to either the 'political' or the 'non-political'
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realm, or who reject it altogether, fail to acknowledge the inevitably comprehensive nature of 
these principles and the way in which these principles are inevitably embodied in the structure of 
liberal politics and dialogue. Liberalism, we have shown, is necessarily premised upon the idea 
that all persons should possess the ability to interpret, revise, and potentially reject their particular 
ends and to “defend their preferred understandings of the public interest or common good on 
the basis of moral or ethical reasons which are acceptable to all participants” rather than merely 
the blind assertion of certain truths or beliefs as necessarily worthy of toleration or immune from 
any form of questioning or debate.1 The normative requirement of reasonableness, that is - which 
we find in different forms in contractualist and discourse theories, as well as in theories of 
deliberative democracy, pluralism, republicanism, and the politics of difference -  requires that all 
persons must be capable of understanding their ends and projects from a standpoint which 
transcends their brute particularity. For our particular claims and arguments to be accepted by 
others who do not share our particular views about the good, they must be “aimed at what is 
common rather than what is particular to individual or group. W e.. .  [cannot] make appeals to 
divine authority or to controversial understandings of human nature as the ultimate ground of 
our claims on other citizens” because this merely pushes disagreement to a different, and more 
fundamental, level.2 For the purposes of deriving principles of justice and determining the shape 
and content of political institutions, then, contractualists, discourse theorists, deliberative 
democrats, republicans, and pluralists are all united in their requirement that persons voluntarily 
constrain their deliberations (and their pursuit of the good) in order that some resolution might 
be found to those concrete political and ethical questions which arise in circumstances of 
ethnocultural and religious diversity.
Consequently, if subjectivists are right in their claim that justification simply represents the 
articulation of ‘shared values’ or collective understandings within the ‘group’ to which one 
belongs (and that we cannot go further than this, even if we tried) then this represents not merely
1 Melissa S. Williams, ‘The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy’, 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies, W. Kymlicka & W. Norman, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), p. 124-152, p. 127.
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a critique of ‘liberal’ dialogue, but all forms of dialogue which aim at resolving questions of 
justice, or which seek to provide some set of principles capable of regulating the actions -  or 
defining the structure, or purposes, or duties -  of political institutions. However, once we 
acknowledge that all these theorists necessarily invoke an account of deliberation which is 
constrained by the principles of individuality, autonomy, and equality, and that these principles 
are inextricably interwoven into the structure of the contract or the discourse itself (and hence, 
the politics born out of it), then we can begin to see that the account of toleration that they 
would endorse is in fact more stringent than they claim.
Consequently, the ‘cultural defence’ cannot in and of itself represent a justification for our 
actions or claims because the appeal to culture can -  and must -  itselfbe subject to interpretation 
and scrutiny. The appeal to culture is indeed a reason (and, perhaps, an important reason) for the 
toleration of certain customs or traditions, but it is not the only reason, or a reason which is in 
itself able to trump any other. Persons should be able to articulate their own beliefs and values in 
dialogue with others, and they should be able to persuade others about the need to tolerate these 
beliefs and values, but in turn, these others can force them to explain themselves and they are 
entitled to offer alternative reasons as to why these values should not be tolerated in particular 
circumstances. Dialogue cannot end with the appeal to culture; if it did, then dialogue itself 
would come to an end and with it any chance of resolving those very real, very complex, very 
political questions which arise out of cultural diversity. If we are to have publicly justifiable 
institutions -  which is to say, institutions which are justifiable to each and every member of the 
public - rather than institutions which are held in place by intimidation or imposition, or which 
are thought to be only justifiable to a chosen few, then we need common and inclusive dialogue 
about what these institutions should look like, what they should do, and how they should do it. 
And for liberals -  as for deliberative democrats, agonists, and pluralists -  despite what they may 
say to the contrary, this requires that persons be understood as equal and autonomous 
individuals.
2 Ibid. p. 128.
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So individuality and autonomy are fundamental to liberal political theory, just as they are 
fundamental to many of those theories which seek to challenge liberalism. Only by adopting a 
‘reasonable’ standpoint with regard to their own ends and values and, hence, establishing a 
politics rooted not in the affirmation of ends but in the protection of those background freedoms 
and conditions which allow us to pursue our own ends freely and meaningfully, can we construct 
a stable politics in response to diversity. Through its commitment to reasonableness, liberalism 
leaves the truth of particular ways of life to individual conscience and hence privatises them, while 
enshrining in both public and private (and at all levels of one’s fife) the ability to make up one’s 
own mind (and therefore to exercise one’s freedom of conscience) about what they find valuable 
or worthwhile or admirable.
By progressively emptying liberalism of its commitment to autonomy, then, toleration-based 
liberals underm ine their own capacity to provide persons with the resources they need to escape 
imposed authority as surely as do those non-liberals who reject autonomy but seek to retain some 
notion of dialogue or agreement. Individuality and autonomy do not represent substantive 
‘conceptions of the good’ or ‘ends’ in themselves as they are so often thought to; rather, they 
represent those values which frame and circumscribe and facilitate our deliberations about value 
itself, at whatever level, and whichever context, is most appropriate.
Hence, liberalism -  like its various ‘alternatives’ -  must be committed to the normative project of 
providing all individuals with the freedom to reflect upon, question, and justify their particular 
ends and attachments. And, if what we have said in part three is coherent, then this does not 
require the defence or the protection or ‘affirmation’ of group identities. Liberalism should not 
be understood to be committed to ‘group rights’ or ‘community specific rights’ in the way that 
culturalist liberals like Kymlicka and Raz believe it to be. This is because their justification for the 
protection of cultural groups through the allocation of group-rights -  namely, that membership 
in a specific, individuated, and flourishing cultural group is a structural prerequisite of individual
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autonomy -  is false. Individuals will be shaped by many attachments and commitments, and their 
view of the world -  their understanding of themselves, their values, allegiances, and obligations -  
will come to them from many sources at once. Quite often, no single attachment or membership 
will provide the agent with a final and ultimate answer to what he or she should do in the 
circumstances at hand. Hence, while individuals will indeed understand their lives, the ends that 
they pursue, and practices in which they engage in a particular ‘context of choice’, it is not true to 
say that this context is necessarily provided by one’s cultural or national group alone, or by a 
particular allegiance above all others.
Persons may often draw the various aspects of their character from many sources at a local, 
national, and international level. They may identify with a cause or a movement in a country to 
which they have never been, and held by people they have never met. Groups and communities 
within and between particular societies do not exist independently of one another; their members 
will live among and beside members of other groups, and beside members of their own groups 
who understand this group (and the responsibilities of being a member) very differently to them. 
They will witness and internalise ideas and ways of life very different to their own. The opinions 
they form about these ways of life will not necessarily be tolerant or accommodating, of course, 
and the way in which persons understand their relationship to others (and to their ends and 
commitments and beliefs) will be dependent upon the virtues and attitudes which have been 
encouraged within them. National and international politics is becoming increasingly 
characterised by the widening of discourse among different groups and communities via 
developments in communication and the exchange of information. If we take the issue of 
globalisation even vaguely seriously, for example, we might want to point out that international 
communities are closer now (in terms of what they know about one another or, at least, what 
they can find out about one another) than ever before. With the expansion of technologies which 
facilitate communication and exchange among groups and nations separated by hundreds or 
thousands of miles, the claim that different groups, different cultures, stand in isolation from, or in
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mutual incomprehension of, one another, or that they define themselves independently of one 
another, has never been so tenuous.
But whether or not this is true at an international level (and it has not been my intention to 
discuss this here), it is more obviously true at the level of particular societies, especially Western 
liberal democratic societies which are characterised by a huge and complex diversity of ends and 
beliefs and what subjectivists would call ‘cultural groups’ or ‘whole ways of life’. Hence, as we 
saw in part three, what liberalism must encourage is an open and inclusive social and political 
environment which supports the ability of each and every individual to explore their own 
identities and interests for themselves and to determine for themselves what they value and what 
they do not against the background of their lives as a whole, in all their unique complexity. 
Cultural groups will be internally diverse and changeable because the persons who compose them 
will be internally diverse and changeable through their experience of living in a society (in a 
world) in which cultures co-exist, evolve, and define themselves in terms of the diverse contexts 
in which they are embedded, and the real decisions of those who live in and among them.
Our ability to live a life in pursuit of genuinely valued ends is not, therefore, structurally or 
necessarily dependent upon our membership in a particular cultural or national group, and hence, 
the claim that these groups should be protected via group rights or legal exemptions in the 
interests of defending the autonomy of their members collapses. Indeed, it may well be the case 
that one’s membership in a particular cultural group actually inhibits or thwarts one’s ability to lead 
an autonomous life. Liberals and non-liberals alike are united in denying ‘group rights’ to such 
communities. But, as we saw in chapters one and two, once we get clear exactly which practices a 
liberal state can permit and which it must reject as intolerable, then the idea of group rights simply 
becomes anathema. Given their wider commitment to the ideal of individual autonomy, liberals 
and non-liberals alike can only legitimately afford group rights to groups which already support 
and encourage individual rights. But what would such a group right look like, and how might it help 
to protect ways of life which are, in the end, already compatible with individual rights?
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This thesis has attempted to show that liberalism -  like any other form of politics which invokes 
an account of legitimacy rooted in public justification via some process of agreement or dialogue 
or public deliberation -  is, in the end, necessarily committed to individual autonomy, that the 
limits of liberal toleration are necessarily circumscribed and set by this prior commitment to 
individual autonomy, and that this commitment does not endorse the protection or recognition 
of cultural groups via the application of groups rights because membership in an individuated 
cultural group is not a precondition of individual autonomy in anything like the way culturalist 
liberals believe it to be. The exercise of one’s autonomy is dependent upon one’s ‘membership’ 
of a political community which supports their individual right to pursue ends that they 
themselves have decided are valuable in the light of all those commitments and allegiances and 
attachments which together make them who they are. The liberal account of autonomy does not, 
therefore, presuppose an atomised or unencumbered self, and neither does it presuppose a self 
inescapably trapped by its current commitments and attachments. It does not require persons to 
understand their most deeply-held values as contingent or unimportant, and it does not imply 
that they cannot understand their lives, their place in the world, and their actions to be bounded 
and animated by their religious or cultural beliefs. And it does not presuppose that every decision 
or choice will be made after a coldly rational process of deliberation and deep reflection. Rather, 
it merely represents the claim that one’s values should be open to question and that persons 
should be provided with the freedoms they need in order to make genuine decisions about what 
they believe, what kind of lives they wish to lead, and what roles they wish to occupy, given their 
wider ideas about the world. Autonomy does not destroy our capacity to understand ourselves as 
rooted in a particular history, or engaged in ends which to some extent ‘define’ who we are. 
Rather, it merely proposes that we should not understand ourselves as trapped by these ends, or 
the forms of political, cultural, or religious authority which confer them upon us to the extent 
that we cannot question them. Groups cannot seek to deny or thwart their members in 
deliberating meaningfully upon the validity and worth of their attachments and ends and
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practices by, for instance, denying them the requisite education or freedom or legal rights that 
they need to do so.
In deciding how to respond to the particular circumstances that face us, we consult a varied set 
of understandings and ideas drawn from all aspects of our lives including the particular ‘cultural* 
group to which we belong. Liberal institutions must establish and protect a stable and cohesive 
society, circumscribed by the principles of individual autonomy and equality, in which we might 
work out for ourselves what we believe to be valuable, and pursue lives based upon these values. 
Others may reject these beliefs, and might think that the ends to which I strive are false or 
pointless, laughable or tragic. They might think them worthless or even dominating. But they are 
only worthless or dominating if they are imposed from without. If choose to submit to a particular 
form of inequality, or if I choose to live a life in pursuit of ends that others find tragic or ridiculous, 
then there is nothing in liberalism which says that I must be persuaded otherwise.
A state which encourages to reflect upon our ends -  and hence, enables us to reflect upon the 
content of politics and justice more generally -  does not free us from the claims of our pasts, and 
neither does it emancipate us from the burdens of our choices. Political institutions must enable 
us to confront the world on our own terms, and not the terms dictated to us by arbitrary 
authorities. They must therefore, encourage those intellectual, psychological, political, and 
economic resources that we need in order to question not only those structures of political 
authority which govern us, but those structures of authority embodied in the religious, cultural, 
and ethnic groups to which we belong. But once I have made my decisions, the state should 
respect them and should not seek to undermine or deny them. The aim of liberalism is not, after 
all, to ban or rule our practices and ways of life out of a desire to correct people’s opinions or to 
dissuade people in their belief in certain gods or ways of living; rather it is to protect individuals 
from having to live lives that are imposed upon them by external and arbitrary authorities which 
deny their ability to question or escape these ways of life. Liberalism therefore embodies a regime 
of toleration that requires all groups to enable individuals to make genuine decisions about their
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lives and to pursue ends on the basis of these decisions within a wider framework of rules and 
constraints which are themselves justifiable to each and every individual to whom they apply.
And this, it must be said, is an aim necessarily shared by liberals, difference theorists, pluralists 
and deliberative democrats alike. Once we realise that one’s ability to deliberate about politics, 
justice, and the limits of toleration is dependent upon one’s ability to reflect upon, interpret, and 
justify one’s beliefs and actions on ‘reasonable’ terms -  and once we agree that all persons should 
be able to question the value of their current roles and memberships and reject them if they so 
desire (and that this applies to social, familial, and personal memberships as much as any other) - 
then we must acknowledge that all those theorists who invoke some notion of ‘public reason’ 
(and who argue that legitimate authority is derived from an appropriate process of deliberation, 
agreement, and justification) must necessarily invoke and defend the protection of personal 
autonomy in the policies and laws enacted by the state. And they must do so even if certain elites 
in certain groups argue otherwise in the name of their particular cultural or religious beliefs or 
ways of life.
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